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ABSTRACT 
One of the most dangerous, illusional and deceptive of Australian pre-World War 11 
beliefs was that the British represented a powerhouse of military protection against 
any foreign intimidation. In reality they impersonated a defence system without 
substance and an actual siphon of Australia’s military resources towards their own 
ends while offering only a potentially high-risk strategic alliance that helped bring 
Australia to the brink of disaster. As just one outcome on 18 January 1942, over two 
months after the Japanese air attack on the American naval base at Pearl Harbor, less 
than half a squadron of Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) Wirraway lightly armed 
training planes alighted from an airstrip at Rabaul on New Britain ostensibly to 
intercept a Japanese naval air armada of over one hundred modern military aircraft, 
the outcome of which was a national tragedy. The Australian-made and manned 
Wirraways were shot from the sky or crash-landed with the loss of most of their 
crews. The planes had been directed to be built and equip the RAAF as fighters by 
Australian politicians. 
Traditionally, the defence of Australia was based largely on British goodwill, an 
arrangement which itself was collectively called imperial defence involving all the 
nations of the Empire collaborating on military matters. But imperial defence was 
little more than a name. Britain emerged from the First World War drained of much 
of its military strength and deep in debt. From this standpoint, during the twenty year 
interval between the World Wars, the British implied that the dominions were 
responsible for their own national defence, a situation generations of Australian 
politicians were reluctant to accept.  
The RAAF was formed after World War I but its exact role was never precisely 
defined. There was no doctrine produced by the government or its advisers to allow a 
concrete plan to be followed and aircraft procured to implement that plan in times of 
war. Therefore an ad hoc air force grew in disarray that could neither defend the 
nation from air attack nor sink capital ships if they threatened national security.  
The advent of potent monoplane aircraft overthrowing biplanes in the mid to late 
1930s gave a new dimension to military warfare. For the poorly defended nation of 
Australia with its tiny population and large landmass, the warplane was a blessing 
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and a curse. The invention of modern interceptors and dive-bombers by the major 
powers meant that any country could be attacked at any time by carrier-borne planes 
but also that they could defend themselves from a major aggressor without the 
necessity of a large navy; a method of defence known by the Chinese as 
‘asymmetric’ employed successfully during the interwar years by several minor 
military powers.  
There were only two means of acquiring contemporary aircraft—build them locally 
or buy them combat-ready from a powerful ally with the infrastructure and 
technology to design and mass produce warplanes while administering a foreign 
policy of selling them to friendly nations. The Australian government decided on 
both courses despite having neither the inventiveness nor the aircraft industry to 
manufacture warplanes. It also lacked the expertise to select warplanes being made 
by major military powers needed for destroying capital ships and intercepting 
bombers under combat conditions.  
The failure of successive prime ministers (of which there were four) in the years 
immediately preceding World War II to understand the RAAF’s needs and equip it 
accordingly, particularly in the case of first-rate interceptors, appeared to amount to a 
national characteristic flaw. The result was a series of military and civilian disasters 
as well as the Rabaul fiasco including a mammoth Japanese air attack on Darwin of 
19 February 1942 and on Broome of 3 March 1942 in which hundreds of Allied 
personnel and foreign civilians perished because of Australia’s lack of an adequate 
aerial defence system.   
This thesis shows that such an end result was not inevitable. Australian industry had 
the capacity to manufacture warplanes but not the necessary infrastructure. The 
process of establishing an aircraft industry was too protracted to meet the 
deteriorating international crisis following the rise of Nazism in Germany and 
Japanese aggression in the 1930s. The government’s obligation to protect its people 
independent of Anglo-Australian relationships and fear of the strength of a powerful 
adversary to overwhelm its defences produced a form of self-induced inertia.  
During the time under review there were more than enough indications that local 
industry and British aviation companies on which the government was reliant for the 
iv 
supply of aircraft, would not reach the RAAF in time for the unfolding international 
crisis. Yet only at the last minute did the government switch to the purchase of 
military planes from America despite an aggressive pre-Pearl Harbor drive by US 
aircraft companies to supply allies with outstanding warplanes under the generous 
terms of Lend-Lease.  
The realities of a ‘fighterless’ air force had many repercussions apart from needless 
deaths, fear of uncontested invasion and loss of independence. The government had 
to rely on American charity for survival and the stationing of US air force fighter 
units in regions of Australia under air attack that should have been protected by the 
RAAF. Political independence was lost to American military command as was the 
control of Australian forces. This thesis uncovers the political decisions that 
promoted not only the largely useless decisions that led to an air defence collapse of 
1941–42 as soon as it came under fire but establishes clearly that the compilation of 
an air defence force that may have prevented the disasters this crisis created was 
always at hand.  
The fact that Australian air space was invaded for two years was an outcome of the 
decisions of politicians during the pre-war years and not the lack of prowess of 
RAAF aircrews. This thesis illustrates the air force the nation may have acquired if 
common sense, patriotism and knowledge of military aircraft had been pursued, 
learned and applied by the nation’s leaders and their advisers during the immediate 
pre-World War II years. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Introduction 
This thesis examines the political decisions and policy that led to the Royal 
Australian Air Force (RAAF) having no fighters for the coming war against Japan 
despite all the evidence that they were an essential ingredient of warfare. The 
political mismanagement of Australia’s air defence is interwoven with the Anglo-
Australian alliance so relevant British contributions are investigated. By investing in 
British military and political policies with its limited military might after the war in 
Europe erupted in September 1939, the Australian government let itself be ‘betrayed’ 
by Britain through its own submissiveness. In reality there was no betrayal: the 
British made it clear to Australian government members up to prime ministerial level 
well before the Japanese struck that there would be no military reinforcements to 
South East Asia and that the dominions were responsible for their own defence.  
This thesis will demonstrate that the solutions to Australia’s air defence were not 
beyond the capabilities of Australian politicians and military planners nor taxpayers. 
The impact of the poor political decisions made during the inter-war years 
culminated in national disasters of Rabaul, Darwin and Broome. More professional 
decision-making even within the constraints of imperial defence by bureaucrats 
could have seen a much different outcome of these aerial invasions of Australian air 
space with their tragic consequences.  
As part of the investigative process, details of available first-line American military 
aircraft that would have seen Australia adequately defended are included. America 
became known as ‘the arsenal of democracy’ because it was supplying military 
hardware to allied nations before 7 December 1941. The option of buying ready-to-
fly American fighters was ever-present and made even more urgent when British 
firms either failed to supply the RAAF with aircraft ordered, delivered them late or 
sent obsolete models already replaced in the Royal Air Force (RAF). 
Part of the challenge to the orthodox view is therefore to explain the paradox 
presented by the ineptitude of Australian politicians who failed to understand the 
change in warfare embraced by the Japanese and Americans and the impressive 
statistics of the Australian contribution to the defeat of the Axis powers. While the 
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successful outcome of the war against Japan cannot be used as a benchmark for 
Australian pre-war performance, the fact remains that neither the RAAF nor the 
Royal Australian Navy (RAN) was responsible for the destruction of any of the five 
Japanese aircraft carriers during 1942. It was brilliant United States Navy (USN) air 
actions that changed the balance of power in the Pacific achieving this outcome.  
Post-Midway, that is after May 1942, was devoid of any authentic Japanese invasion 
risk to Australia. This climate allowed the Curtin Government and the RAAF to 
shine as supportive to the overall Allied effort in the South West Pacific Area 
(SWPA).  Even so, for the duration of the Pacific War, the RAAF did not achieve a 
credible capital ship sinking capacity. Behind the deceptive façade of what was really 
an American victory over Japan, arguably achieved without RAAF input, the 
symptoms of poor political management of the pre-war years were still present.   
 
 
(Source: Public domain) 
Figure 1: One of the weirdest of all wartime Australian decisions was that of using a training plane, 
the AT-6, as a fighter. Apart from unnecessary loss of life, it had disastrous military and political 
repercussions that were to haunt the American-Australian alliance for the duration of the war and 
beyond: the defenceless dwarf having to be protected by a giant.  
 
Unlike the United States of America (USA), Australia had been at war since 
September 1939, almost two years before the Japanese onslaught in the Pacific. What 
became known as the Battle of Britain, the five month aerial contest between the 
German Luftwaffe and the RAF over southern England of mid-1940 was followed 
closely by the Australian media. The RAF was lauded as saving the English speaking 
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world from Nazi domination although many RAF aviators who took part were not 
from the British Isles but from occupied Europe, America and the British Dominions. 
Strangely, despite the Anglo-Australian relationship and traditional defence ties, the 
British crisis and its world renowned outcome did not translate into any Australian 
politicians copying the British aerial defence system of radar-backed interceptors as 
the nation’s first line of defence. Yet as will be shown, the Japanese naval offensive 
was based around the aircraft carrier which meant any sudden raid on Australian 
territory would come from the air. This thesis examines the national myth that 
Britain was, far from being an asset to Australia, actually a liability with its 
demoralised far eastern forces collapsing quickly under the Japanese attack. Hence 
ended Australian politicians’ misplaced faith—in the myth of British military might, 
the League of Nations as a guarantor of world peace and appeasement towards the 
Japanese as a form of defence.  
The primary outcome of the vital no-fighter decision was the easy Japanese 
destruction of RAAF Wirraways defending Rabaul. The secondary result was its 
contribution to a predictable collection of military and civilian disasters on mainland 
Australia. Still nothing tangible was done even by the new John Curtin Government 
whose members had been so vocal in opposition about an RAAF improvement.  
The Curtin Government’s failure to press on with grand schemes to adequately equip 
the RAAF with unnamed warplanes did irreparable harm to Australia’s national 
interest. Instead of its dependence on the British for survival, the Labor Government 
simply switched to appealing to the Americans for military protection once the 
Japanese struck. That aeroplanes from the United States (US) air force began arriving 
in Brisbane at the end of December 1941 was by chance not by plan, as they were 
unable to reach their destination of the Philippine Islands. With this windfall, the 
Labor Government tried desperately to convince the Americans to divert fighter 
squadrons unloading in Brisbane to Australia’s defence. As American Air Force 
(AAF) Lieutenant General Lewis Brereton stated: 
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The Australians continued their efforts to divert American planes to the defense of 
Australia. Strong pressure was brought by the Australian Government and Mr. R. G. 
Casey in Washington to move the 17th Pursuit Squadron, under command of Maj. 
Charles A. Sprague and preparing to move to Java, to Townsville and Port Moresby. 
I refused … 1 
The bitter irony of the Anglo-Australian relationship in terms of arming the RAAF 
was that the realisation Americans made better warplanes than the British came too 
late.  
The need for modern fighter aircraft for the RAAF  
Australia, in the 1930s was a small nation of less than ten million people. Its defence 
budget was proportionally minute. Between the World Wars the RAAF struggled 
against inter-military rivalry as ‘the third brother’—the poor relative of the three 
services. The doctrine of the army and navy was not one of defence of the nation so 
much as employing expeditionary forces for overseas operations as part of British 
military might. Probably only the fact that the RAF, on which the Australian air force 
was modelled, survived the inter-war years, kept the RAAF alive. Thus the air force 
was not going to attract the finances needed to get aircraft capable of fending off a 
world power equipped with contemporary warplanes unless radical government 
insight occurred coupled with spending in real terms on hardware.  
The Australian Imperial Forces (AIF) suffered terribly in World War I with 
casualties numbering 152 171,2 yet unlike the American government that favoured an 
isolationist policy through disillusionment after its late attendance at the war,3 
subsequent Australian government defence planners did not baulk at their self-
imposed philosophy of supporting Britain with military forces. Such an unnecessary 
and subservient policy stymied the development of an independent air force doctrine 
that kept pace with international military aircraft inventiveness. The air force was 
never going to be allocated up to the minute offensive aircraft capable of first 
reaching and then sinking an enemy’s capital ships, nor the training for Australian 
                                                 
1 Brereton, L. H. 1946, The Brereton Diaries, William Morrow and Company, New York, p. 81. This entry in 
Brereton’s Diaries is dated, ‘Brisbane, Australia, 20–22 January 1942.  
2 Bean, C. W. 1942, The Australian Imperial Force in France, vol. IV, Angus and Robertson Ltd., Sydney,  
p. 1099.  
Nevin, D. 1981, Architects of Air Power, Time-Life Books, Alexandria, Virginia, p. 29. 
3 —(n.d.), ‘American Isolationism in the 1930s’, US Department of State, Office of the Historian, viewed 5 
December 2014 at, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937–1945/american-isolationism>. 
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defence while it remained in the shadow of the RAF. Airpower would obviously 
determine to a large extent the outcome of future wars and could be a substitute for a 
large navy at a lower cost.  
For the RAAF to become an independent entity with the capability of defending the 
Commonwealth from a major power with air forces and navies powerful enough to 
attack it, the government needed an independent stance, particularly once the fast 
bomber-destroying monoplane interceptor was invented and began equipping air 
forces of the nations at the forefront of military technology. The inter-war conflicts, 
even more dramatically, the battles for France and Britain of 1940, illustrated clearly 
the differences between military aircraft—and set the ground rules for battles to 
come. In general, bombers could not survive against fighters of the same era. 
Although interceptors could destroy opponent fighters in the air, the differences 
between international makes and models were marginal and other factors such as 
ground control, radar, tactics and training would dictate the outcome.  
Examples of air war ignored 
Australian politicians had international examples before them of the best use of air 
power and the aircraft types mandatory to achieve an adequate defence doctrine. The 
undeclared wars in Spain, Finland, and China and finally, the two years of world war 
between September 1939 and December 1941displayed adequate air defence as will 
be shown in this thesis. These conflicts illustrated definitively that the side that held 
air superiority controlled the battle below. And the only way to gain air superiority 
was to have sufficient high performance fighters of the calibre and number to deal 
with an air invasion by bombers with or without escort. Both Germany and Japan 
sustained unacceptable bomber losses until the introduction of the redoubtable Me-
109E and Zero-Sen in the role of bomber escort over Spain and China respectively.4  
The little known Russian Polikarpov 1.16 monoplane fighter proved very effective 
against Condor Legion and Italian bombers and transports during the Spanish Civil 
War. According to Nevin, the standard Luftwaffe fighter, the He 51 was so 
thoroughly outclassed as an interceptor by the Soviet 1.15 and 1.16 that it had to be 
                                                 
4 Ibid., p. 154. 
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diverted to ground attack roles and avoid combat with Spanish-manned fighters until 
replaced by the 109.5 
 
 
(Source: Public domain) 
Figure 2: The Russian Polikarpov 1.16 fighter; the world’s first all metal monoplane with folding 
wheel. 
 
The lesson for Australian defence architects from these well-publicised international 
events to which the world press ‘… reacted in a substantial burst of shock and 
outrage’6 was that, because a complete air force was beyond the nation’s means and 
industry, to follow the lead set by defending forces and build a contemporary fighter 
command with aircraft from major allies to control air space over its own territory. 
The authorities needed only to buy up-to-date fighters and deploy them behind points 
in the north of the continent likely to come under attack.  
Fighters and radar; a war-winning combination 
By the 1940s, Britain led the world in radar development.7 An astute Australian 
government could, with British technology, have constructed a ‘chain home’ radar 
line to give early warning of the approach of units of a foreign air force. World 
renowned fighters were always available from America. Several types—the Republic 
P-43 Lancer, the Bell P-39 Airacobra, the Lockheed P-38 Lightning and the 
Grumman F-4-F Wildcat with their speed, range and firepower, stand out. All would 
                                                 
5 Ibid., p. 150. 
6 Ibid., p. 160. 
7 Galland, A. 1956, The First and the Last, Readers Book Club, London, p. 82. 
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have made excellent defence choices and been able to intercept approaching enemy 
aircraft—RAAF pilots having the advantage of fighting over their own territory. 
Early warning radar or even a well-organised observer corps was the means of 
keeping defending fighters grounded until the moment to ‘bounce’ the raiders 
arrived. Modern fighters could also be used as fighter-bombers as was done so 
effectively by the Luftwaffe’s Me-109 in Spain and the Curtiss P40 Tomahawk by 
British and Commonwealth pilots of the Desert Air Force during the North African 
campaign in the two years before Pearl Harbor.  
The only other planes within the nation’s gross national product (GNP) and defence 
budget were reconnaissance types to monitor an approaching enemy naval air force 
and light-medium bombers to attack it. This was later done with the direct purchase 
of ready-made American Lockheed Hudson maritime patrol bombers and 
Consolidated Catalina float-planes but their acquisition was given priority over 
fighters apparently not considered necessary. Faced with producing a maritime 
patrol-navigational aircraft for a British requirement, Lockheed made a militarised 
version of its Super Electra 14 civil airliner which the RAF dubbed ‘Hudson’.8 The 
RAAF intended to use the Hudson as a bomber to sink ships, a role outside of its 
design and for which it did not have the bomb capacity; just 1600 pounds pay load.9 
A far better purpose-designed bomber was available in the form of the ultra-modern 
tricycle-under-carriaged A-20 Douglas Boston later acquired by the RAAF by 
default. Unlike the Boston, the Hudson was no match for modern fighters. 
 
                                                 
8 Mondey, D. 1996, The Concise Guide to American Aircraft of World War II, Chancellor Press, London,  
p. 160. In comparison, the B-25 Mitchell bomber could carry up to 3 000 pounds of bombs (Mondey, op. cit.,  
p. 195).  
9 Ibid., p. 162.  
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(Source: Public Domain) 
Figure 3: The A-20 Douglas Boston served with outstanding success in RAF and United States Army 
Air Force (USAAF) squadrons and may have been purchased for the RAAF from America before the 
War, as was done by Britain, France, and Holland. 
 
 
(Source: Public Domain) 
Figure 4: The Lockheed Hudson; an effective maritime bomber was a hybrid inferior to the purpose-
built A-20 Boston. It was the RAAF’s only modern warplane in December 1941 after the Australian 
aircraft industry failed to deliver the Beaufort on schedule. 
 
This thesis therefore focuses on the reason why the RAAF needed fighter aircraft 
equal to those of the major powers to defend its air space due to the advent of the 
aircraft-carrier and growing obsolescence of the battleship which could carry and 
launch only light seaplanes.  
During the 1930s, after some neglect, the cantilever-winged, stressed skin monoplane 
made its universal appearance over-powering all other types. The fighter version, 
being light, singled-motored with one pilot, evolved into a high performance, heavily 
armed combat plane superior in speed to bombers and airliners although initially, the 
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difference was marginal. In the case of the British Supermarine Spitfire, it was 
relatively expensive and work-intensive to produce. But other makes and types 
designed to a similar format; the Hawker Hurricane, Curtiss Tomahawk and 
Grumman Wildcat were purpose-designed as a compromise between performance, 
mass production and repair in the field and although slightly slower, did the job 
before being overtaken by the second round of monoplane all- metal fighters. 
 
 
(Source: Imperial War Museum) 
Figure 5: The photogenic Supermarine Spitfire Mark 2, a version deployed during the ‘Battle of 
Britain’. In 1940, the Spitfire captured the hearts and minds of the English speaking world probably 
creating the impression among Australian parliamentarians that British warplanes were beyond 
compare. 
 
The thesis also addresses the government’s so-called ‘hostage’ to imperial defence. 
On the surface, the government ignored imperial defence over the decision of a 
private firm, the Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation (CAC), to build an American 
military trainer under licence with the government’s blessing. The ties that bind were 
also broken by the outright purchase of American twin-engined combat aircraft off 
the shelf in the late 1930s and early 1940s. These acquisitions apparently incited the 
British government to withhold the supply of motors for the Australian-built 
Beaufort bomber after encouraging its manufacture. An offer by British aircraft firms 
to build warplanes in Australia when their management discovered a satellite 
company of an American corporation was involved was also withdrawn leaving the 
Australian authorities with a major defence dilemma on their hands.  
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The interwar years of indecision  
In the field of aerial technology, World War II was World War I continued. Aircraft 
development did not end in 1918 although it slowed. Even as the First World War 
was brought to an end by the German surrender, new applications for aircraft were 
introduced. Originally planes were employed for reconnaissance with enemy crews 
greeting each other, but by 1918 they were deadly war machines spearheading 
ground assaults and bombing behind the lines. The fighting plane evolved from 
multipurpose wire and wood contraptions and balloons of 1914 into an indispensable 
weapon of war: 
By mid-1915, ‘fighting scout’ aircraft were … used to accompany [escort] 
reconnaissance and artillery-spotting aircraft. When these escorting fighting scouts 
clashed and tried to destroy their respective charges, the first true dogfights began. 
Whereas early aircraft with poor performance had avoided aerial confrontation, pilots 
equipped with more able fighting machines began to go on the offensive.10 
The improvement in aircraft technology during the war was steady if not vast.11 At 
the beginning the plane’s role was uncertain, but by 1918, bi- and tri-planes were 
established as accepted weapons with many applications, some realised and others 
fanciful. Speed and height capabilities had increased, reliability was enhanced as was 
armament. Twin-engined bombers attacked targets far behind the static trench lines. 
Fighter-bombers were used to both support tank and troop offensives and to drown 
their approach with the noise of their engines.12 German bombers attacked London 
while coalition bombers were active against enemy railroad centres and other non-
military targets in and out of civilian and military use.13 Railway workers and 
commuters became casualties during their routine peacetime employment. Air 
attacks on enemy troops was also effective as noted by Australian historian, C. E. W. 
Bean: 
The German trench divisions on the Hamel Villers-Bretonneux front … had long been 
deteriorating under the nightly fire of artillery and machine-guns and the bombings of 
the air force.14 
                                                 
10 Crosby, F. 2008, Fighter Aircraft, Imperial War Museum, Hermes House, London, p. 10. 
11 Ibid., pp. 10–13.  
12 Bean, C. W. 1942, op. cit., p. 74. Bean virtually ignores the introduction of the aeroplane as opposed to the 
tank showing the full impact of aircraft may not have been appreciated by the official Australian war historian.  
13 Nevin, D., op. cit., p. 7. 
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For the Australian government, the outstanding lesson of World War I was simple. 
Air power was a permanent part of warfare and might ultimately be a substitute for a 
large navy. This lesson came not from aeroplane deployment above the trenches but 
its development in defence of the British Isles against air attack and the 
bombardment of German air bases. And that an independent air force based on the 
successful Royal Flying Corps (RFC) model should be formulated. This dream was 
realised on 31 March 1921 with the official birth of the RAAF, the same year as an 
Air Board was inaugurated.15  
The Board subsequently prepared recommendations on air power policy with 
geography being central to its proposals.16 But it was still a government satellite and 
subject to political interjection with its powers limited to administration and … 
‘could not in any way interfere with policy. All matters of policy must be referred to 
the Air Council consisting of existing Naval and Military Boards’.17 Thus Air Board 
members could not decide on selecting or buying aircraft types, something that was 
to stymie the force getting the best planes for its purpose in the years ahead. 
Members prepared recommendations on policy more conservative than participating 
in a war of independence. It took account of the limited radius of then-available 
British aircraft and decided that independent action against potential enemy centres 
was impractical.18 As a result the Board, comprised of just four air force officers and 
one civil servant, recommended that the operations of the RAAF be auxiliary to the 
army and navy.19 In reaching this unimaginative decision, members had contrary 
information available. For instance there was a report by the Royal Navy’s (RN) 
Admiral of the Fleet, Lord Jellicoe, who in 1919 sounded a warning to navies about 
the future possibilities of air attack, although his solution was limited to building 
better warships: 
Great damage could be done to Australia in certain circumstances before the mother country could 
intervene … It must be recognised that Australia is powerless against a strong naval and military 
power without the assistance of the British fleet … The advent of aircraft has recently formed an 
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16 Ibid., p.7305. 
17 Ibid., p.7305. 
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(Hobart), 22 July, p. 4. 
19 Odgers, G. 1957, op. cit., p. 60–1. 
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additional reason for the thickening of armoured decks, the carrying of protecting aircraft by ships, 
and use of high angle guns to sink ships.20 
This protracted RAAF development contrasted the evolution in military thought 
during the inter-war years that often ran ahead of reality as the struggle for a 
definitive air power doctrine unfolded. Some politicians did not help by prophesying 
doom; for example British Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin who, in an ill-advised 
and non-politically correct statement, proclaimed in 1932 that: 
I think it is well for the man in the street to realise that there is no power on earth than can 
prevent him from being bombed. Whatever people may tell him, the bomber will always get 
through … the only defence is offence, which means that you have to kill more women and 
children more quickly than the enemy if you want to save yourselves.21  
Problems regarding air power’s predicted application came from expectations by 
over optimistic theorists arguably advocating that air power would render all other 
forms of military might obsolete. But only the dropping of the atomic bomb in 
August 1945 saw a nation forced into submission by air attack. Even then the aircraft 
employed were part of a still-vulnerable delivery system soon replaced by pilotless 
missiles. Manned aircraft were subject to interception and human error, and became 
even more at risk once surface-to-air missiles were invented. Bombers carrying 
nuclear weapons being vulnerable to missiles meant they eventually suffered the fate 
of the battleship despite Baldwin’s prophesy.    
Meantime the realisation that air power was as important as other forms of military 
might seemed slow to be accepted in Australia. Almost from its inception, the RAAF 
struggled to survive both for existence and independence, particularly through the 
years of the Great Depression and from pressure by the army and navy for funding. 
Nevertheless as early as 1923, the effectiveness of military aeroplanes was seen by 
some far-sighted politicians. 
Mr W. M. Marks, a former officer in the RN pointed out in the House of 
Representatives that aviation could reduce the cost of Australia's defences by 
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removing the necessity of a powerful navy.22 But without hot-war examples—China, 
Spain, Finland and Ethiopia, still a decade away—such statements could be 
disparaged or ignored. And ‘bushfire’ wars gave no indication of the aircraft carrier’s 
potency that allowed warplane operations anywhere, any time.  
British influence; British attitude 
Even a cursory examination of the Anglo-Australian relationship reveals Australia 
gave more than it got from imperial defence. The decision to build the NA-33 aircraft 
in Australia in the late 1930s obviously went outside the spirit of Empire defence but 
making a trainer may not have been as unintentional as so often described. If it was 
an error of selection (a trainer for a warplane), it could have been corrected quickly 
by the government making a complete switch to US warplanes once the mistake was 
recognised. What seems more likely is that the Lyons Government did not want to 
directly offend the British. By building an American trainer already operated by the 
RAF, the government may have been consciously providing an advanced trainer that 
could prepare RAAF aircrews for RAF service in keeping with the terms of the 
Empire Air Training Scheme (EATS). By fitting the NA-33 with guns, the public 
face of the Wirraway decision was ostensibly part of a defence preparation when in 
reality the government only saw the RAAF as a training organisation for the RAF. 
This notion was let slip by Defence Minister Thorby in a debate on the Supply Bill of 
29 June 1938 in the House of Representatives. During the topic of RAAF accidents 
in which Labor member J. Matthews compared RAAF accident rates with those of 
QANTAS, Thorby retorted: ‘The honourable member does not make the allowance 
for the fact that the Air Force is a training organisation’.23 
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36 
 
(Source: Public domain) 
Figure 6: The NA-33 Harvard advanced trainer built locally as the Wirraway. Arguably the Lyons 
Government, which approved the project, never really envisaged its use as a warplane—according to 
Defence Minister Thorby, the RAAF was ‘a training organisation’. This creates a conundrum; whether 
the government went against the spirit of imperial defence via the American NA-33, a pseudo 
warplane, as a sop to public opinion or it manufactured a trainer in compliance with British demands 
for EATS. 
 
Throughout the inter-war years the British did not encourage the Australian 
government to expand its air power to counter Japan’s naval air strength, neither did 
it prevent it. Instead they degraded Australian political and public fears of the 
Japanese. As late at 1937, with the Japanese occupying Manchuria and invading 
China, the British, at an Imperial Conference, opined that: 
The southward movement [of the Japanese] would not menace the security of British 
India, Australia or New Zealand unless it gave the Japanese control of bases.24 
That the British ignored carrier-based raids against the Australian mainland is typical 
of the way they trivialised Australia's plight, even though the RN operated carriers 
successfully in World War I. But not everyone was of the same opinion. During the 
1938–39 Budget debate, the speaker, James Fairbain, warned that ‘… it is necessary 
for Australia to put its defences in order as quickly as possible’.25 In his address he 
raised the possibility of Singapore falling and Japanese aircraft carrier attacks, then 
debunked the notion by adding:  
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Many people believe that Australia must have an air force which could meet in a pitched battle one of the 
great air forces of the world [Japan]. That is not so because no great air forces could reach these shores 
until Australia had been practically defeated … to launch an attack on a strategical [sic] object in 
Australia an aircraft carrier would have to come within 200 miles of its objective, and, at that distance, 
the Royal Australian Air Force, even in its present state … would be able to destroy the aircraft carrier.26 
Such a naive evaluation of the capability of carriers symbolised political ignorance of 
the nation’s biggest defence problem—a lack of conception of the role neither of 
interceptors nor of the types of planes required to counter aircraft carriers.27 Nor had 
the potential of the aircraft carrier and the bombers and fighters it operated been 
correctly evaluated. Instead of gaining this knowledge for themselves, the 
Australians keep trying to extract defence guarantees from Britain, at least until 
April, 1942.28 But in the 1930s, when Australian authorities were begging for a 
bigger British presence in the Pacific, the transition in world military power evident 
long before Pearl Harbor was attacked, never seemed to be fully appreciated. Nor 
was the fact that the only defence against such air assault was land-based interceptors 
equal to those of the aggressor. Despite wishful thinking about the ability of the yet 
to be built British Beaufort bomber, the RAAF lacked the capacity to sink capital 
ships. By not facing Australia’s dire situation, no fighters were acquired either from 
America or Britain, and the reality that the Australian aircraft industry was too small 
and limited in output to produce the warplanes required was never accepted.  
Affection for the battleship 
The reliance on the RN and Singapore for defence remained the foremost 
government policy throughout 1918–1941; a policy promoted as much or more by 
Australians than the British as shown in this thesis. Cold comfort came in the form, 
at least in theory that the idea ran parallel to most international military outlook. First 
Lord Amery (RN) for instance, at the 1923 Imperial Conference in London, 
concluded that neither aircraft nor submarines could sink capital ships and the 
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battleship would remain 'the pivot and kernel of the naval battle'.29 When Prime 
Minister Stanley Bruce returned home, he simply repeated Amery’s words in 
parliament. Air power was 'really no menace at all to the modern capital ship' he 
announced in his dismissal statement.30 Just three years later, the United States Army 
Air Corps’ (USAAC) Lieutenant General William Mitchell would demonstrate 
otherwise even if he did over-play his hand by leaving out warships’ defences—
fighters, anti-aircraft artillery and avoidance manoeuvring.  
The debate about which was best, the aeroplane or the warship, became more 
complex and began to make less sense as the military world evolved through a visual 
transition from air to sea power. Although it was unclear that in future warfare 
capital ships could be sunk by single-engined dive or torpedo bomber monoplanes, 
this idea was generally discredited. Only an actual major war would prove the 
effectiveness of carrier-based bombers and their vulnerability to anti-aircraft artillery 
and interceptors. Fortunately American aircraft designers had independent ideas of 
the warplanes needed for the future, particularly the air war at sea.  
Between 1918 and 1938 aeroplanes arguably eclipsed battleships as dominant 
military machines. But old military and political thinking dissuaded smaller nations 
like Australia from arming themselves with contemporary warplanes to prevent naval 
aggression against them. And they failed to take advantage of this change in its 
economic relief. There were many efforts in both practice and in theory to convince 
government officials and military leaders that future wars would be won or lost by 
air power but conventional policies of the traditionalists remained largely unchanged. 
And while Australian politicians adhered to British understatements, nothing new 
was likely to occur.  
Lieutenant-General 'Billy' Mitchell, for example at the cost of his career, in 1921 
demonstrated lumbering AAF biplanes could sink captured German capital ships as 
the world, including the Japanese, watched in awe.31 But he was not diplomatic 
enough within the bounds of his rank so was vulnerable to criticism for publically 
criticising US defence policies and strategies. As a government servant, this went 
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against his oath of allegiance. Thus Mitchell’s demonstrations were over-shadowed 
in the furore that followed. Instead of Department of War bureaucrats and politicians 
accepting his thesis, Mitchell was dismissed as an eccentric pest with President 
Calvin Coolidge officially announcing there would be no change in America's 
'defense' policy.32 Australian politicians, still thinking imperialism, did not go against 
the tide or look more closely at re-equipping the RAAF in keeping with Mitchell’s 
experiment. But the Japanese apparently took note and were soon building a world 
class naval air service, albeit with British help.33  
The same year the British sanctioned an ‘unofficial’ advisory party of thirty ex-naval 
officers to help Japan establish its naval air force.34 And in 1923, she launched her 
first aircraft carrier, the 7585 ton Hosho.35 Although pocket sized, it must have taught 
the Japanese much about naval air warfare. The even larger Akagi followed in 1927 
with a displacement of 43 500 tons; bigger than British carriers and thus handled all-
metal, high performance monoplanes.36 British carriers were still equipped with bi-
planes which created an extraordinary military enigma for Australia’s defence 
planning.   
There was information available to show that the days of conventional sea power 
were in decline. Despite Coolidge, the American naval and marine officers attending 
Mitchell's demonstration contended that 'aircraft had the power to sink or seriously 
damage any naval vessel at present constructed'.37 British trials that followed were 
conducted with less passion and publicity but were convincing enough. Air attacks 
against HMS Agamemnon resulted in forty-seven direct hits from 637 bombs.38 The 
Air Ministry opined that a capital ship could have its 'fighting capacity' seriously 
reduced from air attack.39 Therefore from the mid-nineteen twenties onwards, if 
Australian defence planners and politicians had been militarily astute, an assessment 
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of its own air defence needs in light of these developments could have been done 
independently of imperial defence. 
The British neither help nor hinder 
One big barrier for Australian defence planners during the inter-war years was the 
imagined controls the bonds of Empire placed on policy and equipment procurement. 
All major defence decisions were referred to Britain and military equipment was 
mostly bought from Britain or was of British design.40 This was confirmed at a 1926 
Imperial Conference when Prime Minister Stanley Bruce stated: 'The guiding 
principle on which all our defence preparations are based, whether for the Sea, the 
Land or the Air Force, is uniformity [with Britain] in every respect'.41 Buying or 
making American combat aircraft was not considered in this defining statement. Otto 
D. Tolischus was an American New York Times and London Times foreign 
correspondent expelled from Germany on Hitler’s orders after his book, They 
Wanted War, was published in 1940.42 Moving to Tokyo where he got a cool 
reception, and was interned when war erupted, he reported in February 1941: 
After closer contact with things Japanese and a careful check-up on recent developments, I began 
to get a picture of the Pacific situation. And while the picture was still blurred, it looked … 
alarming.  
The present war scare … had begun with a speech by Matsuoka in the Diet on January 27, in 
which he told the United States and Great Britain, in no uncertain words to get out of the Western 
Pacific and surrender it to Japan’s obligations under the Triple Alliance with Germany and Italy 
that ‘the Japanese will never avoid war through fear’. And it was obvious that Japan was preparing 
to back up this threat with military and economic war preparations exceeding any she had made 
before.43  
While the dependence on the RN remained, self-reliance and an investigation of the 
possible use of aircraft to counteract Japan’s ultra-aggressive stance was bandied 
about in federal parliament as a ‘pie in the sky’ topic.44 The successive governments' 
dependence, at least publically, on the RN for security was challenged by the press 
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and the Federal Opposition but never changed even when Opposition Leader John 
Curtin attained power in late 1941. The psychological pull of the 'Singapore 
syndrome' and 'the fleet to Singapore' was to take the least line of resistance.45 
Parkhill, Defence Minister, even added in mid-1939 that Australia ‘should have two 
battleships of its own’ to work in conjunction with the Empire fleet.46 This sea power 
doctrine which largely underwrote Australia's security was obviously dated and 
failed to accurately assess the military power of Japan or the carrier. Too much 
capacity was also placed on the ability of Australian industry to build warplanes 
quickly for any future Pacific conflict. Australian defence, on the surface, depended 
both on Britain's assessment of threat and its conservative ideas on the way future 
wars would be fought. But paradoxically government ministers took little notice of 
the two senior RAF officers paid to advise and recommend on the currency of the 
RAAF. 
Britain makes promises it cannot keep 
The steady development of air power between 1918 and 1939—bi-planes to 
monoplanes; single-engined reconnaissance planes to four-engined bombers; fabric 
and wood to all-metal, cantilever, stressed skin fighters with speeds in excess of 300 
mph—seemed endless. Some Australian politicians spoke strongly of defence by 
aircraft alone in place of capital ships with which the RN was mainly equipped but 
overlooked the RAAF need to be firstly a self-defence bomber-destroying force 
ahead of a capacity to sink capital ships. Britain on the other hand was building an 
interceptor air force supplemented by twin-engined light and medium bombers. In 
other words, the British followed one air power doctrine at home and applied another 
abroad. Thus although the Australians themselves were aware of the changing 
climate of naval and air power, such awareness failed to change government policy 
and equip the RAAF appropriately. The danger presented by the Japanese navy to 
Australia’s defence with the carrier as its backbone may have been countered in the 
late 1930s through the acquisition of contemporary American navy warplanes; for 
example the Douglas Dauntless dive-bomber and the Grumman Wildcat fighter. 
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(Source: Public domain) 
Figure 7: The Douglas Dauntless dive-bomber, the nemesis of the Japanese Pacific fleet. 
 
 
(Source: Public domain) 
Figure 8: Grumman Wildcat USN fighter ideal and available for Australia’s defence. The Dauntless 
and the Wildcat made a deadly combination. 
 
Few defence managers, including Australians, were, in the 1920s and 1930s 
confident enough to challenge the status quo except with rhetoric. Departure was too 
radical. Part of the problem of overcoming conservative thinking was a comparison 
between battleships and airplanes in size, cost and psychological impact. The capital 
ship was the biggest, most powerful machine made by man. It could hurl two-ton 
shells at targets twenty miles away. In contrast planes were slow, vulnerable and 
easily wrecked in a poor landing. It was difficult to imagine such machines would 
not be destroyed or driven off by anti-aircraft fire long before they could bomb 
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moving warships. Their image was against them as the weapon of the future.47 But 
the Japanese and Americans, with their more lateral and non-traditional thinking 
appeared to believe that although sea power would dictate the outcome of future 
warfare, it would be fought with air power at sea across the horizon. 
The Japanese invasion of China fails to effect exports  
On 18 September 1931 the Japanese began bombing China.48 They did not start a 
world war simply because no major power came to China’s assistance. From a 
European perspective, the so-called 'Incident', which included the Japanese Army Air 
Force's (JAAF) indiscriminately bombing of Shanghai in March 1932, was too 
distant from both Britain and America, in miles and interest and did not enlist the 
response it deserved.49 But the Japanese air attacks on Chinese civilians opened a 
new era in warfare—a well-orchestrated terror bombing campaign by modern 
monoplanes to subdue a nation. The ground invasion caused some media 
consternation in Australia with Japan being a long-standing security threat50 but the 
bombing did not see a RAAF fighter force urgently compiled. Instead, the 
Australians simply drew closer to Britain while conservative politicians kept up their 
pretence that the air force was adequate. Australians at the same time, continued to 
export primary products with an actual increase in wool and wheat over pre-war 
scales.51 
At first only token Western intervention in China applied and was limited largely to 
diplomatic protests. The material Western response was just one group (three 
squadrons) of Curtiss P-40 fighters—the American Volunteer Group (AVG) manned 
by mercenaries lured from the USAAC by money and adventure. One of the pilots 
recruited was Colonel Gregory Boyington: 
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The pilots and ground crews were recruited secretly from the Army Air Corps, Navyt and 
Marine Corps … A World War I flyer [Chennault], retired Army Air Corps captain, breezed 
around different flying bases here in the United States, recruiting people he counted on having 
the necessary qualifications. If a pilot or ground crewman signified his intention to go, from 
there on everything was handled through Washington, D.C.52 
The AVG was effective but too small to gain control of the air. Nevertheless, the use 
of fighters to stop bombers continued to evolve in China as both the US and Japan 
trialled their first-line aircraft. The limitation of the standard US day fighter was soon 
revealed but no studies by the Australians of the air war over China before Pearl 
Harbor appear to have occurred.  
The Sino-Japanese war remained a mystery in that the Chinese contained the 
Japanese for so long. But being protracted, it became a milestone in military aviation 
as Japanese, Russian, American and British governments could experiment with their 
fighters. The theory that 'the bomber would always get through' was found flawed as 
Japanese Zero pilot Okumiya confirmed.53 Medium, twin-engined bombers in 
particular, could not defend themselves again contemporary fighters. The gap 
between bomber and fighter was widening and as it did, the bomber needed fighter 
escort for penetration of enemy territory; the opposite to Douhet’s theory that money 
spent of fighters and anti-aircraft artillery was wasted.54  
Some bombers would always survive and reach their target if losses were ignored, 
but the number destroyed was usually too high and the bombing too limited for the 
aggressor to maintain even if only for logistical reasons—aircrews took too long to 
train. The Japanese raids on Chinese cities were of mammoth proportions, arguably 
greater than those inflicted on Poland or Britain by the Luftwaffe but by no means 
one sided. In mid-1940, the JAAF (Japanese Army Air Force) tried unsuccessfully to 
overwhelm the defences of Chungking:  
Every flyable night [Japanese] aircraft flew in each mission against Chungking for a total of 168 
daytimes and fourteen night raids, 3 717 [planes] over the target.55 These raids were made 
unescorted due to the limited range of the Japanese Claude fighters being deployed in China and 
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suffered heavy losses. During some raids, the percentage of lost or damaged rose beyond the 
‘prohibitive’ figure of ten per cent.56 
 
 
(Source: Public domain) 
Figure 9: The obsolete Japanese Mitsubishi A5M ‘Claude’ fighter that operated in China had was 
replaced by the modern Zero-Sen due to the introduction of American-made fighters.57 
 
 
(Source: Public domain) 
Figure 10: The Japanese Nakajima Ki-49 ‘Helen’ used in China proved that bombers could not 
operate unescorted in daytime without unsustainable losses.58 
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Warplanes participating in the drawn-out Sino-Japanese conflict gave a graphic 
demonstration of a ‘David and Goliath’ contest between a well-prepared and 
equipped aggressor and a defender using a piecemeal collection of imported 
interceptors welded into a semi-effective air defence force. Japanese fighter pilot Jiro 
Horikoshi noted in his diary of mid-May 1940, ‘The continuous aerial assaults [by 
the Japanese] noticeably weakened the Chinese Air Force’s offensive power. Despite 
the effectiveness of the attacks, however, within six months we noticed definite signs 
of recovery’.59  
A secondary issue evolving from the air war showed it was still fought in support of 
armies and did not replace them—the bomber did not make other forms of military 
arms obsolete as predicted. There was no illustration that bombing could force a 
nation to surrender. Nor was there any example of capital warships being sunk by 
aircraft in Spain or China.  
The non-declared wars between 1932 and December 1941 were the type the RAAF 
would obviously face if Australia was attacked: heavy air raids against small nations 
by world powers that could deploy overwhelming might, and if necessary, withdraw 
at their own volition. The stand-out examples cited including China might have given 
astute Australian politicians enough evidence to convince them that the warplanes 
they had, or were selecting, were inadequate. 
Too little; too late  
When Australian politicians did finally realise the necessity for interceptors, they 
selected a long-range aircraft that was a fighter in name only. Ostensibly acting on 
advice from air force officers, the government chose the British Bristol Beaufighter, 
a new twin-engined plane evolved from the Beaufort bomber. Unfortunately the 
Beaufighter was not a long-ranged fighter as implied. Like all orders for British 
aircraft, the first deliveries were late; promised for November 1941,60 completely 
knocked down (ckd) Beaufighters began arriving in March, 1942 and were of a 
veteran mark.61  
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The fact that no RAAF fighters rose in defence of Darwin on the morning of 19 
February 1942 was the ultimate demonstration of the failure of the British to 
understand Australia's defence needs and exposure of the incompetence of 
government ministers when they made their own decisions. The RAAF’s fighter 
squadrons, equipped with indigenous armed trainers, were unable to participate in the 
internecine struggle for control of Australian air space. No contemporary fighters 
were, at that time, either being manufactured in Australia or on order from off-shore 
suppliers. This was the situation in which the nation found itself at its most perilous 
hour. 
How this outcome had been allowed to develop through twenty years of peace and 
why all the rhetoric about defence between conservative governments and the British 
until late in 1941 came to such an end point is a tragic and bizarre story. Any in-
depth analysis must show that the Anglo-Australian defence alliance was detrimental 
to the nation’s defence. Had Australia not participated in imperial defence, its 
politicians might have taken a different tack, realising they could only rely on 
themselves, and attacked the need for aerial defence in a practical and professional 
way.  
By February 1942 it was too late to make interceptors for the RAAF. Singapore, the 
symbol of British military might in the Far East capitulated on 15 February 1942 in 
circumstances that must be described as a debacle.62 The two British capital ships 
sent from Britain to protect it, the Repulse and the Prince of Wales, and ultimately 
Australian interests, were at the bottom of the South China Sea. Thus the myth of 
imperial defence between the wars, the stated linchpin of Australia's security policy 
                                                 
62 Woodburn Kirby S., Major-General 1957, The War Against Japan Vol I, The Loss of Singapore, Her Majesty's 
Stationery Office, London, p. 473. Singapore’s capture shocked the Chinese who drew comparisons between their 
ability to resist the Japanese for five years while the British capitulated in ten weeks (Anon. 1942, ‘China’s Self-
Respect Raised [by the fall of Singapore]’The Northern Miner, 11 May, p. 3). The Chinese reportedly said, ‘If the 
Japanese during a little more than two months achieved as much against the Anglo-Saxon Powers as they did in 
55 months of war against China, did we not underestimate the great performance of our own performance and 
strength?’ Ibid., p. 3.   
Gillison, op. cit., official RAAF historian (p. 352) describes the capitulation as '...one of the most bitter and 
decisive defeats ever suffered by the forces of the British Commonwealth'.  
'Now that Singapore was lost and we were unable to concentrate a superior fleet, the strength of our defences was 
inadequate to defend Australia ... against an enemy with command of the sea and air. We lacked air support, 
possessing no fighters whatsoever, and our bomber and reconnaissance planes had been reduced to about 50 
machines. No country ever faced a greater danger with less resources than Australia', (Curtin Australia and the 
War, quoted in Stephens, A. 1992, Power plus Attitude, AGPS, Canberra, p. 59). In The Hinge of Fate, Churchill 
compares Singapore’s loss to the fall of France calling it, 'the worst disaster and largest capitulation in British 
history', cited in Manchester, W. 1978, American Caesar, Hutchinson of Australia, Sydney, p. 234; Murray, W. 
1999, War in the Air, Cassell, London, p. 192; Hoyt, E. P. 1986, Japan's War–The Great Pacific Conflict, Guild 
Publishing, London, p. 255). 
48 
was perhaps the first casualty of Singapore’s capture and could never be resurrected. 
Common sense would have to prevail and the realisation accepted however 
unpalatable, that Britain could never have protected Australia. Worse, the British 
arguably never had any intention of aiding Australia while fighting a European 
conflict. Once Germany invaded Russia, the British government saw the support of 
Stalin as more important than assisting Australia.63 
Apart from the policies of imperial defence, part of the problem that culminated in 
the Darwin debacle was due to British military thinking. When German forces 
entered Poland in September, 1939, British naval air power was outdated. The RAF 
possessed one of the world’s best interceptors in the Spitfire, but had no carrier-
based monoplanes. The British had been once been ahead in carrier development but 
by 1939 its aircraft firms had languished in carrier aircraft development. Now that 
the Japanese had the best naval fighter in their Zero, for the first time in history, a 
navy fighter possessed the performance of land-based one. The Americans were also 
unable to match the Zero until Grumman designed and produced the Hellcat in 1942. 
Meantime, the British failed to fully exploit naval air power. And because the 
Germans and Italians followed suit, early naval battles between the European Axis 
powers and the British Empire seemed to justify British dependence on battleships 
and cruisers. The sinking of the German pocket battleship Bismarck in 1940 was by 
battleships supported by naval air power in that the German warship was disabled by 
aircraft. 
 
                                                 
63 This was obvious by aircraft supplied to Russia compared to Australia—almost 3 000 Hurricanes to 
Russia by the British and 656 Spitfires to Australia during the war (Gillett, R. 1996, Australian Air 
Power, The Book Company International Pty Ltd, Sydney, NSW., p. 86.). For weeks after 
Singapore’s loss, only Australian forces resisted the Japanese in the SWPA. Some fighters then would 
have been invaluable to the RAAF. 
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(Source: Warbird Images) 
Figure 11: The USN’s F6F Grumman Hellcat, the first naval fighter to completely out-perform the 
Zero on all accounts. It went into action in January 1943. 
 
Through fears and endless paranoia built up by obvious factors—a big country with a 
small population, uninhabited coastal regions and so on—Australians had long seen 
their land as a prize to attract an over-populated Asian aggressor. But in fact, that 
moment had not arrived. In reality, somewhere in the depths of political thought, the 
Japanese offensive in the Pacific should have surprised no one. Rather it was 
predictable. Token defence is probably as bad as no defence. Australia’s denuded 
defences were the culmination of the political outlook of the 1930s, its dependence 
on Britain for protection when there was none and its head-in-the-sand attitude 
towards rapidly developing aerial military technology which, by 1939, was at full 
gallop. The worst ingredient of Japanese aggression in the Pacific was not the lack of 
mercy they showed but the failure by the Australian government to arm the RAAF 
with the right warplanes to oppose it, knowing how well equipped the Japanese were 
with their over-sized aircraft carriers.   
Successive governments must have considered the consequences of attack, but did 
not seriously compile a doctrine on self-defence. With limited forward planning and 
spending in real terms, even a few hundred ultra-modern fighters could have 
defended the nation. Instead, sending thousands of soldiers and airmen to fight 
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British military campaigns or to join the RAF seemed the best strategy local 
politicians could invent.64 This policy, followed by other dominions, spawned EATS 
which drained Australian aircrew trainees into the European war when Japan was 
aggressing and the RAAF needed urgent expansion at home. The alliance with 
Britain was not the great investment in Australia’s future some politicians seemed to 
think—a two-way street. 
It would hardly have been difficult for thinking Australians to see the consequences 
of an enemy coalition striking America and Britain together. Common sense could 
have questioned the chances of British forces arriving quickly enough to make any 
difference. A calculated British assessment of the situation based on global strategies 
and the realities of priorities— what was vital and what was expendable—would 
have been made. Australia, with its small army and industrial base, was hardly a vital 
ingredient in the victory process. Probably by February 1942 Australia was 
considered a liability to Churchill with its pleas for help and its refusal to cooperate 
in either the retention of troops in the Middle East or its participation in the defence 
of Burma. In a letter of 25 January 1942 to Sir Earle Page (for Churchill) Curtin not 
only called for Britain and America to supply the RAAF with ‘up to 250 fighter 
aircraft of the Tomahawk [P.40], [Hawker] Hurricane 2 or similar type’ but added: 
‘Impossible for us to give effective resistance with inadequate aircraft at our 
disposal ..’65. Ironically, the government’s last minute cry was not for battleships or 
bombers but for fighters, the acquisition of which it had deliberately ignored for 
years.  
Hurricane interceptors were always available 
Curtin’s appeal for fighters from Churchill after Rabaul was the government’s final 
fall-back position; and admission its pre-war policies were a failure. Neither the P-40 
nor Hurricane, types Curtin wanted, was readily available in a world at war. But 
obviously a decision to make or buy either of these fighters instead of the Wirraway 
and the Beaufort taken when war was building both in East Asia and Europe would 
have put the RAAF in an independent position. Curtin’s cry for help after the Rabaul 
debacle revealed he only then became aware the RAAF was inadequately armed. 
                                                 
64 Crowley, F. K. (ed.) 1974, A New History of Australia, William Heinemann, Melbourne, p. 457.  
65 Anon. 1942, ‘Grave Events in Pacific Urgent Request for British-US Aid’, The Argus, 24 January, p. 1. 
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The Canadian Car and Foundry Company began producing Hurricanes in 1941 and 
made over 1 500 for the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) and the RAF of which 
the Russians were given 2 952 from Britain and Canadian production.66 Despite the 
Hurricane being one of the poorest performing frontline fighters of the main 
belligerents, canny Allied pilots could survive as one Battle of Britain Hurricane 
pilot recorded: 
They [Hurricanes] were not the equal to the 109 flown by the Germans. I cannot think 
of one occasion when we encountered 109s and were above them. They were invariably 
above us every time we met. They seemed faster, had a better climb and much better 
altitude performance. Notwithstanding all this, the old ‘Hurri’ provided some 
considerable comfort in its ruggedness and … manoeuvrability. I certainly had the 
feeling that with this … no one could get me as long as I saw him coming.67 
 
 
(Source: Imperial War Museum) 
Figure 12: Conventional and controversial, Sydney Camm’s Hurricane was Britain’s first mass-made 
monoplane fighter.68 Outclassed by Axis fighters it was retired from first-line duties after the Battle of Britain. 
                                                 
66 Green, W. 1961, op. cit., p. 66. 
67 Stewart, A. 2006, They Flew Hurricanes, Pen and Sword Publications, London, p. 155.  
68 Hurricanes rarely outperformed their opponents and were inferior to the Zero-Sen and Me-109. The 
Hurricane’s asset was that, like the US P-40, available in quantity when needed most. It was manoeuvrable, 
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RAF needs (Green, W. 1972, Fighters Vol. 2, MacDonald and Co. Ltd., London, p. 60–61, Anon. 1989, Jane’s 
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Hurricanes served the RAF effectively in the Battle of Britain where they 
outnumbered the Spitfire, destroying more German aircraft than all other British 
defences.69  
Despite the performance of British fighters of the mid-1930s, the CAC70 Wirraway 
'General Purpose' plane went into production in 1939. By October 1941 it was 
delivered to the RAAF at forty-five planes every thirty-one days.71 Ironically, the 
Hurricane was easier to make than the Wirraway—an ultra-modern trainer. The 
Hurricane’s designer, Sydney Camm, had foreseen the coming war and economically 
retained the fabric-covered metal-tube fuselage of bi-planes producing an interceptor 
‘… easy to build, fly service and repair’.72 The Hurricane offered the unprecedented 
firepower of eight .303 machine guns and absorbed punishment.73 
The North American Aviation NA-33, on the other hand, had to be modified—
machine guns added and synchronised with the propeller, strengthened for dive-
bombing and fitted with a three-bladed propeller causing delays in production.74 The 
Hurricane would not have needed any modifications. The effort expended 
implementing the Wirraway program may have equated to around 800 Hurricanes 
delivered to the RAAF by the time Curtin harassed Churchill for fighters in January 
1942. Even allowing for attrition that would have accompanied the Japanese 
offensive, it is reasonable to assume that 400—half production—would have reached 
RAAF squadrons to resist Darwin’s bombing and Broome’s strafing in February and 
March 1942 respectively. 
                                                                                                                                          
Fighting Aircraft of World War II, Random House, London,  p. 125. It could have been built in Australia in time 
for the Pacific War.  
69 Bishop, C. (ed.), op. cit., p. 282. 
70 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates House of Representatives Hansard, No. 44, Friday, 4 November 1938, 
p. 1317. The CAC became a private company on 17 October 1936. The government had no financial input. 
71 Ibid., p. 1317. 
72 Bishop, C. (ed.) 1998, op. cit., p. 242.  
73 Dowding, Air Marshal Sir Hugh, 1940, ‘Battle of Britain, Phase in the Attempt to Immobilize the Royal Air 
Force’, The Second Great War: A Standard History, The Amalgamated Press, Ltd., London, Ch. 114,  
p. 1193.  
74 After Rabaul, Wirraways retired to second-line duties; target identification, communication and 
training (Parliamentary Debates Senate, Hansard, No. 6, 10 February 1943).  
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‘He’s coming south’ 
Japan’s naval might established between the wars around the aircraft carrier married 
to the Zero meant the British had less hope of aiding Australia's defence than 
assisting Poland in 1939.75 By December 1941, the Japanese and Americans were far 
in front of Britain in naval air power. In their best naval air attack of the war against 
the Italian Naval Base of Taranto in November 1940, the RN was still flying bi-
planes—Fairey Swordfish torpedo bombers. The Americans and Japanese had long 
since changed to all-metal monoplanes with performance equalling land-based 
counterparts.  
 
 
(Source: Imperial War Museum) 
Figure 13: The RN’s Fairey Swordfish torpedo bomber, despite its archaic appearance, successfully 
attacked the Italian fleet at Taranto in November 1940. The Swordfish was a stable delivery system 
but a slow moving death-trap for its three-man crew facing flak and fighters in open cockpits. 
 
                                                 
75 Fortunately the USN and not the RN fought the battles of the Pacific of 1942. RN aircraft carriers 
did not have the same combat capacity to sink Japanese carriers with bi-planes. Without these 
American naval victories, the Pacific War may have been lost.  
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(Source: Public domain) 
Figure 14: The Italian naval base at Taranto; the blueprint for Pearl Harbor. 
 
The ongoing press and parliamentary debate over the value of Singapore to 
Australia's defence continued until it fell in February 1942, but the concept was not 
without its pre-war critics. Opposition Leader Curtin in 1937, asked: 'How can 
Singapore be so far away from the Yellow Sea as not to be able to hurt it and be a 
thousand miles further from Sydney and be able to protect it?'. He quoted from a 
speech by Hughes of 20 October 1936 who proclaimed: ‘Aerial defence is the only 
defence within our capabilities’.76 For a capital outlay of fifteen million pounds, 
Curtin claimed, Australia could have fifty squadrons or 600 aircraft, adding that 
aircraft would be more valuable than warships at the same cost.77  
Lieutenant-General Mitchell, the aviator-theorist mentioned, convinced much of the 
military world that aircraft versus battleships was no longer a contest with his July 
1921 demonstration.78 But not everyone seemed convinced. The military leaders of 
many nations were slow to appreciate that monoplane dive-bombers and fighters 
answered their defence prayers. At a fraction of the cost of a large navy, defence 
could be maintained with air power as Curtin predicted. Because it was a new 
concept, the dependence on aircraft was actually an untried phenomenon in combat, 
                                                 
76 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Hansard, No. 34, 1937, pp. 106–7. 
77 Ibid., pp. 106–107. 
78 Washington, J. 1942, ‘Airpower Prophet Honoured at Last’ The Argus, 15 January, p. 8. (According to this 
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so only a brave leader could break the mould and replace his warships with 
warplanes.  
The arguments between the world wars over ‘bombers versus battleships’ came to an 
abrupt end even before Taranto. Less than a year on from Poland’s invasion, the 
aeroplane had obviously won hands-down; not planes per se but purpose-built ones. 
The best and most effective way of sinking capital ships was by dive- and single-
engined torpedo bombers. The dawning of a new day in naval warfare came when 
the German cruiser Konigsberg was sunk near the Norwegian coast by fifteen RN 
single-engined Skua dive-bombers in April 1940.79 Historically, this was also the first 
destruction of a cruiser from the air.80 The attack was not, as Mitchell predicted, 
made by formations of heavy bombers dropping hundreds of tons of explosives. 
Instead, it was done by a small number of dive-bombers from the Ark Royal, based 
temporarily at Hatstron in the Orkneys.81 Operating at the limit of their range, they 
surprised the Konigsberg and sunk it with direct hits from three 500 pound bombs.82 
The Skuas were not even equipped with bomb-sights; their pilots simply lined up a 
point on the cowling with their quarry once their machines reached a prescribed 
angle of dive.83 This success was to be followed by many more, particularly in the 
Pacific. 
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80 Ibid., p. 83.  
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(Source: Imperial War Museum) 
Figure 15: The RN’s Blackburn Skua dive-bomber; the first aircraft in World War II to sink a capital 
warship. 
 
Armed with such knowledge before the war against Japan, the government allowed 
the RAAF to degenerate to the precarious position of being without monoplane 
fighters or dive-bombers when war seemed imminent. RAAF commanders were 
faced with the prospect of Australia being bombed or invaded with little RAAF 
interference. The government had 'backed the wrong horse' not only in its 
dependence on the British, but on English aircraft industry to produce planes, both in 
terms of types and the fulfilling of purchases.  
Obsessed with a home-grown air industry  
Most of the post-Depression, parliamentary debates about modernising the RAAF 
met with 'fire and forget'. Once the Lyons conservative overnment placed its hope 
and dependence on the Beaufort as its answer to sinking warships then it looked no 
further. The Beaufort and the Wirraway were both under construction in Australia by 
December 1941 but long delays in modifications meant few reached squadron 
service. Worse, neither of these two types was suited to the internecine struggle 
ahead. Beauforts never sunk any Japanese aircraft carriers or capital ships and 
Wirraways never shot down any bombers.84  
                                                 
84 A number of honest claims were made but post-war investigations by the US Joint Army-Navy Assessment 
Committee using Japanese records discounted claims of RAAF planes sinking more than five Japanese ships 
(Gillison op. cit., p. 554, footnote no. 9).  
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After its failure as a ship-buster, the Beaufort became a conventional night bomber; 
too vulnerable for daylight operations.85 American Douglas Boston A-20 bombers 
acquired (not ordered) by the RAAF in 1942 when twenty-two ‘A’ models, from a 
Dutch purchase, were diverted to the RAAF after the Netherlands East Indies 
government capitulated proved a superior aircraft.86 The Boston was available ready-
made from the USA under Lend Lease while America was neutral. Such an option 
was never considered by the government which seemed obsessed with a local aircraft 
industry regardless of whether or not it fulfilled RAAF needs. 
 
 
(Source: Imperial War Museum) 
Figure 16: The Beaufort was designed in 1937 as a torpedo bomber but did not enter RAAF service 
until October 1941 delayed by the British banning the export of aircraft engines. The Australian model 
needed re-engineering to accept US-Pratt and Whitney twin-wasp motors.87 By the time Beauforts 
reached the RAAF they were obsolete. 
 
To supplement the practicality of buying A-20 Bostons instead of making Beauforts, 
a better choice than the Wirraway would have been to manufacture the smaller, 
single-engined Douglas Dauntless dive-bomber. The Dauntless, a masterpiece of 
American engineering, would account for all four of the Japanese carriers sunk by 
the USN in the Battle of Midway of May 1942.88 Manufacturing the Dauntless may 
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have been simpler than the Wirraway and certainly easier than the Beaufort. And it 
would have been built before America was at war making assistance less 
problematic. Such choices will be examined in their proper perspective.  
Conclusion 
The main thrust of the text that follows is not a redefining of the action and activities 
associated with Japanese air attacks on Australia unchallenged by the RAAF, but a 
determined examination of the political decisions that allowed such a scenario to be 
reached. Poor defence policies and the lack of military knowledge and evaluation led 
Australian authorities down the back roads to a defence crisis in 1942. The fact that 
mainland Australia was not invaded was not the outcome of any British or Australian 
defence policies between the wars or action by the RAAF; rather it was decided by 
the policies and military prowess of other nations. The defenceless position in which 
Australians found themselves in 1942 must be judged not on the successful ending of 
a war in which Australian forces had played the role of an active, yet supportive ally 
to the Americans and which dwindled as the war progressed, but on its own merits. 
The reality that the RAAF did not possess fighter planes to oppose Japanese 
incursions into its airspace in the first months of war and had to rely on the AAF, 
cannot be blamed on anyone but Australian politicians on both sides of parliament 
who made or did not make the vital defence decisions between Hitler taking power in 
1933 and the Japanese attacking Darwin on 19 February 1942. Australia had the 
men, means and money to compile an efficient and effective air force ahead of the 
highly anticipated military contest for control of the Pacific, but those in command of 
the nation, for various reasons including lack of self-confidence, ignorance and 
incompetence, decided not to direct those resources into the arena of aerial defence.  
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 
(Source: Public domain) 
Figure 17: Japanese K-21 bombing the Chinese City of Chongqing. 
 
The main literature covering the political-defence development of military aircraft 
during World War 1 and the inter-war era is centred around their invention and 
progression into manufacture and operation by the major powers—Britain, France, 
America, Japan, Germany, Russia and Italy. By the time aircraft were imported into 
Australia before 1914, bombs had already been dropped from planes by the air forces 
of many military powers. But their use as weapons of war and ad hoc separation into 
categories remained mysteries until World War I erupted and a trial and error process 
began under combat conditions. 
In his 1908 novel, War in the Air, H. G. Wells wrote a story about German airships 
crossing the Atlantic and destroying infrastructure in New York overlooking the fact 
they would have had to fly back.89 Nevertheless, Wells’ novel is one of the most 
commented-on works in the science fiction canon. But the real threat posed by aerial 
warfare proved to be different from fantasy. German airship and aeroplane raids on 
Britain began in 1915 and continued throughout the war, but their limitations were 
soon apparent. There was a far greater risk of British civilians being killed or injured 
in traffic accidents in the black out than by German air raids.90 But the raids did 
                                                 
89 Wells, H. G. 1908, War in the Air, George Bell and Sons, London.  
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inflame British hatred for Germans with members of the public trashing German-
owned property in England and accelerated the development of aircraft defences.91 
 
 
(Source: Public domain) 
Figure 18: H. G. Wells and the cover of his book, The War In The Air of 1908, six years before World 
War I. 
 
The history of aircraft and their piecemeal allocation into various categories that 
would become standard in the air forces of the world that fought the Second World 
War is fundamental to the development of the RAAF of which there is a number of 
books of a similar format. They are largely public relations exercises rather than in-
depth studies; valuable in their purpose of extolling the bravery of Australian flyers 
but generally over emphasise the importance of the RAAF and its achievements. For 
example it is difficult to find hard evidence of the RAAF sinking any capital ships or 
large freighters during the Pacific War despite accounts to the contrary. In 
comparison, Brisbane-based submarines of the USN sunk sixteen Japanese freighters 
in six months—March to August 1944.92  
The history of the Australian aircraft industry of the 1930s and the selection of 
airplanes it built, only one of which was of indigenous design, is also relevant to this 
study. This thesis will prove that the wrong aircraft were chosen for production 
resulting in tragedy and ineffectiveness at the battle-line. And that the way in which 
the government advertised the performance of the CAC Wirraway trainer was 
fabricated.   
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A. T. Ross claims in Armed and Ready that the NA–33 was the best option but 
careful comparison between his work and the official histories of the air war show a 
lack of originality. For example Ross uses the same excuses as Mellor to vindicate 
the controversial Wirraway decision: ' … that it would take five years to advance to 
the stage of producing a first-line high performance aircraft in a new and unproven 
plant'.93 The local aircraft industry commenced with the government-approved but 
not funded Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation (CAC) in Melbourne without any 
guarantee by the government it would purchase the planes constructed.94 Although a 
wonderful alternative to doing nothing, CAC was established by private 
entrepreneurs; Broken Hill Propriety Limited, Broken Hill Smelters Pty Ltd and 
General Motors Holden (GMH)95 with their own agenda, and grew along peacetime 
lines profiting from government aircraft orders. The outstanding military aircraft 
eventually made by the CAC, Department of Aircraft Production (DAP), and 
deHavilland Aviation (Australia)—the deHavilland Mosquito, North American 
Aviation F-51 Mustang, DAP Beaufighter 21 and the CA-12 Boomerang all entered 
service too late to make any worthwhile contribution to the defence of Australia or 
the defeat of Japan. One of the few references to this point comes from the unlikely 
pen of Air Marshal Sir George Jones, Chief of the Air Staff in his forward to Aircraft 
of the RAAF 1921–71 by G. Pentland and P. Malone when he wrote reservedly in 
1971: ‘From the local production we obtained mostly Wirraways, Beauforts, 
Beaufighters, Boomerangs and Mosquitos. These were good aircraft but those from 
Australian production were sometime [sic] too late to be fully effective’.96  
In his book, Wirraway to Hornet, a brief history of the CAC, Brian Hill states that 
‘History and 50 years of hindsight have vindicated and validated the choice [of the 
Wirraway] — the mission picked exactly the right aeroplane’.97 Yet Hill himself 
writes that the NA-33 ‘… was a machine regarded [sic] essentially as a trainer’98 at a 
time when the RAAF needed frontline interceptors to defend the nation against 
hostile air attack by modern warplanes—the Hurricane or Spitfire with which the 
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British were rushing to equip the RAF were the logical choice and would have 
received British blessings rather than opposition. Hill’s guarded admission that the 
Wirraway was ‘regarded’ as a trainer implied he is not prepared to admit publically 
that the aircraft was a trainer—designed, built and deployed as such by the AAF and 
the RAF. Hill also admits that Wing Commander Wackett (a member of the three-
man selection team) later regretted not building the Supermarine Spitfire of which 
the Americans had no equivalent at the time.99 
The pre-war error of equipping RAAF fighter squadrons with trainers from CAC 
production was rammed home once war began. There was no justifiable reason for 
the RAAF going into battle against the JNAS sans fighters. But Jones defends this 
policy by denying anyone intended the Wirraway as a warplane: ‘Unfortunately, 
when the Japanese attack came at the end of 1941, we were forced [sic] to use it [the 
Wirraway] as a fighter because we had nothing better’,100 conveniently overlooking 
the fact that deployment was directed during his watch as Chief of the Air Staff. 
Jones went on to state, ‘In turn this meant that the RAAF’s major effort was with 
British and American made top line aircraft’.101  
Jones’ excuse was deliberately misleading. Using Wirraways for fighters was 
decided in the 1930s and implemented with the full deliberation of RAAF and 
Defence Department officials, not as an ad hoc emergency in which the RAAF was 
… ‘forced to use it as a fighter …’ as Jones claimed. As demonstrated in this study, 
the Air Ministry issued an order after the Rabaul debacle that the Wirraway was not 
to be used as a fighter again.102 The ‘top line’ British- and American-made aircraft 
about which Jones speaks (Beaufighters, Bostons and Kittyhawks and others) did not 
reach operational service with the RAAF until after the extensive Japanese attacks on 
Rabaul, Darwin and Broome. None were interceptors or a match for the Zero 
although the Boston was just as fast. Until then, the RAAF fought the Japanese with 
a dwindling number of Lockheed Hudson light maritime bombers which fortunately, 
along with some Catalina flying boats, were bought ready-to-fly from America in 
early 1941 as described.  
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The Australian government had not prepared the RAAF for combat operations which 
had a number of important repercussions. One was dependence on Lend Lease. In 
turn this meant the government was at the mercy of Britain (which controlled the 
supply of American aircraft distributed under Lend Lease to the dominions).103 
Before December 1941, attempts were made to produce just two ‘warplanes’ in 
Australia to break from a predicted dependency in time of war. But the choice of a 
sub-standard British Beaufort and the Wirraway was unfortunate. The local RAAF 
effort, however courageous, which remained solely in the SWPA under American 
General Douglas MacArthur’s command, was all too soon wasted in what Anthony 
Beevor in his book The Second World War describes as ‘ … MacArthur [giving] the 
Australian forces the dispirited task of clearing New Guinea and Borneo of … 
pockets of Japanese’.104  
This point by Beevor in itself is an understatement, but importantly, was a by-
product of pre-war unpreparedness that helped make the Australian military 
subservient to the Americans when the RAAF lacked the equipment to remain 
independent. ‘Pockets’ implies small, isolated groups of by-passed, semi-harmless 
Japanese forces easily overcome. In reality there were tens of thousands of hostile 
enemy soldiers ready to fight viciously to the last man whom Americans had driven 
into the jungle on the islands they wanted as air bases.105 Had the government 
equipped the RAAF for active service, the RAAF would have been vital to the 
Americans and in the position of the RAF in Europe; able to remain independent of 
the American command with the government retaining control. By not compiling a 
fighter force for home defence, Darwin, Townsville, Port Moresby and Milne Bay all 
had to be defended by an ad hoc collection of imported American-made P-39s,  
P-400s and P-40s flown by both Australians and American pilots. That these fighters 
arrived in time was only by luck; they were aboard US convoys bound for the 
Philippines diverted to Brisbane and Melbourne when Manila was besieged.106  
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Filling the gap 
There is a major gap in published literature of the political mistakes, procrastination 
and back-sliding that passed as an air defence policy in Australia between the World 
Wars. The dependence on local aircraft production alone was reliance misplaced. 
The Australian aircraft industry was too small and too slow for the job. As just one 
example, when planned for local production in 1941 before the Pacific War, the 
deHavilland Mosquito was a world standard intruder. In Britain, a government 
contract was placed with deHavilland Company by the Air Ministry for fifty 
Mosquitos for the RAF, after it gave an impressive first flight on 25 November 
1940.107 The ‘wooden wonder’ was also one the most cost-effective aircraft of all 
time being inexpensive to build with its wood frame and was relatively easy to 
repair. Yet the Australian government, in its pre-war indecisiveness, lost the 
opportunity to manufacture the Mosquito in time for the nation’s defence crisis of 
1942. By the time it got into frontline service in 1944 three years later due to 
technical problems in production and a year wasted over the decision to make it at 
all, the war had moved out of the SWPA in which the RAAF operated. 
 
 
(Source: Australian War Museum (AWM)) 
Figure 19: New Mosquitos await delivery to the RAAF outside de Havilland’s Bankstown factory, 
NSW in 1944. By then the SWPA was a backwater yet the RAAF continued to attack Japanese 
occupied islands losing valuable machines and crews in the process. 
 
Thus the CAC and DAP failed to provide the RAAF with first-line designs at the 
time they were needed. This point, highlighted by Jones’ guarded admission quoted 
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above, has not been examined or even properly researched by historians exemplified 
by the government’s delayed interest in the Mosquito or its rival, the Lockheed 
Lightning, a dedicated daytime interceptor.  
Stewart Wilson in his book, Beaufort, Beaufighters and Mosquito in Australian 
Service108, has written competently if in lack lustre genre about the history of some 
of the planes in Australian service but has not tackled the political roadblocks that 
hindered their slow introduction into RAAF service. Had the Mosquito, for example, 
been rushed into production (as in England) after the decision to manufacture it in 
Australia in September 1941,109  the Mosquito may have been operational in time for 
the defence of Australia and New Guinea.  
With the government’s planned manufacture of the Mosquito before Pearl Harbor 
and its order for fifty-four Beaufighers, its members knew the Wirraway was not 
capable of filling the role of a fighter as claimed in the late 1930s. Yet the Menzies 
government still defended its decision to deploy the Wirraway to forward air bases 
with fighter squadrons in the pretence it would be adequate; a needless waste of men 
and machines for apparent political reasons. When John Curtin attained office weeks 
before the new war, he took no immediately action to redress the situation by 
ordering fighters from the USA to replace the Wirraways or withdrawing them from 
active service. These facts have not been brought forward in any history of the 
Pacific war as far as can be established.  
Bob Wurth’s book Saving Australia,110 looks into the theory that Curtin tried to 
prevent a Japanese invasion of Australia through his close friendship with Japanese 
Ambassador Tatsuo Kawai. But it would be ‘drawing a long bow’ to link Wurth’s 
thesis with Curtin’s lack of action over the replacement or at least withdrawal of 
Wirraways. 
The wrong Wirraway myth remains 
The myth of Wirraways taking to the skies in numbers to ward off the Japanese was 
perpetuated in folklore even in international publications. For instance, the 
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Instructions for American Servicemen in Australia 1942, published by the Special 
Services Division, Services of Supply, United States Army in Washington and issued 
to thousands of American servicemen and women bound for Australia states: ‘When 
the Japs first threatened invasion of Australia, the RAAF (Royal Australian Air 
Force) fought off the enemy bombers with trainer planes—almost all they had’.111 
The epic of the Wirraway being a semi-effective warplane was passing into folklore 
for the wrong reasons. No member of the Lyons’ Government in power at the time of 
the Wirraway decision being taken, was ever brought to account. Lyons died before 
the Pacific War started, designated fighters arrived just in time from the USA, and 
the whole fiasco was quietly ‘swept under the carpet’. It was as if equipping the 
RAAF with Wirraways as fighters had never been part of government policy and it 
was only the incredible bravery of their pilots that saw them used in combat. There 
was no Royal Commission into the matter while newspaper accounts glorified the 
heroism of the dead aircrews but did not recount the process that sent them into 
combat in a trainer.  
The industries of the Australian government’s major allies, America and Britain, 
were equal in aircraft design and production to that of the Axis powers. Thus the 
Australian government was still able to acquire assistance with its fledgling aircraft 
industry, manufacturing both American and British warplanes. But more importantly, 
the mass production methods of America, and to a lesser extent the UK, were so 
prolific that the government could purchase military aircraft from these two sources 
and make up, to some degree, ground lost through inept pre-war decisions. The 
histories of American and British aircraft design and manufacture are therefore of 
general import to this study and to a lesser extent, those of the Axis powers. For 
example the CAC, despite it official sounding name was a privately-owned company 
as described, notwithstanding statements to the contrary and questions raised in 
federal parliament about its funding.  
When it made the controversial decision to produce the Wirraway, the ramifications 
were pivotal to the air defence of Australia. The AT-6’s history is well documented 
in publications on American warplanes of the Second World War such as The 
Concise Guide to American Aircraft of World War II written by David Mondey and 
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published originally by Hamlyn Press in 1982,112 which at no time refers to the 
Harvard as a warplane. This well-researched and illustrated book can be taken as 
representative of a number of post-war documentary style books on the military 
planes of the major belligerents of World War II. Mondey, like Green before him, 
tries to satisfy the endless fascination with that conflict. Their relevance to this study 
lies not only in the AT-6 which became the Wirraway locally, but brings to the fore 
the large number of designated fighters and interceptors, particularly those of the 
USA built for Pacific conditions, that could have been acquired for the RAAF in the 
vital months between the late 1930s and December 1941. Had Australian politicians 
been equal to the task of selecting single-seat, high powered interceptors for its air 
force and ready-made American medium bombers as had other Allied nations, then 
the air defence of Australian territory may have been a success story instead of one 
of disaster.   
Other general histories of importance to World War II cover the undeclared wars in 
Finland, China and Spain of the 1930s in which burgeoning air power was a decisive 
ingredient. The Rape of Nanking by Iris Chang113 is the bestselling book of the Sino-
Japanese war reportedly unveiling ‘the forgotten holocaust of World War II’114 does 
include some detail of the war in the air but the efficiency and sophistication of the 
Japanese Naval and Army Air Services is not closely examined. The main thrust of 
the air war is the way the Japanese bombed civilians in what often appears to be a 
one-sided affair. But as examined in this study, the Spanish and Chinese conflicts 
revealed for the first time that even the latest German, Italian and Japanese bombers 
could not operate without fighter escort.  
The outstanding publication of the Spanish Civil War titled Architects of Air Power 
by David Nevin does not attempt to address this issue.115 Instead, Nevin debunks the 
theory that a nation could be subdued by air power alone as envisaged by Douhet and 
Mitchell: 
German officers … viewed the raid [against Madrid] partly as an experiment to test the effects of 
bombing on civilians. Strangely … the reaction of Madrid’s populace was … different from the 
expectations of the apostles of aerial bombardment. The people were not induced to surrender by 
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the bursting bombs and raging fires; they were not even demoralized. Instead, from different 
parts of the city, like a rumbling drum, came the defiant cry of Republican resistance, chanted 
syllabically by thousands of voices: “No pa-sa-ran! No pa-sa-ran! No pa-sa-ran!” — “They shall 
not pass!” And they did not pass. When the bombing stopped, the Nationalist were no closer to 
taking Madrid than they had been.116  
The aeroplane as a war weapon  
With aircraft and the air battles as their subject, long after the First World War a 
number of important books emerged. It is poignant that such compilations appeared 
when they did. By such timing, the gloss, opinions and beliefs that persisted during 
and immediately after the conflict could be discounted and the real situation 
examined and described as much as possible with the pilots, aircrews and all others 
involved, deceased or otherwise unavailable. But personal diaries, official 
documents, log books and similar records, still give objective descriptions that have 
been compiled into important historical publications.  
An outstanding example of this relatively small raft of literature centreing on the first 
air war is Jon Guttman’s Fighting Firsts: Fighter Aircraft Combat Debuts from 
1914–1944 published in 2000.117 The first five chapters are dedicated to the air war 
when the aeroplane was evolving from a vulnerable, unarmed, wood and wire aerial 
scout-car to a potent weapon capable of deciding battles—the shape of the future. In 
particular Chapter 5, ‘Passing Glimpses of Things to Come: Fighters of 1918’, is 
relevant to the beginning of this study. In the conclusion to the chapter, the author 
opines:  
When World War I begun, the fighter plane did not exist. The war’s last year showed how far 
aviation had come, and the sleek, swift fighting machines of 1918 had showcased many of its most 
noteworthy structural refinements. … a good many of the innovation making news managed to be 
too far ahead of their time. While the immediate future was claimed by conventional wood-and-
wire biplanes like the Bristol F.2B and the Sopwith Snipe, aeroplanes featuring such refinements 
as radial engines, monoplane wings, cantilever wing structures and all-metal construction 
generally proved to be less practical … as passing glimpses of things … to come. It would not be 
long … before the state of the art caught up with the concepts they had pioneered.118  
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Guttman’s summation, correct in context, does omit other detail such as aerial 
cannon, retractable undercarriages and enclosed cockpits. And the fact that the 
carryover of aircraft design of which Guttman writes lingered too long into the 
interwar years of ‘peace’. The physiological battle between monoplane and biplane 
design, for instance, did not end until the Spanish Civil War. And the British hung 
onto biplane layout and open cockpits long after the monoplane was obviously faster 
and more versatile— outboard turrets, folding wheels and tricycle undercarriages—
the latter pioneered by Americans well before being accepted by other 
manufacturers.   
Such stubbornness not only meant the RAF was forced to fly biplanes in World War 
II but also led to the mass production of the Hurricane and the Mosquito for frontline 
service; both a combination of wood, aluminium and canvas. These hybrids had 
advantages while the RAF was a defence force but the Hurricane was obsolete by 
1941 and the Mosquito, a superior machine, did not stand up to all climatic 
conditions due to its wooden fuselage as already indicated.119 Manufacture of the 
Mosquito in New South Wales (NSW) by the British-owned deHavilland Company 
began in September 1941, yet the first one was not delivered to the RAAF until 5 
March 1944 due largely to finding the correct combination of Australian wood and 
glue and a shortage of skilled workers.120 Wilson covers the development of most 
combat aircraft used by the RAAF in the Pacific in detail but without sources. 
Although he adds to the raft of knowledge on the trials and tribulations of the 
Australian aircraft industry, much of the information was already available in the 
official war histories from Mellor.  
Australia and World War I  
Government authorised histories like the Official History of Australia in the War of 
1914–18 by C. E. W. Bean, published in six volumes by the Australian War 
Memorial Board, twenty-three years in the making, are also relevant albeit, with 
reference-only purpose. Bean, a traditionalist, displayed little interest in the 
burgeoning Royal Flying Corps (evolving as the RAF, the Royal Naval Air Service 
(RNAS) or the Australian Flying Corps (AFC). This is a serious omission. It was 
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British carrier-based biplanes attacking ‘targets of opportunity’—rail marshalling 
yards, bridges, airbases, Zeppelin ‘sheds’ and residential precincts housing factory 
workers beyond the front-line, that was to revolutionise the war in the air. 
 
 
(Source: Imperial War Museum) 
Figure 20: An early British aircraft carrier accepts a Sopwith Pup during trials. Aircraft had to be 
hauled down by hand until arrestor gear was invented (in America). 
 
Bean’s work is a meticulously sad one of the slaughter of soldiers, huge casualty 
numbers, and without analysis of the decisions that caused it. But he did have the 
advantages, as he writes, of basing his narrative on first-hand observations and 
evidence ‘ … to old comrades of the First AIF of every rank for their unfailing 
readiness to help …’121 although no mention is made of aircrews of both sides whom 
he could have interviewed. His only worthwhile acknowledgement of Australian 
aviators’ involvement in the conflict is a quote from an English Lieutenant-Colonel 
L. A. Strange, the commander of the 80th Wing, RAF with which the two Australian 
fighter squadrons in France were operating. In this regard, Bean noted: ‘It became 
the practice for our Australian squadrons to lead the [RAF] 80th Wing’s bombing 
raids. When later in the year (1918) over a hundred machines set out on missions, the 
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spearpoint was always formed of Australian airmen led by an Australian’.122 
Unfortunately no photographs of British, French, or German aircraft or Australian 
squadrons appear in Bean’s six volumes (although they depict landscape where 
battles were fought, old trenches and broken down tanks). The environment of the 
birth of air power, as he must have realised when finishing the First World War’s 
history in 1942 after Pearl Harbor and the Battle of Britain, proved so decisively that 
the nation controlling the air, controlled the war. A better approach may have been 
separate volumes on the three Australian services as was done after World War II.  
The wars of the world 
Through the era of ‘peace’, development of military technology slowed immediately 
after World War I and again during the Great Depression. But by the mid-1930s the 
civil war in Spain and the Japanese invasion of Manchuria and China were 
significant milestones in aerial warfare if anyone in Australian political circles had 
bothered to study them. In particular they showed the advancements in offensive 
monoplanes of the Russians, Japanese and Germans and their increased performance 
over the biplane. The British and Americans, by not involving themselves directly in 
these wars, missed the opportunity for their pilots to gain operational experience. 
Conservative British politician generally were too timid to chance another ground 
war against Germany. The Americans had adopted an isolationist policy disillusioned 
over the outcome of World War I. The Germans had been militarily defeated but the 
reparation policies applied by the Allies built resentment and revenge-seeking when 
the coalition tried to enforce them.  
Localised, one-sided, conflicts of the strong against the weak also made public the 
predominance of the fighter over the bomber once the German Messerschmitt 109 
and Mitsubishi Zero-Sen were introduced into the two separate but time-parallel 
campaigns. Aircraft supplied to China and the Spanish by the Western powers and 
Russia were immediately outclassed, albeit with some reservations. The British, ever 
on the defensive as they fell behind Germany in their exploitation of the tank and the 
bomber, seemed to learn this lesson well and gained parity with their Supermarine 
Spitfire. They enlarged their monoplane fighter force quickly between 1936 and 
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1939 while the Americans concentrated on heavy, medium and light bombers at the 
expense of fighters—an omission that would later have near fatal results for the 
Western world. Had the Germans not attacked Poland in 1939, the urgent need for 
better interceptors might not have been appreciated and the rush to get 400 mph-plus 
long-ranged fighters into US squadrons not implemented in time for the war against 
Japan. Britain and its Commonwealth, France, Russia and many other Allied nations 
also relied heavily on the Americans for Lend-Lease fighters. 
The aircraft that won and lost World War II 
Accurate histories of individual monoplane aircraft invented during the most 
important period of military history—the late 1930s and early 1940s—on whose 
performance the fate of all nations hung after September 1939 did not appear until 
after World War II when censorship was lifted, propaganda was irrelevant and 
government files were opened. Newspaper articles and radio broadcasts were the 
main sources of information during the war and sometimes to the enemy. According 
to Peter Williams, author of The Kokoda Campaign 1942, ‘On 5 October [1942], 
when the Japanese were falling back from Kokoda and were unaware of the location 
of the Australian pursuit, The Sydney Morning Herald divulged that the pursuers had 
reached Efogi’.123 Newspaper articles were usually accurate although they have to be 
approached with care.  
The post-war historical trend began in the 1960s. William Green was the main 
promoter with his definitively researched books on the development and manufacture 
of the most important warplanes of the 1939–45 conflict—Famous Fighters of the 
Second World War124 followed by Famous Bombers of the Second World War.125 The 
omission of the combat history of the aircraft about which Green writes means 
looking further for details during the Sino-Japanese and Spanish conflicts and during 
the September 1939–December 1941 period. Green does include aircraft numbers 
produced and their performance. It would have surprised many readers to learn that 
the Hurricane ‘… was a disappointment in fighter-versus-fighter combat against the 
Messerschmitt Me-109’.126 Also Green’s reluctant admission that the American  
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F-51 Mustang was … ‘Perhaps the most successful piston-engined fighter produced 
by any nation …’ would have been another surprise to British readers.127  
The wartime British booklet Aircraft Identification, produced by The Aeroplane128 
magazine, called the Spitfire: ‘A thoroughbred aeroplane with a name which has 
captured the imagination of the British people and combines beauty with 
performance—the Supermarine Spitfire is the greatest aeroplane of all time’.129 
Although post-war research reveals it was out-performed by the German Fw-190 
Focke Wulf in 1943 as Green admits, the image of the Spitfire was used by 
politicians for propaganda. The populations of Britain and its Commonwealth 
believed their own media’s propaganda for the duration of the European war and the 
notion that the Spitfire won the Battle of Britain; that the winning of the battle led to 
the winning of the war, embellished by Prime Minister Churchill’s eloquent 
speeches, led to the Spitfire’s alleged invincibility.130 This propaganda would later 
handicap the RAAF in getting the latest American fighters instead of an obsolete 
version of the Spitfire.  
The worldwide success of Green’s volumes encouraged him to broaden his research 
into almost all fighters and interceptors of World War II in four minute volumes. He 
included some lesser known aircraft such as the CAC Boomerang. There are also 
minor mistakes such as his claim that the Vickers Wellington bomber ‘disproved the 
widely held belief that large bombers could undertake daylight attacks against 
heavily defended areas without fighter escort’.131 But this was established beyond 
doubt during the German air invasion of Southern England and before that in Spain 
and China. In his autobiography, Zeke pilot Masatake Okuiya in Zero132 admitted that 
unsustainable bomber losses were inflicted on the Japanese by the Chinese Air Force 
on 13 and 15 May 1940 when Chungking and Hankow were bombed in the heaviest 
raids of the war. Losses rose above the ‘prohibitive figure of 10 per cent’.133 The 
Japanese answer was to deploy their super-plane, the Zeke (Mitsubishi Zero-Sen type 
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‘O’) escort fighter to regain air superiority. The RAF in the same situation without an 
escort fighter was forced to switch to inaccurate nocturnal area bombing with targets 
difficult to locate. Pre-war predictions, (already failures in Spain and China) that 
bombing could win wars, were discounted early in the European conflict of 
September 1939.  
The combat between the RAF and Luftwaffe over Southern England in 1940 (which 
was a British success but with the Germans claiming ‘… the battle was broken 
prematurely by order of top-level command because the German Air Force was 
needed for the forthcoming war with Soviet Russia’134 revealed some standout 
examples of air battles ahead. But for minor powers like Australia it was a practical 
demonstration of first class interceptors being irreplaceable. Even with a relatively 
high number of ordinary interceptors like the Hurricane, medium Japanese bombers 
could probably have been repulsed or forced into ineffective night bombing. 
According to author Chester Wilmot whose book The Struggle for Europe was 
published in 1952 and regarded by Life as ‘The best single volume on the war in 
Europe’,135 states that ‘As for night bombing, the Luftwaffe had neither the trained 
crews nor the technical equipment to obtain accurate results’.136 Once the Germans 
changed from strategic to area bombing, the RAF was saved. 0 
Very few aircraft were designed, manufactured and became operational during the 
war. Therefore aircraft books looked into the development of successful military 
aircraft invented between the World Wars, particularly the late 1930s and refined 
during operational action. But such books were mostly written by Britons whose bias 
towards English aircraft, although camouflaged, was noticeable with opinions and 
quotes that defy the facts such as the Avro Lancaster being the best bomber of World 
War II when it was completely outclassed by the Boeing B-29 Superfortress.137  
Before Green and the 1960s, the history of warplanes from the 1930s and their 
development came almost entirely from the media and aircraft periodicals such as 
Flight and the Aeroplane often based on press releases. These two well-regarded 
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British magazines, which sold in Australia, were as objective as censorship 
surrounding military aircraft would allow. After World War II, first-hand details 
were from biographies and autobiographies in the late 1940s and 1950s of the 
aviators who flew warplanes in combat. Of special interest are those who served 
before World War II. Such literature included Reach for the Sky,138 the biography of 
legless RAF pilot Doulas Bader by Paul Brickhill, The Big Show139, autobiography of 
French RAF ace Pierre Closterman and Zero140 from Masatake Okumiya and Jiro 
Horikoshi; God is My Co-pilot141 by Col. Robert Lee Scott Jr.; Wing Leader142 by 
Johnnie Johnson; and The First and the Last143 by Adolf Galland, Germany’s ace 
Me-109 pilot who survived both the Spanish and European wars.  
As Green points out in his introduction to Famous Fighters of the Second World 
War, part of his thesis was to correct misconceptions from the Second World War or 
from Allied and Axis combat crews in their post-war accounts in recounting 
experience from their own perspective. Galland’s work is of particular import as he 
flew in the Spanish Civil War with the Legion Condor and was a Luftwaffe fighter 
pilot during the Battle of Britain. The same applies to Masatake Okumiya who flew 
Claudes and Zekes against the Chinese Air Force and AVG from 1937.144 Okumiya 
gave valuable and objective insight into fighting Allied types, some of which the 
RAAF could have obtained before December 1941. The experience gained by 
Galland and Okumiya in Spain and China respectively, by their own admissions, 
helped them combat inexperienced Allied pilots at the start of World War II.  
Australian political masters  
Political-defence concepts in Australia between the Wars have not been covered in 
detail in one publication. Obviously events were not dramatic or dynamic—there was 
no ongoing theme, sensationalism or pressing public interest. Publications that did 
appear seemed to be university theses converted into books. Most publications of the 
period tended to touch only on defence politics treating it as background to World 
                                                 
138 Brickhill, P. 1954, Reach for the Sky, Odhams Press Ltd., London.  
139 Closterman, P. 1951, The Big Show, Chatto and Windus, London.  
140 Okumiya, M., et al, op. cit., p. 78. 
141 Scott Jr., R. 1943, God is My Co-Pilot, Blue Ribbon Books, New York.  
142 Johnson, J. 1956, Wing Leader, Chatto and Windus, London.  
143 Galland, A., op. cit.  
144 Okumiya, M. et al., op. cit. p. 79.  
76 
War II. For example, Gillison (1962) in the official history, Royal Australian Air 
Force 1939–42,145 includes details of the formation of the RAAF. His account covers 
the procurement of aircraft and funding with little reference to the political 
indecision and procrastination that ended in a ‘fighter-less’ air force in 1941. Rather, 
Gillison’s work is a fact-finding tour of combat in the SWPA to the end of 1942.  
John McCarthy's Australia and Imperial Defence 1918–39146 was published in 1976. 
It concentrates on the inter-war relationship between Britain, Australia and New 
Zealand. It does not examine the impact of the problems arising from the one-way 
relationship so much as the government’s so-called ‘hostage’ to imperial defence. 
The idea of a hostage relationship (which did not really exist) is examined in this 
thesis. With the selection of an American ‘fighter’ for manufacture in Australia 
during the 1930s when the superior Hurricane and Spitfire may have been built 
instead, appeared to illustrate the Australians ostensibly stepped outside the 
relationship but hidden agendas were at play. These points have not been examined 
before nor has the fact that the British sent huge numbers of fighters to Russia after 
June 1941, yet none to Australia after Pearl Harbor despite the RAAF’s plight.   
The other indepth air power study is Power Plus Attitude147 from Alan Stephens of 
1992. This book covers too wide a canvas—from World War I until modern times—
to pinpoint the reports, diaries, records and decisions that culminated in the 
‘fighterless’ RAAF. Stephens' thesis was the absence of a RAAF doctrine that should 
have emerged between the wars. In the space he has, Stephens analyses the theories 
of Douhet, Trenchard, and Mitchell, and their impact on air warfare. He overstated 
the RAAF’s importance in world history and the initiative of the CAC in particular 
and Australian industry generally in tackling the building of some of the world’s 
most famous piston-engined planes.  
The Third Brother by C. D. Coulthard-Clark148 is the history of the foundation and 
evolution of the RAAF. It depicts the force as a poor-relation in the defence stakes 
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and details its struggle for survival through the inter-war and Depression years. It 
also includes the stifling effect of the imperial connection. Coulthard-Clark, in 
recounting the bravery of the RAAF's efforts not only to expand, but to survive, does 
not apply the air force’s strength directly to the 1941–42 crises but provides a 
starting point for further research. 
Misunderstood men of air  
The lives of high ranking rebel aviators, the theorists who changed the course of 
world history, are well-documented. Books such as General Billy Mitchell by Booth 
Mooney149 tell the story of Mitchell, the person. Accounts of Mitchell, Trenchard, 
and Douhet, the leaders in military aviation theory between the wars, described them 
as patriotic but misunderstood visionaries to whom few politicians would listen. 
Mitchell, given to speaking publically without approval, was a zealous USAAC Lt. 
General who staged bombing demonstrations in the 1920s against moored ex-World 
War I warships. He ignored the interceptor, which when flown from bases in range 
or from aircraft-carriers in combat, may have decimated many of his unescorted 
bombers before reaching their targets. Mitchell was too unconventional and 
outspoken to gain the decision-making audience he craved in the conservative 
political world of the 1920s and 1930s when America's involvement in a European 
conflict seemed unlikely. 
Douhet’s case is unique. He was a theorist whose visions were too elephantine to be 
demonstrated in the 1920s when he wrote Command of the Air.150 Douhet’s book was 
nevertheless a hugely influential treatise on strategic bombing. General Hap Arnold, 
Arthur Harris, Hermann Goering and even Adolf Hitler may have studied his 
theories. Certainly attempts were made to practice the art of war winning by 
bombing civilians so survivors would demand their government surrender. For 
Douhet, who was an officer in the World War I Italian infantry, to have created such 
a powerful impact on international military thinking between the Wars seems strange 
considering the genre of his works is pedestrian and unprofessional. His disjoined 
style tends to camouflage the thrust of his thesis and several readings are necessary 
to unravel his work. Much of what Douhet describes is not original; the idea of 
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subduing a nation by bombing its cities was tried unsuccessfully by the German Air 
Force in World War I. Douhet died before the fighting in China, Finland and Spain 
revealed the limitations of the bomber and the power of the interceptor and anti-
aircraft artillery. Although he described ‘combat planes’ (fighters) as necessary, 
Douhet played down their importance in interfering with bombing. 
 
 
(Source: Public domain) 
Figure 21: Hermann Goring: Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe from 1935. A World War I fighter 
ace and a Douhetist, he tried to bomb the British to the conference table in 1940 with his force of light 
bombers and short-ranged fighters and failed. 
 
The same did not apply to Claire Chennault, an ex-USAAF mercenary, sent to China 
in 1937 by the American government as an adviser to Chiang Khi-shek under orders 
from Roosevelt to organise and command the clandestine AVG, the Flying Tigers, to 
assist the Chinese Air Force.151 According to some reports, Chennault warned his 
uninterested government of the quality of Japanese operational aircraft (particularly 
the Zero) being tested in China that the Zero was superior to the American P-40 
fighters of his AVG outfit. 
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(Source: via Corbis Pictures) 
Figure 22: AVG pilots ostensibly scramble to intercept incoming Japanese aircraft. The allocation of 
one fighter group to China by Roosevelt could only have been a political gesture rather than an 
attempt to stop the Japanese. 
 
Chennault’s wife, Anna, adds human interest to her father’s legend with her 
Chennault and the Flying Tigers—Way of a Fighter152 published twenty years after 
the war and is hardly objective. Anna shows a softer, more human side of the leather-
faced man, having access to personal letters and diaries and her own memories. The 
only book that does not hero-worship Chennault and enters into the squabble 
between General ‘Vinegar’ Stilwell and Chennault over who controlled the USAAC 
in the Burma-China theatre is Barbara Tuchman’s account, Stilwell and the American 
Experience in China 1911–1945 post-Pearl Harbor.153 Stillwell was the US Army 
General in command of the Burma theatre who decided to absorb the AVG into the 
USAAC after 7 December 1941 against Chennault’s will. Going against the grain, 
Tuchman claims Stilwell made the right decision by overriding the former AVG 
civilian who continually challenged his seniors about air tactics. Right or wrong, 
military subordinates seldom win such arguments as Mitchell, Caldwell, Harris, 
MacArthur and many others found out. Chennault was no exception. 
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(Source: Public domain) 
Figure 23: Barbara Tuchman’s Stilwell autobiography won the Pulitzer Prize in 1975. It attempts to 
unravel the disagreement between Chennault and Stilwell, US Attaché to China and Commander of 
AAF in Burma, over the status of the AVG after 7 December 1941. 
 
Other books of note centred on the Flying Tigers include Baa Baa Black Sheep by 
‘Pappy’ Boyington’154—a rich vein of seemingly embellished air war stories edged in 
cynicism by a Goodyear Corsair fighter pilot who served with the AVG and Marine 
Corps before being shot down and captured.  
A History of Bombing by Sven Lindovist155 is a reference write-up—a chronological 
account of his subject. In diary style, it covers the dropping of the first bomb from a 
plane on 1 November 1911 with entries to the end of the twentieth century. It is too 
wide to include the Australian front in World War II or the theories and doctrine of 
air power. But it does include the battleship versus bomber debate of the three 
decades between the world wars.  
The bombing of civilians is controversial—the experiment of bombing as a master 
feat of psychological engineering against the straight out mass murder of the 
innocent for political-war purposes. The governments of bombed nations used the 
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theme ‘we can take it’. Morale mostly stiffened and the war effort was enhanced by 
being bombed, which in World War II was never very accurate. Large numbers of 
bombers performed a particular purpose—often a hammer against an egg—but at 
extreme cost in planes, crews and civilians.156 
There are few books that document military aircraft development during 1918–1939. 
It is a generalist area by and large and no academic studies are locatable. Unless the 
aircraft described served in World War II like the Fairy Swordfish and the Gloster 
Gladiator the planes built have received scant interest from aviation writers or 
historians. An outstanding exception is Milestones of Aviation published by the US 
Smithsonian Institution National Air and Space Museum.157 It is a classic reference 
book for dating when individual aircraft were introduced and the records set by early 
aviation pioneers although the concentration is on American milestones.  
On the other hand, famous individual aircraft that played a major role in the Second 
World War, a number of which were private ventures, have been the subject of many 
books and documentaries. Publications on the history of the Spitfire, Mosquito, 
Lancaster, Mustang, Liberator, Mitchell, Zero, Messerschmitt 109, Flying Fortress, 
Lightning and Kittyhawk are numerous and new publications continue to appear 
regularly. 158 But the history of aircraft that served between the wars and never saw 
combat has been neglected. Again there is just not enough reader interest to generate 
the research involved.  
The other concise reference guide besides Green’s is Jane's Fighting Aircraft of 
World War II159 (published and republished by Random House for each year of the 
conflict without dedicated authors or editors). These books are objective, factual and 
authentic but do not include details of the Axis and Allied aircraft’s operational 
history. Being published during the conflict meant that some details, including the 
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performance of all aircraft, were still secret. Unlike Green’s work, Jane’s books 
contain all aircraft invented by the belligerents including the CAC’s Wirraway, 
Boomerang and Woomera. They are probably the closest publications to definitive 
coverage. 
There have been no similar books telling of the individual development of 
Australian-made wartime or pre-war planes that the writer could locate. The 
Wirraway, Beaufort, Beaufighter and the other aircraft produced in Australia both 
before and during the war were British and American designs built by licence. So 
their full development is either included in the official histories of Australia at war 
such as The Role of Science and Industry,160 published by the Australian War 
Memorial, included in books about the aircraft that equipped the RAAF, or as an 
appendage to international books covering the development of the original aircraft-
type by the American or British parent company. In many publications about 
wartime aircraft the Boomerang and Wirraway are mostly excluded.  
The role of warplanes during the inter-war years is also neglected or précised. The 
development of the aircraft carrier paralleled the evolution of warplanes and its 
gradual domination of naval warfare but its potential was not addressed in Australia. 
Aircraft carriers were a British invention near the end of World War I by adding 
landing decks to merchant ships for protecting convoys. Ironically, it was Americans 
and Japanese who eventually exploited the carrier's full potential. Carrier-based 
warplanes could be deployed to bomb naval bases as was done at Taranto in 1940, 
support amphibious landings, bomb an enemy’s homeland, and eliminate the other 
side's capital ships. 
At first it seemed that contemporary military aircraft could not operate from short 
carrier decks. This gave the impression naval aircraft would always be poorer 
performers than land planes. The British appeared to believe this to be true and 
retained short take-off and landing biplanes on their carriers. Such practice prevailed 
until the Japanese deployed their Army Zero-Zen as a naval fighter. This gave Japan 
a huge advantage. The Zero had the performance of a land plane with a longer range 
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than European fighters. The Zero was thus the world’s best naval fighter for the first 
eighteen months of the Pacific War.161  
The Pacific sea battles that turned the tide—Coral Sea and Midway—were fought 
over the horizon by American and Japanese carrier-based aircraft. These two battles 
of mid-1942 marked the limit of the seemingly unstoppable Japanese advance, also 
illustrating the vulnerability of the carrier. Ironically it required protection from the 
warships it replaced, the battleship and the cruiser which had a new role—escorting 
the carrier and defending it from submarine and air attack. The best aircraft carrier 
reference book is probably Bernard Ireland’s Aircraft Carriers of the World162 of 
2005.  
There is a number of publications examining the Japanese role in prelude to the 
Pacific conflict. These books give insight into the mind-set of the then-enemy and his 
ambitions. The warning signs that could have alerted the Australians to quickly build 
an operational air force are documented. Particularly poignant are the Japanese 
incursions into China and then Indo China. Japan's War by Edwin Hoyt,163 although 
not an academic study, details Japanese preparations and sign-posts ignored by the 
Western powers. According to Hoyt, they were obviously positioning themselves for 
expeditions into South Asia with further strikes south and west. The Japanese 
coveted territories occupied by America, Britain, and Holland long before 7 
December 1941.  
Better still is the first hand account by Otto Tolischus titled Tokyo Record164 of 1944. 
Tolischus won the Pulitzer Prize for journalism in 1940 while representing the New 
York Times in Berlin before being expelled by the Hitler regime.165 He was one of the 
last Americans allowed into Japan in 1941only to be interred after 7 December. 
Tolischus’s book was written on a day-by-day diary basis and documents events in 
Japan that were obviously leading to war. There is no indication that he alerted his 
government of the impending Japanese military assault, but Tolischus does write that 
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the media was waging a ‘war of nerves’ against the Americans and the Japanese 
government’s intentions were therefore well advertised. As an example, he wrote that 
in February 1941: 
The opening gun was fired, as was fitting in a “war of nerves” not by the military, but 
by the new … Japanese Fuhrer—Prince Fumimaro Konoe, the Premier. In a press 
interview in October 1940, Koneye declared: “In the event that the United States 
recognizes Japan’s stand in Asia and the stand of Germany and Italy in Europe, these 
three Powers are ready to recognize the stand of the United States in the Western 
Hemisphere.” But he [the Premier] added: “If the United States refuses to understand 
the real intentions of Japan, Germany, and Italy, and persists in challenging those 
Powers, there will be no other course open to them but to go to war.”166 
Tolischus claims this and similar statements were published in Japanese newspapers 
but aimed at a worldwide audience. Japanese arrogance also blinkered the potential 
of America’s military might—two years into the Pacific War the USN was stronger 
than the combined navies of all America’s allies and enemies.167 The same applied to 
US war production. By 1943 its factories made one and a half times the war material 
of the three Axis powers combined and by 1944, production was more than double 
that of Germany, Italy and Japan.168 Also of interest to this thesis is the fact that by 
February 1941 the Japanese ‘were establishing airports in French Indo-China, a few 
hours flight from Singapore’.169 Tolischus wrote that as a consequence, ‘Australian 
statesmen were proclaiming that “the shadows of war are deepening over the Pacific” 
and that they were putting Australia on a war footing to repel invasion’.170 Tolischus 
does not indicate his source, but he does emphasis that the Australian authorities had 
warning to take drastic steps to protect their nation from air attack.  
The other area of relevance is that of the main military and political figures who 
participated in Australia's defence. General MacArthur was the key military officer 
in the South West Pacific Area before and during the War. His career spanned 
decades and his controversial role in the defence of the Philippines was crucial to 
Australia's exposed plight. Part of Australian complacency was obviously based on 
the American presence in the Philippines and the British in Malaya. In turn, their 
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governments believed that the AAF build-up in the Philippines with its B-17s would 
deter the Japanese from going to war.171 Costello argues that MacArthur considered 
his B-17s his ‘ace units’ and planned to launch air strikes, not only against Japanese 
bases in Formosa, but against Japan itself.172 Thirty-six of these giants had reached 
Clark Air Base by October 1941 and according to US Secretary of War, Henry 
Stimson, by being there, had ‘revolutionised’ the American strategic possibilities 
against Japan.173 
 
 
(Source: USAF) 
Figure 24: Boeing B-17D Flying Fortress four-engined bombers deployed to Luzon as America’s ‘big 
stick’ deterrent. No other nation possessed such a plane giving rise to the impression the B–17 was 
impregnable to fighter attack. Due to command bungling, most were destroyed on the ground 
 
The presence of this force ready to respond to Japanese aggression must have 
comforted British and Australian leaders, but a bungle neutralised its effect. 
According to Costello, MacArthur and Chief of Staff, General Sutherland, even after 
receiving news of Pearl Harbor, blocked a pre-emptive B-17 strike against Japanese 
bases in Formosa that proved disastrous.174 Due to MacArthur’s inertia, about half the 
B-17 force was destroyed on the ground.175 Thus in one dreadful day which the Far 
East USAAC Commander, General Brereton called ‘… a tragic timetable, one of the 
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blackest days in U.S. military history’,176 the US military air power buffer between 
the Philippines and Australia was gone. As Brereton conceded in his diary, ‘the 
ultimate collapse of resistance in the Philippines was due primarily to the loss of 
airpower’.177 Costello’s book remains important as it gives insight into American 
self-delusion of ability which unravelled quickly once the Japanese struck.  
American Caesar by William Manchester178 is more in keeping with the usual 
American patriotic vision of maintaining MacArthur’s status. Manchester paints a 
near picture perfect of the general and his handling of the Philippines defence and his 
strategic moves thereafter. Manchester is an apologist and blames others for the 
command indecision that resulted in so many AAF aircraft being lost cheaply after 
hostilities begun. Manchester arguably presents a flawed account both about 
MacArthur’s ability to rewrite history in his own image and in his interpretation of 
MacArthur’s manipulation of Australian military officers and politicians. Such a 
book cannot be taken seriously—it is too flexible in its approach to the truth both 
about the Philippines’ saga and the Australian front where Blamey was probably the 
better and more experienced general.  
Once MacArthur put an American general in charge of the Allied air forces in 
Australia, then the RAAF became the poor relation with its mottled collection of 
planes and inability to destroy Japanese warships. This in turn was another off-spin 
from the lack of pre-war planning. The RAAF had to await delivery of Lend Lease 
planes to join the fight under American control. When US aircraft did arrive, they 
were never the latest types which the USAAF retained. The Americans appeared to 
have a policy of exporting rejected or second-rate warplanes to their allies and 
keeping the best for themselves. 
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(Source: AWM) 
Figure 25: RAAF Lend Lease Vengeance dive-bombers in 1943. No record of one sinking an enemy 
ship exits. Selling the Vengeance to Australia seemed an example of the US government ‘dumping’ 
aircraft that the AAF did not want but had been purchased in advance from the manufacturer; in this 
case Vultee. Such was the position Australian authorities reached by not equipping the RAAF with 
first-line warplanes before the war. 
 
Books about the life and times of John Curtin, the pre-war opposition leader who 
assumed power on 7 October 1941, are important.179 Australia's Perilous Years by 
John Buckley,180 John Curtin, a life by David Day181 and John Curtin by L. Ross182 
are three attempts to analyse his leadership. Curtin had some broad ideas about air 
power and its application to defence but detail was lacking. His wartime actions and 
statements seemed to show an impractical air power thinker. Instead of organising an 
operational air force quickly when he won office, Curtin took no action. When 
MacArthur arrived in Australia in April 1942, Curtin gave him carte blanche 
command of the Australian military which ended its independence. American control 
became a political issue after the invasion threat passed and MacArthur by-passed 
the Australian services. Such issue is beyond this thesis except when it impacts on 
equipping the RAAF. For example under US control American commanders decided 
the RAAF’s fate—it received only P-40s when the AAF was equipped with better 
fighters.   
These events are documented in Australian publications to a limited degree, but not 
in the detail or originality required of this study. And none of the above books, 
objective as they try to be, unravels the reason why Curtin, as Prime Minister in late 
1941, did nothing to upgrade the RAAF as he had advocated in his criticism of 
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Lyons and Menzies. When war broke out, the RAAF was still equipped with 
Wirraways; even by 3 March 1942 when Broome was attacked, the RAAF was still 
without fighters.183  
Publications about Sir Winston Churchill are many and varied. His main interest was 
the European front and he seemed to care little for Australia’s defence or post-war 
relationships—the Australian military was just too small to influence the outcome of 
the war. The years between the wars as referred to in Finest Hour by Martin 
Gilbert184 and Churchill's War by David Irving185 are important relative to the 
Singapore syndrome. Churchill obviously saw the Japanese as the least evil of the 
three Axis powers. He thus concentrated his political efforts at getting the Americans 
involved and keeping the Russian front from collapse by supplying hardware to the 
Soviets. Once Singapore fell, the British withdrew from the Pacific and returned 
when the European war was ending. Basically, Churchill coerced Menzies into 
sending forces to North Africa and Britain before December 1941 on the pretence 
that a reciprocal arrangement was in place.   
No news is bad news 
The inter-war years, although largely ignored by writers, are important due to 
technological advancements in aircraft crucial to the outcome of World War II. For 
example there is little literature on the Japanese invasion of Manchuria and China 
covering the air war, the conflict between Finland and Russia, and the civil war in 
Spain. Yet these conflicts were dress rehearsals for World War II and war in the air. 
Years of ‘peace’ are of limited interest to authors for one obvious reason—there were 
scant public attention-getting events. Aircraft development was slow with a heavy 
concentration on its commercial value. The transition from biplane to monoplane, for 
instance, took almost twenty years. At the outbreak of World War II all major 
belligerents were still partly equipped with biplanes. Yet in four years of war, 
fighters evolved from the canvas covered Hurricane with its single blade propeller to 
the Lockheed Shooting Star, Gloster Meteor and Messerschmitt 262 jets—a twofold 
increase in speed. 
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Imperial defence has also been neglected by other than Australian writers with its 
poor universal appeal, probably because of its failure. Even today, criticism of the 
British seems taboo. This thesis will fill a gap by addressing imperial defence 
cognisant to Australian air power between the wars and the failure of successive 
governments to prevent the draining off of Australian forces by the imperial defence 
relationship and the inability of the British to protect Australia from Japan. It also 
examines the aeroplane versus battleship controversy as it affects air defence and the 
imperial issue.  The Great Betrayal by David Day186 claims that the British deceived 
the Australians to extract maximum help from Australia while reassuring protection 
but this conventional and convenient belief does not appear to take into account the 
many messages sent to both Australia and the dominions indicating directly or 
indirectly that they could not expect military assistance from Britain.  
The failure of literature on imperial defence is not to admit, as Graham Freudenberg 
finally does in 2008, that the Australian government ‘was appalled at the idea of the 
British Empire going to war over Danzig’;187 The Australian military was just not 
ready to contribute with its run down military forces. Australia was badly scarred 
from the Great War and the Depression and attempting to rearm with British 
equipment. Had Lyons, then-Prime Minister and a staunch pacifist not died at the 
reins at this critical point, the government might have wavered due to the threat 
posed by Japan. Freudenberg argues rightly that Churchill, First Lord of the 
Admiralty, was, after Menzies’ infamous ‘Australia is also at war’ speech, partly 
responsible for the unprepared state of the military. After 9 November 1939, 
Chamberlain recalled the RN west of Suez which included most of the RAN.188 Had 
the Australian defence forces possessed an operational air force, then it too would 
probably have gone to the Middle East to defend Egypt with the army and navy. 
Thus Australia was denuded of its military power although arguably and in fairness, 
the British saw the war as a global one with Germany the most dangerous adversary. 
This point is often overlooked by Australian historians, many of whom again, over-
state the importance of Australia and its people in a world at war.   
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Drew Cottle in his book, The Brisbane Line: A Reappraisal189gives the most detailed 
outline to date of all that is known of ‘The Brisbane Line’; what appears to have been 
a mythical plan of some conservative Australian politicians to do a deal with the 
Japanese during World War II and let them have the continent north from Brisbane. 
But Cottle’s thesis is hard to accept. If the Brisbane Line did exist at all then it would 
not have been one of appeasement but for the military defence of the industrial areas 
of Australia south of Brisbane and Adelaide. 
Fighting the Pacific War without fighters; myths and realities 
Understanding the history of the RAAF up to December 1941 is paramount in an 
analysis of the reason why the air force lacked fighters when the Japanese struck. 
There is a number of publications of the air force’s history but few are worthwhile to 
any academic study. For instance, The Royal Australian Air Force written by George 
Odgers,190 a wartime reporter, can be discounted. Odgers simply writes or rewrites 
the operational history of the RAAF during the war against Japan without any 
indepth examination of the political decisions that sent its airmen into action flying 
Wirraways and Beauforts.  
Wounded Eagle by Peter Ewer191 with its grandiose title (arguably more appropriate 
to the AAF—the RAAF strength was less than one hundred aircraft in December 
1941) is a rewrite of the official histories of Australia in the Pacific War without the 
inclusion of new material shedding light on deeper and more sinister aspects of 
RAAF deficiencies. And its inability to prevent the Japanese from brushing it aside 
in the wider picture of war. The fact needs to be faced that the RAAF effort, with all 
its glory and heroics, would have amounted to nothing much more than it was in 
February 1942 without the arrival of massive material from America in 1941–44.  
Therefore Australian publications on the air war against Japan can generally be 
discounted. They merely recant the bravery and heroics of RAAF crews in all the 
wars in which the RAAF fought with an emphasis on World War II and borrow 
heavily from the official histories. Odgers, like Ewer, particularly glorifies the 
hackneyed events surrounding the fall of Singapore, the Rabaul debacle and Darwin 
                                                 
189 Cottle, D. 2002, The Brisbane Line: A Reappraisal, Upfront Publishing, Peterborough, UK. 
190 Odgers, G. 1965, op. cit.  
191 Ewer, P. 2009, Wounded Eagle, New Holland, Sydney.  
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and how the RAAF recovered quickly and took part in the successful Allied counter-
drive that rid the SWPA of Japanese forces, most of whom were isolated by 1943 
because of American submarine action. Australian writers tend to overlook the 
importance of the USN with its carrier fleets that triumphed in the Coral Sea and 
Midway battles and many others after those momentous events. Together with its 
fleet of submarines based in Brisbane and Fremantle, the USN and USAAF 
eventually rendered Japanese shipping impotent to the point enemy ground troop 
presence in the islands directly to the north of Australia was powerless as a threat to 
the Allied effort.  
Under the Anglo-American management of the war, the RAAF’s role quickly 
became a supportive one. No mention is made by Odgers or any other writer of the 
fact the RAAF did not possess a capital ship sinking capacity; the Beaufort, from 
which so much had been expected, proved a failure in that role and was, instead, 
deployed as a nocturnal area bomber because the RAAF was without escort fighters. 
Problems in production beset the Beaufort program from its inception and only a 
very small number had been manufactured when Malaya was invaded. And the 
Beaufort was the aircraft that was supposed to prevent enemy warships getting close 
to Australian territory.  
The problem with such historical studies is that some authors tend to accept myths 
and half-truths written during the 1930s and 1940s. Hearsay or personal opinions are 
permeated and rewritten down the years by historians accepted as experts wanting to 
show Australia’s military prowess in the best or worst light. The basis for this genre 
appears to be that if politicians failed to equip the RAAF with the necessary 
hardware, then this deficiency could be overcome by Australian courage. 
Unfortunately the proposition that pure bravery will win wars cannot be backed by 
logic—had the RAAF been equipped with Zeros and the Japanese with Wirraways 
and Buffalos, then the outcome of the battles over Singapore, Malaya and New 
Britain would undoubtedly have been very different.  
The tendency to defend the prowess of RAAF aircrews has become a shield around 
the truth that can be painful and its exposure seemingly unpatriotic. Odgers, the 
author of books and articles about the RAAF and an official government historian, 
for example states that ‘Buffalo fighters [with which the RAAF in Malaya was 
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equipped] were to prove lamentably poor performers against the highly efficient 
Japanese fighter aircraft, particular the Zero’.192 Odgers’ statement is an over-
simplification and only partly true. Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham 
RAF, as will be shown, in his pre-war visit to Australia, announced that the 
Buffaloes were equal to Japanese fighters. While Brooke-Popham knew better, 
Buffaloes were not the poor performers Odgers’ implied. In his book, Buffaloes over 
Singapore, Brian Gull193 paints an objective picture of the marginal gap between the 
Zeros and Buffaloes. According to Gull, overwhelming odds and lack of an adequate 
warning system at Singapore were the main ingredients in the collapse of Allied air 
defence as Buffalo pilot, Geoff Fisken, DFC, Royal New Zealand Air Force 
(RNZAF), reflected:  
The Buffalo was a real ladies plane to fly—a beautiful plane to fly. Anyone could fly 
them. All the American planes were heavy—very heavy … with Buffaloes if you had 
… height … you could get away from [Japanese fighters] by diving straight down, no 
trouble. We had the diving speed, and would hold together, whereas their planes 
wouldn’t. We had armour plating … and they had none at all. If you hit one of them, 
they would often burst into flames … But apart from that they had too many for us … 
But destroying a [Japanese] fighter was no use to you—whereas if you knocked down a 
bomber, it was carrying a lot of explosives and could kill a lot of people, buildings etc. 
… Normally you didn’t worry about the fighters—try and get through them as fast as 
you could … the only thing you could do if you met them on even terms—was go for 
about a three or five second burst, and then get out of it because they wouldn’t follow 
you down. If you didn’t meet them on even terms—then you had to get out of it … I got 
a couple of trips in Hurricane Mk 11Bs that 488 Squadron had in Singapore and I don’t 
think the Hurricane was as good as the Buffalo.194  
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(Source: AWM) 
Figure 26: The maligned Brewster Buffalo equipped No. 453 Squadron RAAF at a Malaysian base 
before the Japanese onslaught 195 The British at least appreciated fighters but by buying the Buffalo, 
underestimated the standard of Japanese warplanes. 
 
As another example, Timothy Hall, in his lightweight book, Darwin: Australia’s 
Darkest Hour196 claimed the government was offered Hawker Hurricanes by the 
Canadian government and Lockheed Lightnings by the Americans197 before Darwin 
was destroyed, but no confirmation could be located. And Hall does not include any 
referencing. Yet Hall’s assertion is likely to be repeated as fact as the events of the 
1930s and 1940s fade and authentic details counter-balancing such claims become 
difficult if not impossible to prove.  
Little care and no responsibility—the government and the air 
defence fiasco 
On January 18 each year a group of ex-servicemen and their relatives gathered to 
hold a ceremony at the Shrine of Remembrance, Melbourne. The diminutive meeting 
                                                 
195 F2A-3 American Buffalo fighters equipped British and Commonwealth air forces in Malaya. Most were 
destroyed on the ground (as apparent from their parking) when Japanese strafed without warning on 8 December 
1941. According to Gull, the Buffaloes destroyed over one hundred Japanese aircraft before the surrender (Ibid., 
pp. 59–60).  
196 Hall, T. 1980, Australia’s Darkest Hour, Methuen Australia Pty Ltd., Sydney.  
197 Ibid., p. 87.  
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commemorated the day of the first attack against Australian territory and the tragedy 
that befell eight young RAAF pilots and their air gunners who took to the air in 
Wirraway ‘general purpose’ planes that morning to defend the town against over one 
hundred Japanese naval bombers, fighters and seaplanes.198 Of the sixteen air gunners 
and pilots, six were killed and five wounded.199 And of the eight Wirraways, three 
were shot down in flames, two were wrecked landing with battle damage and one 
crashed taking off.200 Watching from the ground, David Bloomfield later wrote: 
There was something sickening in that sudden, merciless extermination [of the 
Wirraways by Zekes at Rabaul]. It was like watching hawks attack sparrows. I was 
shocked at the sight and realised the RAAF crews had no chance against such numbers 
and such better aircraft. 
The Zero tactics were noted with interest. They would peel off and dive on a Wirraway 
from behind, with one directly to the rear and the others to the side. Machineguns would 
be fired first to determine the fall of the shot, and as they closed the Wirraway, the 
cannon would be fired. If the gunfire missed, the Zeros used their superior power and 
speed to climb above and ahead, then stall turned back on the Wirraway.201 
No enemy aircraft were destroyed in this combat despite Odgers' claim of 1943 that ' 
… a number of Zeros were shot down before they themselves [the Wirraways] went 
crashing downwards';202 a fictitious addition perhaps excusable as ‘journalistic 
licence’. Thus ended the ten minute battle that dismissed all pre-war claims and 
counter-claims that the two-seated, 200 mph AT-6 Harvard-Texan-Wirraway trainer 
would match Japanese fighters, a fact government ministers of the Menzies/Fadden 
pre-war era undoubtedly knew when they ordered Beaufighters at the last minute. At 
the same time, the conservatives toyed for a time with buying fighters from the 
Japanese;203 yet another diversion into procrastination. The Japanese Mitsubishi A6M 
Reisin (Zero) fighter, the best of the Japanese aircraft, was kept secret and as such 
would hardly have been released to the Australian government. 
                                                 
198 Odgers, G. 1943, 'The Epic Story of Australia's Wirraways', The Argus, 27 March, p. 33. Odgers became an 
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199 Gillison, D. 1957, op. cit.  
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202 Odgers 1957, G., op cit. p. 33. 
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This first air encounter between the RAAF and the Japanese, as could be expected, 
was an unnecessary tragedy. The story of the battle has gone into Australian history 
as an outstanding example of raw ‘digger’ courage against impossible odds rather 
than what it was—a national disgrace highlighting in the worst way the failed 
government pre-war defence policy to equip the RAAF and the ignorance of 
successive government ministers to question the deployment of the Wirraway. This 
ignorance combined with arrogance predominated when there was evidence to the 
contrary (with Sir Robert Brooke-Popham and Sir Edward Ellington in particular) 
advising the government that the Wirraway was a trainer at a time when authentic 
American interceptors could still have been acquired.204  
 
                                                 
204 After the Darwin attack of February 1942 sans RAAF interception the Curtin government, looking for 
scapegoats, blamed RAAF personnel for the ‘SNAFU’. As a subterfuge, a Royal Commission was held in Darwin 
while the danger persisted. Members of the RAAF who failed to activate the air raid alarm were persecuted. 
Darwin was not defended by fighters until two months later when a USAAC fighter group, the 49th arrived 
(Rorrison, op. cit.).  
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(Source: AWM) 
Figure 27: The Curtin Government displayed such faith in the Beaufort, initiated by the Lyons 
Government in the late 1930s, that it circulated this poster apparently in a belief that the bomber could 
sink Japanese warships. 
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Methodology 
The field of study is the air defence of Australia between the World Wars and the 
lack of the RAAF’s preparedness, particularly its dearth of fighters, to protect 
Australia. This study is based on government archive material, memoirs and other 
literature including newspaper reports, interviews, unpublished records and diaries. 
Australia's defence policy will be examined comparatively in light of the nation's 
overall position within the British Commonwealth and in its geographical and allied 
associations. Many of the government's pre-war decisions were either made by 
British military personnel, politicians or were based on British policy. Both 
Australian and British government and military records during the inter-war years 
will be examined in detail. This will be done in chronological order from the end of 
the First World War and the development of air power through to the bombing of 
Darwin by the JNAS in February 1942; the major outcome of the RAAF’s lack of 
hardware to oppose it. 
The thesis will be revisionist in that it challenges the orthodox account that, after the 
Great War was won by the Allies, although the world suffered through the Great 
Depression and its aftermath, nothing of note happened in a military sense until 
Poland was invaded in 1939 and Pearl Harbor attacked from the air opening the 
European and Pacific theatres of war respectively. It will be descriptive in that it 
covers the relevant events, decisions and developments in military aviation during 
the period under reference. It will also be revisionist in that it will revise the 
documentation and material available. The thesis will be argumentative in that it will 
show that political and governmental decisions were faulty and the capacity to adopt 
an operational air force role in the region was possible and would have been 
effective. 
Archives, libraries, museums and defence departments have been accessed. They 
include the Smithsonian Institution in the USA and relevant defence records in Japan 
and Britain as well as Australia. Such approach has, at times, included the 
employment of research assistants at the locations that are non-accessible. Interviews 
of ex-military personnel from Britain, America and Australia were conducted. 
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Relevant publications have been analysed and are listed in the bibliography. They 
include World War I and World War II books and articles in the context of their 
application to the topic. Limitations to research include the fact that: 
 there is no mass public documentation (newspapers, Hansard or private papers; 
during the inter-war years defence was not a popular issue) 
 the obvious omissions in literature—publications about World War I aircraft 
and those planes produced between the wars not used in World War II 
 German, Dutch and Italian records have not been translated. 
Data collected will be interpreted in the context of four major approaches; namely: 
 Chronological: material is assembled in chronological order for the period 
between World Wars of the 20th Century. This thesis begins at the end of 
World War I and its air power lessons. It details the inter-war years relative to 
the development of airpower in Australia and the world. It covers the conflicts 
that erupted in Spain, China, Finland and elsewhere that gave indication of how 
airpower would be deployed in future major conflicts. 
 Technological: this approach analyses the development of the airplane from the 
end of the World War I to the beginning of the Second World War. It includes 
details of how the aircraft went from primitive observation machines to ones 
that could decide the outcome of a world war. Aircraft development, although 
rapid during conflicts, steadily advanced between the wars. This thesis shows 
how range, bomb capacity, armament, and performance of aircraft accelerated 
and over-took warships as the principle weapon of war. Also it shows how the 
fighter outpaced the bomber to the point that bomber fleets could not operate 
economically without escort.  
 Imperial related: this approach relies on a political and emotive framework to 
analyse the Anglo-Australian alliance. Australia military forces suffered major 
setbacks in the opening months of the Second World War mostly because of 
government dependence on British military and political policy. 
 Political policy related to local defence arrangements despite imperial defence: 
certain insightful Australians saw the need to change air defence policy and 
doubted the RN and Singapore would contain the Japanese. 
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The topic of imperial defence has not been neglected in Australia but has limited 
universal appeal. Imperial defence culminated in the fall of Singapore in February 
1942. The British then abandoned the Pacific until the European conflict was ending 
in mid-1945. Thus the British-Australian relationship is not a subject attractive to 
non-Australian authors. This thesis will fill that gap—it will address the issue of 
imperial defence relative to Australian air power 1918–1941 and the failure of 
successive Australian governments to evaluate imperial defence honestly against the 
capacity and capability of the British to ensure Australia’s security. It also examines 
the aeroplane versus battleship controversy as it affected imperial defence. 
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CHAPTER 3: IMPERIAL DEFENCE—AUSTRALIA AND 
BRITAIN 
 
 
(Source: Public domain) 
Figure 28: Winston Churchill and Robert Menzies meet in London. 
 
There are no naval grounds … always remembering that the United States is our friend, 
which should prevent the despatch of an Australian army to the decisive battlefields, 
where their name stands so high.205 
 
Air power and Empire 
Before Guilo Douhet, Lt General ‘Billy’ Mitchell and Lord Trenchard worried the 
world with their theories of bombing cities and battleship to win wars, the idea of 
aircraft attacking soft targets was debated. By1918, the Allies were wanting an exit 
from the mire of the Western front; a war of attrition cutting down the flower of 
British youth. Perhaps the first official end-the-war-by-air power debate, in which 
British and Empire politicians argued about its use to by-pass the killing fields of 
France, came unexpectedly.  
Interest was ignited at the twenty-second Imperial War Cabinet Meeting of 28 June 
1918 at 10 Downing Street with the war almost over although the collapse of the 
German Army was unanticipated. Major General Sykes, Chief of the British Air 
Staff was the speaker. He painted a sanitised picture of burgeoning RAF air power, 
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improvement in Allied aircraft and advancements in aerial technology—military 
aircraft were the best method of destruction alongside the tank.206 
The only dissenter was Australia’s Prime Minister ‘Billy’ Hughes, noted for his 
tactlessness. Hughes had already humiliated himself with wild promises he could not 
keep. At the height of the war, the ‘little Digger’ claimed Australia could send 9 500 
fresh soldiers a month to cover ‘wastage’ in AIF numbers.207 But two referendums on 
conscription failed despite ambiguous wording to prompt a ‘yes’ response. The 
government was then unable to muster enough volunteers in a nation weary of war 
and controversial British campaigns.208 
 
 
(Source: Public domain) 
Figure 29: Wartime Prime Minister William ‘Billy’ Hughes who made wild promises over AIF troop 
numbers he was unable to keep without conscription which he failed to introduce despite two cleverly 
worded referendums. He visualised air power saving the slaughter on the battleground.  
 
After Skyes’ twelve page monologue209 Hughes argued about funding for a bigger air 
force, and second, the source of aircrews for the RAF with the Allies suffering 
appalling losses on the ground.210 Hughes was supported by Winston Churchill, then-
Minister for Munitions. Questioned by British Prime Minister Baldwin, Hughes 
demanded to know if the British had an exit strategy, win or lose, and if the massive 
cost in young lives211 was to continue.212 Finally, if the weekly loss in troops might be 
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avoided by airpower about which Skyes talked so much and about which Hughes 
knew so little: 
What was the [British] Government policy on manpower? [Hughes asked] Supposing 
the war is going to last another two years and our losses continue on the scale of 1916 
and 1917 …. This is the way I put it. I say you are using up the flower of your [sic] 
nation.213 In two years at the rate you have been going, on the chances as a competitor 
with America or with Germany, will be very small. 
So I say …we have heard … of the potentialities of this wonderful Department of the 
Air. When the war started … it was a negligible force. Then it was developed and now 
it has become a great Arm. Now we [still] go into battle with infantry and you do well 
… if you come out with say 20,000 casualties. The Australians lost 20,000 in a week in 
some of the offensives that have taken place.214 
Hughes contended that the Allies would soon be ‘barren’ if the current loss rates 
continued. He put British representatives on notice by asking that if airpower was as 
advanced as Skyes claimed, could it replace the bloodshed of the trenches, displaying 
both his ignorance of airpower and how over-estimated it had become: 
‘… it’s no good talking about infantry or anything else when you have a striking [air] 
force which is as useful and as likely to bring you victory as anything else, by our 
manpower having gone, and our having to accept the crumbs from the table, or in any 
case if we [sic] were a great power  
then …’215 
… We have met here not merely to get information but to make use of it. I say … I 
would like to know as a representative of the Dominions: What is the Policy of the 
British Government in regard to the Air Force, the use of man-power, and its resources 
generally? What line are we going along? I have set it out quite clearly and now I think 
perhaps we may either discuss it, or you, Mr. Prime Minister, might state it.216 
The subsequent debate revealed that the British had no airpower doctrine. Further, 
the British and French (whose air force had out-grown the RAF217) were not acting in 
concert to exploit the air superiority attained.218 Finally, Baldwin asked ‘… has there 
been a consideration say, of the campaign of 1919 as to the part aeroplanes are to 
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play?’.219 Skyes had to admit that although a committee was formed at Versailles 
there was lack of progress—the French were uncooperative and ‘… we have met 
twice but come up against a brick wall’.220 The matter of target selection, Skyes 
stated, was debated as committee members groped for a solution to ending the war.221  
Despite such interest in the air arm from politicians, by the time of the armistice of 
November 1918, aircraft had proved a useful tool, but had been unable to have any 
significant influence on the outcome of the greater battle below. Technology 
improvement in engines and armament was impressive, but interest in warplanes 
faded with the world’s population embracing peace. The British government let its 
air force deteriorate, and was soon busy avoiding involvement in warfare. Once 
disarmament became popular, the British and others saw airpower as a deterrent to 
the war in the uneasy peace that followed. At the same time, fanciful ideas emerged 
during the post-war years such as alluded to by Hughes; that air forces could replace 
all other forms of military power.  
Self-delusion and delightful ignorance  
The rocky road down the so-called imperial defence path of the twentieth century for 
Australians was a long and prickly one fraught with unlikely-to-be-kept promises, 
unrealistic expectations, impractical dependence, self-delusion, denial, poor advice, 
lies and an unclear doctrine of empire security. And in the background was the 
British pretence that they would protect their empire while arguably assuming the 
Americans would contain the Japanese if they aggressed in the Pacific.  
The Joseph Lyons and Robert Menzies Conservative Governments held power for 
most of the period between 1935 and October 1941.222 They must take all the blame 
for not accepting the forthright messages coming out of the UK about their limited 
ability to defend South Asia. Added to this admission was the inference that the US 
would be Australia’s saviour if the Japanese, at that time occupying French Indo 
China, were to aggress further south.223 In December 1940, with Britain fighting a 
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losing war against Germany and Italy, the government sent Menzies a message 
clarifying the situation in brutal terms: 
We are at the fullest naval strain I have seen in this or former war. The only way a naval 
squadron could be found for Singapore would be by ruining the Mediterranean situation 
This, I am sure, you would not want us to do unless or until the Japanese danger 
becomes far more menacing that at present. I am also persuaded that if Japan should 
enter the war, the United States will come in on our side, which of course will put the 
boot very much on the other foot.224  
Imperial defence was supposed to coordinate the military forces of the dominions. It 
was one of extremes compiled of huge and indefensible topographical locations, 
differing needs and strengths; all under the shadow of the added dimension of 
Britain’s diminished military power. The UK could really only protect its own 
interests in Europe and North Africa. But to maintain the flow of servicemen from 
the dominions, arguably it pretended it would rush to their aid if needed. Considering 
that only Australia and New Zealand were likely to be threatened by Japanese 
aggression, it was their governments that were hanging on Britain’s apron-strings.  
The receipt of Cranborne’s telegram virtually ended imperial defence as an 
Australian security policy. It could have been taken as a blessing in disguise and 
initiated an immediate turnaround in the military stance of the Menzies’ government. 
But instead of accepting the facts and quickly approaching the USA for aerial 
defence assistance (as Curtin did in a roundabout way in1942 in dire circumstances), 
Menzies flew to Britain via Singapore to ask Churchill to reconsider the British 
decision.225 
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(Source: Public domain) 
Figure 30: British Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs Lord Cranborne telegrammed Menzies in 
December 1940, a year before Pearl Harbor, warning no more military forces would be sent to 
Singapore; that in the unlikelihood of Japanese aggression, the Americans would ‘put the boot on the 
other foot’. 
 
Still no pursuit planes for Australia  
It is difficult, even in hindsight, not to wonder why a strong defensive RAAF of 
fighters of international parity could not have been compiled. On the matter of air 
defence, once Cranborne told Menzies the unwanted truth, the door opened to base 
air defence on still-available American hardware. Instead, a half-hearted one of paper 
squadrons, training planes and wishful aircraft orders from over-worked British firms 
was installed. The RAF’s own rearmament program was accelerating so the 
Australians may have justifiably turned to US firms despite British attitudes. Caught 
between getting American help or living off British promises, the results were years 
of vacillation and in between, the defective decisions to build the Beaufort and the 
NA-33 trainer.  
During this vital time of peace in the Pacific, there was criticism of the conservative 
government’s staid defence policy but without effect; for example, in his reply to the 
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debate on the Imperial Defence Conference of 1937, Opposition Leader Curtin 
proclaimed:  
The strength of Australian defence must lie in aviation … the Labour party stands for a 
five-fold aerial fleet with refuelling and repair aerodromes in all parts of Australia. It 
stands for an aerial fleet that can go across the continent and render service in peace as 
in war.226 
British aircraft companies kept their secrets guarded which would later hinder 
manufacture in Australia. But the neutral Americans had no such compunctions. 
Ernst Udet, a German World War I ace like Herman Goering, became head of the 
Luftwaffe’s Technical Office and the Office of Supply and Procurement Department 
after Adolf Hitler took power in 1933.227 Udet visited America ostensibly on a 
goodwill tour and to observe the development of military aviation but with a hidden 
agenda.228 He discovered a new weapon, the single-engined dive-bomber that was to 
effect Luftwaffe policy after producing an unlicensed copy; the Junkers JU-87 
Stuka—a new feature for German military offensives. In Spain the Stuka became 
notorious not only for dive-bombing, but for striking fear into civilian hearts 
wherever it appeared, the pilot pinpointing his target and diving vertically with siren 
screaming.229 
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(Source: Imperial War Museum) 
Figure 31: Junkers Ju-87 German dive-bomber in action. 
 
The California-based Curtiss Aircraft Corporation was building prototype fighters as 
well as dive-bombers and accepting international orders. Under Udet’s 
recommendation, the Germans bought two Curtiss Hawks, the American government 
apparently having no reservation about exports to its former enemy.230 The 
Australians, with their close American affiliation, may have bought similar or better 
warplanes from the Curtiss and Douglas Companies. Such purchases would certainly 
have improved the RAAF’s defence capability. 
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(Source: USN) 
Figure 32: The USN’s Douglas SBD Dauntless: the war’s most successful dive-bomber. Slow and 
small, it was feared by the enemy more than any other Allied aircraft, virtually winning the 1942 
Battles of Coral Sea and Midway singlehandedly.231 
 
Such independent action beyond British psychological oppression would have 
resuscitated the NA-33 selection—perhaps the most standout break from imperial 
defence despite clandestine overtones.232 Professional calculations would have found 
that the making of the first ‘warplane’ in Australia was ‘too little; too late’ (and a 
non-combatant type); the first Harvard (under the nomenclature ‘Wirraway’) not 
flying until 27 March 1939, almost three years after inception.233 By this time, the 
RAF was re-equipping with Spitfires and Hurricanes in hundreds, but once Wirraway 
production accelerated, no one seemed brave enough to stop it. If this was true, the 
obvious answer was to let manufacture run its course and buy American fighters 
simultaneously, considering the lead-time needed to make planes locally. 
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(Source: AWM) 
Figure 33: The Australian-made ‘General Purpose’ Wirraway’s first flight in March 1939.234 Neither 
the Menzies nor the Curtin government that replaced it did anything to prevent Wirraways being 
deployed in front-line service before or after the Japanese ‘blitz’ which suggests it was really built for 
the EATS program. 
 
 
(Source: Public domain) 
Figure 34: The Curtiss P-40 B Tomahawk; a dedicated fighter-bomber flown successfully by 
Australians in North Africa a year before the government deployed Wirraways to New Britain. The 
P˗40 was on sale in America had the government been serious about an operational air force. 
 
Building Wirraways was itself a form of procrastination. Arguably, the original 
decision was part of a bigger plan by the conservative government not to displease 
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the British; an advance trainer was required for EATS. If Australian politicians 
deluded themselves into believing the Singapore scenario, they did the same 
regarding air defence, modern fighters being an ingredient mandatory to survive air 
attack if the lessons of the Spanish, Finnish and Chinese conflicts were studied even 
to a cursory degree. Some newspaper Australian newspaper articles did refer to the 
air war in Spain; for example the Hobart Mercury carried a story of the value of civil 
aviation being highlighted during the conflict.235 Unlike the Germans, the British had 
overlooked the military value of compiling fleets of civil aircraft that could be 
adapted quickly to army and air force transports. Another story from the Great 
Southern Herald reported the arrival of Russian fighter in Spain which quickly 
outperformed the 140 mph fighters in use by government forces’.236 
But in general, Australians adopted an ‘isolationist’ policy over China and Spain. 
According to Robertson, the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in July 1936, 
‘increased Australia’s interest in external affairs, though the very fact the issue was 
explosive inhibited full discussion’.237 Curtin who replaced Scullin as leader of the 
opposition, was extremely reticent on the war and the government’s policy was one 
of strict refusal ‘to interfere in the internal disputes of any foreign country’.238 
Therefore considering the performance of the Wirraway it can be assumed that it was 
never meant as a warplane—its real purpose was to train aircrew for the RAF. By 
arming the NA-33 and extolling its virtues, the government bluffed the public into 
believing it was creating a genuine air defence force. To leave it in front-line service 
to be slaughtered by the Japanese air forces may have been a desperate 
demonstration of how defenceless Australia was and help bring a rapid ‘super power’ 
response. 
The British appeared ambivalent about Far Eastern defence. Secret Cabinet Minute 
W.P. (40) September 1940, with England besieged by the Luftwaffe and it citizens 
anticipating invasion, stated: ‘Until we have defeated Germany and Italy, or 
drastically reduced their naval strength, we are faced with the problem of defending 
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our interests in the Far East without an adequate fleet’.239 The minute also stated: 
‘Our defence policy in the Far East in the absence of an adequate fleet must rely 
primarily on air power … The minimum requirements for the security of Malaya; 
Borneo … is a total of 336 first line aircraft’.240 The minute was ultra-secret so it 
seems unlikely it reached Australian eyes, but anyway the figure of 336 warplanes 
was fanciful.241  
Another Minute of 20 March 1940 showed War Cabinet had already approved the 
withdrawal of two RAF bomber squadrons (Blenheim) from Singapore to India … 
‘subject to the condition that this move should not be carried out until the Secretary 
of State for Dominion Affairs had consulted the Governments of Australia and New 
Zealand and obtained their concurrence in this step’.242 But the British did not 
disclose that the Blenheims were reinforcements for the Middle East; India was 
merely a stopover.243 Thus the meagre air forces at Singapore were further depleted 
for the sake of the desert campaign.  
In a previous secret minute W. P. (40) of 4 September 1940, ‘Aircraft Carriers’ the 
RN’s requirement for a dual war with Germany and Japan was estimated at fourteen 
carriers; four for the Far East.244 Although the British knew the Japanese were 
building a massive navy around the carrier from 1937,245 they never admitted the 
Australian mainland was vulnerable to carrier-borne aircraft attack. Instead Churchill 
typically degraded any danger. Rather than tell the truth, he made light of Australian 
concerns stating that: 
It is always possible that a long-ranged submarine or raiding cruiser might turn up and 
insult Australian shores by firing … shells into some seaboard city, or cause temporary 
inconvenience by disturbing the coastal trade. But Japan would hardly reap any results 
except Australian resentment from such escapades’.246  
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Churchill added a promise he probably knew he would never keep, believing the 
Americans would prevent the Japanese occupying Australia:  
We wish to make it plain … we regard the defence of Australia, and of Singapore, as 
stepping stone to Australia, as ranking next to the mastering of the principal fleet to 
which we are opposed, and …if the choice were presented of defending Australia 
against a serious attack, or sacrificing British interests in the Mediterranean, our duty to 
Australia would take precedence ... There are no naval grounds, therefore, always 
assuming that the United States is our friend, which should prevent the despatch of any 
Australian army to the decisive battlefields, where their name stands so high.247  
Churchill thus showed his true hand—empty promises to get servicemen from 
Australia. By using the bait of British forces rushing to Australia’s aid (when the 
threat became ‘serious’), he manipulated the Menzies government into sending 
forces to the Middle East—the ‘decisive’ battlefields of the world and not the 
theoretical ones of the Pacific.  
This was an important milestone in imperial defence. As stated, the British 
apparently had no intention of defending Australia except with words; they were 
relying on American intervention to save the Pacific rim dominions. 
Characteristically, Churchill contradicted himself in his War Memoirs, serialised in 
Australian newspapers in 1950, writing the reverse. Mr John Dill, Chief of Imperial 
General Staff, submitted a series of papers to Churchill in May 1941. In one, Dill, on 
the topic of priorities, wrote, ‘The loss of Egypt would be a calamity which I do not 
regard as likely and one which we could not accept without a most desperate fight; 
but it would not end the war … Egypt is not even second in order of priority for it 
has been an accepted principle … that in the last resort, the security of Singapore 
comes before Egypt’.248 But this ‘principle’ was quickly quashed by Churchill who 
must have forgotten his pledge to the dominions. In his reply to Dill he wrote, ‘I was 
astonished to receive this document’, replying a week later caustically:  
I gather you would be prepared to face the loss of Egypt and the Nile Valley, with the 
surrender or ruin of the Army of half a million we have concentrated … rather than lose 
Singapore. I do not take that view, or [sic] do I think that alternative is likely … The 
defence of Singapore is an operation requiring only a … fraction of the troops required 
to defend the Nile Valley … Should Japan enter the war, the United States will … come 
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in on our side, and … Japan would not … besiege Singapore … this would be an 
operation far more dangerous to her and less harmful to us than spreading her cruisers 
and battle-cruisers on the Eastern trade routes. At this time … the Japanese were not 
established in Indo-China. Many Governments I have seen would have wilted before so 
grave a pronouncement by the highest professional authority, but I had no difficulty in 
convincing my political colleagues. And I was of course supported by the Chiefs of the 
Navy and Air. My views … prevail and the flow of reinforcements to the Middle East 
continues unabated.249 
 
 
(Source: Imperial War Museum) 
Figure 35: Sir Winston Churchill: his dislike for Australians was common knowledge, yet he sent AIF 
troops on British military expeditions that were often doomed from the start. Churchill promised to 
deploy military forces to Australia should it be ‘seriously’ threatened by Japan, a promise he did not 
keep relying on the Americans to do it for him. After the war he denied ever making such a claim. 
 
In this post-war admission, Churchill confessed he had no intentions of sacrificing 
the Middle East campaign for Singapore and that he squashed any such notion 
among British politicians and officials. Dill, like Menzies, must have been informed 
the opposite early in the war; that Singapore took precedence over the Middle East. 
And in the case of any ‘serious’ attack on Australia, then the Middle East would be 
abandoned. But through the rhetoric that surrounded the matter of British priorities, 
even after the German invasion of Russia of June 1941 guaranteed Britain’s survival, 
it is clear Churchill’s promise to Australia was hollow. The truth was probably an 
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intention to abandon Australia and New Zealand on the premise that the South West 
Pacific would become an American responsibility if Japan aggressed. This is made 
clear in point 19 of his letter of appeal to President Roosevelt of December 1940 
which was tantamount to a plea for the Americans to enter the war: 
If, as I believe, you are convinced Mr. President, that the defeat of the Nazi and Fascist 
tyranny is a matter of high consequence to the people of the United States and to the 
Western Hemisphere, you will regard this letter not as an appeal for aid, but as a 
statement of the minimum action necessary to achieve our common purpose. 250 
The Atlantic Charter 
The official US involvement in pre-Pearl Harbor conferences with the British 
occurred between Churchill and Roosevelt on neutral ground.251 In August 1941, 
Roosevelt and Churchill met secretly in Newfoundland devising an eight-point plan 
of war aims—The Atlantic Charter—although in essence a gentlemen’s agreement.252 
While not binding, the Charter was significant. It affirmed the solidarity between 
USA and Great Britain against Axis aggression. Morally this probably meant the 
Americans accepted responsibility for the Pacific. Therefore, with the coming war 
against Japan, the British promise to Australia would never be tested, that of 
‘sacrificing British interests in the Mediterranean’.  
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(Source: AWM) 
Figure 36: Prime Minister Menzies photographing London bomb-sites after his tour of Singapore and 
the Middle East while enroute to England in January-February 1941. He met AIF and RN personnel in 
North Africa but forgot to consult with RAAF pilots. 
 
 
(Source: aces of ww2) 
Figure 37: Flight Lt. Clive Caldwell (left), the leading Allied fighter exponent of the desert air war 
during Menzies’ visit to North Africa in early 1941. Despite Caldwell’s knowledge and experience, 
Menzies failed to consult any RAAF personnel about air defence. 
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(Source: Public domain) 
Figure 38: The Luftwaffe’s Ernest Udet stole the dive-bomber concept from the Americans during a 
good-will visit in the 1930s. Via reverse engineering, Junkers Aviation turned a US plane into the 
gull-winged Stuka. The Ju-87 spearheaded the Blitzkrieg in Europe until it met the Supermarine 
Spitfire in battles over England in 1940. Udet misread the USN’s dive-bomber role intended for naval 
operation.253 
 
The British are traditionally blamed for ‘letting Australia down’254 when the Japanese 
‘suddenly and deliberately’255 stormed through the Pacific. But their lead-time was as 
predictable as Hitler’s invasion of Poland. The British policy of appeasement seemed 
senseless but it gave the coalition time to overhaul its air defences for the German 
onslaught. The RAF was only receiving its first Spitfires during the Munich crisis of 
1938, but by September 1939, Fighter Command possessed 187 Spitfires in front-line 
service.256 The same applied to Australia’s air defence—the government had an 
interval of opportunity between Poland’s invasion and Japanese aggression to rearm 
its air force with American fighters but chose to do nothing.  
Singapore syndrome: too illogical to be true? 
According to Robertson, ‘… for years, Australians had been led to believe that 
Singapore was a virtually impregnable fortress’.257. If correct, this belief represented 
a Maginot mentality, not a logical perception in the day of aeroplanes, aircraft 
carriers and blitzkriegs. To believe government representatives relied on a static 
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fortress built over an island with the promise it would be reinforced quickly with 
conventional capital ships if the need arose is difficult to accept. This thesis therefore 
illustrated Australian authorities were aware such a defence policy was fanciful; and 
that local, self-deluding defence ministers were equally to blame for not establishing 
an operational air force outside imperial defence. No evidence is available of any 
British promise to provide for Australia’s air defence or to supply fighters even 
though the British would have been aware of Australia’s Wirraway-based air force 
after Ellington’s visit. 
Rejected in London, Menzies saved face by declaring that: ‘The best contribution I 
can make to the war effort is to help keep up the spirits of the British people, whose 
courage wins my unbounded admiration’.258 But he could hardly maintain his own 
spirits, returning home ‘depressed’ commenting that ‘misty generalisations will 
please and sustain only the Japanese.259 Instead, with British doors closing, Menzies 
might have sought US help.  
In June 1940 Roosevelt committed his country to ‘lending’ aid materially, ‘to the 
French, British and other friendly peoples’.260 Australia fitted this criterion. Menzies 
might have activated the President’s promise in the time left by ordering US fighters 
through Lend Lease to supplement the warplanes already ordered. France, for 
instance, bought one hundred Curtiss Wright P-36 fighters during this period. 261 Had 
Menzies followed, he may have averted the air defence crisis and saved his 
government from wartime oblivion. As the American media wrote following Curtin’s 
plea for fighters after Rabaul fiasco, the UK government had, months before, offered 
to release Lend-Lease fighters to Australia, but was rejected.262 The planes, Republic 
P-43 Lancers and Grumman Wildcats had been allocated to the RAF under Lend 
Lease. During ‘Its shipment of aircraft to the Dominions’ Ottawa conference of July 
1940 held to distribute US Lend-Lease warplanes earmarked for the RAF, the British 
made them available to the dominions, ‘ … so far as United Kingdom needs 
permit.’263 
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(Source: Public domain) 
Figure 39: The Republic P-43 Lancer: the British Purchasing Commission ordered fifty via the US 
mutual assistance program and offered them to Australian representatives at an Ottawa Conference of 
July 1940. Instead, the Australians ordered fifty-four British Beaufighters missing another chance to 
equip the RAAF with first-line fighters.264 
 
That aside, what seemed certain was that Australian military advisers and their 
political masters saw through the cracks in imperial defence before the doomed battle 
of Singapore. Through self-satisfaction and probable ignorance of air defence, their 
own doubts were ignored. Menzies and Curtin, although discussing military matters 
in parliament, had no RAAF experience. Menzies, an officer in the Citizens Military 
Forces, was publicly criticised for not enlisting in the AIF during World War I.265 
Numbers of ancillary issues were also evident. The government’s failure to supply 
Australian built Beauforts to the RAF for the defence of Singapore as promised was 
one. There was obviously also a dire lack of understanding of the importance of 
fighters and air superiority despite evidence available during the interwar years and 
in the 1940 ‘Battle of Britain’.   
Much debate but little action  
War had never really ended for the British so they collected a wealth of military 
information during the inter-war years. There was never a time when the RAF not 
fighting somebody somewhere.266 And in the Australian House of Parliament, there 
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was hardly a time when the matter of defence was not being debated. For example in 
August 1937, Curtin stated:  
‘… the best form of co-operation … Australia could make to imperial security was … 
impregnability of her own forces. We have spent one hundred million pounds on 
defence since the Armistice, and there is grave uncertainty as to the value … 
received.267  
But words without action were meaningless. No air force could function 
operationally without the necessary hardware. Curtin might have achieved more 
by studying aircraft designs needed for air superiority and hammered government 
members accordingly. All through the inter-war years, ambivalence over the 
relevance of imperial defence and its capacity to stop aggression was overly 
debated. It was only when hostilities began that Churchill, after receiving the 
Australian government’s ‘inexcusable betrayal’268 message, changed from 
abandoning Singapore, to sending twelfth-hour air reinforcements, predominately 
crated Hurricanes.269 
 
(Source: Public domain) 
Figure 40: A poor but important photograph of a wrecked RAF Hurricane, one of fifty-one newly 
arrived at Singapore aboard a US freighter after the Japanese assault.270 Onlookers seem uninterested, 
probably realising the city’s fate was sealed and the battle lost symbolised by the wreck. 
The British Cabinet White Paper, 3 March 1936, ‘Statement Relating to Defence’, 
the history of defence since World War I, made dismal reading. It documented how 
British military forces were starved of funding. The policy between 1919 and 1936 
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was, according to the Paper, based on the 1934 unsuccessful League of Nations’ 
Geneva Disarmament Conference271 and not on the power of the RN and RAF:272  
The establishment of peace on a permanent footing is the principal aim of British 
foreign policy … … British policy is … to secure …peace … emphasis on unswerving 
support of the League of Nations, on the promotion of collective security and on 
repeated efforts … to promote better international understanding, and to reach 
international agreement for the reduction of and limitation of armaments. These objects 
… continue to inspire British policy, and the programme of defence expenditure which 
the country now has to face does not imply any reversal or qualification … but is on the 
contrary the indispensable condition of their attainment.  
In recent years successive Governments have deliberately … postponed defence 
expenditure which would certainly have been justified and might … have been regarded 
as necessary, in order to give the best possible opportunity for … a new international 
order.273  
Probably Australian parliamentarians read the White Paper. It was ‘published and 
printed by His Majesty’s Stationery Office’ in 1936 with a price tag of three pence.274  
Imperial defence, to which Australia was still voluntarily aligned, both militarily and 
psychologically, was thus being rekindled. But this British policy obviously was of 
little value to the Australian prime minster who should have suggested his ministers 
look eastward for help. When the new ingredient of air power was mentioned at all, 
the White Paper admitted: 
In the air we virtually disarmed ourselves in 1919, and, subsequently, from time to time 
proposed attainment of the minimum air strength regarded as necessary to our security 
in the face of air developments on the Continent.  
In its post-war defence policy for the Empire, the British role for aircraft carriers was 
not mentioned. Thus the British were largely unaffected by the new dimension in air 
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power they had invented during the war. They must have followed the build-up of 
naval airpower by others but their once dominant position of  'ruling the waves' was 
gone by the 1920s and 1930s due to the Great Depression, the disarmament 
agreements and the lingering dread of another bloody war they might not win. But 
also involved was Britain’s failure to capitalise on the aircraft carrier and for its 
manufacturers to design modern naval planes and long-ranged land-based fighters 
and bombers. The British were aware of Japan’s so-named 1931–1936 replenishment 
program to off-set America’s Pacific naval domination; in fact they assisted the 
Japanese to construct an impressive navy based around the carrier as already 
noted.275 Discussing the disparity of air strength between the British and Japanese 
navies respectively, Mr Hector Bayswater, a naval correspondent to the London 
Daily Telegraph, wrote in 1933: 
Although Japan desires the complete abolition of aircraft-carriers, she herself possesses 
a formidable fleet of these vessels. In addition to the giants Kaga and Akalg, each of 
28,100 tons, and the smaller Ryujo, a new carrier of medium size has been converted 
into an aircraft carrier … during the recent naval manoeuvres—the largest ever held by 
Japan–230 aircraft were in service. This is 80 more than the … British Navy has at its 
disposal today’.276  
Against the Australian government’s concept of fighters being unnecessary, the 
reverse was voiced at a War Cabinet meeting of 1940 when battles between RAF 
Hurricanes and Spitfires and German Messerschmitts, Heinkels and Dorniers were 
dominating media and newsreels worldwide. Cabinet’s minutes indicated ministers 
were ‘considering’ replacing Wirraway Squadron No. 7 with ‘one fighter 
squadron’.277 Nothing was done but at least the government recognised that 
contemporary fighters existed and it might be a good idea to get some.  
Britannia ruling the waves was, by the 1930s, in second or third place; about 
proportional to the decline in England’s ability to keep pace with Japanese and 
American naval expansion. The RN's position was challenged by Italy, a World War 
I ally, as well as Germany, particularly in the Mediterranean where Dictator 
Mussolini was opposing British interests. Based on a question directed to the British 
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Chief of the Naval Staff, Admiral Sir Ragnar Colvin, by the Australian Minister of 
the Army, Sir Percy Spender, in Washington in mid-1941, Colvin replied: 
... Attacks on Australia can be ruled out … The word 'attack' was intended to be used in 
the sense of invasion, which conforms with the basis accepted in previous reports of 
recent Singapore Conferences. Provided … Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies 
… hold out … at the most, Australia might be subjected to intermittent bombardment 
from raiding cruisers and by a sharp cruiser-borne raid on vital areas, the raid in such 
instances consisting of not more than 100 men thereabouts'. 278 
The RN’s Admiral Colvin failure (deliberate or otherwise) to admit air attacks by 
carrier-based aircraft were possible against Australia could have hardly been through 
ignorance. But Colvin's conclusion was arguably typical of the British adamant 
opinion of the low risk of air attack against Australia before Pearl Harbor. The 
problem for the government, because its military services were weak, was to not only 
get a concrete commitment from Britain to provide defence in the form of capital 
ships, but to overcome British denial of Australia’s vulnerability. Successive 
governments, both conservative and non-conservative adhered to this policy even 
after the British became embroiled in a second European war from September 1939 
and had advised the Australians of their stretched defences.  
The government pays insurance 
The government's reaction to the new military order was predictable. With its 
military protector all but gone, rather than face a two-year drive to defend itself 
based on cost effective warplanes to counter the Japanese naval-air threat, its 
response was ambivalent. It sent its elite ground and naval forces to North African 
and European war zones under British control. Australia’s defence was therefore still 
of secondary importance to Britain’s; even to Australians. Such subservient foreign 
policy was a double-edged sword—not only was Britain’s ability to protect Australia 
unlikely after September 1939, but exporting military forces to help Britain could no 
longer guarantee any reciprocal response. And it meant the (Curtin) government 
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would eventual face the problem of getting its own depleted forces home when local 
defence was most needy and British objection was highest. 
The twenty years of useless angst that was imperial defence was immediately 
revealed with the Hawaii air attack. The Japanese onslaught was so overwhelming 
that the combined forces of Australia, China, Britain, America and Holland were 
unable to contain it. Curtin was obviously aware Australia’s military resistance was 
inadequate and the nation without air defence as the Japanese swept south 
(desperation lasted until April 1942 when Australia and New Zealand became 
America's military responsibility.279) The fall-back position of having to appeal to 
America was an ironic and inglorious twist to imperial defence on which successive 
Australian governments had relied and sacrificed so much. 
The Anglo-Australian alliance worked against the development of the RAAF. Even 
if the need for fighters was ignored, the government wanted long-ranged, air 
surveillance of approaches to its coastline. Accordingly it ordered nine long-range, 
four-engined Short Brothers Sunderland seaplanes from Britain in May 1939280 to 
form two reconnaissance squadrons.281 The Sunderland’s range was 2 900 miles. It 
was one of the world’s most enduring aircraft.282 Defence Minister Street could 
hardly have anticipated the Sunderlands would not arrive until 1944, but should have 
been cognisant with British aircraft firms’ poor record of fulfilling airplane orders.283 
Traditionally, military hardware came from England, although a delinquent tendency 
emerged with the Wirraway, but like all planes bought from Britain, the 
Sunderland’s delivery date came and went. With Britain at war, the seaplanes were 
retained for RAF duties. The Sunderlands were formed into No. 10 Squadron, RAAF 
under the RAF’s Coastal Command.284 At home, the RAAF was thus without long-
range patrol planes and lost more aircrews to the RAF who had travelled to England 
to collect the flying boats. The British again reneged on an Australian order for 
aircraft placed in good faith. 
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(Source: Imperial War Museum) 
Figure 41: The Sunderland seaplane was another example of a British warplane purchased for the 
RAAF before the war delivered late or not delivered at all. Sunderlands were to have ferried to 
Australia in 1939 but did not arrive until June 1944.285 
 
There were apparent illogical reasons for this local policy—sound in ordering long-
range seaplanes against the decision not to get more urgently required combat planes. 
This in turn was a failure to face the threat from aircraft carriers. But the point of the 
Sunderland example was that Britain's defence took priority over Australia's when 
the danger posed by Japan could no longer be denied. Had the government ordered 
similar aircraft from neutral America, a process discouraged by Britain although it 
reneged on supplying warplanes itself, they would undoubtedly been delivered on 
time, considering the track records between British and American manufacturers. 
Part of this self-depreciating 'Britain first' policy of the government meant that no 
reconnaissance aircraft could be allocated to Darwin, the direction from which an 
aggressor would undoubtedly approach mainland Australia, so improvisation was 
necessary: unarmed passenger seaplanes were seconded from Queensland And 
Northern Territories Air Service (QANTAS): 
The Sunderland aircraft which were to arm two flying boat units were formed into one 
flying boat squadron in England. The R.A.A.F. need for flying boats was met by taking 
up two Empire flying boats from Civil Aviation. Approval has now been given to 
                                                 
285 Wilson, S. 1992, op. cit., p. 167. 
125 
impress two more Empire flying boats, thus increasing the flying boat force based at 
Port Moresby to four.286 
In 1941, the government bought American Consolidated Catalina flying boats 287 but 
the Department of Defence still seemed ambivalent about the nation’s first line of 
defence. In a Minute Paper 13 July 1938, it noted that:  
Labour policy attaches much importance to Air Force with a minimum of 300 
machines. They do not believe in relying on a Navy which comprises vessels of varying 
degrees of obsolescence. Think United Kingdom Government should protect trade 
routes … So long as adequate Empire Naval Forces are in being the danger of invasion 
of Australia is remote and it is axiomatic that our first line of security is Naval Defence 
– the Army and Air Force supplementary and co-operating.288    
Unlike the British Sunderlands, the Catalinas, ordered in June 1940, were delivered 
5 February 1941, just eight months later.289 
Too many purchase orders for British aircraft go unfulfilled 
In a secret British Cabinet meeting of October 1937, the threat posed by Mussolini 
was tabled and an attempt to respond proposed addressing the deteriorating 
relationships with Italy. Two solutions were suggested—courting the sabre-rattling 
dictator by pursuing a renewal of friendship or a bigger British military presence in 
the Mediterranean to deter him: 
For some time the Chiefs of staff have been preoccupied with the importance ... of the 
restoration of our former friendship with Italy ... As a general proposition anything 
which can be done at the present time to improve Anglo-Italian relations would be of 
the greatest advantage from the military point of view ...'290 
Torn between stick and carrot, the British vacillated but the Italian threat drew any 
focus on the Far East that remained onto the Middle East with its vital oil supplies. A 
review of imperial defence by the Chiefs of Staff of February 1937, to which 
Australian ministers were privy, stated: 
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... our communications through the Mediterranean can only be made really secure either 
by maintaining friendship with Italy or by establishing ourselves in such military 
strength in the Mediterranean as would permanently deter Italy from embarking on war 
against us.291 
Concerns over Italian ambitions were pressing to the British with an escalating 
demand on their resources. Imperial defence therefore became more based on hope 
and promise for the faraway dominions. War against Italy was not inevitable but 
British concerns closer to home naturally took precedence. The threat from Italy 
became reality when its government declared war on Britain on 10 June 1940, action 
that must have seemed logical. The Germans appeared to have the British beaten and 
the Italians would profit cheaply from the Wehrmacht-Luftwaffe victories in Western 
Europe.  
Australia's forward defence planning was being eroded by British distractions 
highlighted by their Chiefs of Staff in both Europe and the Middle East. Against this 
background, it was unlikely that any move towards an independent stance or attempt 
to build a RAAF fighter command equipped with contemporary interceptors for 
Australia's home defence would ever emerge from imperial defence. The focus was 
always elsewhere. Concurrently, the British had compiled their own air defence 
system, arguably the best in the world and could have helped the Australians prepare 
a more moderate version.   
The ghost fleet to Singapore  
The history of the British presence in the Far East depended on the semi-permanent 
stationing of RN capital ships on station which in turn needed a naval base at 
Singapore. In November 1921, the US convened an ‘International Conference’ in 
Washington and submitted proposals designed to contribute to the maintenance of 
world peace and reduce the burden of an arms race.292 A treaty among the British 
Commonwealth, USA, France, Italy and Japan was signed on 6 February 1922 
limiting naval armaments.293 This treaty would have repercussions in the years of 
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peace ahead. Its purpose was to try to curb Japan's aggressive tendencies that were so 
evident after 1915, the time of the 'Twenty-one Demands'.294 
The British Imperial Conference held in London late in 1923 reviewed the Pacific 
situation against the background of the Washington Treaty. There was reference to 
the growing need for a naval base at Singapore which the representatives of 
Australia, New Zealand and India wanted without delay.295 The conference concluded 
with agreement that the project proceed quickly. A sub-committee presided over by 
Lord Curzon (Curzon Committee) approved the location in Johor Strait. After 
considerable debate, the committee decided that the Japanese traditional methods of 
attack used at Port Arthur against the Russians and at Tsingtao in 1914 would not 
work in the jungle of Malaya and therefore any attack on Singapore would come 
from the sea.296 
Britain and the air defence of Singapore 
At the same time there was deep debate about air defence for Southeast Asia. On this 
point, which remained unresolved, official British historian Major General 
Woodburn-Kirby wrote: ‘The suggestion that aircraft might take the place of fixed 
gun defences led … to a difference of opinion among the Chiefs of Staff, and started 
a controversy which lasted for ten years'.297 The British Air Ministry wanted torpedo 
bombers, fighters and reconnaissance aircraft for Singapore.298 Part of the successful 
counter by the Admiralty and War Office was that torpedo bombers were not yet 
shown as reliable deterrents to naval attacks.299 Australian politicians worried that the 
Singapore base, considered mandatory to their security, would not go ahead.300 While 
the debate raged, the government declared, 'If the Singapore base is not built, the 
British Empire in the Pacific cannot give effect to the five, five, three standard laid 
down by the Washington Treaty’ and opined that this would be a ‘destabilising turn 
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of events’.301 But not everyone was blinkered to Singapore being inadequate or 
overrun. According to official British historian, Sir Ian Hamilton 'Knowing only too 
well my countrymen's tendency to underrate their enemies and to indulge in wishful 
thinking', he wrote in 1924 on Singapore, 'I have no fears, unless we ourselves fit out 
a half-way house and then—half garrison it, as is our wont—make a present of it to 
the wrong people'.302  
Against such uncertainty, the government drew upon the expertise of the British Air 
Ministry and Air Staff to upgrade the RAAF. Before September 1939, it was 
investigated by two ex-RAF chiefs—Sir John Salmond (1928) and Sir Edward 
Ellington (1938). As the inter-war years unfolded with their new threat from 
Germany, the British, focused on Europe, predictably continued to degrade any 
danger from Japan. To compound the situation, some Australian politicians agreed. 
Labour Prime Minister J. Scullin, elected October 1929,303 thought the naval base at 
Singapore was unnecessary when the British decided defence work be slowed 
because of the Depression.304 Scullin, a pacifist, argued that 'surely the world might 
become more sane in the future', and 'I had never been greatly impressed with the 
suggestion that Japan might invade Australia'.305 This type of talk played into British 
hands. 
The brutal fact was that the British, by the 1930s, no longer had the power (or 
perhaps the will) to be the world’s number one power: they could not match 
American industrial capacity or the size of the Japanese presence in the Pacific. 
These latter peoples had little interest in Europe where the rumblings of a second 
world war were loudest. They could concentrate in the Pacific without dividing their 
strength. And traditionally they were not restricted by inter-services’ rivalry and 
obsolete thinking.  
Despite Scullin and the economic crisis of the 1930s, the Australian defence policy 
seemed static—to keep the British in Malaya and ensure Singapore naval base was 
finished so RN warships were stationed there permanently. When the Lyons 
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government won office in January 1932, Australia was virtually defenceless. The 
United Australia Party blamed Scullin whose government reduced defence spending 
from £12 794 000 in 1928–29 to £7 376 000 in 1930–31, but fault went much 
wider.306 The new government tried to address defence but instead of air power being 
predominant in the Lyons’ budget, the RN connection was reiterated: 
The provision of sea power for the defence of sea-borne trade simultaneously furnishes 
a deterrent against invasion by sea-borne, land or air-forces, and a general defence 
against raids. An adequate naval strength is of fundamental importance to Empire and 
Australian defence and the Australian Navy should be maintained at a strength which is 
an effective and fair contribution to Empire Naval Defence.307 
Thus 'Empire Naval Defence' remained paramount with dependence on the RN and 
Singapore; the unassailed linchpin of Australia’s policy. The RAAF was a deterrent 
against 'raids' but somehow without the necessary warplanes. The concept of raids, 
which would always imply light air attacks presumably to be repelled by Wirraways, 
was accepted probably because it was achievable. The role of air defence was 
therefore unrealistically restricted by the adoption of the so-named 'Defence Against 
Light Raids'.308 Such a strange concept apparently envisaged attacks by seaplanes 
which conventional warships carried for scouting but not from aircraft carriers. The 
light raid policy appeared partly due to British Admiralty advice from the 1920s, 
over a decade before the Japanese acquired their fleet of carriers.   
The RAN’s peacetime equipping was included in the Defence Equipment Bill of 
June 1924. The Bill recommended the purchase of two 10 000 ton eight-inch 
cruisers, two submarines and a seaplane carrier.309 The government was advised not 
to buy destroyers because of their limited range and no aircraft carriers because they 
'were unproven'.310 This advice was in contrast to the British pioneering the carrier 
and its development between the wars already mentioned. The Australian 
commitment to imperial defence and its failings was another two-edged sword. Not 
only could the RN not protect Australia from heavy raids by carrier-based aircraft not 
even envisaged, it meant the RAAF did not need fighters. But an independent 
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assessment by Australian politicians and defence chiefs would have found the 
Japanese had, by the 1930s, surpassed the British in improving the carrier in the way 
the Germans had out-paced them in tank design. Apparently the Japanese did not see 
the torpedo bomber or the carrier as ‘untried’.  
Despite optimistic British evaluations, Japanese sea power status could hardly be 
hidden. During the 1930s the Japanese commenced a major naval expansion 
culminating in the Kaga and the Akagi, the former being the world’s biggest carrier 
with a displacement of 39 000 tones and a complement of sixty modern aircraft.311 
This paralleled development of single-engined, all-metal, naval monoplanes 
including the Zero fighter and the Kate bomber, two late model aircraft. Thus while 
British decisions stymied the RAAF getting the correct equipment to protect or even 
warn against attack, a combination of understated British assessments of hardware 
needed and unfulfilled aircraft orders, put the air force in an almost defenceless state. 
Part of the problem stemmed from the British being unable or unwilling to fill 
Australian aircraft orders after Poland and their opposition to the Australian 
government buying American planes. And attempts to make warplanes in Australia 
as a source of supply to the RAF and RAAF were tantamount to failure. Yet, as early 
as June 1928, the British voiced concern over Japanese occupation of Formosa, 
within air range of the Philippines, and Hong Kong, a RAF base.312  
The Wirraway and imperial defence 
The decision to build the ill-fated NA-33 was important for several reasons—it 
appeared to break the shackles of imperial defence and gave the impression 
Australian politicians knew more about military aviation than they actually did. Non-
government agencies were considering buying a new all-metal American commercial 
airliner, the Douglas DC-2 promoted by Charles Kingsford-Smith—Kingsford-
Smith, the first aviator to fly the Pacific, was using an American Lockheed Altair to 
set newer records.313 While the government was buying Wirraways as fighters, 
commercial Australian carriers were acquiring the latest and best passenger plane in 
the world. Pressured by the British not to buy American, the Lyons’ government 
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hesitated when diplomatic effort was put on Menzies as Attorney General during a 
visit to London. It was stressed that only British aircraft should be bought because of 
imperial defence and ongoing trade with Britain.314 
 
 
(Source: Lockheed Martin) 
Figure 42: Sir Charles Kingsford Smith’s Lockheed Altair flown for his record flights of the mid-
1930s. The Altair was a commercial monoplane faster than the Wirraway ‘fighter’.315 
 
The DC-2 airliner purchase did proceed, both for commercial carriers and the RAAF; 
common sense prevailed—there was no equal British aircraft. The Australian 
situation attracted the ire of the British but more ad hoc policy lay ahead. 
 
 
(Source: Public domain) 
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Figure 43: The American Douglas DC-2 airliner of 1934; years ahead of any similar aircraft that set 
new standards in air travel. The DC-2 was only slightly slower than the NA-33. 
 
The Americans were advanced in airline and bomber design but neglected 
interceptors until the last minute. There was no American equivalent to the Spitfire, 
Me-109, or Zero. This dilemma may have influenced the Australians into not 
switching to American fighters (like the French and Dutch) and becoming aligned 
with the US in the Pacific. With no advanced American fighter immediately 
available like the DC-2 commercially and the Catalina and the Lockheed Hudson in 
their military categories, the British Spitfire and Hurricane remained the glamour 
interceptors apparently saving the Free World from Fascism. Their pilots, the 
majority of whom did not shoot down any German planes, continued to be worshiped 
by the Western world helping promote an image of British invincibility. 
There is little point in labouring the stop-start way the Australian aircraft industry 
was established and the British role—sometimes opposing it and sometimes being in 
support—obviously for reasons affecting their own industries. Approval was 
straightforward when British designs were chosen for manufacture so it was strange 
the Spitfire did not receive consideration.316 Without an operational fighter command, 
the RAAF continued to languish in its British-approved role in EATS which, as 
stated, might have been the real reason behind the Wirraway selection.   
At the same time, political faith in imperial defence seemed shaky. In Labor’s 
‘Views on defence’ of November 1936, opposition leader Curtin reiterated that the 
Singapore base could not be regarded as a measure of Australia’s defence except in 
conjunction with a RN fleet.317 In a public speech he declared that the naval forces 
needed to make Australia secure were in doubt, revealing he still put the ‘fleet to 
Singapore’ as his first choice.318 Curtin was careful to avoid suggestion that ties with 
Britain be broken but added that, ‘A greater degree of self-reliance in Australia 
defence is essential, and I do not disregard our relationship with the British 
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Commonwealth of Nations.’319 On air defence, Curtin stated that, ‘Australia’s air 
force should be developed on the basis of reconnaissance tasks and as a striking force 
and later in direct conjunction with the land forces’.320 Alarmingly, he did not even 
mention fighters, instead  taking the middle ground despite the fact that the minor 
powers of China and Finland stood up to major ones by their own efforts and 
initiatives with  a strong fighter force.  
When Curtin reiterated his party’s defence policy the following year, Menzies 
termed his reply as a 'largely negative task'321 without adding anything about 
protection in the air. Instead he attacked Curtin's call for a referendum before 
Australian forces could be committed to areas outside Australia. Reiterating that 
Singapore was vital to Australia's defence, Menzies denounced Labor's policy by 
farce: 'Should someone attack Singapore, a key point that is vital to Australia's 
defence, could Labor require that before Australia did anything about it, there should 
be a referendum?'.322 
While the British retained an interest in the Pacific based on Singapore, there was no 
arrangement made for Australia’s air defence and its territories or in fact any modern 
fighters provided for Singapore itself. So the government continued with its own 
policy on local air protection divorced from imperial defence. Without an efficient 
fighter force backed by radar stations across Australia's north, the RAAF had no 
means of preventing air raids, light or otherwise, against the nation's northern 
population centres and military bases. Australian pre-war defence planning, although 
doomed once the Wirraway went into production, could only work while Britain and 
America deemed Australia worth defending and then supplied military aid. And this 
may have had to be at the expense of Cairo, Ceylon and Burma, which to Churchill, 
it was obviously not. Thus the RAAF did not get any aid for air defence of the 
continent despite Britain having the means and the knowledge to activate a first class 
fighter command based on the RAF’s advanced example. 
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Hitler decides if Britain will help Australia 
To break, or even think of breaking from Britain was perhaps too dreadful for the 
ethics of the inter-war years. The government and the people seemed to have such 
loyalty to the mother country even if Britain preferred to defend Ceylon to Darwin 
and to supply fighters to Russia than Australia. At the time of his visit to Britain in 
January–February 1941, when Menzies tried to secure reinforcement for Singapore 
he was told by Stanley Bruce, the Australian High Commissioner in London, that ‘… 
everything here is governed by what Hitler’s next move is going to be—it is difficult 
to see how it can be other than on the grand scale’.323 He meant that everything 
depended on whether or not the German air offensive was a prelude to invasion and 
until that danger passed, other matters of major policy ‘were unlikely to receive any 
serious attention’.324 Thus Menzies was twice advised not to expect much from 
Britain. If Britain was going to send massive military aid as Churchill promised, then 
it could only have been for helping drive the Japanese out of Australia. Time and 
logistics would dictate that anything else was unfeasible.   
Menzies misses the point 
British focus being different from Australian gave Menzies a mandate to turn to 
America. Probably because of his preoccupation with Singapore, he missed two 
important points during and after his London trip that illustrated his ignorance of 
aerial defence. The first was not consulting pilots of the RAAF’s No. 3 Squadron, 
although he ‘glowed at the thought of visiting his troops [the 6th Division in the 
Middle East] on his way to England’.325 326 His second was not hurrying home to take 
urgent steps about Australia’s own defence, particularly in the air; for instance asking 
for American assistance in establishing an operational fighter command as had been 
done in China.  
Churchill’s attitude was understandable. It was vital that Russia did not capitulate 
under the massive German onslaught but if Australia was occupied it could be 
retaken once Germany was defeated. In fact, by 1941, the Australians were probably 
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a liability to Britain with demands for reinforcements to Singapore and their refusal 
to cooperate in either the retention of AIF troops in the Middle East or its 
participation in the defence of Burma or India. In a letter to Sir Earle Page (for 
Churchill) Curtin not only called for Britain and America to supply the RAAF with 
'up to 250 fighter aircraft of the Tomahawk [P.40], [Hawker] Hurricane 2 or similar 
type' on 25 January 1942, but stated that is was ‘Impossible for us to give effective 
resistance with inadequate aircraft at our disposal’. This appeal for fighters at the 
twelfth hour was the final fall-back position; an admission by Curtin that the 
government’s aircraft procurement program at home and abroad were failures. 
Neither the P-40 nor the Hurricane, the types Curtin wanted from Britain or America, 
were being produced in Australia nor were on order. Curtin’s appeal for American 
and British fighters came just five days after the debacle at Rabaul of 20 January 
1942, where Wirraways were sent aloft to combat Zeros. Thus Curtin, despite his 
continual criticism of the United Australia Party Government during his years in 
opposition, did not act on aerial defence until after the Rabaul fiasco. It is obvious 
that a decision to acquire Hurricanes and Tomahawks for which Curtin appealed so 
vehemently as if to imply it was the fault of Australia’s allies that the RAAF was so 
poorly equipped. The decisions of the 1930s surrounding the building of the Harvard 
and the Beaufort in Australia were not those of Curtin’s, but his lack of foresight in 
not formulating a doctrine during his years in opposition and lack of action after he 
took power in December 1941 were his alone. In Parliament in June 1941 before 
Curtin won power, Senator Armstrong, then in opposition, stated in a speech on 
defence, that: 
We are manufacturing Wirraway aeroplanes, but we should have progressed beyond 
that stage in the first eight months of war to the manufacture of Hurricanes, Spitfires, 
and American Curtiss fighters. Without them we cannot defend Australia adequately. 
The Government has not attempted to take even the initial steps necessary for the 
manufacture of front line fighter aeroplanes.327  
The long silence from the government benches only reiterated the truth of 
Armstrong’s words. But no action was taken; Armstrong’s vision apparently being 
ignored by Menzies, but just as importantly, by Opposition Leader, Curtin. Not until 
late in 1944 did the Australian government, still under the leadership of Curtin, ‘take 
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the initial steps’ to make a fighter plane in Australia, the F-51 Mustang, at a time 
when the USAAF was bombing Japan into submission and the war was won.  
The answer as to why no action was taken to attain fighters can only be found in the 
minds of the politicians who made the decision. Arguably Liberal government 
members decided that the best way to guarantee British protection was to build 
trainers for EATS in the pretence they were for defence of the realm. Until the 
Japanese aggressed, then subsequent prime and defence ministers probably 
considered the likelihood of the Japanese breaking through British and American 
defences in the Pacific extremely unlikely, so the need for an operational air force 
unnecessary. In the case of Curtin, the situation in which he found himself after 7 
December was probably too overwhelming for a non-military leader. His only 
solution was to appeal belatedly to Roosevelt and Churchill for fighters.   
The Japanese, the one possible protagonist capable of invading Australia, had been 
building a carrier fleet for over a decade.328 Because of the nation’s geographical 
position and reliance on imports, a strong navy based on the carrier was essential.329 
Strangely, in light of later developments, it was the British who provided the know-
how. As early as the 1920s, a semi-official mission of ex-British military officers led 
by the Master of Seville (Captain William Sempill) resulted in the formation of 
Japanese naval doctrine that would last until 1945.330 The doctrine envisaged a 
carrier-centred heavy raiding force supported by fast battleships.331 Emphasis was 
placed on single-engined torpedo bombers and later, on dive-bombers. This naval 
expansion program culminating in the construction of the immense 800-foot carriers 
Akagi and Kaga with more to follow.332  
It is also true the British had details of Japanese aircraft before the war began. 
According to Basil Collier in Japanese Aircraft of World War II, as an outcome of 
the Zero operating in China, British military authorities at Singapore received data 
about the fighter when one was shot down in May 1941.333 According to Collier, a 
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fairly accurate estimate of performance followed in September.334 The information 
was sent to (British) Headquarters, Air Command, Far East, where it was ‘filed and 
forgotten’.335 The official British history of the war against Japan is silent on this 
matter as are Craven and Cate, (The Army Air Forces in World War II 1948) the 
official AAF historians.336 Yet when Menzies spoke with British commanders in 
London in 1941, he was told, ‘The Jap is reported here a poor airman. Even on the 
naval side, the Second Sea Lord (Phillips) British fleet would be happy to attack with 
only 60% of the Japanese forces! The Japanese experience in China seems to point to 
a similar state of affairs in the Army’.337 Such underestimation of Japanese military 
might seemed to have been accepted unequivocally by Menzies.  
The British assessment of the Japanese, from their pilots to their planes, was 
inaccurate as was the types of air attacks that could be mounted against continental 
Australia, but once the light raid policy was concocted it was never discarded even in 
the face of the obvious Japanese potential to launch heavy aerial attacks from aircraft 
carriers. Such an optimistic outlook, like most of Australia's major defence decisions, 
was British in origin; in this case from the British Chiefs of Staff although there were 
important exceptions. In the official history of the RAAF of the air war against 
Japan, Gillison states that: 
… on the proposed organisation of the RAAF [the British] expressed general agreement 
with the [Australian] Air Board's proposals. Choice of the same type of aircraft for 
general purpose and general reconnaissance squadrons was regarded as sound policy . . . 
In view of the kind of attack Australia might expect, no strong case could be made on 
purely military grounds for the provision of fighter squadrons, though there might be 
psychological and other reasons for forming some squadrons of this [fighter] type.338 
Gillson qualifies his statement by opining that the British 'either were thinking in 
very immediate terms and without any comprehension of the RAAF becoming a 
fully coordinated air force, or that they did not recognise at this time the value of 
fighter aircraft as escorts for bomber formations … ' 339 But this is not entirely true as 
the British were hurriedly expanding the RAF with fighters. The one decision that 
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mattered most to Australian defence, that of getting a modern interceptor of 
international parity to replace its biplane fighters in RAAF fighter squadrons in the 
mid-1930s was not British—the decision to build the NA-33, arm it and deploy it to 
front-line air bases in Northern Australia and Australian mandated territory was 
entirely Australian. Thus the reason for the tragedy that followed can be blamed 
entirely on cabinet ministers on both sides of parliament and not on imperial defence 
or British influence.  
Australia’s air defence, in which the British played no direct part, was never an issue 
within imperial defence, and has to be addressed separately. The British were invited 
to advise on Australian air defence and RAF officers held top jobs in the RAAF, but 
the building and equipping of local squadrons for supposedly holding air superiority 
sway over an aggressor, was entirely a government concern. The only criticism that 
can be levelled at the managers of imperial defence is that practical help could have 
been offered to Lyons or Menzies to compile a RAF-type fighter command at the 
local level. 
Thus if any failure by the Chiefs of Staff to appreciate the fighter's necessity in 
military defence or offensive operations is discounted as it must be, this only leaves 
the notion that the British did not want the RAAF to become a 'fully coordinated air 
force' and Australian politicians did not have the fortitude or confidence to go against 
British desires. This may be so, but the British did not support the light raids’ 
philosophy for the right reasons; that there was no need for Australia to be defended 
by fighters. What was far more likely was that the British wanted to ensure the flow 
of Australian aircrews as an integral part of its world-wide training base for the RAF 
and the Wirraway decision was part of that plan. To encourage a switch to 
operational fighter squadrons might have meant a change in focus from EATS to 
active service and an American alliance.  
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Summary 
It is important to note, as highlighted by the American media over Curtin’s 
impassioned cry for fighters after the Japanese air attack on Rabaul, that, ‘It would 
be accurate to say that … the Australian Government must share responsibility for 
the existing situation’; [the failure of imperial defence]’.340 With the advance in 
military aircraft during the mid to late 1930s; the obvious threat imposed by the Axis 
powers and their well-advertised intentions; with imperial defence sinking into self-
destruction between January 1935 and December 1941, Australian politicians and 
defence planners were stunned into impotency. Once France fell and the British were 
threatened with invasion in 1940, however hollow in reality, the practicality of a 
British air and naval presence in the Pacific in sufficient strength to stop a Japanese 
onslaught was obviously small. The Australians were probably fortunate that the 
British army (which outnumbered the Japanese army in Malaya) was sizable enough 
to offer resistance and divert Japanese attention from the Pacific long enough for the 
Americans to organise.  
The non-potency of imperial defence for Australian security was emphasised clearly 
in British White Papers of 1935 and 1936. Eventually the Curtin government turned 
to the Americans and pleaded for help but only after Pacific hostilities broke out. 
During his time as opposition leader in the pre-war years, Curtin constantly pushed 
in parliament for modern aircraft for the RAAF.341 Yet on becoming prime minister 
weeks before war started, he did nothing to equip the RAAF with interceptors. Thus 
the tragedy of imperial defence as it affected the war effort is not its failure to protect 
Australian soil or that the government was hostage to the policy, but that local 
politicians and defence planners knew of its inadequacy but chose to do nothing 
concrete except to produce Wirraways and Beauforts in tiny numbers and expect a 
successful air defence outcome. More military-minded people would have ‘looked to 
America’ while the ‘arsenal of democracy’ was still neutral.  
                                                 
340 Anon. 1941, ‘Mr Curtin Defends Views “Loyalty but Voice Must be Heard”’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 30 
December, p. 7.  
341 Anon. 1941, ‘They Laughed When He Wanted Planes’, Mirror, 27 December, p. 12. 
140 
The sinking of the RN Repulse and Prince of Wales on which imperial defence was 
based, at least in South Asia, occurred off the coast of Malaya three days after Pearl 
Harbor by conventional, land-based Japanese bombers and torpedo planes of the kind 
the major belligerents were manufacturing by the thousands. With this disaster, the 
Western powers found out too late those ordinary medium bombers, with acceptable 
losses, could sink capital ships at sea as envisaged by Billy Mitchell fifteen years 
before. The quality of the bombing force was important, but if the warships had no 
fighter cover, combined with shipboard anti-aircraft artillery, then the outcome was 
inevitable.  
This conclusion, taken a step further, would suggest that the ruthless but war-
winning Churchill, a big player in a global war in which the survival of the English-
speaking world was at stake, probably decided any sacrifice for victory was justified. 
Japanese occupation of Australia was undoubtedly included if it came to a choice 
between priorities. His policy is conveyed in action rather than words; the non-
Spitfire reinforcement of Singapore; his plea to Roosevelt to join the war, his unkept 
promises to Menzies and a comparison in the numbers of interceptors shipped to 
Russia and to South East Asia in February 1941—the Soviet Union received 2 952 
Hurricanes 342 while only fifty-one were sent to Singapore arriving 13 January 1941, 
more than a month after the Japanese landing.343  
The fact was that Australians needed British assistance (which never arrived anyway) 
much less than they believed. Chinese strategists use the term ‘asymmetric’ warfare; 
tactics and tools that can allow a weaker and smaller country (in terms of population) 
to inflict huge damage on a bigger rival.344 The Australian government did not need 
to match the Japanese defence budget pound for yen to achieve such a goal; it needed 
only to spend enough wisely and selfishly to change the strategic balance over 
Australian territory.  
The USN equipped its task forces with planes capable of sinking warships up to the 
size of carriers and fighters to protect them—the Dauntless and the Wildcat. These 
were both inexpensive, single-engined monoplanes probably cheaper to buy or make 
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than the Wirraway-Beaufort combination. American Catalina seaplanes and Hudson 
patrol aircraft were already in service with the RAAF by December 1941.345 
Combined for a concerted reconnoitre and ambush of the Japanese fleet of four 
carriers and ancillary support vessels that arrived off Darwin on 19 February 1942, 
the RAAF could conceivably have sunk some of the carriers and damaged others had 
it been similarly equipped and its aircrews given US training in dive-bombing and 
fighter interception tactics. Such a scenario was within the reach of the Australian 
defence budget prevented only by defiance of all evidence and a failure to believe the 
nation’s air force could equal the Japanese at needlepoint when they inevitably met 
over Australian territory. 
 
 
(Source: Public domain) 
Figure 44: End of an era: the doomed RN battleship Prince of Wales in the China Sea, which with the 
cruiser Repulse, was sunk three days after Pearl Harbor bringing imperial defence to an end. Their loss 
also dispelled forever doubts aircraft could sink battleships under combat conditions. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE AIRPLANE AS A DEFENSIVE AND 
OFFENSIVE WEAPONS SYSTEM—THE 
MILITARY AVIATION SCENE 1918–1938 
 
The day may not be far off when aerial operations with their vast devastation of enemy 
lands and destruction of industrial and populous centres on a vast scale may become the 
principal operations of war, to which the older forms of military and naval operations 
may become secondary and subservient.346 
 
Sensationalism surrounds the bomber 
In his story, The War in the Air of 1908, H. G. Wells, who had startled the population 
of the planet with The War of the Worlds, emphasised the destructive role that yet-to-
be-invented flying machines would have on civilised cities.347 Wells saw himself as 
'an educator whose task it was to enlighten the public about the dangers from 
technological inventions'.348 He believed it inevitable that great cities of the world 
would be destroyed from the air—in The War in the Air, he wrote about German 
airships flying the Atlantic to bomb New York and force the Americans into 
submission.349  
When World War I began in 1914, the German airship was probably the world’s best 
intercontinental bomber while Allied anti-aircraft defence remained paltry. After 
only limited success as a bomber, the airship lingered into the inter-war years 
because of its combat radius and fast rate of climb. But as a first-line battle plane, it 
had already surrendered to heavier-than-air machines that were faster, cheaper, more 
manoeuvrable and less vulnerable. 
The immediate post-war period 
During the 1919–1939 era aircraft were applied to a wider range of offensive and 
defensive tasks than during the war. Their potential was obviously very lethal but 
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easy to over-rate. Yet once the shooting stopped in November 1918, the need for 
rapid warplane development collapsed. Some manufacturers stopped producing 
planes and switched quickly to civilian products. Others went out of business when 
government orders evaporated. The RAF’s wartime force of 188 combat squadrons 
and fifteen flights shrunk in a matter of months to a mere thirty-three squadrons.350 
The British Army and Navy wanted to divide the remaining squadrons between 
themselves and disband the RAF.351  
With demobilisation, the war surplus wood, wire and fabric planes were scrapped or 
became items of entertainment, curiosity and fear rather than what they were—the 
forerunners of a hugely destructive force for the years ahead. Out-of-work aviators 
and fighter aces, the heroes of the past, gave joy-flights in surplus warplanes, did 
'barnstorming', carried mail, rounded up cattle or pioneered new air routes across 
their homelands and across the world. Yet others, including a new wave of female 
pilots, took part in government sponsored air races around the globe. Others, mostly 
of high military rank, worked on the theories of future air power applications and 
ways in which it might be deployed as a war-winning tool beyond its wartime role of 
reconnaissance and troop support. 
There were also more ‘humane’ thinkers promoting an obscure philosophy that if 
war was inevitable, it might be won with less loss of life than World War I through 
terror bombing alone. Airpower seemed to offer a ray of light through the gloom of 
trench warfare with its emphasis on attrition. Perhaps in the future, airpower could 
either prevent wars as a deterrent or win them quickly. The situation for the Allies, 
after success in the Great War, which immediately stopped the slaughter of their 
young men, was followed by a great desire for peace and a call for disarmament.352 
Peter Calvocoressi et al. wrote that, ‘ … the self-governing British Dominions, 
whose role and influence tends to be underrated, expressed strong and vocal 
opposition in public as well as in private against any moves which might involve 
them in another European holocaust’353 which is hardly surprising when the sobering 
casualty list is considered. With the small peacetime defence forces remaining after 
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demobilisation and despite ongoing concerns about a disgruntled Germany, the 
governments of the Allies adopted a policy of avoiding war at all costs leading 
downhill to the appeasement policy of the late 1930s. In the case of America, 
disillusionment evolved into ‘isolationism’.354 ‘It is best to count on nothing’ British 
Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain was quoted as saying up until the time of the 
Munich Agreement of 1938.355 But for those military officers, analysts, ex-aviators 
and politicians who saw future conflict as inevitable, the ever-evolving aeroplane 
remained a means of mass destruction of infrastructure separate from the battle front 
avoiding the massive loss of life and injury in troop numbers that dominated the 
conventional way of winning a war. Yet absent in such theories was any realisation 
of the large loss of life of airmen that might result from the destruction of expensive 
bombers by the defences of the nation under attack.  
Despite the ‘peace at any price’ policy of Britain and France, there was steady 
progress in aircraft development by manufacturers trying to win the government or 
off-shore orders that did still exist for military planes. Some companies had such 
faith in an aircraft they had designed, they went ahead and built prototypes before 
tenders were called and government specifications laid down. Well-known examples 
of this scenario were Sidney Camm’s Hawker Hurricane, Geoffrey de Havilland’s 
Mosquito and Boeing’s Flying Fortress, all of which were private ventures and 
played vital roles in World War II. 
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(Source: Imperial War Museum) 
Figure 45: The deHavilland Mosquito fighter-bomber prototype on its maiden flight 25 November 
1940 as a private venture bought by the British government for the RAF in quantity; 7 781 being built 
in England, Canada and Australia by 1945.356 
 
Monoplane or biplane 
Monoplanes had taken part in World War I, but were rare. During this trial-and-error 
period, the argument between which was best, the monoplane or the biplane, had 
been ongoing since before World War I and continued after it. Louis Bleriot, a 
Frenchman was the first aviator to fly the English Channel and did so in a tiny 
monoplane he built himself.357 In 1912, the British War Office decided against 
monoplane development for military use due to a spate of flying accidents and 
incidents, a decision that cost the RAF dearly: 
The recent order of the War Office suspending the use of monoplane flying machines 
for military purposes has led to the renewal, in the daily press, of a discussion of the old 
riddle. Which is the better, the monoplane or the bi-plane? When Bleriot crossed the 
Channel, the daily papers rang the praises of the monoplane; now everyone favours the 
biplane, and there is a danger lest the monoplane may be condemned for faults not 
necessarily attributable to the mere fact that it is a monoplane. The military authorities 
have wisely called in the assistance of the National Physical Laboratory in seeking an 
explanation of why so many … accidents have occurred with monoplane machines.358 
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Like the airship, the biplane prevailed into the late 1930s, but despite the official 
British ruling on the side of two-wings, its days were numbered although by clinging 
to the concept that the past is best, the British lost their lead in aircraft design 
dragging the Empire along with them. The biplane went on to dominate military 
aircraft design until the need for speed and heavier armament demanded its demise. 
Biplanes were more manoeuvrable, less difficult to fly and easier to keep aloft due to 
their gliding capacity and were generally more stable gun and bomb platforms. Their 
turning circle and aerobatic qualities were also relevant while ‘dog-fighting’359 
remained in vogue until the mid-1930s when the greater straight line speed of the 
monoplane fighter with its much heavier armament and ability to combat the bomber, 
quickly replaced it.  
By hanging on so hard to the biplane, the British allowed other countries to leap-frog 
over them. For example the Russians, who were not held back by tradition and 
trademark agreements, mass produced the first modern monoplane fighter design; the 
Polikarpov I-16 revolutionary Soviet design and the world's first low-wing cantilever 
monoplane fighter with retractable landing gear entered service in 1935.360 The I-16 
was to attain full operational status before any similar aircraft and led a new era in 
fighter design, not only for its configuration, but also by reaching over 300 miles an 
hour in level flight.361 The I-16 was successfully deployed in Spain, China, and 
Finland and was still in frontline service at the outbreak of the Second World War. 
But a bit like the biplane with the British, the Russians held onto it too long and soon 
got overhauled by other international powers. 
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(Source: Public domain) 
Figure 46: The Polikarpov I-16 Rata: the Soviet fighter of advanced design that fought well in the 
Sino-Japanese and Spanish wars until the Zero and the Me-109 respectively ended its brief reign. 
 
By the 1920s, it was obvious that the straight-line speed of fighters was never going 
to extend much beyond 200 miles an hour if the biplanes were retained, no matter 
how streamlined they were or how powerful their engines. Double-winged planes 
could not be converted to all-aluminium ones due to power-to-weight ratios, so 
hybrids appeared—biplanes with the front half of the fuselage made of metal and the 
rest of fabric and wood. Aeronautical engineers realised that greater efficiency could 
be achieved if the fabric of the wings could be replaced by self-supporting material 
not requiring an internal framework. This would also remove the struts and supports 
needed for fabric wings. Thus the cantilever winged monoplane was born.362 Some 
manufacturers turned to making aluminium or half-metal monoplanes in the quest for 
speed above manoeuvrability, an outstanding example being the Hawker Hurricane 
that first flew in November 1935.363 Hawker, confident in his hybrid design, 
authorised tooling in March 1936 for 1000 to be built.364 Three months later his 
decision was vindicated when the British government ordered 600 examples for the 
RAF.365 
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(Source: Public domain) 
Figure 47: The British Hawker Hurricane prototype of 1935: where metal meets fabric can be clearly 
seen. 
 
 
(Source: Public domain) 
Figure 48: Australian Sydney Camm, aged thirty-two, chief engineer at Hawker Engineering 
Company, led the team that designed the Hurricane monoplane, a break from tradition, as a private 
concern. He got authority to begin tooling up for 1 000 Hurricanes in 1936 in anticipation of a 
government order. 
 
The Hurricane was only fractionally faster than the Russian I-16 despite superior 
aerodynamics and greater quality control. But the British plane lagged in body 
construction; it used fabric to lower costs and reduce aluminium consumption; a 
scare commodity in Britain. The best breakthrough in all-metal, cantilever-winged 
fighters with retractable wheels was the German Messerschmitt 109 with a speed of 
350 mph and better all-round performance than any other fighter.366 It entered service 
with the Nationalists in Spain during 1937 ‘where World War II was being rehearsed 
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on a smaller scale’,367 and gained air superiority over the Russian and American 
fighters flown by the Republicans. The British and French, who had beaten Germany 
just eighteen years before, were lagging behind. The English Supermarine Spitfire of 
all-metal design like the Messerschmitt redressed the German advantage to some 
extent but did not eliminate it.  
 
 
(Source: Imperial War Museum) 
Figure 49: The Messerschmitt Me-109; probably the world’s best fighter until the advent of the P˗47 
Thunderbolt and the F-51 Mustang in 1943. 
 
 
(Source: Imperial War Museum) 
Figure 50: As an illustration of how far the British fell behind in bomber design: this was the standard 
‘heavy’ in RAF service during the Munich crisis of 1938—the Handley Page Heyford. Its layout was 
of World War I vintage; a biplane with fixed wheels and open cockpit. It was 150 mph slower than the 
American B-17 yet remained in service with the RAF until 1941. Its small bomb-load hangs beneath 
the wings. 
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(Source: Public domain) 
Figure 51: In stark contrast, yet of the same era as the Heyford, was the ultra-modern Boeing YB˗17 
prototype which flew in 1935 and serviced with the USAAC from 1937 as the Flying Fortress. Its 
speed was over 300 mph. 
 
The aeroplane in ‘civy street’ 
The full potential of the aircraft for peaceful, civil use was quickly recognised with 
the ending of the war. On 25 August 1919, less than a year after the armistice, the 
British firm of Aircraft Transport and Travel inaugurated the first post-war air 
service between London and Paris.368 This pioneering effort was soon copied by 
others. The only planes immediately available were war surplus bombers; for 
example the British DH-4. In the beginning, travel by air in converted warplanes was 
expensive and uncomfortable so only the rich and the brave took to the air. 
Pioneering new air routes became popular. The first crossing of the Atlantic in June 
1919 was by Captain John Alcock and Lt. Arthur Whitten in a specially prepared 
Vickers Vimy; an ex-RAF long-ranged strategic bomber developed late in the war to 
attack German cities.369 Six months later, Australian brothers Ross and Keith Smith 
flew another converted Vimy bomber from England to Australia, a distance of just 
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over 11 000 miles.370 But it was Charles Lindberg's solo flight from Long Island to 
Paris in a single-engined, high-winged civilian monoplane that captured most 
publicity. This flight, more than any other, enchanted the people of the world and 
gave a great fillip to air services and their safety as well as demonstrating beyond 
doubt the superiority of the monoplane.371 As air travel surged after Lindbergh’s 
success, the lighter-than-air transport also made its resurgence. The world was now 
aware of new and peaceful uses for the aeroplane although purpose-built civilian 
aircraft were usually a step or two behind military applications where performance 
was the criteria. The world of aviation seemed to be taking a new path, one away 
from military deployment and destruction.  
Technology for military use nevertheless did continue to evolve, sometimes ahead of 
being applied to commercial aircraft and sometimes behind. By the day of the cease-
fire of 1918, engine power had reached 300 hp.372 The rotary engine gave way to the 
static radial and the in-line V-12 which allowed more streamlined aircraft fuselages 
with pointed noses. Turbo-chargers, which boosted engine power temporarily in 
critical combat situations, were introduced as were variable propeller blades allowing 
for greater grip to cope with altitude and oxygen changes as aircraft flew higher and 
climbed more quickly. This meant that warplanes became more lethal. But after the 
euphoria over the war's end there was little parliamentary support for governments 
spending large amounts on armaments. Aircraft firms continued to be pressed into 
developing military planes to their own specification and then trying to sell them to 
the air forces of the world. In Britain, the very survival of the RAF was threatened, 
and apart from the efforts of Lord Hugh Trenchard, Air Marshal of the RAF, it may 
have rejoined the navy or even merged with the army. 
Can bombing win wars 
Lord Trenchard not only advocated that the RAF should be a separate entity, but that 
it should be 'policing the Empire'.373 Finally he was allowed to test his theory. 
Twelve, two-seated, multi-role DH-9s were dispatched to Africa in January 1920, 
where they bombed the native forces that were threatening home rule in British 
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Somaliland.374 The results were definitive. While the world watched, this minute 
campaign became a blueprint for the use of military aircraft—bombing, strafing and 
terrorising ground forces into submission. The fact that the opposition was poorly 
armed in anti-aircraft defences and had no interceptors was largely over-looked. The 
RAF victory was hollow and could not be accepted as the way of winning future 
wars although arguably taken as such.  
As long as aircraft were used in this one-sided way the need for technological and 
strategic advances in the performance of military planes was not very important. For 
ten years after the end of World War I, development in aircraft design made only 
modest progress, although power plants became more efficient and reliable with 
output stabilising at around 500hp like the 490-Bristol Jupiter fitted to the Bristol 
Bulldog of 1930 which gave a top speed of 178 mph.375 Most aircraft engines were 
bolted to the front of a two-seater military biplane with a traditional airframe of 
either wood or welded steel tube covered in stretched fabric. No one nation held an 
advantage in the air for long. Important milestone examples of aircraft design came 
from all the major powers—the British Westland Wapiti, the French Potez 25, the 
Dutch Fokker CV(5), the American Douglas O-38, the Russian Polikarpov as 
documented and the Japanese Kawasaki Type 88, all of which were made in large 
numbers. Many were sold abroad or made licensed or un-licensed off-shore.  
Because of the economic policies of governments to allow their aircraft companies to 
sell overseas, there was general standardisation in design. Thus it was difficult for 
one country to get far ahead with its aircraft technology. If an industrialised country 
lagged, it could simply buy a foreign-made plane and through reverse-engineering, 
build it with minor modifications, mostly in appearance. Or if there was a limited 
war somewhere in which modern warplanes were in use, then inevitably examples 
were captured.  
With many new ideas emerging, defence planners probably had trouble identifying 
their specific needs. For instance, sea planes and flying boats gained importance 
between the wars mainly for the advantage of being able to operate in remote and 
undeveloped areas independent of airports. This suited the British role of ‘policing 
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the Empire'. The British ‘had in effect stated that assistance is required from the 
Dominions in the air more than on land or sea’ and wanted to establish an Empire air 
force376 although nothing came of it. Flying boats also had an added safety margin, a 
physiological one of ability to land at sea in emergencies during over-ocean flights in 
an era when engine reliability was a factor. The crews and passengers of 
conventional aircraft landing in similar circumstances were usually doomed. A 
typical example was the USN's Curtiss Type PN series, a descendant of the wartime 
Curtiss H-16. In the race to be the first to fly from California to Hawaii, several 
competing seaplanes took off from San Pablo Bay in September 1925. They set 
course from Hawaii some 2 400 miles away. One, captained by a Commander John 
Rogers, leaked fuel and landed at sea hundreds of miles from Hawaii. Despite a huge 
search from warships stationed along the route, the seaplane was never found. The 
crew finally rigged a sail from the aircraft's fabric covering, and in arduous 
conditions, surprised the world by reaching Oahu after ten days of sailing.377 
The versatility of seaplanes against land-locked aircraft meant they could be used for 
search and rescue missions over vast areas of water and collect survivors from 
stricken ships. Many navies, air forces and airline companies operated them between 
the wars. Heavy seaplanes designed and built for commercial application could be 
converted to military operations by the addition of anti-reflective paint, guns, bombs 
or depth charge racks. They could range far beyond areas defended by fighters, 
stalking and attacking ships and submarines and shadowing convoys. An island 
nation like Australia put flying boats and amphibians to good use patrolling the coast 
line, but without protection, bi-plane models had limited military value except for 
reconnaissance. In 1921, the RAAF had eight Supermarine Seagull amphibians and 
two Supermarine Southamptons.378 But they were not a substitute for bombing planes 
that sunk ships.  
Australians begin twenty years of worry 
Australia emerged from the World War I as one of the winners at a time when the 
importance of the aeroplane in warfare was evolving. The cost of the ground war had 
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been horrendous for Australia with its minute population and tended to overshadow 
other factors like the part played by aircraft as the nation counted costs in human 
lives and pounds owed. Introspective policies resulted from a war-weary government 
rather than strategies based on the future of air power. Internationally, this type of 
thinking converted into static ground defences such as the Maginot Line, the 
Singapore fortress, the Mantra tunnels, and the capital ship—defences designed to 
hold the enemy at bay rather than winning a war quickly. Treaties tried to contain 
aggression and military expansion—agreements that could never be policed. 
With the progress in aircraft technology there was a parallel level of public concern. 
The United Kingdom’s Secretary of State for Air, Sir Samuel Hoare, when 
introducing the air estimates in the British House of Commons in March 1923, stated 
that there was a general feeling of anxiety about Britain's air strength compared to 
that of France 'who had more developed her air power’.379 'No one must form the 
impression that he believed that war was even remotely possible between the two 
great allies', Hoare went on to say, qualifying his outburst.380 He compared the 
number of aircraft and personnel of the respective air forces of the two allies, 
pointing out that by 1925 the French would be equipped with some 2 180 aircraft 
against the RAF's 575.381 Hoare's only solution was to summarise by saying that the 
British would have to concentrate on quality in place of quantity. Strangely this 
opinion mirrored that of Australian historian Manning Clark who claimed that only 
the French, who retained a large post-war air force as a deterrent to Germany, 
remained a potentially serious security threat to Britain.382 He wrote that, ‘It is 
significant that the giant acoustic screen on Romney Marsh, which in the early 1930s 
was still the kingpin of Britain’s early-warning system, was directed at France and 
Paris rather than Germany and Berlin.383 In truth, it was probably directed at the 
continent in general.  
At the same time prophecies were emerging about the terrifying potential of bombers 
in wars yet to come. Historian Sven Lindqvist in A History of Bombing argued that 
the principle behind the bombing at Dresden and Tokyo late in World War II (and on 
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a much smaller scale at Broome and Darwin in 1942) 'was already formulated in the 
beginning of the First [World War]'.384 This claim seems to be based on the 
indiscriminate bombing of civilians which began with German Zeppelin raids on 
British southern cities and towns from January 1915 in which very little material 
damage was done but significant signs of civilian panic had been discerned by 
British authorities.385 Zeppelins reigned supreme over southern England until British 
air defence galvanised and probably helped give the impression that the bomber 
would be largely impregnable and thus civilians would be defenceless from air attack 
in the future. If enough bombers were operational, then the deployment of air power, 
particularly when used against cities, seemed limitless.  
At the start of their bombing campaign in World War I, the Germans were almost 
jocular in their lack of concern about RAF interception. One Australian newspaper 
reported that German air force Colonel Zablonsky, writing of the Zeppelins, did not 
seem worried about British air defences in the least, joking that missions were flown 
on weekends because 'the young [RAF] airmen entrusted with the defence of London 
leave their posts on Saturdays and return on Monday'.386 
Whenever they were conducted, the German dirigible and Gotha raids against 
England showed that heavier than air fighters would need to be improved in 
performance as pure interceptors. The British responded by retaliating in kind, 
bombing German towns and cities from bases in France and Belgium. The important 
secondary bonus of bombing the enemy’s homeland was that resources had to be 
expended on protecting civilians that otherwise were useful at the front. Also 
interceptors would now need to be purpose-built with fast climb rates, height 
capabilities, manoeuvrability and heavy armament as opposed to their largely 
reconnaissance and dogfighting roles of the past—bomber destroyers.  
The German air raids on the British Isles killed 1 413 Britons, most of whom were 
non-combatants.387 The South Africa leader, General Smutts opined that the Gotha 
raid of 7 July 1917, in particular, shocked Britain and probably caused more concern 
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in London than any other single event of the war.388 The visual impact of giant, black 
Gotha bombers flying unmolested over the city in the daylight of an ordinary 
working day undoubtedly caused great consternation. Such operations made no 
military contribution in deciding the outcome of the war, but 'the moral and political 
effects of the German raids on London were grave and far-reaching'.389 They had 
shown the world a glimpse of a future in which civilians far from the battle-line 
doing their non-military activities were in danger of death simply because they lived 
in cities, were the ‘enemies’ of the bomber crews, and resided or were employed 
within range of the latest weapon of destruction.390 But they also emphasised the 
difficulties faced by the aggressor—the German raiders flew without fighter escort 
due to their range, had to locate their targets, dodge anti-aircraft artillery and ward 
off interception. What could have been advertised more to quell civilian concern was 
the way British air defences were organised and refined to meet the new danger. For 
their time, they were remarkably effective. The London Air Defence Area (LADA) 
initiated in August 1917 comprised of a mix of army artillery mounted to stands to 
fire skyward, interceptors, searchlights, unmanned balloons in cabled rows across the 
paths of the incoming bombers, and spotters, all coordinated to overlap and work 
together.391  
On their own, anti-aircraft guns and tracking systems had not been very effective in 
shooting down their quarries, but were greatly advanced in the inter-war years. Lack 
of ground defence against the aeroplane and the similarity in performance between 
bombers and fighters became huge factor in the direct application of the writings and 
practices of Messrs Douhet, Mitchell and Trenchard all of who appeared to ignore 
the value of the interceptor and anti-aircraft artillery. Even some Australian 
politicians of the early 1930s recognised its value like Senator Sir William Glasgow 
who stated in parliament in school-boy rhetoric: 
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The great strength of the fighter lies in its ability to attain a considerable altitude in the 
shortest possible space of time. It has not got a big petrol tank, but it rises higher and 
quicker than the other aircraft, and this is in a more advantageous position for attack 
than they.392  
There was also the matter of reprisals. Once one nation bombed another's citizens 
who could not protect themselves, reprisals were sometimes more vicious than the 
original application when ‘the gloves came off’. Following the early success of the 
Zeppelins despite the vulnerability of airships, the British set up a special air service, 
the Independent Air Force—the forerunner of the RAF. Its purpose was purely to 
attack soft, non-battlefield targets behind the lines in response to the German impact 
on British morale. This was a recommendation from the quickly formed Smutts 
Committee to report on Home Air Defence and the Direction of Aerial Operations 
after the 1917 German air raids—an argument promoted by the two-man 
committee—Smutts and Prime Minister Lloyd George, that the existing system of air 
power was wasteful.393 They complained the RFC (army) and the RNAS (navy) 
duplicated their efforts and competed with each other.394 George and Smutts were 
desperate to help General Haig escape the appalling moribund mess of the western 
front. In so doing, they embraced optimistic expectations for air power, ideas later 
expressed by the theorists who so alarmed the world. 
Air forces can be independent  
Sir Frederick Sykes, Chief of the Air Staff (RAF) stated in 1922 that 'only a 
comparatively small percentage of the Independent Air Force [of World War I] were 
[sic] directed against the industrial targets for which the force had been created'. 395 
This suggested that the lives of enemy civilians were of no concern to air force 
chiefs. The notion of victory through air power alone appealed as the justification for 
an independent air force with the bomber the predominant feature. The forming of air 
forces separate from the other two services was also the first step towards so-named 
'area bombing'; air raids involving the indiscriminate killing of large numbers of 
civilians by targeting towns and cities including suburbs, the prime aim of which was 
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to assail industry, communications and morale to compel the surrender of the enemy 
if and when bombing military targets failed.396 
With an independent air force, imprimatur was given to the concept of the aircraft 
with strategic importance in its own right. The air force was no longer tied to the 
needs of the army. The premise of area bombing was that all citizens were, in some 
way, connected to the war effort—even if it was only ‘keeping the home fires 
burning’.397 Thus nations could 'impose [their] will upon the enemy population 
separate from that of the army and navy' through both fear and infrastructure 
destruction.398 This, in theory, would lead to capitulation—the nation under 
bombardment would submit to stop the bombing without a land or sea battle being 
required. The only losses to the attackers would be in aircraft and aircrews but as 
long as the war was short, this loss may be acceptable. Without the forming of the 
Independent Air Force in 1917 and then the RAF, it is unlikely that the RAAF would 
have been founded three years later as the world's second independent military air 
service. But in some ways this mimicking of the original model was to curtail 
independent thinking and lack of co-operation with the Americans who had similar 
needs in warplanes.   
Because of the emphasis on the perceived ability of the bomber to win wars by itself 
through terror, the role of the fighter plane was constantly under-rated and relegated 
to a secondary consideration throughout the inter-war years. During the First War, 
German raiders had at first proved difficult to intercept and destroy, particularly if 
they flew their missions at night. Therefore attacks on cities and civilians were 
inevitable during nocturnal mission: military targets were almost impossible to 
identify but cities were easy to find. The example of World War I bombing behind 
the lines of the frontline on the Western Front suggested that virtually everything 
from food-processing plants to factory workers in their homes could be targeted in 
the next international war.399 However wide of their mark the bombs fell, if a city was 
                                                 
396 Calvocoressi, P., et al, pp. 512–3.  
397 Alleged justification included industries dispersed throughout cities as in Japan with cottage industries 
producing war material (see Lindqvist, L., op. cit., Paragraph No. 104). 
398 Murray, W., op. cit., p. 86. 
399 Slessor, Sir J. 1956, The Central Blue, Cassell, London, p. 70; Douhet, G., op. cit., p. 28; Warner, E. M. 1943, 
‘Douhet, Mitchell: Theories of Air Warfare’, in Earle, E. (ed.) 1943, Makers of Modern Strategy: Military 
Thought From Machiavelli to Hitler, Princeton University Press, New Jersey; MacIsaac, D. ‘Voices from the 
Central Blue: The Air Power Theorists’, in Paret, P. (ed.) 1986, Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to 
the Nuclear Age, Oxford University Press, New York.  
159 
the target, then some destruction would occur that would hinder the enemy—water 
supplies, lighting, transport, housing and even entertainment—could all be disrupted 
and indirectly impact on the overall war effort.  
Giulio Douhet calculated that eighty to a hundred tons of poisonous chemicals would 
be enough to enclose London, Paris or Berlin.400 Between 1918 and 1939, the bomber 
continued in the forefront of aircraft evolution although acceleration was mainly 
directed at fast, lightly armed twin-engined planes which seemed to be aligned to 
Douhet’s theories. Demonstrations such as those of Mitchell also reinforced the role 
of the bomber but failed to show the effectiveness of fighters or anti-aircraft 
defences, which, in wartime, would have been encountered in some form by his 
aircrews. While the biplane fighter remained, then some bombers would get through. 
But in the interwar years the fighter underwent progressive refinement that began to 
out-match that of aviation in general.  
The decisive impact of aircraft on naval as well as land battles of the future was 
largely unanticipated. The notable exceptions were the British, Japanese and 
American navies, which, in a stop-start way, pursued the idea of the single-engined 
carrier-based dive-bomber and torpedo attack aircraft but largely without any 
defining direction and often against stiff opposition from other military factions. 
Between the wars, there was a number of hot-spots worldwide where some of the 
major powers tried out their new military aircraft, either by proxy or by themselves, 
but the effectiveness of the carrier-based bomber would not be illustrated until the 
successful British attack on the Italian fleet at Taranto in 1940; that is under combat 
conditions.  
Japanese aircraft deliberately underestimated 
The Japanese reputation as copyists of Western military hardware caused their 
aircraft to be dismissed during the inter-war years as inferior to those of Britain, 
America and Germany—easily overwhelmed should confrontation arise.401 Japan, 
which had a poor history of quality control in commercial manufacturing, was not 
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believed able to produce a fighter to equal the British Spitfire or the German 
Messerschmitt.402 This attitude included an ongoing degradation of Japanese planes 
and pilots. British military aviation historian, William Green, in his 1959 exhaustive 
research about the development and performance of the world's most famous military 
wartime aircraft, states that: 'A major enigma in the years immediately preceding the 
Second World War was the quality of the air forces of Japan and the Soviet Union. 
Both nations were popularly believed to be copyists and regarded qualitatively if not 
quantitatively as second-class air powers'.403 
Even in hindsight as that of Green’s, there was an element of truth in the claim that 
Japanese military planes were either inferior to, or copied from, German or Western 
types. In their official history of the American Army Air Forces in World War II, 
Craven and Cate state that the planes [of the Japanese navy and air force] 'were 
hybrids of foreign designs, with German influence being particularly noticeable after 
1936 when Japan threw in her lot with Germany by signing the Anti-Communist 
Pact.404 Researching such a point is beyond the scope of this thesis, but the copyist 
assessment did not make Japanese air power any less lethal. It was soon found during 
combat in China between the AVG and the Japanese air forces before Pearl Harbor 
that their Zero-Sen fighter out performed all Western and Russian types in most 
respects.405 The Zero (Allied name Zeke), the best Japanese aircraft operating in 
China, was designed, developed and put into production in 1940, almost two years 
before the War and yet it was claimed to be a ‘surprise’ to the Allies when the Pacific 
war began.406  
This assessment is contradicted by Claire Lee Chennault, a retired Air Corps officer, 
who went to China in 1937 with the blessing of President Roosevelt as a civilian 
‘special adviser’ to the Chinese Air Force. Famous in the USA as a member of the 
‘Flying Trapeze’ circus act which was running sensational air shows, he was a 
diligent student of fighter tactics.407 Like Mitchell, Chennault constantly rebelled 
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against the status quo and challenged USAAC traditional military aviation theory, so 
Roosevelt was probably glad to see him leave. The principle that 'bombardment, 
once in the air, could not be stopped'408 in particular was refuted. Chennault believed 
well before the example of the RAF in 1940 that properly employed fighter planes 
could intercept and destroy bombers and make long-range bombing militarily 
uneconomic.409 His AVG outfit was to be equipped with one hundred Curtiss P-40B 
Tomahawks paid for with Chinese money (allowed under Lend Lease after 
7 December), and released by the RAF and USAAC.410 The Tomahawks were 
originally bought by Sweden, an export sanctioned by the US Government.411 In turn 
this meant the Australian government may have done the same as Sweden before that 
country was over-run, and probably given a higher priority as a British dominion had 
it recognised the value of the fighter per se. Two RAAF fighter squadrons, Nos. 3 
and 451 were currently flying P-40 fighters successfully against the Luftwaffe and 
Italian Air Force in North Africa as already noted in this thesis, yet the RAAF had no 
fighters at home. Menzies, then-Prime Minister, visited Australian forces in the 
Middle East and in England in April 1941 and gained much political mileage from 
the media coverage but without ever becoming aware that fighters were mandatory 
for defence.412 
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(Source: Public domain) 
Figure 52:The Curtiss P-40 B Tomahawk flown by the RAAF in North Africa and AVG against the  
Japanese in China and Burma. 
 
 
(Source: Public domain) 
Figure 53: Claire Chennault formed the clandestine AVG in China before World War II. He tried to 
warn his government about the quality of Japanese aircraft but to no avail. 
 
Under the subterfuge of the 'Central Aircraft Manufacturing Company', Chennault 
recruited Western aviators and ground crewmen, mostly from the USAAC, who were 
prepared to fight in China as mercenaries. His portfolio was to establish a non-
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aligned civilian air force to oppose Japanese air raids, the so-named ‘Flying Tigers’ 
or AVG.413 After subsequent clashes between his group’s P-40s and Japanese aircraft, 
Chennault reportedly alerted the Western world of the existence of a Japanese super-
plane, the Zero-Sen operating over China eighteen months before Pearl Harbor.414 No 
hard evidence of this warning can be located, but it appears to have filtered through 
to US aircraft companies that were busy designing air superiority fighters.   
How ignorant the Allies remained of the danger imposed by Japanese aircraft of the 
1930s, not only of the Zero but its monoplane bombers, remains controversial. In 
some ways the unlikely high ‘kill’ claims of AVG pilots added to the impression the 
Japanese were easy to beat with smart tactics and sturdy, American-made fighters. 
For example the AVG’s most famous pilot, Robert L. Scott in his book God is My 
Co-pilot, and in other writings and talks he gave, claimed twelve Japanese aircraft 
destroyed including Zeros while flying P-40s in China and Burma with the AVG and 
the USAAC.415 According to Fowler, the AVG was credited with destroying 229 
Japanese aircraft in the air, but Japanese records put the number at 115, about half.416 
Any warning about the dangers imposed by the quality of Japanese aircraft would 
have been partially negated by unconfirmed victories and ‘hints’ about flying the 
P˗40 which included:417 
American Leadership and Pilot Ability – due to their commander’s knowledge both of 
Japanese psychology and the shortcomings of the Jap fighter planes, American pilots of 
both the AVG and the China Task Force have been able to so bring about their meetings 
with the enemy, that the P-40’s superior strength, diving speed and firepower, have 
brought astounding results, which are several times to one in our favour.418 
Well-meaning statements like Scott’s could have given the wrong impression about 
Japanese fighters. Considering the AVG’s success rate was half that of claims then 
Scott’s assessment was commendable but not entirely helpful.   
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General Douglas MacArthur commanded the defence of the Philippines during the 
war in China. In 1943 in his autobiography, he made no mention of America's lack of 
preparation when he re-examined the Philippines campaign and seemed to be 
ignorant of any warning from Chennault about the quality of Japanese aircraft.419 Air 
Vice-Marshal Bladin, RAAF, indicated that his official ‘little red’ air force notebook 
placed only question marks against all aspects of the Zero fighter.420 If Chennault 
warned the West about Japanese aircraft as he claimed, it does not appear to have 
reached either members of Australia’s Department of Defence or MacArthur’s 
command, or if it did, was ‘pigeon holed’. 
Espionage in the air 
During the years 1919 to 1939, among the Western powers only the British 
developed an all metal interceptor of world class: the Supermarine Spitfire. And only 
the Americans made a daytime intercontinental four-engined bomber of a war-
winning design. Boeing and Consolidated aircraft companies, in fact, designed the 
four-engined bomber ahead of the fighter, not to attack anybody, but for national 
defence—a policy resulting in the B-17 Flying Fortress equipping the USAAC in 
large numbers to protect America from the air.421 On the other hand, Japan, Italy and 
Germany, countries with aggressive expansionist ambitions, never produced a heavy 
bomber monoplane during the two decades of the inter-war years, instead 
manufacturing only dive-bombers, intruders, fighters and light bombers.422 
The British, after inventing the aircraft carrier and using it operationally in World 
War I, showed little peacetime interest in naval aviation until the rise of Nazi 
Germany in the mid-1930s. Of the RN’s seven carriers in service by the time Hitler 
seized power, only one, the Ark Royal, was modern.423 Thus the Fleet Air Arm 
suffered from two decades of neglect. While the Americans and Japanese converted 
to low-wing monoplane naval fighters with speeds of 300 mph and over, the only 
aircraft assigned to RN carriers were biplanes—Gloster Gladiator fighters and Fairey 
Swordfish bombers. Due to budget restrictions and the RAF having sole 
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responsibility for aircraft design, the RN received only a limited number of low-
performance aircraft.424 Yet it was the British who helped the Japanese establish their 
naval air arm. As stated by MP Marks (Member for Wentworth) after a visit to Japan 
in 1923, the Japanese naval air force ‘had been organised by the Master of Sempill, 
the great British airman, and a number of [British] aviators who distinguished 
themselves during the war’.425  
Marks was referring to the so-named  ‘Sempill Mission’—after the Japanese made a 
formal request for British assistance to build a naval air arm.426 Consequently the 
British agreed despite protest from the Americans.427 Subsequently, thirty 
experienced ex-RNAS pilots travelled to Japan in 1921 under the leadership of Sir 
William Forbes-Sempill, late-Deputy Director of the new Air Ministry.428 Sempill, an 
ex-RAF officer who had helped establish the RFC, was allegedly subverted by the 
Japanese, kept in close touch with their military through the 1920s and 1930s, and 
‘there is circumstantial evidence to suggest that Sempill passed sensitive military 
material to the Japanese’.429 Japanese declassified records are even more damming 
stating that Sempill, ‘… a pillar of the British establishment was passing secret 
information about aviation design to Japan during the 1920s according to secret 
government records. The [Japanese Foreign] Office files from 1926 show that Lord 
Sempill gave vital details of British ‘aeronautical construction’ to the Japanese naval 
attaché in London, Capt. Teijiro Toyoda’, for which they awarded Sempill the Order 
of the Rising Sun in 1961.430 According to Ireland: 
The Americans … had good reason to distrust the [Sempill] mission, for although it was 
also a commercial success, with British Products and designs being acquired, several of 
its members, including the ‘Rutland of Jutland’, were successfully subverted by their 
hosts. 
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The verdict of history is that, while the Japanese would eventually have caught up with 
American expertise in the field [of military naval aviation], the British considerably 
expedited the process.431  
 
 
(Source: Public domain) 
Figure 54: The ‘British Zero’ look-alike built before the Zero-Sen by Gloster in response to British 
Air Ministry requirement F.5/34. Its plans were probably passed to the Japanese by Sempill whose 
espionage seems to have known no bounds. He was never brought to account due to Churchill’s 
personal intervention.432 
 
 
 
Figure 55: SAS El Rescate De Il2 2001, viewed 5 September 2001: 
<http://www.sas1946.com/main/index.php?topic=15324.0>. 
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(Source: ) 
Figure 56: Profile drawing of Zero-Sen shows a distinct similarity with the Gloster F-5/34, 
By Lansdale, J. F., (n.d.), War Prize: The Capture Of The First Japanese Zero Fighter In 1942, 
Graphics By Don B. Marsh viewed 9 September 2012 at, <http://www.j-
aircraft.com/research/WarPrizes.htm>. 
 
 
(Source: ) 
Figure 57: Early three-view plan of the Mitsubishi Zero. Ex-RAF officer Sempill led the mission 
that supplied secret British aviation material to the Japanese in the 1920s and 30s. Gloster sold biplane 
fighters to the Japanese so Sempill probably had access to Gloster’s designs and drawings including 
the F-5/34 (Masefield, P. G. (ed.) (no date circa 1942), Japanese Aeroplanes Aircraft Identification, 
Temple Press, London, p. 25). 
 
Even if the British and American military authorities claimed ignorance of the 
Mitsubishi Zero-Sen, the Australian Opposition Leader John Curtin, in 1937 knew 
the British had assisted the Japanese heavy industries company which manufactured 
it, to make planes ‘as good as the British:  
The British artisans were sent to Japan to show the Mitsubishi Company how to make 
planes as good as the British. And while such things as this have been happening, the 
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workers of Australia are to be taxed in order to defend [Australia] against possible 
invasion by a country which has its equipment built for it with the aid of those who are 
part and parcel of the British Commonwealth of Nations … To have any hope of 
effectively resisting an enemy’s attempt to land here, Australia must have 
approximately the same number of defensive planes. Australia has not got those 
planes.433 
A re-think of war 
As the aeroplane encroached on the capital ship’s traditional role, a major re-think of 
the way in which land warfare of the future would be fought went with it. This new 
doctrine, which was not as dramatic as mass heavy bombing, was based around tanks 
and aircraft and saw the formal dawn of the blitzkrieg434—‘lightning war’ that 
combined dive-bombers, armour and infantry to overwhelm or bypass enemy land 
forces before a protracted battle could develop. Thus even land battles it was argued, 
by using aircraft correctly (in a support role), could be won quickly. Those who did 
not take heed suffered accordingly. The German blitzkrieg against the Low Countries 
in 1940 came as a shock to the Allies with their largely static defence lines based on 
obsolete war strategies such as the Maginot Line. Theories about the alternative use 
of airpower with tanks and infantry together in battle were thus the subject of 
attention in the interwar years. Major General John F. C. Fuller, who planned the 
Allied Cambria attack of World War I, is generally credited with inventing blitzkrieg 
although others, particularly British theorist Captain Basil L. Hart, have also claimed 
to have created the concept of lightning warfare with the light bomber leading the 
assault.435 
Australian government members and defence experts were in a unique position to 
study and learn as such new types of warfare emerged and large, unaffordable, 
conventional warships and armies became less important. Instead, they chose not to 
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make any dramatic changes in direction until the lessons of a new war were clear 
through combat; a reactionary policy that ultimately left the continent unprotected in 
the air. In developing their air defence based on the light conventional Beaufort 
bomber, Australians apparently followed a mistaken belief that if air power had a 
future separate from the navy, it lay in bombers: that enemy warships could be 
attacked and driven off before they reached their targets. The only acquisition of 
warplanes made before December 1941 was for light bombers and seaplanes—
Lockheed Hudsons and Consolidated Catalinas and the only designated warplane 
being produced in Australia was the Beaufort bomber. As demonstrated not only by 
the RAF in 1940, but by the Finns and the AVG before Pearl Harbor, a small air 
force could be effective against a larger offensive one if it was well organised and 
equipped. 
The faster of the latest fighters—low-wing, cantilever monoplanes, had vee-twelve, 
overhead-cam motors producing between 650 and 1000 horsepower (hp).436 Engine 
output and specialised refinements meant they gradually outperformed bombers by 
an increasing margin although the issue was not clear cut until combat intervened. 
Better optical gun sights, cannon and heavier machine guns, retractable wheels and 
high performance air cooled radial, piston engines or liquid cooled inline ones 
enclosed in flushed rivet, aerodynamic all-metal fuselages of the mid-1930s onwards, 
saw the fighter’s influence become profound.437 But high performance and armament 
were not without cost. Heavy fuel consumption and low ammunition capacity not 
only restricted the pursuit plane’s domination of the sky but also its bomber ‘killing’ 
abilities. This was especially true of British fighters purpose-built for defence. The 
Hurricane, the most numerically important RAF fighter before 1941, only carried 
enough ammunition for its rife-calibre guns to fire for 13 seconds.438 The small 
calibre guns arming British fighters also restricted their ability to intercept.439 Green 
suggested in 1961, the '[aerial] encounters over the Western Front in 1939–40 
differed as radically from those that took place in German skies five years later as did 
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a cavalry charge at Waterloo and a tank battle in the Western Desert.440 As fighters 
grew bigger and faster, so did their armament with cannons and rockets replacing 
bullet firing machine guns.  
Information on such progression was available, but the government seemed blind to 
the transition of the military fighter from observation plane to a brutal, war-winning 
weapon that flew at over 350mph, fired twenty-millimetre cannon and could destroy 
a four-engined bomber. As the 1930s closed, air defence offered undreamed of 
options that might see a nation protected by fighters and dive-bombers alone if 
attacked by a large, carrier-equipped naval force. There were numerous advantages 
for the defender. The take-off run and size of twin and four-engined bombers 
restricted carriers to employing single-engine torpedo- and dive-bombers. Fighters 
could not sink carriers but they could provide defence against the scale and size of air 
attack possible from a carrier’s bomber force. Foresight, planning and money were 
all that was needed.  
Over-dependence on local plane makers 
Back in 1923, the New South Wales Chamber of Manufacturers urged the Federal 
Government to 'give encouragement to the manufacture of aeroplanes (and to train) 
sufficient pilots and mechanics ... to man a fleet [of aircraft] for commercial purposes 
and to be available for defence'.441 This was after the failure of the Australian 
Aviation and Engineering Company, established in April 1921 with the assistance of 
the British firm, A. V. Roe.442 With markets lacking, a government-supported aircraft 
industry was needed. By 1936 this was achieved—the CAC (a private venture) was 
established in Victoria and selected the North American Aviation’s NA–33 (AT-6) 
dual-seat trainer for ‘mass’ production against strong British opposition.443 The 
British government used imperial defence as one reason for its resistance to an 
American aircraft.444 The AT-6 was to be built by CAC 'in the belief that it was better 
to learn to walk before learning to run', D. P. Mellor, official AWM historian, wrote 
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in The Role of Science and Industry.445 Some later historians agreed. For example 
Ross uses the same reasons as Mellor to vindicate the Wirraway decision: 'That it 
would take five years to advance to the stage of producing a first-line high 
performance aircraft in a new and unproven plant'.446 This prediction was in fact 
made by the syndicate that formed the CAC: Broken Hill Proprietary Company Ltd, 
General Motors-Holden Ltd and Broken Hill Smelters Pty Ltd447 and unfortunately, 
was to influence the government in accepting the NA-33 (as the Wirraway) into 
production. In turn the decision was two-edged. It tied up resources that delayed the 
production of a fighter and it meant that RAAF pursuit squadrons were equipped 
with training planes when the world’s major air forces were all buying or building 
high performance, single-seated interceptors that could far out-perform the 
Wirraway. The five-year estimate by the CAC was not a reasonable 
recommendation. Just two years after Wirraway production began the Menzies 
government, after a visiting British Air Mission recommended the government make 
a monoplane bomber,448 approved the production of the British twin-engined 
Beaufort, a more complex design than the Hurricane or even the Spitfire but certainly 
far more complicated than the Wirraway. Despite Sir Edward Ellington’s Report449 
which criticised the Wirraway for being what it was, a slow-flying trainer, in 1939, 
as Wirraways were being accepted into RAAF squadrons, a statement was made to 
the contrary by the Assistant Minster for Supply and Development Harold Holt. Holt 
announced in the House of Representatives that the Wirraways were ‘giving the 
greatest satisfaction, according to all the evidence in his possession’.450 But ‘singing 
the praises’ of the Wirraway as it came on line went against the Menzies 
government’s own statement the year before. At that time, Minster for Defence 
Thorby announced that: ‘Immediately upon the completion by the CAC of the 
present … order of Wirraway ’planes, the Commonwealth Government will place an 
order for fighting machines’.451 Thorby added that ordering a ‘new type of fighting 
plane was a result of Ellington’s report that the Wirraway was unsuitable as a fighter 
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owing to its comparatively slow speed’.452 Thus the government hypocritical verbal 
defence of the Wirraway had begun to unwind and with its ministers contradict 
themselves. Another newspaper report dated 19 October 1939 stated: 
The Commonwealth Aircraft Factory … will probably abandon the manufacture of 
Wirraway machines after it has completed the Government’s order for 40 machines. 
Material for another 60 machines is already in stock, but it is expected that by the time 
it is used, a more advanced type of machine will be available for manufacture.453 
In other words if the Wirraway was a fighter ‘giving great satisfaction’ then the need 
for ‘fighting planes’ of some mysterious type following it into production would 
have seemed superfluous. And the term ‘fighting planes’ appeared to indicate the 
Wirraway was not of that class.  
The argument that the NA-33 was easy to produce; that it was better to learn to walk 
than to run also does not stand examination. Mellor claims that: ‘The NA-33, a two-
seater, single-engined, low-wing monoplane had been designed by North American 
Aviation for simplified, large scale production’454 but omits to mention that it was 
purpose-designed as a pure transitional trainer under the designation AT-6 
(Advanced Trainer-6). A much more obvious and easier-built aircraft and one that 
was a purpose-designed fighter was the Hurricane not mentioned by anyone in 
government or the CAC.  
There were also comments about the ‘obsolescence’ of the Wirraway almost from its 
inception. But the aircraft as a trainer was ultra-modern; never obsolete in the terms 
intended, which clouded the issue. In November 1938, with war looming in Europe 
and the British hurriedly equipping the RAF with contemporary interceptors, Deputy 
Opposition Leader Forde claimed the Wirraway would be ‘out of date and practically 
useless’ in the event of war.455 The Minister of Defence naturally denied the claim 
adding as a subterfuge that delivery of the first Wirraway was expected in January 
1939 at a cost of £8 000.456  
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The battleship sails on 
Part of the problem of overcoming conservative military thinking between the wars 
was the difference between the capital ship and the aeroplane of the same era. The 
battleship was one of the biggest machines made by man. It could hurl two-ton shells 
twenty miles and devastate a small city. On the other hand, most bombers of the 
period were primitive—slow, vulnerable and easily wrecked by a bad landing. Their 
image went against them as the weapon of the future. The bomb load they carried 
was puny. As Lindqvist noted, when the aeroplane was first used as an instrument of 
war, 'The damage done can be taken as roughly proportional to the means and cost of 
its deployment'.457 At best one plane could probably destroy one city building. To try 
and wreck an enemy city would take thousands of bombers flying hundreds of 
missions over a protracted period of time. Until the latter days of World War II when 
unarmed B-29s were deployed at night in low altitude incendiary missions against 
Japanese cities, the effects achieved were nearly always difficult to ascertain, 
particularly in psychological terms. Often results seemed less than expected from the 
effort exerted and the number of crews and aircraft lost. A bomber force sent to 
destroy a target, an army barracks complex or a railway marshalling yard, may have 
successfully wrecked it while sustaining acceptable losses, but this may not mean the 
exchange was profitable. The cost in currency to build a heavy bomber and train its 
crew was high. If five bombers were lost from an attack force of 100 for the 
destruction of a rail yard, replacing wagons and train tracks might be quicker and 
cheaper than the five bombers and their crews. The exchange rate here would have to 
include the contribution that the disruption made towards winning or shortening the 
war, despite its imbalance of material loss or gain. 
In his introduction to the 1928 election, Curtin, campaigning for the seat of 
Fremantle, called the dependence on the British for defence, a ‘sham’.458 Yet 
Australians voted for the ‘Imperial Firm’ and returned the conservative Bruce 
government and accepted Stanley Baldwin’s statement that the major responsibility 
for defence rested with the British and that the British Navy was the bastion of her 
defence..459 Many Australians must have been confused. Most major defence 
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decisions were referred to Britain for solutions. In 1923 the first Imperial Conference 
held in London included the statement that, '... the defence solutions that this 
Conference produced, largely governed Australia's interwar defence policy'.460 Not 
only that, many senior Australian military positions were occupied by British 
officers.461 'In those days', Gillison, the official RAAF historian, wrote in 1962: 
'senior officers of the British Services evidently seemed to some Australian Ministers 
to possess a glamour that their own senior officers lacked'.462 This dependency was a 
hamstring to any independent analysis of Australia’s air defence needs and the 
procurement of the best equipment available. Thus defence was tied to British 
decisions that arguably, were mostly wrong. The defence of the continent was more 
akin to that of the USA as indicated. When the government turned its back on the 
British and bought or made only ready-to-fly American warplanes (the Hudson and 
Catalina) in time for the Pacific war, the door was opened to align itself with the US 
government and get independent advice on air defence from Washington. Although 
there were notable visionaries such as Labor’s member for Kalgoorlie who saw the 
aeroplane as the ultimate naval war-winning weapon of the future, most militarists 
and politicians of the 1930s seemed to think the next war would be similar to the last.  
Sir Frederick Shedden, Secretary of Defence 1937 to 1956, was, according to David 
Horner in Defence Supremo, the most powerful figure in Australia's defence-making 
policy both before and during the war; '... [he] believed that Australia's defence was 
best secured within the framework of imperial defence, by relying on the Singapore 
strategy and enlarging the RAN.’463 Horner claimed Shedden later became sensitive 
to the fact that the Singapore strategy, which he had supported, failed, but 
nevertheless wrote a paper entitled 'Empire and Australian Defence’ in 1944 which 
stated that the ' … fundamental basic of Empire defence has been sea power'.464 The 
argument can be easily dismissed; there was never any need for Australia to obtain a 
large naval force or depend on the RN once air power became the dominant 
battlefield force as was the case before Japan attacked. Australia’s defence needs 
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were not the RN or an enlarged RAN but for the RAAF to be equipped quickly with 
contemporary interceptors and dive-bombers to resist Japanese carrier raids.  
Horner also claims that the government was hostage to imperial defence which is 
really a myth.465 Once the government decided to go ahead with the NA-33 and 
Defence Minister Thorby announced that a new type of warplane would be built by 
the CAC after the Wirraway, this transaction showed clearly that the ‘hostage’ myth 
could no longer be applied. The Federal Government’s error was one of ignorance 
and self-delusion. Once it stepped outside the imperial defence arrangement, then the 
British took umbrage and advised that no further military material could be expected, 
a decision that greatly slowed Beaufort production. Whether this was done through 
spite or genuine defence concerns remains a moot point, but the effect was the same. 
Advice from the British cancelling military material and the decision to build an 
American plane could have been the turning point for the government not to trust the 
British again for defence hardware.  
The Australian Labor Party (ALP) did appreciate the need for an effective air force 
for home defence rather than British battleships but was always short on detail.466 
During the Abyssinian crisis, the bulk of the RN sailed to the Mediterranean to 
counter Italian naval strength which did not go unnoticed in Australia. The Canberra 
Times reported that the ‘British Fleet’ was to immediately move to the 
Mediterranean. In a front page news story it noted that the fleet was on its way and 
gave details of the British government’s defence budget which included the addition 
of two new 5 000-ton cruisers, eight destroyers, one aircraft carrier and four 
submarines.467 At that point it was obvious the Mediterranean was more important to 
the British than South East Asia; yet another reason for the Australians to look east 
for help.   
The realisation there would never be any 'fleet to Singapore' was probably well 
advanced in Australian political circles before the Japanese struck; the same as the 
realisation by members about the inferiority of the Wirraway. The Labor Party 
started to promote a policy of self-reliance more actively than in the past or by any 
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other political party. During the 1937 national election campaign, Curtin advocated a 
fifty-squadron air force, at last adopting policy ideas that Wrigley suggested years 
before.468 The Italian invasion of Albania in 1939 was a panacea for the world—the 
first airborne landings in history when operation 'Esigenza A' got under way.469 Some 
four hundred aircraft of the Regia Aeronautica began taking off from Italian airports 
on the morning of 6 April 1939 while ships transported the main invasion force: 
'Lack of unified command and poor inter-service cooperation made the operation 
hesitant at first, but eventually things proceeded more smoothly' one journalist 
wrote.470 By 11 April, the landing of the Gtanatieri was complete with some 22 000 
Italian soldiers on the ground. King Zog fled to Greece on the day the Italians arrived 
and Albania became part of the Italian kingdom. The world watched but took no 
direct military action despite powerful elements of the RN being on station. This 
controversial Italian operation illustrated two issues together—the impotency of the 
British government and the power of the aeroplane to dictate the order of battle.  
Thus it was air power, whether conventionally land-based, or as is more likely for an 
island continent, naval air power, rather than naval power per se that offered the 
biggest threat to Australia. In reality what must have seemed like a high risk decision 
to change course was too controversial to make: a sudden switch to air power within 
imperial defence even in the wake of this glaring Italian example of 1939. But above 
that, there appeared to be no one in parliament who was air minded enough to even 
decide the aircraft types the RAAF needed. Despite Curtin’s call for planes, his 
opposition never documented the types and as seems certain, Curtin never advocated 
squadrons of contemporary interceptors be stationed in northern Australia to counter 
the threat from Japan. 
The British ended the First World War with very advanced aircraft. The Americans 
had bought and leased fighter planes from both French and British sources for their 
European air force. But in the twenty-year interval, Britain lost its lead and by 1938, 
all major powers had aircraft as good as or better than the British. The only real war-
winner in the RAF armoury was the Spitfire—without cannon and short-ranged. The 
Americans had forged ahead of everyone in heavy bomber development, the B-24 
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and B-17 being the only four-motored intercontinental bombers in service in any air 
force:  
The British and French prefer considerably smaller bombers—medium bombers able to 
carry up to a ton of bombs at speeds of around 300 mph and heavy [medium] bombers 
able to carry up to three tons of bombs with top speeds of about 270 mph.471 
The layout of the low-winged, all metal monoplane fighter—a flying gun-platform of 
limited duration —was a vast compromise and usually epitomised the country of 
origin. It had wing- mounted armament in most cases to save synchronisation, 
internal fuel tanks and armour plating. This meant that all first generation high 
powered monoplane fighters were of similar appearance and performance with 
speeds of about 350 mph. At combat distance it was difficult to tell an in-line-
engined Spitfire from a Me-109 or a radial-engined Zero from a Wildcat, particularly 
from the front. For example the Spitfire's straight line speed was 355 mph, and that 
of the Messerschmitt was 348 mph.472 The Zero operating in China in 1938 could 
reach 336 mph while the US Tomahawk waged against it by the AVG had a speed of 
345 mph.473 Thus the difference came from handling characteristics—climb rate and 
diving speed due to weight, horse-power, altitude engine ratings, super chargers and 
amour protection coupled with the training and skill of the pilots. Medium bombers, 
another compromise between a fighter and a heavy bomber, fell behind in 
performance to the point they were generally unable to protect themselves from 
fighters. They could not carry the heavy self-defence armament of a B-17 nor did 
they have the speed or manoeuvrability of a fighter. By 1938, only the US heavy 
four-engined bomber with its power turrets and high altitude performance could fight 
its way through the enemy's fighter defences, albeit with losses although the 
percentage was still to be established.474  
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Conclusion 
The history of warfare in the twentieth century is inextricably woven into the history 
of airpower and aircraft development. The progression of military aircraft between 
the world wars had been slow but steady with the biplane lingering too long as 
frontline equipment. This resulted in biplane fighter pilots having to face superior 
next-generation monoplanes in the wars of the 1930s and lives lost needlessly 
particularly in the RAF. The reliance on the biplane after it was obsolete stymied the 
introduction of the monoplane design becoming standard, particular in pursuit 
configuration which needed to be faster than the bomber. The interruption of the 
Depression meant there was an interval when many nations stopped buying or 
making military planes. This too effected their development. Strategic and then area 
bombing were tried by the Germans against London during World War I, first with 
Zeppelin airships and then conventional biplane bombers. But the Zeppelins were 
slow; their navigation and bomb aiming poor. The German Gotha bombers did better 
but once the British organised a defence system, they both proved vulnerable. By late 
1916, rather than face further losses, the airships were phased out—the opposite to 
the fanfare of their introduction and the German threat to ‘burn London to the 
ground’. The biplane bomber program that followed fared little better. Mechanical 
problems haunted the Gothas under the rigors of war and the growing effectiveness 
of LADA led to losses the Germans could not sustain. This ratio was to prove more 
important in the wars of the future and limit bombing or reduce its effectiveness. But 
that was not the memory that remained. Instead, as Pimlott points out: 
People remembered the raids of June and July 1917 as the symbols of a nightmare 
suddenly coming true—the prospect of indiscrimate aerial bombardment of civilian 
centres, leading to death, injury and panic. It was an image of future war that was to 
have a profound effect during the interwar period.475 
England’s Prime Minister Baldwin’s famous line ‘the bomber will always get 
through’, uttered in parliament in 1932476 was arguably premature or at worst, wrong. 
The first attempt to subdue a nation by bombers tried by the Germans in World War I 
had failed. Baldwin probably took his concern from the German experiment. But 
what they illustrated was the difficulties bomber crews faced in reaching their targets 
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and then hitting it. As the mix of anti-aircraft artillery, interceptors, searchlights, 
barrage balloons, and direction finding between ground controllers and fighter pilots 
improved, the ability of the bomber to get through was far from certain. And if it did, 
then numbers had to be big enough to cause significant damage to the enemy’s war 
effort.  
Baldwin and other alarmists of the 1930s also did not take into account the growing 
superiority of the monoplane fighter. The biplane had, by the early 1930s, reached 
the zenith of its potential. The RAF Gladiator for example had a creditable speed of 
253mph,477 but there was no way of making it go faster. This fact became crucial 
when manufacturers produced light monoplane bombers that had greater straight line 
speed than biplane fighters. One example was the Bristol Blenheim1with a speed of 
285mph.478 Standard fighters were temporarily outclassed by the very machines they 
were meant to catch and destroy. 
 
 
(Source: The Aeroplane) 
Figure 58: The British Gloster Gladiator reached the zenith of biplane fighter development in the late 
1930s. 
 
This obvious contradiction, combined with international air races such as the 
Schneider Trophy, led to the prototypes of the Spitfire, the Hurricane and the 
Messerschmitt 109 with speeds of around 350mph. They set a new standard in 
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fighters and interceptors and regained ascendency over the bomber that was never 
reclaimed. Thus even monoplane bombers such as the four-engined Boeing B-17 
Flying Fortress of the mid-1930s needed heavy defensive armament—power turrets 
with twin five-inch machine guns, giving them much more self-protection than the 
Blenheim, but decreasing their speed below contemporary fighters. In the end it 
became obvious that it was the fighter that would always get through.  
 
 
(Source: Public domain) 
Figure 59: Most belligerents went their own way in aircraft design but often arrived at the same place. 
The German Hs 129 intruder by Herschel was much like the Mosquito and Beaufighter. It proved an 
effective tank-buster on the Eastern Front.479. 
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CHAPTER 5: CREATING THE RAAF AND SELECTING ITS 
AIRCRAFT 
 
(Source: Public domain) 
Figure 60: de Havilland DH-4 
 
A modern battle-plane is estimated to cost 2,500 pounds, so that for the cost of one 
battleship (7,000,000 pounds) Australia might have 2,800 modern battle-planes. ... it is 
clear that for the expenditure of a comparatively small amount of money Australia 
might be made immune from attack by even the most powerful naval force in the 
world.480  
We were amazed when we saw the aircraft with which the Australian air force was 
equipped.481 
There is nothing that is a more certain sign of insanity than to do the same thing over 
and over and expect the results to be different.482  
 
The Great War ended without satisfaction or any dramatic illustration of air power 
replacing troops in trenches. The soldiers on the ground fought to the bitter end the 
way they began. But air forces had proved their worth in war and were a fixture in 
future defence planning. Even before the shooting stopped, by April 1918, Lt Gen 
Legge, Australia's General Chief of Staff, wrote a memorandum proposing a 
permanent local air force, stating: 'A sufficient air service can go far toward breaking 
the strength of an attack, or increasing the value of an inferior defending force if it 
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can master the air service of an enemy'.483 Legge also made a statement that 
ironically, was to become common in Australian defence circles between the wars 
drawing a comparison between the cost of warships and planes, declaring that 1000 
aeroplanes would cost less than one battle cruiser.484 This equation, although 
regularly raising its head, did not appear to influence defence spending. In 1920 
during the debate on Defence Estimates of 16 November, Parliamentarian Lucien 
Cunningham stated that ‘[He] believed that in the future our main line of defence 
will be submarines, aeroplanes for scouting and for launching torpedoes against 
hostile troopships, and wireless telegraphy’.485 He went on to add that, ‘… only £250 
000 have been set aside for aeroplanes in the main Defence Estimates; and if that 
amount were doubled, it would still leave 600 thousand pounds for expenditure in 
other directions. Comparatively speaking, aeroplanes do not cost very much, and 
quite a number could be erected for the cost of one battleship … ’486 
While such comments were easy to make in parliament, for a nation ‘girt by sea’ 
Australia would always need warships; the real question was whether an air force 
would come under the army or the navy and for some years, whether it should exist 
at all.487 Another was that the potential of aircraft was continually over-estimated and 
often by the opposition who had no power to change policy. In one such case, 
William Higgs, the Member for Capricornia, in October 1918 criticised the 
government for appropriating money to naval bases stating, ‘I do not believe that we 
shall require round our coast anything like the number of dreadnoughts, cruisers, and 
destroyers that some honourable members appear to think. We should be spending 
our money more wisely if we put it into the construction of submarines and 
aircraft’.488  
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The homecoming AFC did bring experienced aircrew, tacticians and biplanes; a 
nucleus on which to build an air force. Subsequently there was a commitment from 
the government that: 
... the art of aviation will not be lost sight of after the war, so far as Australia is 
concerned. is evidenced by the fact the Minister of Defence (Senator Pearce) recently 
stated that the Defence Authorities are now taking steps to establish an efficient air 
force in Australia.489 
A quick name-change and the AFC became the Australian Air Corps on 1 January 
1920, based at Point Cook in Victoria.490 This alteration in name mimicked the ‘home 
country’s’ decision to form the RAF on 1 April 1918.491 The RAF was the world's 
first independent military air service; a compilation that finally put paid to the 
wartime rivalry between the RFC and the RNAS for funds, pilots and planes.492 The 
British Air Force Bill passed into law on 29 November 1917 as the Air Force Act and 
the Air Ministry was duly established in January 1918.493 
In Australia, the next step was the RAAF’s official inauguration of 31 March 1921494 
matching the format of the RAF on a smaller scale. The RAAF was controlled by an 
Air Board which itself answered to an Air Council presided over by the Minister of 
Defence under what can only be called restrictive condition, as spelt out by the 
Minister, George Pearce: 
The powers of the Air Board are limited to administration, and it cannot … interfere 
with policy. 
All matters of policy arising must be referred by the Air Board to the Air Council. The 
Air Council consists of existing officers of the Naval and Military Boards, and they will 
receive no extra pay for duties imposed on them under the Bill. 495  
It appeared that the RAAF was to be weighed down by bureaucrat tape. To stay 
solvent and capture its share of the defence budget, the RAAF had a long row to hoe 
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despite some grudging approval from navy and army commanders.496 Even though 
these stayed services accepted the creation of a single air service, they shared a 
consuming rivalry over the question of control of the new entrant, agreeing only that 
it should remain subservient to them.497 Then-Flight Lieutenant H. N. Wrigley, a 
decorated World War I aviator, managed the fledging force for its day-by-day 
operations. In this role Wrigley was sought out by the press and questioned over the 
future direction of the force; the glamour arm of the three military services. When 
interviewed by The Hobart Mercury, Wrigley replied: 'The policy of the federal 
government is to sooner or later establish air force stations in all the States as the 
force grows and to keep the Australian Air Force in line with the Royal Air Force in 
England'.498 After being pressed by reporters on the RAAF’s strength, Wrigley, who 
later became an Air Vice-Marshal famous for his 'notes' on air power doctrine, 
replied that there were 150 aircraft499 on muster with 'seaplanes and flying boats on 
order from Britain'.500  
Wrigley’s admission revealed two things—there were no plans to break from 
tradition in the purchase of military hardware from England. And the RAAF's role 
was to be mainly one of maritime patrol. There was no plan to buy bombers or 
torpedo planes to sink enemy capital ships as seemingly envisaged by RAF tacticians 
at the conclusion of the Great War.501 Such concept could only be called a developing 
self-defence force rather than the RAAF having an expeditionary role like the army 
that would entail a protracted process—the government arguably had little interest in 
defence spending after its catastrophic contribution to the world war. It had cost 215 
045 AIF casualties—sixty-four per cent of the troops committed; higher than 
Britain’s losses of forty-seven per cent of all soldiers fielded.502 In monetary terms, 
the government was weakened by the monstrous burden of a £350 000 000 war 
debt.503 Obviously, despite the occasional outburst in parliament about defence in the 
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age of the aeroplane, there was no rush to implement a strong, regional air defence 
arm.  
The opportunity to shop around the now-at-peace world for the best deals in military 
aviation to fit Australia's unique air defence requirements was ignored. The military 
aircraft needed for Australian defence as a large island continent with a 
disproportionate population collected in coastal regions was vastly different to the 
British scenario—facing the possibility of a naval attack but having to build an air 
force to support a world-class army in Europe and intercept raiding bombers at 
home. Collaboration with American air force managers; their defensive role dictated 
by the government's isolation policy,504 may have been more fruitful. America's 
defence needs were similar to Australia's in terms of distance and space. The US was 
also a Pacific rim power that could be threatened by an over-populated Asian invader 
armed with an armada of capital ships. Perhaps more importantly, America’s air 
force was not burdened by traditional thinking and was supported by a vast industrial 
base.  
On 22 January 1924, the Western Argus (Kalgoorlie) carried a story under the banner 
'Australian Air Force' reporting the Commonwealth Defence Department was to 
build 'aeroplanes and flying boats' for the RAAF.505 A navy workshop was occupied 
at Randwick for this purpose with Squadron Leader Wackett, the RAAF's Chief 
Technical Officer in charge.506 The emerging RAAF had a core of aviators who, like 
Wrigley, had excellent reputations with the AFC in France.507 The first military flying 
school at Point Cook, Victoria, built before the war, was expanded.508 But despite 
such activity, there was still uncertainty about the role of the RAAF which included 
some radical suggestions. According to Bean, there was talk in government circles 
about the RAAF being used as ‘the link’ between Britain and America in any new 
conflict with Germany or even against Britain to gain local independence in the 
American vein.509 Despite such wild ideas, air power had, as noted, established itself 
as an essential service and there could be no turning back.  
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Unfortunately, the RAAF’s establishment coincided with the decision to place 
defence spending on a peacetime basis for the first time since the Great War.510 
Funding became even tighter during the Depression of 1929 and the immediate years 
beyond. By 1932, the RAAF was receiving less than ten per cent of the defence 
budget.511 There was even talk of abolishing the RAAF altogether when the Lyons 
Government raised the issue in 1932.512 Although the nation was beginning to emerge 
from the Depression by the mid-1930s, the RAAF had only one operational 
squadron.513 
Back in 1925 Air Marshal Richard Williams at the head of the force, known as the 
‘Father of the Air Force’514 had been dismayed by the lack of direction and 
government interest in the RAAF. This complacency which included funding, was 
Williams argued, inconsistent with international developments in air power.515 
Williams, another Australian advocate of air forces ahead of his time, maintained 
that aircraft, with their range, speed, and striking power answered Australia's defence 
dilemma of distance, population and resources.516 Williams recommended a force of 
two fighter squadrons, one of float-planes, one of flying-boats, one of torpedo 
bombers and two of reconnaissance.517 The response of political leaders was 
typical—to ignore Williams’ scheme, but such reaction was probably ‘ignorance and 
indifference’ to the reality of protecting Australia being too difficult.518 Also, 
Williams failed to address the doctrinal dimension in his argument so his 
contribution was possibly less than he expected. Besides, Prime Minister Lyons was 
a known pacifist—a former Labour Defence Minister, Albert Green revealing later to 
the media that ‘the government had decided there would be ‘no war for ten years’519 
thus decreasing the defence budget accordingly. Green was chastised by government 
members for revealing defence secrets, but they did not deny his revelation.520 
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Government ministers apparently lacked confidence both in themselves and their 
RAAF officers. This was evident when a British assessment of the RAAF was 
commissioned. The subsequent evaluation, led by Air Marshal John Salmond RAF, 
arrived in Melbourne 2 July 1928.521 His terms of reference were to examine and 
report on the equipment and training of the RAAF.522 Salmond was also to judge the 
organisation itself on its development and deployment.523 But Salmond's task was 
virtually impossible given that the government was unlikely to allocate the funds 
necessary to compile an air force capable of defending Australia. It was a token 
gesture at best, the terms of reference being so restricted with Minister for Defence 
(Harold Thorby) telling the press before Salmond’s arrival that, ‘He [Salmond] 
would not be asked to recommend a new air defence policy. His investigation would 
be related mainly to details of organisation, to ensure the dovetailing to Empire 
services in all vital particulars ensuring effective co-operation'.524 In reality, the 
government was probably procrastinating on defence spending. Williams and 
Wrigley, young aviators with vast combat experience, were available to plan an 
adequate air defence doctrine. Salmond's credentials were honed on the defence to 
the British Isles, an area about the size of Victoria, with short-ranged interceptors 
operating in obtuse conditions against enemies different from those the RAAF was 
likely to face in the Pacific. 
When Salmond arrived only two squadrons, Numbers 1 and 3, were operational. The 
standard throughout the force was low, so his report of 20 September 1928, just 
before the Great Depression descended, made many recommendations for RAAF 
improvement over the next nine years. But it was largely an embarrassment for the 
government with The Canberra Times and other newspapers carrying the headlines, 
‘Air Force Unfit for War. 525 In some aspects, Salmond’s findings conflicted with the 
unstated British policies for the Empire—it included fighters; one flight at Richmond 
and a second at Point Cook.526 Refreshingly, Salmond also recommended: 'The 
Employment of the Royal Australian Air Force in the Defence of the 
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Commonwealth' focused on air power as the primary defence force.527 Salmond's 
proposal suggested that air should be a substitute for sea and land power, adding that 
the RAAF was not capable of contributing to Australia's defence [as it existed].528 
 
 
(Source: Public domain) 
Figure 61: Air Marshal John Salmond RAF commissioned in the 1920s to evaluate the RAAF. His 
recommendations were largely ignored. 
 
Salmon's Report was greeted with enthusiasm by the government but never 
enacted.529 Worried about its influence on defence, the other two services argued 
strongly against the Plan and its independent RAAF doctrine.530 Army and navy 
officers seemed to fear aircraft would replace capital ships and fixed defences and 
that most of the defence budget would be channelled into the purchase of planes.531 
This self-interest and lack of foresight compromised defence with no one service 
getting enough money to compile a contemporary force.  
Despite the above, for a moment it appeared the government might accept Salmond's 
proposal when, in January 1929, Ministerial approval was given for the purchase of 
six British Bristol Bulldog single-seat bi-plane fighters for a flight at Point Cook.532 
But there were no recorded plans to station fighters elsewhere in the Commonwealth. 
And the Bulldog, a fixed undercarriage bi-plane of World War I configuration was 
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not delivered by Britain until  March 1930 when eight arrived in crates ‘specially 
constructed in Great Britain for the Royal Australian Air Force’.533 The Bulldog’s 
speed was 160mph with a ceiling of 16 000 feet.534 Buying warplanes from British 
makers was questionable. They were still committed to the bi-plane design which 
was rapidly becoming obsolete. The government was not positioned economically or 
psychologically to continually replacing its warplanes to keep up.  English aircraft 
development was lagging behind the Americans—as early as 1933, the USAAC was 
operating all-metal Boeing and Martin monoplane bombers when British aircraft 
manufacturers were still building bombers of wood and fabric and producing open-
cockpit fighters little different from those of World War I.535 
 
 
(Source: Imperial War Museum) 
Figure 62: The Bristol Bulldog fighter bought from Britain in the 1930s. Its format was vintage World 
War I; fixed under-carriage, open cockpit and double wings all inducing drag and slowing it down. Its 
speed was 174 mph, seventy mph slower than the American B-10 monoplane bomber of the same 
era.536 
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(Source: Public domain) 
Figure 63: As the RAAF was getting British Bulldog biplanes, the USAAC was re-equipping with the 
Martin B-10 all-metal monoplane bomber with a speed of 240 mph.537 
 
Although Salmond's plan was accepted but not adopted by the government, his 
judgment appeared to have laid groundwork for a significant increase in the status 
and independence of the RAAF and formed the idea that air operations might one 
day assume the leading role in defence. But Salmond's plan also tied the government 
to British ideas about air defence and the purchase of their hardware. These lack 
lustre, self-imposed restrictions impacted heavily on the air force. RAAF senior 
commanders had a distinct appreciation of the value of air power and the way it 
should be employed in defence.538 This appreciation obviously came not from British 
sources but largely from their own experience. Although there was no formal text on 
air power doctrine, a number of official and unofficial records indicated farsighted 
thinking. The notebooks of Wrigley,539 for example, are particularly poignant and 
provide the basis as a valuable milestone. At the same time, Wrigley did not seem to 
appreciate the importance of contemporary interceptors.  
Generally, ideas and application of air power remained in keeping with World War I 
practice. There was a noticeable difference between military aircraft of 1914 and 
1918 and the way they were deployed. Pilots in unarmed reconnaissance machines 
from both sides originally waved to each other. But soon aircrews were firing side 
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arms at each other and finally sophisticated machines guns synchronised with 
propeller speeds, allowing pilots to aim their planes directly at enemy machines. The 
use of aircraft was further advanced when they began to strafe and bomb and help 
win a ground battle. During the fighting at Verdun for example, the French adopted 
an aggressive air power strategy with heavy strafing and bombing as a prelude to 
ground assault. The doctrine articulated by Wrigley drew attention in Australia to the 
singular ability of an air force to take the initiative and operate alone, an application 
of his experience in France.540  
The British openly warn the dominions 
The stifling effects of naval and army domination of the RAAF’s development was 
arguably repeated at the highest policy level. But despite what is rumoured and 
written, Australia's defence never seemed constrained by the self-imposed national 
commitment to imperial defence. Lack of progress appeared more a case of 
indifference and procrastination. At the Imperial Conference of 1923 on defence and 
trade, Acting Prime Minister Earle Page came away empty handed. Speaking in 
public at Dandenong (part of his electorate), Page claimed it was the British who 
questioned him about the Australian government’s intention—that the world might 
be facing cataclysm equal in intensity to 1914 to which Page claimed ‘he had not 
committed Australia in any way’.541 This appeared to imply the government would 
not again send ground troops to European battlefields as in 1914, ‘And in reference 
to the problem of imperial defence’, Page announced, ‘each part of the Empire was 
to be primarily responsible for its own local defence’.542  
Therefore just five years after the War, the British were sounding warning bells not 
only of another war against an angry and revengeful Germany, but that the 
dominions would be defending themselves. The government was thus put the 
Australian on notice in the 1920s and 1930s to weld their own military services into a 
worthwhile defence force in place of a token one, and not to rely on Britain for 
protection. Any politician, who, after this clear notification, hid behind the RN being 
Australia’s first line of defence, as many did in the ensuring years, was deluding 
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himself. The British policy was confirmed and accepted by Australian governments 
at the subsequent conferences of 1926, 1930 and 1937.543 Some suggestions for an 
expanded RAAF role were toyed with at the 1937 conference as recommended by 
Salmond in his 1928 plan, but British sea power appeared to have remained as the 
basis for the each dominion’s national defence. 
Despite previous dire warnings about Germany, the British-chaired Committee of 
Imperial Defence of July 1928 played down the chance of war announcing: 'There 
will be no great war for ten years'.544 The committee opined that the ten year 
prediction of peace applied to both Japan and European powers.545 This prediction 
seemed to go against that of 1923. To allay the fears of exposed and poorly defended 
dominions about the growing might of Japan, Sir Austen Chamberlain stated that, 
'Japan has never been more peacefully inclined than at present, and the only thing 
that would arouse her would be a menace to her own interest in Manchuria'.546 The 
same Cabinet Minute noted that the planned expansion of the RAF would be delayed 
until 1935–36.547 Thus British complacency and underestimation was rife. At the 
same time a realistic appraisal on the basis that it would be better to be sure than 
sorry could have alerted the dominions to the danger of Japan and her ambitions in 
the Pacific. Apparently a real British fear remained—that Commonwealth aircrews 
would be diverted to home defence, and in the case of Australia, resources directed at 
home defence, perhaps even fighters from America, if local politicians were 
frightened into re-equipping the RAAF quickly should a proper appraisal of Japan be 
released.  
Whenever the Japanese spoke about possible war in the Pacific as was alluded to by 
Frank Tudor during the Imperial Conference in the House 13 April 1924, then-Prime 
Minister Hughes who was present, voiced his mind that Australians should maintain 
friendly relations with the Japanese. An appeasement policy, he apparently believed, 
would keep Japan at bay; an attitude that pleased the Japanese Acting Consul-
General who remarked: ‘I believe that Mr Hughes’ speech will be welcome not only 
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in Japan, but also by all lovers of peace throughout the civilized world.548 This type 
of international back-slapping probably gave Australians false hope about Japanese 
intention and the lack of any need to build up aerial defences along international 
lines. More astute Australian defence planners might have learnt to read between the 
lines of dictators’ speeches and British complacency. 
In 1934 the Australian media was told of an 'Air Force Big Expansion New Unit for 
W.A.' as bannered by The Sydney Morning Herald.549 With the rise of Nazism in 
Germany and its underlying military philosophies coupled with Japanese and Italian 
embracement of similar ideologies, there was a genuine danger of a second world 
war. This concern was précised in parliament by the member for Cook (John 
Garden): ‘War preparations are going ahead apace, both in Europe and the Pacific; in 
Europe, because of the fear of the Fascist Government of Germany; and in the 
Pacific, for the control of the oil of Manchukuo, the only oil in the Pacific’.550 The 
choice of Perth as a new air force base, was according to the newspaper report, part 
of the government’s ‘coastal defence program' in installing a battery of (army-
manned) 9.2 inch guns on Rottnest Island.551 The expansion paralleled an order for 
eighteen Hawker Demon ‘general purpose’ aircraft setting the pattern for the 'dual 
purpose' policy that served neither the need for a bomber nor a fighter.552 Politicians 
did not seem to appreciate the requirement for high performance fighters or of air 
superiority, a doctrine established in World War I. With the Demons was an order for 
nine Seagull amphibians, a slow and vulnerable single-engined reconnaissance 
biplane designed for flying off warships by catapult.553 Both aircraft were British. 
Alternative aircraft from other sources did not seem to have been considered. In 
parliament, the Seagull order was criticised by Opposition Leader Marks, ‘As it is 
considered that the nine F6 flying boats … are by no means the latest machines … 
will the Minister representing the Minister for Defence ask that representation be 
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made to the Home authority with a view to the securing of the latest types?’554 But 
the order held and the Seagulls duly arrived. 
 
 
(Source: Public domain) 
Figure 64: Hardly the latest in aircraft technology: the British Supermarine Seagull III serviced with 
the RAAF from 1925. 
 
The government decision to buy new aircraft was a move in the right direction but 
was flawed by its choice of types. The Demon was a biplane; one that was to have a 
chequered RAAF career—a total of twenty-nine being lost in training and practice 
incidents killing aircrews.555 This led to embarrassing questions from the opposition, 
with the member for Capricornia and Deputy Opposition Leader, Francis Forde 
observing: 
The record of the Royal Australian Air Force in regard to accidents compares … 
unfavourably with that of planes engaged in civil aviation. During the last twelve 
months, commercial aircraft in Australia have flown 5,497,401 miles and carried 43,402 
passengers with only eight fatalities. It is notable that seven machines out of the nine 
engaged in this Royal Australian Air Force flight of 2,000 miles has crashed. Such an 
amazing contrast … calls for a … public probe of the whole air force organization. The 
black record of the Royal Australian Air Force of eight accidents in nine days involving 
the death of one pilot and injury to nine members … of the service surely must give 
everyone cause for concern556 
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(Source: AWM) 
Figure 65: Another biplane from another British manufacturer obsolete on delivery, the controversial 
Hawker Demon in RAAF service circa 1935. So many were lost in accidents that questions were 
asked in parliament about its airworthiness. Like the Bulldog, the drag coefficient was high and the 
design dated.557 
 
Minister for Defence Thorby defended the Demon as expected, but did promise 
‘There is to be a department inquiry that will not be open to the public’558 Nothing 
resulted but the matter of selection of the two military aircraft to be built in Australia 
by the late 1930s was at least for monoplanes. But again the program was floored in 
that neither type selected was a dive-bomber or a fighter—the types needed to sink 
ships and intercept air attacks. These had to be begged, borrowed and bought from 
Australia's allies, America and Britain, after the Pacific war began and when 
worldwide demand was at its height. In developing their air defence based on the 
Beaufort, Australian planners seemed to be following Douhet’s mistaken belief that 
bombers could defend themselves, even if no doctrine for air power had been 
conceived. 
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558 Parliamentary Debates, 8 December 1937, op. cit., p. 1.  
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(Source: Public domain) 
Figure 66: Harold Thorby, a grazier with no military or aviation background was the Minister for 
Defence in the conservative Lyons Government of the 1930s when the manufacture of a trainer as an 
interceptor was decided, a decision never overturned until combat dictated otherwise. Before the war, 
Thorby vigorously defended the Wirraway as the ‘best in its class’ despite contrary evidence. The 
problem was that the Wirraway, an armed trainer, was in a class of its own. 
 
The 'general purpose' theme under which the CAC Wirraway program was justified, 
creept in everywhere and appearing to have been adopted by no other belligerent 
nation, resulted in the wrong type of aircraft equipping the RAAF for front-line 
service. Before the Wirraway, the Demons were also a particularly odd purchase—
fixed wheeled biplanes of World War I style with open cockpits and armed with two 
forward-firing fixed machine guns. Deliveries to the RAAF began in 1935 at a time 
when ultra-modern Vickers Spitfire and Hawker Hurricane monoplane interceptors, 
over a hundred miles an hour faster than the Demon,559 were at an advanced stage of 
development. The first Hurricane flew the same year. This was a huge leap in fighter 
development rendering biplane fighters obsolete. Both new British interceptors were 
armed with eight forward firing machine guns, an increase of six over the bi-planes 
they replaced.  
Therefore in the inter-war years there were alternatives to the air defence decided on 
by the Conservative Government. Conventional air defence—a fighter command 
backed by an observation corps and radar system of the type being established by 
other powers— was available to Australia. Even at Singapore with its poor reputation 
                                                 
559 Jackson, R. 2009, The Encyclopedia of Military Aircraft, Paragon, Queen Street House, Bath, UK., 
p. 186.  
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for defence, such a system was being introduced.560 How such infrastructure might 
have been implemented and the types of aircraft that could have been obtained 
readily from America and equipped the RAAF and which eventually did equip it is a 
sad story of what might have been yet was not.  
An unadorned and objective examination of the pre-war attempts to manufacture 
warplanes in Australia and build an effective air force looks very unexciting seven 
decades later. In 1923 the New South Wales Chamber of Manufacturers urged the 
Federal Government to 'give encouragement to the manufacture of aeroplanes (and to 
train) sufficient pilots and mechanics ... to man a fleet [of aircraft] for commercial 
purposes and to be available for defence'.561 The only aircraft manufacturing concern 
in the country was established in April 1921 with the assistance of the big British 
aviation firm of A. V. Roe after the failure of the Australian Aviation and 
Engineering Company in 1923.562 With markets lacking, a government-supported 
aircraft industry was obviously needed if only through the guaranteed purchase of its 
products. By 1936 this was achieved—the CAC was established in Victoria and after 
extensive overseas evaluation, its team of advisors selected the North American 
Aviation’s NA-33 advanced trainer, a low-winged, stressed skin, monoplane with 
folding wheels, for mass production563 against strong British opposition. The British 
government used imperial defence as one reason for its resistance to the selection of 
the American plane.564 Thus it seems that the British would have given assistance in 
manufacturing a fighter had it been one of theirs of which there were only two 
types—the Hurricane and the Spitfire neither of which had the operational radius for 
the Pacific air war but were purpose-built interceptors capable of combating the 
Zero-Sen if piloted properly.  But it remains doubtful the British would have released 
the Spitfire: it was retained for home defence after the collapse of France yet the 
Hurricane would have been far better than the Wirraway.  
 
                                                 
560 War Cabinet Minute, W. P. (42), 403, ‘Despatch on the Far East by Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-
Popham’, 8 September 1941, p. 23, UK Archives, London.  
561 Anon. 1923, Chamber of Manufactures of New South Wales, Annual Report 1923, p. 5.  
562 Anon. 1923, ‘Aircraft Industry in Australia’, Albury Banner and Wodonga Express, 4 May, p. 5. The company 
went bankrupt in 1922 building only six Avro 504Ks for the RAAF and into liquidation in March 1923.  
563 Anon. 1937, ‘How the Proposals Developed’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 4 February, p. 9.  
564 Ibid., pp. 98–9.  
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(Source: Imperial War Museum) 
Figure 67: The Hurricane Mark II Curtin wanted after the Wirraway debacle at Rabaul. The one time 
the government should have stayed with ‘buying British’ fighters to replace the RAAF’s Demon 
biplanes in 1939, the process was ignored. In turn, the British ignored Curtin’s plea for Hurricanes.  
 
The official view was that the NA–33, which was re-equipping Australia's fighter 
squadrons by the outbreak of the Pacific war, was built by the CAC in the belief that 
it was ‘better to learn to walk before learning to run', according to D. P. Mellor, 
official Commonwealth historian who wrote The Role of Science and Industry but his 
statement does not explain away the government’s lack-lustre decision.565 What it 
does show is that the political thinking was out of step with Australia's defence 
needs. The international situation was deteriorating rapidly and war in the Pacific 
could soon see the RAAF fighting enemy air forces with training planes due to a lack 
of understanding of military aviation by both the Prime Minister and the Minister of 
Defence.  
When the Wirraway debate did come up in parliament the subject was continually 
sidestepped by government members. Mostly, as with the Demon before it, the 
debate centred on quality control rather than performance. On 7 December 1939 
when Hubert Anthony asked the Acting Prime Minister if any information was 
                                                 
565 Mellor, D. P., op. cit., p. 381.  
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available about an important part of a Wirraway becoming detached just before it 
took to the air he was rebuked.566  
The other reason given—the five-year estimate by CAC not to produce a fighter—
cannot be justified either. Just two years after Wirraway production began, the 
Menzies government, after a visiting British Air Mission recommended Australia 
begin making a monoplane bomber, set up production of the British twin-engined 
Bristol Beaufort, a much more complex design for example than the hybrid 
Hurricane interceptor and one that required modification to incorporate American 
Pratt and Whitney engines when British motors were withheld. Thus there appears no 
justifiable reason why a first-line fighter was not manufactured instead of the NA-33 
or the Beaufort had the right decision been made at the right time.  
There was further condemnation of the Wirraway as a warplane years before combat 
was joined. Edward Ellington, Inspector-General RAF, visited Australia in 1938, 
having been invited to investigate standards in the RAAF.567 His report criticised the 
RAAF's operational capability and safety standards, leading to a feud between the 
Air Board and government ministers.568 Ellington’s Report was truthful. It stated that: 
‘It [the Wirraway] can only be regarded as an advanced training plane’569 which, of 
course, it was from inception. Ellington was only telling government ministers 
something they must have already known but did not want to hear. The Wirraway 
was again strenuously defended as ‘the best available in its class’.570 Percy Spender, 
then a member of the United Australia Party and holding the seat of Warringah, 
raised the matter in federal parliament in April 1938, asking a string of questions 
about the Wirraway including its performance, to which Defence Minister Thorby 
replied: 
The exact performance of aircraft in use in foreign services in not known, but it is 
believed that, in its class, the NA-33 is equal if not superior, to comparable aircraft in 
                                                 
566 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Hansard, No. 40, 7 December 1939. Such 
side issues were still being debated when the war in Europe was in progress. 
567 Anon. 1938, ‘Air Advisor Arrives. Sir Edward Ellington Will Spend Month in Australia’, The Sydney 
Morning Herald, 15 June, p. 12.  
568 Odgers, G. 1965, The Royal Australian Air Force, Ure Smith, Sydney, p. 67.  
569 Ibid., p. 67. 
570 Ibid., p. 67.  
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use elsewhere. The type being built in Australia (the Wirraway) embodies further 
improvements on the NA-33.571 
Whatever Thorby meant was unclear. An armed trainer was in a class of its own, 
unique to the RAAF. As for the speed of warplanes of ‘foreign services’, Thorby 
cannot have been reading the daily newspapers freely available to parliamentarians. 
For example The Argus (Melbourne) of 26 February 1938, two month before Thorby 
lied to parliament about the performance of foreign aircraft being unavailable, 
reported, ‘Royal Air Force Plane Breaks Record’ stating: 
Three hundred and twenty-seven miles from Edinburgh (Scotland) to Northolt, 
Middlesex (England) were covered in 48 minutes —a speed of 408.75 miles an hour by 
a new Royal Air Force Hawker Hurricane.572 
The details were repeated in other newspapers including the Northern Star 
(Darwin)573 and the Longreach Leader.574 And by November of the same year, both 
the Spitfire and the Hurricane were displayed at the Paris air-show. The Daily 
Advertiser (Wagga Wagga) in its description of the Hurricane at the show gave its 
top speed as ‘more than 350 miles per hour’ in a page-one article.575 Thus the cover 
up of the Wirraway’s inadequacies by the Defence Minister continued when 
evidence to the contrary was available to the general public in its daily spreadsheets.   
Stranger still, Defence Minister Thorby shortly thereafter announced to the media 
that 
‘… the construction of planes more modern that the Wirraway at the CAC’s factory at 
Fisherman’s Bend were under consideration’.576  
While this could have meant many things, such as the Beaufort scheme or the 
Boomerang project (yet to be approved),577 the announcement by the Minister 
was important in that the government must have secretly accepted Ellington’s 
                                                 
571 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Hansard, Answer to Questions, Australian 
Soldiers’ Repatriation Act, Question, 28 April 1938, p. 2.  
572 Anon. 1938, ‘Royal Air Force Plane Breaks Record’, The Argus, 26 Feb. p. 9. Speed was high for a Hurricane; 
probably specially prepared: no armament, the engine ‘souped up’ and the bare aluminium polished.  
573 Anon. 1938, ‘Speed of 409 Miles an Hour/British Hurricane Fighter Plane’, Northern Standard, 15 February,  
p. 6.  
574 Anon. 1938, ‘Defence Plane Does 409 Miles An Hour’, The Longreach Leader, 12 February, p. 14.  
575 Anon. 1938, ‘British Fighter Planes Great Interest in France Display at Exhibition’, Daily Advertiser,  
28 November, p. 1. 
576 Anon. 1938, ‘More Modern Planes’, The Argus, 6 October, p. 2.  
577 Australian Archives, Extract War Cabinet Minute, Melbourne, 2 February 1942, Agendum No. 46/1942–
Aircraft Production Policy. The Boomerang was titled the ‘Wirraway Interceptor’. Built mostly of Wirraway 
parts it was a failure.  
201 
opinion about the Wirraway though nothing came from Thorby’s new 
declaration. This in turn indicated the Wirraway should have been withdrawn 
from RAAF fighter squadrons before the Pacific War, a step that was not taken 
until it failed in battle.  
Besides the Wirraway, Ellington’s report was critical of flying discipline in the 
RAAF. The release of his report in July 1938 led to bitterness between the 
government and the Air Board, with the government removing Air Vice Marshal 
Richard Williams from his post as RAAF Chief of the Air Staff as its scapegoat 
posting him to Britain for two years. He was then appointed Australian air 
representative in Washington which meant relinquishing the positions he held 
already.578 In July 1939 Ellington was augmented in his position as Inspector-General 
by Air Marshal Sir Charles Burnett, who would become the RAAF's Chief of the Air 
Staff in 1940.579 But despite Ellington and his Report and the fuss it caused, there was 
still no move to replace the Wirraway with a fighter. 
 
 
(Source: Public domain) 
Figure 68: Sir Edward Ellington RAF who warned the government in 1938 that the Wirraway was 
only a trainer; it was too slow for a fighter. 
 
The Wirraway controversy centred on its selection for manufacture ahead of British 
planes, and justified on grounds it was a modern aircraft which it was for a trainer. 
But this argument misses the point that it was built and used as a warplane. It had to 
be armed with two rifle calibre forward-firing machine guns (a World War I 
                                                 
578 Anon. 1939, ‘Criticism of Air Board’, The Argus, 16 January, p. 9. 
579 Gillison, D., op. cit., p. 91.  
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configuration) by the CAC before being deployed at the frontline, apparently in the 
belief it could match Japanese fighters. The Lyons government had, for the wrong 
reasons, found the NA-33 the best trainer available but the RAAF’s top priority was 
not for trainers which could be purchased from the USA. With a defence crisis 
looming, the RAAF's demand was for an interceptor equal to those of the Japanese.  
For apparently selfish reasons, the British actively opposed both the Australian 
government's NA-33 decision and the purchase of fifty Lockheed Hudson maritime 
bombers.580 And without this latter purchase, the RAAF would have fought the 
Japanese without any modern combat aircraft, the Beauforts were still under 
construction. But the Hudson was a light bomber which meant the RAAF had no 
means of repelling air attacks. Among the arguments used by the British over the 
direction Australian defence contracts were taking were that the Lyons Government 
was destroying defence cooperation between the two countries and that the decision 
to make and buy American planes was no effective addition to imperial defence.581 
Yet the British themselves bought the NA-33 'Harvard' for training and the Hudson 
for Coastal Command.  
There seems no definitive answer to the Wirraway controversy except that neither 
the Conservative nor the Labor Government that replaced it had the courage to admit 
the nation was defenceless in the air and remove the plane from frontline service.582 
The reaction of Frederick Shedden, Secretary of Australia's Department of Defence, 
and other civil servants and politicians who had steadfastly toed the imperial defence 
line through the 1930s and had not advocated a need for fighters particularly during 
the highly-publicised press coverage of the Battle of Britain can only be 
contemplated.  
When the acquisition of a fighter was finally half-faced, the government began firstly 
to consider the two-seated, single-engined Boulton Paul Defiant, a slow and 
unorthodox ‘turret fighter’ with no forward facing guns: a British failure. The next 
was a twin-engined ‘fighter’, the Bristol Beaufighter, which had no application as a 
daylight interceptor. Its role in the RAF was as a night-fighter and an intruder. 
                                                 
580 Anon. 1937, NA-16 ‘Planes Minister Replies to Critics Invitation to British Firms’, Newcastle Morning 
Herald and Miners’ Advocate, 28 January, p. 10.  
581 D. O. 114–80, ‘Liesching to Batterbee’, 8 October 1936’ in McCarthy, J., o. cit., p. 124.  
582 Wirraway pilots did not try to oppose the Japanese air attacks on Darwin or Broome despite all the 
government driven pre-war fanfare about its suitability as a fighter.   
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Fortunately the Defiant was rejected but an order was placed for fifty-four 
Beaufighters with the British Bristol company. Twelve Beaufighters were to be 
delivered in December, 1941 and the other forty-four in March 1942.583 This order 
was made after the Australian War Cabinet decided on 9 May 1941 that the 
Beaufighter 'appeared to be the only type of aircraft meeting the Australian Air 
Staff's needs for a high performance, twin-seated fighter'.584 The Beaufighter made its 
maiden flight 17 July 1939, six months behind the American Lockheed Lightning 
which took to the air on January 27 1939. The P-38 promised to be an outstanding 
interceptor from the outset, reaching a top speed of 414 mph against the 
Beaufighter’s 333 mph.585 The Beaufighter entered RAF service 27 July 1940 and 
although the Lightning was not delivered to USAAC squadrons until later, the RAF 
took an immediate interest in the twin-boomed fighter and placed an order for 143.586 
The British quickly withdrew their order when the P-38 was unable to turn on a 
sixpence and lost the chance of getting an effective long-range tactical escort fighter 
which they were lacking.587 With Lockheed searching for buyers, this left the door 
open for the Menzies government to acquire the P-38 over the Beaufighter and get an 
air superiority fighter in 1940. 
 
                                                 
583 Anon. 1941, ‘Beaufighters for Australia’, The Argus, 7 November, p. 3.  
584 Green, W. 1961, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 26.  
585 Winchester, J. (ed.) 2012, Aircraft of World War II, Amber Books, London, pp. 51 and 163.  
586 Green, W. 1961, op. cit., vol. 4, p. 115.  
587 This deficiency would haunt the RAF throughout the war, the subversion of the Luftwaffe being done by the 
USAAF with its escort fighters. 
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(Source: Imperial War Museum) 
Figure 69: The unsuccessful ‘turreted’ Boulton Paul Defiant fighter without forward firing guns. Slow 
and underpowered, enemy fighters had to pursue it before being shot down. The British tried to sell 
the Defiant to the Australians.588 
 
That the British agreed to sell Beaufighters seemed generous when their country was 
supposed to be threatened with invasion. In fact, the RAF preferred the more potent 
de Havilland Mosquito from its two intruder types even if the Australians were yet to 
recognise the Mosquito's potential.589 And if the Menzies government was not so 
intent on buying British it may have stumbled upon the best long-ranged fighter of 
the time the P-38, as described, totally suited to Pacific conditions.  
In January 1941, the Sunday Times published a picture of the Lightning reporting 
that the P-38 was the world’s fastest fighter with a speed ‘above 400 miles an hour’ 
and was in mass production for the RAF and the USAAC telling the world it was 
much faster than the Beaufighter.590 The fact that the P-38 and the P-39 were 
available to America’s allies was released to the media in 1940. An article titled 
‘Planes From U.S.A: Advanced types Available to Allies’ appeared in The West 
Australian newspaper on 13 March 1940, stating that ‘… [American] aircraft of the 
most advanced type available to the Allies include the Airacobra—America’s fastest 
pursuit plane which has a speed of 400 miles an hour—the Lockheed P-38 with twin 
                                                 
588 One way RAF pilots died needlessly was flying Defiant fighters. The RAAF had a lucky escape 
when the government bought Beaufighters instead. 
589 Bishop, C. (ed.), op. cit., p. 353. De Havilland Mosquitos had replaced Beaufighters in RAF night fighter 
squadrons by 1944 (Bishop, C.. ibid., p. 353.) Beaufighters and Mosquitos were made in Australia from 1944 too 
late for front-line duties.   
590 Anon. 1941, ‘Unorthodox lines of the Lockheed P-38 Interceptor’, Sunday Times, 12 January, p. 37.  
205 
engines and the Boeing B-17 bomber’.591 Ignoring this outstanding opportunity, the 
government, after a year of procrastination and still extolling the virtues of the 
Wirraway, predictably proceeded with the purchase of yet another British warplane, 
the unknown and slower Bristol Beaufighter. 
 
 
(Source: AWM) 
Figure 70: The Bristol Beaufighter IC—the first one to arrive in Australia in March 1942, months 
behind schedule. The Mark I was already obsolete having been replaced by later models and 
Mosquitos in the RAF. A useful intruder but with littler other application.592 
 
The first Beaufighters did not arrive until March 1942, four months late. By that time 
RAAF fighter squadrons were being re-equipped with Lend-lease American P-40s 
Kittyhawks. But the order was significant as it was the first real attempt to get a 
higher performance warplane for the RAAF although the buyers were obviously still 
not looking in the right direction. The Beaufighter, despite its name, was an 
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‘intruder’ for strafing and light bombing.593 By the 1940s the RAAF was in the 
precarious position of Australia being bombed and even invaded without air defence. 
Only two aircraft were under construction in Australia and neither was capable of 
interception. And only the Beaufighter was on order; a fighter in name only. 
 
 
(Source: RAF Museum) 
Figure 71: Instead of the two-seated, 333 mph Beaufighter that was never a fighter, the government, in 
a last chance to compile a fighter command, may have purchased the P-38 Lightning in 1940 with a 
speed of over 400mph—a designated long-ranged interceptor—almost 200 mph faster than the 
Wirraway. Depicted is a Lightning in RAF livery rejected by the British leaving the door open for an 
Australian order. 
 
The Beaufort, a twin-engined, British designed light torpedo bomber; the second 
aircraft made in Australia was built by the government DAP at Mascot. But again the 
government ‘backed the wrong horse’. The Beaufort was unsuccessful as a torpedo 
bomber and served as a conventional straight and level night bomber. A much 
simpler and effective way forward would have been the acquisition of the Douglas 
Dauntless dive-bomber. The dive-bomber per se was apparently overlooked by 
defence planners, yet proved capable of sinking the world’s largest ships—aircraft 
carriers and battleships. Making the Dauntless in Australia would appear easier than 
the Wirraway and certainly simpler than the twin-engined Beaufort which required 
major redesign to take American power-plants. To its credit, by 1937, the Labor 
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Party did start to realise that the RN could not protect Australia, particularly from 
bombing. It advocated a fifty-squadron air force be compiled quickly, a proposal not 
acted upon until 1942.594  
What was of concern was the aircraft types, principally the Beaufort and the 
Wirraway, that were selected for production. This was not so much because they 
were not sound aircraft, but that they were wrong for RAAF needs and were not 
designed for the roles for which they were required. Put simply, in the case of the 
Beaufort, it did not have the ordinance carrying capacity to destroy Japanese 
warships. And its construction, stymied by the problems presented by the British 
failure to supply engines, proved too slow to make it available in numbers in the 
opening months of the war when any type of contemporary warplanes was needed 
urgently by the RAAF.  
As for the Wirraway, it did not have the performance or armament of a warplane and 
should not have been used as one. It has to be said that for a trainer the NA-33 was 
sound. But the RAAF was grounded without a combat capacity. According to official 
Australian history, D. P. Mellor in the Role of Science and Industry, the syndicate 
formed to develop an aircraft industry opined that ‘about ten years would be 
required’ before a first-line military aircraft could be produced in Australia.595 Mellor 
uses this initial evaluation to justify the Wirraway decision by adding that: 'In view 
of criticisms that were later made about the inadequacy of the first Australian-made 
aircraft as fighter planes, it is important to remember this technical point'.596  
But it must also be remembered that the NA-33 was never designed as a warplane—a 
political decision was taken to arm it in Australia and put it into front-line service. 
This decision cannot be justified on any account yet it was vigorously defended, 
particularly by then-Defence Minister Thorby. When questioned by Opposition 
Leader Curtin who spoke the truth by saying that ‘Australian aircraft were 
lamentably obsolete’ Thorby responded angrily but not directly which would have 
called for an admission of Curtin’s correctness. Instead Thorby declared that: ‘The 
aircraft factory now in production at Fisherman’s Bend was the most modern in the 
world … no government could improve on what is being done for the air force at the 
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595 Mellor, D. P., op. cit., p. 381. 
596 Ibid., p. 381. 
208 
present time in Australia’.597 By skirting the question and praising the factory making 
Wirraways with such emphasis, Thorby’s outburst was tantamount to an admission 
of guilt. No one in government at this point in time, with Wirraway production under 
way, was brave enough to face the truth.  
This same argument is proliferated by Ross in Armed and Ready. But it does not 
stand examination. The decision to manufacture the Wirraway was made in 1936.598 
Within five years, the twin-engine Beaufort, a more complex design, and one 
needing much modification from the original, was being manufactured in relatively 
large numbers. This clearly illustrates that the construction of a fighter, the Hurricane 
or even the Spitfire, was within the capabilities of Australian industry. Better still 
would have been producing an American fighter where the problems that bedevilled 
the Beaufort program through Britain’s lack of cooperation and rivalry between 
British and America manufacturers would have been eliminated. As it was, the first 
Beaufort did not fly until August 1941, two years and three months after the decision 
to manufacture being made.599 After Pearl Harbor, the US and Australia became such 
close allies that the continued production of an American fighter would have been 
supported and assisted.600 Rather than the reason given by Mellor and others that the 
aircraft industry ‘had to walk before it could run’, the real reason for the Wirraway 
being produced when the Japanese threat was highest was obviously the appeal of a 
‘general purpose’ plane for the RAAF which was probably primarily meant for 
EATS, not for combat. The only other reason may have been the general lack of 
respect for Japanese aircraft and their crews. This attitude seems brought about 
through a mix of racism and a misplaced belief in the technical inferiority of 
Japanese, Italian and Russian aircraft. In an interview with Air Vice-Marshal F. M. 
Bladin, then-Director of Operations and Intelligence, the 'little red book' he carried 
showing the performance of Axis aircraft, had a question mark against all aspects of 
the 'Type O' fighter.601 At a War Cabinet meeting in January 1941, Minister for the 
Army Spender admitted he did not think the Wirraway could counter Japanese 
seaborne aircraft after the tabling of an assessment of the performance of the 
                                                 
597 Anon. 1938, ‘Most Modern Aircraft Factory’s Claim’, The Canberra Times, 22 June, p. 3.  
598 Ibid., p. 382. 
599 Mellor, D. P., op. cit., p. 389.  
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Japanese Navy's 'O-96' fighter showing its speed of 300-plus mph.602 This illustrates, 
not only that there were concerns in Australian political circles about Japanese 
aircraft, but the dangers of politicians making value judgments about warplanes. 
 
 
(Source: AWM) 
Figure 72: Air Chief Marshal Charles Burnett (RHS) a RAF officer who headed the RAAF at the time 
of the Wirraway controversy. His services were terminated after the air defence fiasco of the Pacific 
War. 
 
Not that the air force did any better. Air Chief Marshall Charles Burnett, who was 
present, played down the Japanese threat by saying he thought high powered 
Japanese aircraft would be few in number and that the Wirraway would be able to 
'make quite a good show' if Australia was attacked.603 Thus the need to hastily get a 
contemporary fighter went unheeded throughout 1941 as the Japanese threat grew 
stronger. Complacency, if not completely acceptable to everyone, was entrenched 
enough to prevent an urgent, twelve-month crash-program aimed at buying American 
fighters even if they were not Spitfires. Burnett, if anyone, should have been issuing 
warnings and advocating the urgent acquisition of single-seat interceptors for home 
defence.  
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Conclusion 
There are two stand-out points in RAAF equipping 1919–1941 that contributed to the 
‘fighterless’ air force of January 1942. Australian industry was not well placed to 
begin the manufacture of warplanes ‘from scratch’—it was too time consuming in 
building factories, tooling up and producing a prototype, to be viable under the 
urgency of the international situation. There was a delay of three to five years from 
the time of inception to the first plane being flown. This time was never available. 
Having decided to build a ‘warplane’ the company producing it, the CAC, included 
financing by General Motors Holden (GMH) a subsidiary of the parent company, 
General Motors Corporation (GMC) of America. As GMC in turn had a controlling 
interest in North American Aviation, it seems more than a coincidence that an 
aircraft from that company, the NA-33, was selected for construction by CAC. 
Unluckily for the RAAF, the NA-33 was a training plane as indeed its title indicated: 
AT-6 standing for Advanced Trainer 6. Once the NA-33 went into production in 
Australia, then the government refused to reverse its decision after its ministers were 
obviously aware it was too slow for a fighter. Instead they continued to heap praise 
on the Wirraway in a way that can only be called ‘bloody mindedness’. Such 
attitudes stymied the chance to acquire a contemporary interceptor in time for the 
coming defence crisis.  
The second handicap the RAAF faced in the interwar years was the RAF offshoot. 
The impression of subservience to British influences was the standard on which the 
Australian air force modelled itself, from its tradition and organisation down to most 
of its aircraft and training.604 The RAAF was still being supplied with British World 
War I style aircraft into the 1930s when other international air services were flying 
monoplanes, particularly in the USA where bomber design was outstripping other 
nations. From the mid-1920s, the RAAF sent a proportion of its pilots from Point 
Cook courses for further training in Britain. To the detriment of the RAAF, many of 
those pilots subsequently transferred to the RAF. For more than a decade there was 
little effort to consider defence issues from an Australian perspective such as 
discontinuing this policy and seeking advanced American monoplanes. When the 
government broke from buying British to American, its ministers were not versed at 
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making a selection outside the parameters of RAF control and thus took the word of 
the business men (with a vested interest) running the CAC that the NA-33 was the 
best choice. And not only that it was the best choice, but that it was easier to build 
than a fighter—a fabrication.  
Ross asserts that the Australian industry could have produced fighter aircraft of 
sufficient quality to prevent the Japanese gaining air superiority over Australia,605 but 
the history of the CAC shows that the warplanes it made all arrived too late or were 
obsolete by delivery. Before the war, Australia had been virtually a non-starter in the 
field of military aircraft—the one type produced, the Beaufort, being typical. In 
1940, aircraft manufacture output, with the first Beaufort taking over two years to 
make, remained that of a cottage industry with component parts spread among 600 
firms, some of them over 1000 miles apart.606 When the CAC did attempt to build a 
fighter, the CA-12 Boomerang, a derivate of the Wirraway, it proved inferior to 
contemporary Allied fighters and only 250 were made.607 
 
 
(Source: AWM) 
Figure 73: The CA-12 Boomerang fighter of July 1942, with a top speed of 300 mph. The only 
justification for its production was to keep workers at the CAC’s Wirraway plant employed. 
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There was an unwillingness to think beyond the contingency of ‘Defence Against 
Light Raids’ with the only positive road taken being after hostilities began; to 
acquire warplanes from America. This was obviously recognised by both the Fadden 
and the Curtin governments before December 1941, but neither took decisive action 
on the issue. In turn, their inaction led to RAAF aircrews being killed or wounded for 
no military reason. On 11 December 1941, twelve Wirraways were ordered to 
Rabaul from Townsville in keeping with early Air Board decisions;608 the Board itself 
being answerable to the Australian Advisory War Council of which both Fadden and 
Curtin were members.609 By then Curtin had been Prime Minister for over a month 
and had the power to overturn the Wirraway to Rabaul order but he seemed prepared 
to let token resistance take its deadly course. All that aside, the fact remains that the 
manufacture of military planes by the fledgling aircraft industry—the planning, 
building factories, dies and tools, resources, engines and licensing—was too 
protracted. Buying ready-to-fly warplanes from America (Hudsons and Catalinas 
were purchased) was the sensible approach to arming the RAAF. The need had been 
established but the execution was beyond those politicians doing the job.  
When the conservative government finally, at the twelfth hour, realised the RAAF 
needed designated warplanes, probably embarrassed by the press and opposition 
outcry against the Wirraway, fifty-four Fairey-built Bristol Beaufighters 1Cs were 
ordered from Britain as gloomily noted.610 Having tested the waters in North America 
and been exposed to big business and ‘sold a pup’ in the NA-33, the government 
hurried back to buying British. But the British had already shown their mettle as 
tardy suppliers and the Beaufighters, of a superseded mark, did not reach Australia 
until March 1942, three months after the war began.611 Such purchase, made with the 
fanfare that the Beaufighters would be Australia’s first line of defence, showed again 
that government ministers did not have the expertise to select warplanes to match 
Australia’s defence criteria. Generally they vacillated for years and then, at the last 
minute, made decisions ‘on the run’. What they had not brought with them was an air 
force capable of fighting a war. Thus successive governments, by not professionally 
planning and providing for air defence based primarily on the single-seated 
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interceptor, took away the chance of choice. In the mid to late 1930s, the government 
could have gone shopping for the best warplanes. Once that opportunity was gone, 
the RAAF would have to rely on hand-outs from its allies who in turn were 
allocating aircraft where they saw the most need—Russia, the Middle East, India and 
so on. Australia had put itself, through its inter-war choices, in an unenviable, 
dependent position of low priority. 
Impossible as it must have seemed in RAAF circles, the air force became engaged in 
a war of survival against the Japanese without one fighter in home service at a time 
of Australia’s greatest peril. In hindsight the acquisition of contemporary fighters 
seems a relatively simple exercise in strategic planning. First-line, high performance 
interceptors could, as noted, have been bought from American firms who were 
searching for buyers up until December 1941. Even after Pearl Harbor, American 
companies honoured their commitment to Allied buyers as seen from the Dutch, 
French and British examples. 
 
214 
 
(Source: ) 
Figure 74: Stylised advertisement from the British journal The Aeroplane (Temple Press, London, 14 
June 1940, p. 5) that sold in Australia. This Bell Aircraft Corporation’s advertisement for the P 39 
proved the government had time to buy and arm the RAAF with contemporary fighters before Pearl 
Harbor. 
 
The British were hastily rearming the RAF with modern monoplane fighters from the 
mid-1930s—principally Hurricanes and Spitfires—knowing the value of fighters in 
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all roles; escort, interception and ground attack. But at no time did the British suggest 
or encourage the nations of the Empire to similarly arm themselves. Part of this 
policy appears to have come from the British Chiefs of Staff. In the official history of 
the RAAF, Gillison states that: 
… on the proposed organisation of the RAAF [they] expressed general agreement with 
the [Australian] Air Board's proposals. Choice of the same type of aircraft for general 
purpose and general reconnaissance squadrons was regarded as sound policy . . . In 
view of the kind of attack Australia might expect, no strong case could be made on 
purely military grounds for the provision of fighter squadrons, though there might be 
psychological and other reasons for forming some squadrons of this [fighter] type.612 
Gillison qualifies his statement opining that the British 'either were thinking in 
immediate terms and without any comprehension of the RAAF becoming a fully 
coordinated air force, or that they did not recognise the value of fighter aircraft as 
escorts for bomber formations’.613 If this was true, then the policy was completely 
contrary to the British’s own action in mass producing fighters for the RAF and 
selling them overseas. 
Had the British taken a more active role in helping the Australians manufacture 
fighters, both for export and local defence, then the government may have followed 
their lead and not selected the American NA-33. As it stood, government members 
stepped outside the bounds of imperial defence with the Harvard. But they still based 
air defence somewhere between their own penny-pinching and British-stated 
assessments instead of pursuing the development of an independent air force based 
on deteriorating worldwide events and objective aircraft evaluations. Thus when the 
Japanese inevitably struck, taking full advantage of the Allies’ disorganisation and 
lack of cohesiveness, the RAAF did not possess the hardware to protect its own 
airspace. Government members who brought about this tragic situation were never 
held accountable, and the career of the leading figure, Menzies, was never affected 
by it.  
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CHAPTER 6: GLOBAL AND AUSTRALIAN SITUATION IN 
1939–1941 
 
 
(Source: Public domain) 
Figure 75: Scourge of the South Pacific; the Mitsubishi Zero-Sen: its reign of terror lasted less than 
400 days. There was nothing special about it but try as they may Allied pilots could not overcome the 
AM-6 in second-line and obsolete fighters. 
 
Deliberately underestimating the Japanese as international 
diplomacy 
One of the major and costly intelligence blunders of the 20th Century was the failure 
of the Western allies to accurately forecast the intentions and assess Japanese 
military potential before December, 1941. The signposts were many but the outcome 
was one ostensibly of surprise—particularly in terms of the standard of Japanese 
aircraft and the efficiency of their crews. Deciding the extent of this intelligence 
blunder was fact and what was orchestrated is beyond the parameters of this thesis, 
but the outcome was the same and therefore its political impact cannot be denied.  
Germany was monitored with suspicion as the major burgeoning threat to Britain and 
France once Hitler took power in 1933—and as a country that produced world class 
aircraft and aviators. But Japan was never seen in the same light. By the late 1930s, 
the British government was hastily rearming against the danger of a European war 
and modernising the RAF. When war came in September 1939 there was resignation 
to the inevitable resumption of World War I which had left the door open for a 
bigger, longer story. But technology and its application to warfare had changed since 
1918. Those who made the most efficient use of new technologies, particularly of 
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aircraft and mechanised artillery, won the day. Numbers of infantrymen on the 
ground was no longer the deciding factor. Unfortunately, the British did not apply the 
same principles to protecting their Empire as they did with their own air defences 
which were probably the best in the world. As leading Luftwaffe fighter commander 
Adolf Galland recalled:  
From the very beginning the British had an extraordinary advantage which we could 
never overcome through the entire war: radar and fighter control. For us and for our 
command this was a surprise, and a very bitter one. Britain possessed a closely knit 
radar network conforming to the highest technical standards of the day which provided 
[their] Fighter Command with the most detailed data imaginable. Thus the British 
fighter was guided all the way from take-off to his correct position for attack on [our] 
formations.614  
The assessment of Japanese air power was always below its actual potential.615 This 
meant any danger of Australia being bombed was degraded by British politicians for 
their own reasons. Yet in his memoirs of 1951, Sir Winston Churchill wrote of 1941 
that, ‘Australian air-power hardly existed. Can we wonder that deep alarm swept 
Australia or that the thoughts of their Cabinet were centred upon their own 
affairs?’616 Churchill wrote as if such a situation was totally the Australian 
government’s own doing and the British had not played a part in Australia’s lack of 
an adequate air force, however indirectly.  
British failed to warn the dominions of the danger from Japan 
Secretly the British did recognise the danger of war with Japan after its army 
continued advancing south through East Asia using the protracted invasion of China 
as a corridor.617 When Sir Robert Brooke-Popham became Commander-in-Chief, 
South East Area based at Singapore, he recommended to his government on 7 
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December 1940 it should convince the Japanese that British defence in the Far East 
was so strong any act of aggression would prove unsuccessful: so likely had war 
against Japan become.618 On the other hand, although they needed aircraft 
themselves, the British were supplying military planes to China; albeit, in the form of 
second-line machines via Burma, driven by a secret fear of more widespread 
Japanese aggression as recorded in the UK’s War Cabinet Document W.P. (40) 481 
of 14 December 1940: 
The situation has changed since 1937 and 1939 when the previous decisions were taken. 
Japan is [now] allied to our enemies by the Three Power Pact of the 27th September, 
1940. She has obtained control of strategic points and aerodromes in the north of Indo-
China, and there is good reason to believe the she is intending to extend her influence 
over Thailand and to establish naval and air bases in South Indo-China as a preliminary 
to a possible attack on Borneo, the Netherlands East Indies or perhaps Malaya.619 
Obviously war in the Far East was unwanted. The British vacillated against 
themselves with another round of appeasement. As with the Germans, they were 
reluctant to antagonise the Japanese even with their open aggression in China. On 17 
November 1937, the British Cabinet decided, 'That in view of possible Japanese 
reactions' to withhold the assembly of aircraft for China in Hong Kong.620 The 
Chinese had built a factory at Lowiwing in Yunnan, across the Burmese frontier for 
the assembly of aircraft from her allies. The factory quickly began to assemble 
warplanes arriving CKD from America via the Philippines, but it was located by the 
Japanese and destroyed by bombing.621 Yet neither the British nor the Americans 
showed any sign of military retaliation, giving the Japanese carte blanche to perform 
such terroristic acts. On 9 October 1940, the British received an unofficial request 
from Mr T. V. Soong, Chairman of the Chinese Aeronautical Commission, 'for His 
Majesty's Government' to permit a hundred American aircraft crated in Manila 
enroute to China to be ‘assembled in Rangoon or Calcutta and flown hence to 
China’.622 The British approved this application with the Governor of Burma opining 
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that he did not think ‘Japan would go to war with us [over this and other similar 
assistance to China] unless she was otherwise prepared to do so’.623 
Thus while the British and American governments monitored and fought a limited 
and rather timid air war against Japan by proxy and were privy to the quality and 
professionalism of Japanese air power, such knowledge did not translate into action. 
Upgrading the air defences of Singapore and Malaya with Spitfires and Kittyhawks 
or helping and encouraging local dominion governments to prepare their air forces 
for self-defence might have been considered mandatory. Action could also have 
included warning the Australian and New Zealand prime ministers about the grave 
threat before them and of the urgent need to acquire modern American fighters 
before it was too late. Instead, in his visit to Australia of October 1941, Air Marshal 
Brooke-Popham tried again to allay Australian fears by announcing that Japan,  
‘… had temporarily diverted her attention from the south to the north … to rid 
[herself] of the Russian threat to Vladivostok’.624 He added, ‘Our fighters are of the 
Brewster Buffalo type, which are superior to the Japanese and well suited for the 
work in Malaya’.625 Brooke-Popham kept such untruths going, contradicting himself 
by saying, ‘A specific schedule of deliveries had not yet been determined, but a 
definite number of aircraft had been promised by the UK authorities … to include 
170 … fighters which would be an improvement on the Buffalo type [meaning 
Hurricanes; some arrived during the Japanese attack]. At the present time Japan has 
superiority in numbers, but not in quality’.626 All this averred he knew the Buffaloes 
needed replacement. Despite Brooke-Popham’s claim, the Buffaloes were not the 
equal of the Zero-Sen and Hurricanes, while marginally better than the Buffalo, were 
still not superior to the Zero.627  
At the same time Brooke-Popham continued to push the well-established envelope 
that Japan was not such a threat as Australians seemed to think. Addressing the 
Australian Advisory War Council during his October visit, he stated optimistically: 
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... all indications were that, as Russia's preoccupation with the war with Germany 
presented an opportunity for Japan to rid herself of the Russian threat for Vladivostok, 
she [Japan] had temporarily diverted her attention from the south to the north ... the 
Allies would thus have time to complete their defences and to prefect their plans.628 
The results of not acting on their own intelligence would cost the Allies what 
Churchill called ‘… a long period of torturing defeats’,629 when the Pacific War 
finally erupted. The combination of both the effectiveness of Japan's ability to hide 
many of its military secrets and the Allies’ ongoing publicity machine that degraded 
the Japanese continued on well-oiled wheels. This self-defeating approach reigned 
from Churchill down, at a time when an authentic assessment was needed. Churchill, 
realising that Britain could never win the war without the Empire, obviously did not 
want to interrupt the flow of aircrews from the dominions or endanger vital British 
interests in the Middle East. In his carefully worded and thought-through memoirs, 
Churchill testified to the success of Japanese censorship and to the erroneous 
impressions of Japanese air power held by the Allies.630 In reality this impression was 
self-inflicted which saved the British sending substantial reinforcement to the Far 
East, and arguably counted on the Americans to intervene if necessary. Japanese 
aggression against British interests would hopefully bring the Americans into the 
war, something Churchill seemed anxious to encourage.  
Brooke-Popham, in his address in Australia appeared to have overlooked the fact that 
Britain’s pre-occupation with defending herself, gave the Japanese a never-to-be-
repeated chance to strike. At the time of his visit to Melbourne, the Japanese already 
had about 35 000 troops in Thailand and planned to land 125 408 in Malaya.631 Yet 
on his round trip, Brooke-Popham told journalists in Manila on 6 October 1941, just 
before meeting MacArthur, that it was the Japanese who were concerned: ‘I think 
Japan is worried and does not know what to do. It seems to me that the Japanese are 
beginning to wonder if they have not been let down by the Axis—as they really 
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have—and whether they have backed the wrong horse’.632 Later, for unknown 
reasons, Curtin claimed: ‘Just as you foresaw events in Europe, so we feel that we 
saw the trend of the Pacific … more clearly than was realised in London’.633 If that 
was true, then Curtin kept it hidden and did nothing to improve defence when he 
took office in late 1941. Considering Curtin’s promotion of air power in opposition, 
it is hard not to view the political indecisiveness and managerial blundering that 
conspired to undermine the RAAF getting fighter aircraft as amounting to a national 
character flaw.634  
 
 
(Source: AWM) 
Figure 76: Journalist John Curtin became Prime Minister 7 October 1941,635 two months to the day 
before the Pacific war began. He had no military background and had campaigned against 
conscription during World War I.636 His leadership in opposition lasted from 1935 until 1941 when his 
demand for a huge air force was ridiculed.637 Despite his pre-war conduct, Curtin failed to get 
interceptors for the RAAF. Instead, he spoke of ‘replacing those highly-placed experts who rejected 
out of hand his defence policy in 1937 who are still in positions of control of war administration’.638  
 
Australia's position was always tenuous after September 1939 with its military forces 
divided and Britain concentrating on her own defence and the oil fields of North 
Africa. Ostensibly faced with a threat to her existence, the British had no alternative 
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but to seek to avoid war against Japan.639 But if war came, then air power was 
considered vital, at least to some British commanders. For instance Lieutenant-
General Lionel Bond, General Officer Commanding Malaya, knowing that a fleet to 
Singapore would take at least 180 days to arrive, saw that the only other solution 
rested with the RAF and suggested an alternative defence was the RAF being 
responsible for ensuring the Japanese could not maintain a base or operate any line of 
communication within striking distance of the airfields of Malaya.640 No action was 
taken to strike first as Bond proposed, but his evaluation again under-rated the air 
arm of the Japanese and its carrier task forces—far superior to Britain’s, not only in 
numbers but in combat capability. The bombing arm of the air defence of Malaya 
and Singapore consisted of a small force of Blenheim and Hudson light bombers and 
Catalina seaplanes (with the Wirraways and Buffalos)—a total of 160 aircraft.641 This 
equated to about the strength of two Japanese carriers but which were better 
equipped.  
While the bastion of Singapore was supposed to protect Australia from Asian 
aggression, Japanese spy ships simply bypassed the base and were operating with 
naval crews in the guise of pearling luggers in the waters around Broome. At a 
Cabinet meeting in August 1939, the recommendations of the Inter-Department 
Committee on 'Encroachment of Japanese in Australian Waters' in trying to address 
the issue were: 
(ii) That the Commonwealth Government provide a patrol boat at Broome a soon as 
possible. 
(iii) That the Department of Defence give consideration to the provision of aerial 
reconnaissance by seaplane or aeroplane in connection with all the patrol services.642 
Even these small suggestions were not acted upon. Sir Henry Gullet, Minister for 
External Affairs stated that ‘... while the matter was to be kept in mind, no action was 
to be taken for the present’.643 The Japanese also opened a commercial air service 
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between Japan and Dili, Timor Island.644 The matter was discussed in parliament, but 
action, even in the form of diplomatic protest, was not forthcoming.  
Despite the concerns of its government and people, Australia was neither Japan’s 
main potential enemy nor the ultimate destination of its army. Edwin Hoyt 
researched the Japanese military position from 1852 and states that as early as 1918, 
'America had gone to the top of the enemies [of Japan] list—and stayed there'.645 
Newspaper articles as early as the 1920s reported a possible conflict between the two 
powerful nations with dire consequences: 
The most serious problem in the Far East is not the attitude of Japan to its neighbours, 
but that of Asiatic nations to Western ones. Such being the case, no preventative 
measures on the part of the Western nations can be disregarded lightly as adventures too 
far from home. Whether America or Britain sustains the first blow, the results will be 
the same and civilisation as we know it will be at stake once more—this time not in 
peril from blood brothers but from the oriental domination of the world, which will 
result in the enslavement of all free institutions.646 
Certainly later events reflect this finding. But superior American military potential 
and industrial might was not the only problem for Japan. The economic turmoil of 
the world between the wars was partly behind the Japanese decision to aggress into 
Manchuria and China.647 The Great Depression of 1929 and the world’s slow 
recovery meant that most nations concentrated on internal issues alone. Japan, unlike 
America, did not possess the raw materials to support its burgeoning post-Depression 
economy—it needed to control and resource a vast empire in south and east Asia if it 
was to prosper. This requirement was magnified after the Western nations withdrew 
exports of essential raw material in 1941 following Japan's refusal to end its Chinese 
incursion.648  
But the real risk of Japan's plight to the West—the cornering of a tiger—was 
arguably not fully appreciated for itself. Withdrawing from China and Manchuria 
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and returning to peaceful pursuits was unthinkable to the Japanese military (and 
Japanese philosophy) which had such sway with the government: 
The Japanese were thus faced with the coming inevitability of war unless they changed 
their policy. Within the government … there were men who were willing to change but 
the man who was already in charge in fact was not. This man was War Minister Tojo.649 
The same can be said of Japan’s ability to not only produce military hardware equal 
to that of the West but to use it with skill and dexterity in strategies that were often 
superior to those of the Allies. 
There were three distinct reasons for the devaluation of Japanese power. First the 
Japanese military expedition began north into Manchuria away from their ultimate 
goal—a threat to Russia and not America or the colonies of the Europeans. Second, 
the Japanese invaded developing Asian nations that were of little interest to the West. 
Third, the Western democracies were both war-weary and inward-looking after their 
haunting World War I experiences followed by the Great Depression. The looking 
out they did was focused on their old foe, Germany, and its new ally Italy with their 
canny rearmament programs and land-grabbing ambitions often thinly veiled as 
peaceful pursuits and economic restructuring—flying clubs, airline companies, 
commercial airports and other civilian infrastructure that could convert to military 
use. Once Britain and France declared war in 1939, then a two-ocean war against 
three major sea powers was simply beyond their combined capacity. 
The 1932 Japanese invasion of China did bring protests from the international 
community including a stern rebuke from US Secretary of State, Stimson.650 Some 
countries, including Britain and Italy, sent warships and detachments of troops to 
protect their embassies in the 'International Settlement'.651 But there was never any 
likelihood of direct Allied military intervention with Chinese appeals for 
international assistance falling on deaf ears.652 Like Hitler, the Japanese tested the 
resolve of the West and found it wanting. 1932 was an election year for President 
Herbert Hoover, the first since the Depression.653 A series of developments in Europe 
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that could not be satisfied by appeasement were showing signs of descending into 
all-out war. This dire situation kept the British focused on the home-front while they 
applied a half-hearted effort in the Far East where the menace of Japan was of more 
minor concern.  
The Americans embraced 'isolationism'—not to get involved in European wars again; 
a policy still applying after September 1939.654 The bravado and enthusiasm with 
which Britain, France and later America, entered World War 1 soon evaporated after 
the 'butcher's bill' of Flanders proved too expensive. Little but a moral victory was 
gained from the sacrifice and hollow ending of 1918 and the subsequent Allied 
reparation policy that left Germans thirsting for revenge. After the Great Depression 
the major Allied nations with their small peacetime services were quickly rearming, 
albeit largely along World War I lines while applying policies of avoiding war 
almost at any cost. While they rearmed, appeasement became the European 
coalition’s front-line strategy in dealing with the volatile fascist dictators,655 Hitler 
and Mussolini, until they wanted more than even appeasement afforded them. But 
despite its ridiculed place in history, appeasement went a long way towards helping 
the British rebuild the RAF.  
In the East, pangs of conscience took many forms in countries sympathetic to the 
plight of the Chinese with their daily military defeats. On 23 September 1937, the 
‘Committee of 23’ of the League of Nations met ‘to deal with the Chino-Japanese 
conflict’.656 Although the Japanese were censured, neither military action nor 
sanctions resulted.657 America, Britain and Russia sent fighters in a token response.658 
Newsreel footage appeared in international cinemas showing hordes of Chinese 
fleeing the bombing.659 The ‘war of the worlds’ seemed to have begun with the 
senseless killing of Chinese civilians to gain a quick victory for no apparent reason. 
Still photographs depicted Japanese atrocities committed against Chinese civilians 
without mercy particularly after the fall of Nanking on 13 December 1937.660 
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658 Green, W. 1961, op. cit., vol. 3, p. 164, vol. 4, p. 45; vol. 2, p. 49.  
659 Chang, I., op. cit., pp. 146–7. 
660 Some infamous photographs taken by Japanese soldiers depicting their own atrocities were processed in 
Chinese photographic shops and smuggled to the US by W. A. Farmer. They were first published in Look 
magazine causing moral outrage but leading to no Western intervention (Chang I. op. cit.,).  
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Firstly, the Western attitude to Japan ranged from outright dismissal, turning a blind 
eye or depreciating the threat, to possibly hoping her aggression would run itself out 
in the vastness of China's interior. But it was hardening. The advantage to the 
Western powers was that the Japanese invasion of China, despite its success, was 
eating up Japanese military resources that could have been turned against the Allies. 
According to Hoyt, the Japanese had approximately a million troops facing the 
Russians in Manchuria and another million in China.661 
 
 
(Source: Public domain) 
Figure 77: Bombs explode over a Chinese city during Japan’s undeclared war against China. There is 
no evidence of the Australian government sending observers or aid. 
 
The US response, apart from the token AVG, was to continue making diplomatic 
protests but even after one of its patrol boats, the Panay, was sunk by Japanese dive-
bombers, no retaliation was threatened.662 As with Britain's appeasement policy to 
Germany, Japan, although seemingly conscious of international opinion, proceeded 
against all diplomatic protests and persisted with its campaign. When Japanese forces 
entered French Indo-China on 23 September 1940 and occupied airbases without 
opposition, it was obvious they intended extending their conquests.663 The chance of 
the Allies sending sufficient forces to remove the Japanese from Asia was so remote 
that Japan was virtually unrestricted. The real worry for the Japanese was that the 
                                                 
661 Hoyt, E., op. cit., p. 401.  
662 Nalty, B., op. cit., p. 33.  
663 Woodburn Kirby S., Major-General, op. cit., p. 44.  
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Allies would stop supplying raw materials which finally occurred on 6 July 1940, 
putting America and Japan on a collision course.664 
 
 
(Source: Public domain) 
Figure 78: Successful AVG pilot Lieutenant Robert Scott with his P-40 scoreboard. Scott wrote the 
best seller God is My Co-Pilot665 published in 1943. 
 
During this time when the Japanese posed a direct threat in East Asia, the RAAF was 
still without contemporary interceptors and had very few bombers or long-ranged 
patrol planes. At the end of August 1939, the RAAF possessed just eight operational 
squadrons (or part thereof): 
Laverton, Victoria 
 No 1 (Bomber Squadron) 
 No. 2 (General Reconnaissance) Squadron 
 No. 21 (General Purpose) Squadron 
 One flight of No. 12 (General Purpose) Squadron 
Richmond New South Wales 
 No. 3 (Army Cooperation) Squadron 
 No. 6 (General Reconnaissance) Squadron 
 No. 9 (Fleet Cooperation) Squadron 
 No. 22 (General Purpose) Squadron 
                                                 
664 Manchester W. op. cit., p. 191. Once Western nations stopped supplying raw material, the Japanese had two 
options—war and seizure of resources or withdrawing from China—a Hobson’s choice in their eyes.   
665 Scott, R. L. 1943, God Is My Co-Pilot, Ballantine Books, New York.  
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Point Cook, Victoria 
 No. 10 (General Reconnaissance) Squadron (equipped with temporary aircraft 
pending the arrival of Vickers Sunderland flying boats from Britain. 
Pearce, Western Australia 
 No. 14 (General Reconnaissance) Squadron 
 No. 25 (General Purpose) Squadron 
Darwin, Northern Territory 
 No. 12 (General Purpose) Squadron (two flights) 
Brisbane, Queensland 
 No. 23 (General Purpose) Squadron, one flight only 
The total aircraft number in RAAF service at that date were: 
 82 Avro Ansons (obsolete general reconnaissance) 
 54 Hawker Demons (obsolete biplane fighters) 
 7 Wirraways (so-called general purpose armed trainers) 
82 training planes of various types 
21 Seagull seaplanes666 
 
                                                 
666 Ibid., pp. 56–7. 
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(Source: Public domain) 
Figure 79: The British could always afford to send Australia out-dated planes. One of 1 000 ex-RAF 
obsolete Anson bombers were sent to Australia in 1939 to train RAAF aircrews under EATS for the 
RAF’s Bomber Command in Europe. Out-of-date Fairey Battles and Airspeed Oxfords were sent for 
the same purpose. 
 
Two issues predominated concerning this mottled collection of planes—although 
there was a discreet basis to build an operational air force if time allowed, the 
organisation, soon to be the nation's first line of defence, lacked modern hardware. 
And apart from two flights of Wirraways at Darwin, the concentration of the air 
force, such as it was, was around the largest centres of population in Australia’s 
south-east as above.  
The lack of acquisition of combat aircraft, which might have been tackled with gusto 
from the mid-to-late 1930s through December 1941, could not be reversed overnight 
and was exacerbated by Britain’s war. Now many European countries were rushing 
to buy operational aircraft from Britain and America, making the chance of Australia 
upgrading its air force much harder. But despite this buying spree, fighters were still 
purchasable from the US. As late as 14 June 1940, advertisements appeared in 
Britain’s aviation magazine, The Aeroplane showing the P-39 Airacobra interceptor 
still for sale (Chapter 5). 
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But the government remained unmoved. The decision not to buy or make single-seat 
fighters had been taken—only light bombers (Hudsons and Beauforts), seaplanes 
(Catalinas) and long-ranged 'intruders'667 (Beaufighters) were on order from Britain 
and America or being made locally as of December 1941. The Beaufighter was the 
most modern of these planes, so secret that a press release at the time simply stated 
under a hazy photograph: 
TWIN-ENGINED BRISTOL BEAUFIGHTER 
High-speed fighter monoplane armed with 6 machine guns and 4x 2Omm cannon, 
aircraft of this type are being imported to Australia from Britain as our first line of 
defence against air attack.668 
It was not until November 1941 that the order for Beaufighters was made public and 
even then there seemed to be confusion over whether they were fighters or not. At 
that time the press stated that: 
The RAAF will shortly be equipped with the Beaufighter, one of Britain’s most modern 
fighters, which will form Australia's first line of air defence ... It is understood that the 
number of Beaufighters to be bought will be sufficient to counter any attempt by an 
enemy to land airborne troops.669 
Yet the same newspaper article in its sub-banner championed the Beaufighters as 
‘being imported to Australia from Britain as the first-line of defence against air 
attack’.670 Without any air defence doctrine, the types of planes required were never 
established leading to this ad hoc purchase at the last minute. The Beaufighter was a 
warplane but not for the reasons stated. The RAAF needed interceptors. But with the 
war soaking up British resources and some Australian politicians apparently not 
knowing the difference between warplanes, the correct ones to buy or make was 
never defined. Another problem for the RAAF that only time would reveal was 
whether or not the British would release the Beaufighters or renege as they had other 
purchases when their own needs were dire. 
                                                 
667 ‘Intruder’ was a twin-engined fighter-bomber-cross: fast enough to operate alone for strafing and light 
bombing but too slow for daylight interception. The speed of the Beaufighter was 330 mph for most variants 
(Anon. 1989, Jane's Fighting Aircraft of World War II, op. cit., p. 111).  
668 Anon. 1941, ‘Twin-Engined Bristol Beaufighter’, The Argus, 7 November, p. 8. 
669 Anon. 1941, The Argus, 7 November, p. 3. It appears the British convinced government representatives they 
were buying interceptors which, even had that been true, went against their ‘defence against light raids’ policy.  
670 Ibid., p. 3.  
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Some details of a secret proposed purchase reached the media in June 1939. The 
Minister for Defence, Brigadier Street, told the press the RAAF was to be expanded 
to 212 machines which included 'a number of high performance aircraft for fighting 
purposes'.671 The original decision not to buy fighters seemed to be unwinding with 
Street stating that 'the machines were of the type used as interceptor fighters' and that 
it was therefore essential that they ‘should be stationed on the east coast’.672 Not 
knowing the types concerned caused the press to speculate. The Argus stated, for 
example the government was buying: ‘A secret number of fighting planes capable, it 
is believed, of a service speed of about 400 miles an hour’,673 a pace even the Spitfire 
could not equal. The fuss seemed to centre on the Bolton Paul Defiant, a new two-
seated British fighter that had a dream run in the British press before fading into 
oblivion due to its failure against the Luftwaffe. In a British War Cabinet Minute of 
21 July 1940 titled ‘Aircraft Production: Dominion Requirements’, it was written 
that ‘Australia requires 54 long-nosed [sic] 2 seater fighters approaching the Defiant 
type …’674 This interpretation of the Australian government’s sudden interest in 
fighters per se appeared to give the British a chance of steering it into buying 
Defiants knowing they were ‘turkeys’ and wanting to get rid of them.  
And while Australian defence planners had been vacillating, trying to decide how to 
equip the RAAF and whether Japan was aggressive, neutral or even an ally, the war 
in Europe was being lost. Subsequently, the conflict against Germany caused the 
British to advise the Commonwealth in July 1940 news that: 'From this date 
onwards, Australia can rely on England for no further supplies of any aircraft 
material or equipment of any kind'.675 This message was clear and its impact on the 
RAAF would be one of near disaster almost killing the Beaufort program and 
perhaps the Beaufighter purchase. At this point the government had on order 
Beauforts, Sunderlands, Beaufighters and ‘A secret number of the most modern 
British fighting planes [probably Defiants]’.676  
                                                 
671 Anon. 1939, 'Secret War Planes: Fast Machines for the RAAF', The Argus, 22 June, p. 1.  
672 Ibid. 
673 Ibid. 
674 CAB/66/10/10, Secret W. P. (40) 279, 21st July, 1940, ‘Aircraft Production: Dominion Requirements’,  
p. 46, UK Archives, London. Reference to long ‘nosed’ fighters was obviously a typing error for ‘long-ranged’.  
675 Quoted in Parnell, N. M. 1980, Beaufighters in the Pacific, N. M. Parnell, Sydney, p. 2.  
676 Anon. 1941, ‘Fighter Planes: Australia to Make’, The Canberra Times, 6 February, p. 2.  
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With delays or cancellations by British firms, the Australians had an open excuse to 
turn to American manufacturers for ready-made warplanes of international parity. 
The USA was still neutral and Britain herself was buying large numbers of US 
aircraft. In Australia some notice was taken of the deteriorating supply situation, the 
first American combat aircraft being ordered on 2 November 1938 when Prime 
Minister Lyons announced fifty American Hudsons bombers were coming with 
another fifty to follow.677 By March 1940, all one hundred Hudsons had been 
delivered to Richmond Air Force Base, just eighteen months later. Yet the orders for 
British warplanes remained neither supplied nor cancelled.   
On 15 September 1939, less than two weeks after the European war ignited, Menzies 
announced the formation of a War Cabinet.678 No such body existed before in 
Australia. Now it was to be the government’s primary decision-making committee 
for the duration of the conflict. The War Cabinet was compiled of government 
ministers chosen by Menzies with the three Chiefs of Staff attending meetings in an 
advisory capacity.679 Other military experts and representatives of Allied 
governments also took part casually, but no members of the opposition were invited, 
which would have seemed mandatory as even Churchill noted.680  
The real cost of making a British warplane 
The government had already induced the production of aircraft in Australia—Tiger 
Moth basic trainers, Wirraway advanced trainers and Beaufort light bombers. As 
already stated, the latter had been on the recommendation of the British Government 
in 1938.681 The plan was very ambitious: 
The ultimate intention contemplated would ... be to develop, over a period of years, … a 
potential that might reach a total of perhaps 1,000 aircraft, on three shifts, of the 
Beaufort type a year, and to this end it would be necessary to plan on the outset of an 
order for 450 aircraft and to jig and tool accordingly although it is not contemplated that 
the initial order would need to exceed a figure of between 100 and 150 machines.682 
                                                 
677 Wilson, S. 1992, op. cit., p. 86. 
678 Australian Archives, A2673, War Cabinet Minutes (1) 1939–46. 
679 Ibid. 
680 Churchill, W. S, 1951, op. cit., vol. 3, p. 2.  
681 CAB/24/281 C.P. 294 (38), Manufacture of Aircraft in Australia, UK Archives, London. 
682 Ibid., p. 2. 
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Controversy covering manufacturing the Beaufort is examined in another chapter of 
this thesis but apart from its unsuitability for Pacific conditions, there were political 
ramification for the government. Having persuaded the Australians to make the 
Beaufort, the British quickly withdrew their support once the project accelerated. 
Financing the Beaufort’s manufacture was originally to be borne by both 
governments, the British position being that: 'The whole of such cost would not, of 
course, fall on the Imperial Government, and ... that the Commonwealth Government 
should be prepared to accept and pay for at least half of the initial order of 100 to 150 
aircraft'.683 The price was estimated at £250 000 000 sterling for the first one hundred 
Beaufort airframes.684 Thus it was the British who decided which bomber should be 
manufactured in Australia. The official Australian historian, D. P. Mellor defended 
the choice, writing in 1958 that the Beaufort: 
... was a versatile aircraft, adaptable for long-range reconnaissance or for use as an 
ordinary bomber or a torpedo bomber with a range enabling it to operate over wide 
expanses of land or sea. It appeared to be ideal for the defence of a large continent such 
as Australia which could be attacked only by forces operating from fairly distant 
bases.685 
Despite Mellor’s attempt at justification, the Beaufort choice was a poor one for the 
fledgling Australian aircraft industry. It ignored several important points—that 
planes were likely to be launched against Australia from carriers; ships the Beaufort 
would be unable to sink even if it reached them without being shot down; that British 
aircraft engines were yet to be made in Australia whereas American Pratt and 
Whitney motors were already under production for the Wirraway; and finally, better 
US light-medium bombers—the A-20 Boston, the B-25 Mitchell and the B-26 
Marauder were available for purchase with less delay at a much cheaper price.686 On 
the matter of motors for the Beaufort, the British Cabinet decision was vague: 
In regard to engine manufacture, it would be impractical to formulate even a tentative 
scheme at the present stage. It is understood … that arrangements for the manufacture 
                                                 
683 Ibid., p. 2. 
684 Ibid., p. 2. 
685 Mellor, D. P., op. cit., p. 386. 
686 Fighters that Australian industry may have made instead of the Beaufort and Wirraway included the 
Hurricane, Spitfire, Wildcat, Kittyhawk, Lightning and Corsair. Making a twin-engined bomber from ‘scratch’ 
proved too protracted and expensive. And any obsolete single-engined type could have sufficed for training 
instead of the expensive Wirraway. 
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of engines of American type in Australia are already in train and this might facilitate the 
development of an engine potential.687 
The British did originally suggest that one of their own aero companies could 
produce the engines ‘and other such accessories as were unobtainable in Australia’ 
for the Australian Beauforts until a local manufacturer took over, but the European 
war made RAF needs greater and British motors were never received.688 
Too little; too late 
The Beaufort project was soon in trouble; not only because of the motors, but 
because the British reneged on the delivery of the first assembled Beaufort examples 
and on funding.689 And at the same time, a visiting English aeronautical expert opined 
that building Beauforts was beyond Australian industry.690 While the Wirraway 
project was based cautiously on the concept of walking before crawling, in contrast, 
the Beaufort program was one of literally throwing caution away and 'giving it a go' 
as admitted later by Sir John Storey, Chairman, DAP. Storey stated that: 'I think it 
was fortunate that we had not the slightest appreciation of the difficulties with which 
we could be confronted. Had we had any conception of these difficulties I feel we 
would have recommended the abandonment of the project'.691 Besides, the 
modification needed to marry the airframe to American engines had never been 
envisaged. When the supply of war material from Britain dried up, the DAP 
overcame many obstacles resulting in a Beaufort with slightly higher performance 
than the British variant. Fortunately the government in the meantime wisely ordered 
fifty Lockheed Hudsons from the USA when delays in the delivery of the Beaufort 
became apparent.692 
Cost over-runs hold the Beaufort project to ridicule 
Perhaps the worst and saddest aspect of the Beaufort affair and one that has not been 
examined as far as can be ascertained was the exorbitant cost of each machine. At the 
Seventeenth Parliament First Session–Second Period of 11 February 1944, Curtin 
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was asked by an opposition member if the British were contributing toward the cost 
of Australian-made Beauforts and if not, why the public had not been informed.693 
The member also wanted to know if each plane was costing £75 000 when it was 
made in Britain at a lower price.694 Curtin was forced into admitting that ‘The 
Australian government pays all the costs in connextion [sic] with the construction of 
Beaufort bombers in this country’ which meant the British had reneged on buying 
Beauforts from Australia.695 No doubt the RAF had long since discovered that the 
American A-20 and B-25 were much better bombers. And considering the rate of 
exchange between America and Australia at the time (about three American dollars 
to one Australian pound),696 then the price was approximately $225 000 for each 
Beaufort built. This compares unfavourably with the superior B-25 Mitchell medium 
bomber costing $109 670;697 approximately half the price of the Australian Beaufort 
but arguably twice as effective. 
 
 
(Source: Smithsonian Institution) 
Figure 80: A USAAF B-25 Mitchell bomber sinking Japanese ships in Rabaul Harbour, something the 
RAAF Beaufort never achieved as envisaged. The cost of the government buying the war-winning 
Mitchell would have been half that of the inferior Beaufort. 
 
                                                 
693 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Hansard, No. 6, 1944, 11 February 1944. 
694 Ibid., p. 134. 
695 Ibid., p. 134.  
696 Anon. 1942, Instructions for American Servicemen in Australia 1942, Special Service Division of Supply, 
United States Army, p. 45.  
697 Anon. (n.d.) Planes of the Past.com, North American B-25‘Mitchell’Bomber, p. 2, viewed 14 April 2104 at,  
<www.planesofthepast.com/b25-mitchell-bmber.htm>.  
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Conclusion 
The historical period reviewed saw great upheavals in world events. The Australian 
government did not respond calmly and professionally. Bad defence decisions taken 
before the war could not be reversed and the air defence mistakes were never 
admitted. The most worrisome aspect was to see that Australia’s civilian leaders, and 
to some extent officers in charge of the RAAF, close their eyes to the undeniable fact 
the nation was unprotected from the air instead of taking direct action to address the 
deficiency and appropriately tackle the problem head-on as was their duty. 
Any worry Australian politicians did feel about the deteriorating international 
situation, particularly Japanese intentions, they kept mostly to themselves. Instead of 
translating concerns into action on the home front and doing ‘panic’ buying of 
modern warplanes, they continued to badger Britain to make more effort in South 
East Asia. The British, undoubtedly privy to American intentions to defend the 
Pacific, kept on repeating their theme that an attack by Japan on Australia was 
unlikely, or that if it did occur would be limited. This was obviously a subterfuge to 
keep the dominion in the EATS loop and not divert aviators into RAAF squadrons 
when they were needed so badly by the RAF.  
The supply of aircraft to the RAAF, both locally made and from Britain, was based 
on a pudding of expectations, half-truths and false assumptions. For instance the 
Beaufort project appeared to be taken as a shining example of Australian ingenuity 
and there was great pride in this ordinary aeroplane. In its handbook, Instructions for 
American Servicemen in Australia 1942, the US writer states that ‘The Australians 
are proud of the Bristol Beaufort torpedo bomber—as proud as we are of our Flying 
Fortress’.698 This opinion by visiting Americans showed the success of the 
government’s propaganda campaign surrounding the Beaufort and how the light 
bomber’s capabilities were exaggerated. A cursory reading of international aviation 
magazines would have shown that superior American light and medium bombers had 
long overtaken the Beaufort, already on the verge of obsolescence at the time of 
introduction into the RAAF in late 1941.  
                                                 
698 Anon. 1942, Instructions for American Servicemen in Australia 1942, op. cit., p. 47.  
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Another downside to the aircraft industry was that it probably excluded the RAAF 
from receiving the best Lend-Lease warplanes America was producing in huge 
numbers. Had the government done nothing but purchase US warplanes, it would not 
only have given Australia a first class air force, it probably meant supplies 
continuing after December 1941 to keep Australia in the fight. By building its own, 
the government supplied the RAAF with the second-rate Beaufort and no warplane at 
all in the Wirraway. But the presence of these two types, of which only a handful 
were ready by the time of Pearl Harbor, being encased in propaganda, probably gave 
the Americans the impression that all was well ‘down under’ when the RAAF was 
teetering on the brink of extinction.  
The reality that the RAAF was poorly equipped does not tarnish the bravery of 
Australian air crews who flew against the Japanese. But the point has to be made that 
Australian politicians and public servants who armed the RAAF made morale and 
strategic mistakes, whether or not out of ignorance, personal blundering or good 
faith. More astute men would have studied the events unfolding the world over that 
were obviously leading to a new war, then carefully studied the aircraft types needed 
and where they could be obtained.  
Once the British were preoccupied with their own defence and failed to honour their 
agreement to supply Beaufort samples and the motors, Australian eyes should have 
opened wider than they did. When Russia became a British ally after June 1941, and 
Britain began sending massive amounts of military hardware to the Soviets, then the 
chance of the RAAF receiving British help was lowered again. Instead of taking 
umbrage over this lightning shift in British interests and going their own way, the 
Australians accepted their place. The British had let them down time and again, but 
this did not appear to deter the government. Obviously a cost analysis and 
performance comparison between the B-25 and the Beaufort was never run and 
British assessments of RAAF needs were enough so alternative options were not 
examined.  
Churchill’s opinion that Australia would not come under major air attack meant that 
he had a vested interest in allaying national fears. Yet the size of the Japanese Navy’s 
carrier fleet, built for offensive operations and its aggressive diplomatic stance 
indicated otherwise. If local politicians continued to believe British political rhetoric, 
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they only had themselves to blame if their cities were set alight by carrier-based 
aircraft and the nation invaded. Lyons, Menzies and their various defence ministers 
did everything they could to block criticism of the RAAF and of their ineffective re-
armament program. This failure to confront the facts led to two years of 
procrastination and a ‘muddle through’ outlook as fears grew and the media and 
public outcry got louder. At the same time, nothing seemed to galvanise them into 
action. Only when bombs began to fall did a government cry go out for fighters and 
nothing else—not for British battleships, political platitudes or bombers, but for 
single-engined, high performance interceptors to try to ward off the might of a global 
power.  
The final point to be made in the conclusion of this chapter concerns the one-sided 
British and Australian military exchange beyond imperial defence arrangements. At 
some point in time between the invasion of Poland in September 1939 and the attack 
on Hawaii of December 1941, cabinet ministers might have adopted a more patriotic 
stance and asked themselves if the nation was getting any worthwhile benefits from 
the courtship of Australia by Britain. Britain was receiving aircrews for the RAF 
through EATS, AIF infantry divisions for North Africa and Singapore and warships 
for the Mediterranean. The best Australian military forces were thus under British 
control in theatres beyond the Pacific and Australian concern. On the balance sheet 
this was apparently never questioned or seriously examined. In reality the 
government was not getting any military or financial gain in return—no RAF 
Spitfires were stationed in Australia, no British infantry divisions arrived and no RN 
aircraft carriers berthed in eastern ports to off-set the Japanese Navy. Indeed the 
opposite had occurred. Halfway through the Beaufort program, the British terminated 
the supply of vital parts, reneging on their contract of exporting template numbers of 
Beauforts as examples for the DAP, failed to buy Beauforts from CAC, retained the 
Sunderlands ordered for the RAAF and disparaged the Wirraway without supplying 
an alternative such as the Hurricane being sent to Russia in large numbers. Further, 
only on one occasion did they suggest the government buy American warplanes. Nor 
is there any evidence to show the British prompted the RAN to acquire aircraft-
carriers to fight alongside the USN in any future sea battles for the Pacific. Thus 
while Britain drained off the best of Australia’s military units, there was nothing 
tangible in return. With the world on the slippery slope to global war and the 
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Australian continent likely to be in the front-line, the prime minister and his cabinet 
might have questioned the Anglo-Australian relationship and found it wanting. With 
national survival at stake, the Curtin government may well have ‘looked to America’ 
long before it did, and got the RAAF into a position from which it may have 
defended the nation with the best warplanes money could buy; for example the P-38 
Lightning interceptors and B-25 Mitchell medium bombers to name just two. 
 
 
(Source: RAAF poster) 
Figure 81: The dream: joining the RAAF was glamorous and patriotic according to the enlistment 
posters. In reality it was anything but; flying obsolete aircraft against overwhelming odds, being burnt 
alive, maimed or killed in training or in action was often the fate of Allied aircrews. Worst of all was 
to be shot down over Japanese-held territory, a fate usually ensuring decapitation. 
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(Source: Imperial War Museum) 
Figure 82: The reality: weary, grim-faced RAAF aircrew serving with the RAF in Europe  
leave their Lancaster after a long sortie over enemy territory. 
 
 
(Source: AWM) 
Figure 83: While politicians dithered, denied and sometimes lost their seats, RAAF pilots flying the 
aircraft they selected could suffer this fate if they were shot down. 
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(Source: Imperial War Museum) 
Figure 84: Another aircraft the British tried to sell Australians before Pearl Harbor was the unarmed 
Westland Lysander. The Lysander had no combat application; its only value being light transport. 
 
 
(Source: Public domain) 
Figure 85: Headlines of an American newspaper detailing the sinking of the USN gunboat Panay in 
the Yangtze River near Nanking on 12 December 1937, four years and five days before the war 
between Japan and America. The Americans did not respond. 
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CHAPTER 7: LESSONS LEARNED BETWEEN 1 SEPTEMBER 
1939 AND 7 DECEMBER 1941 
The destruction of the bases from which hostile aircraft operate and on which they are 
entirely dependent, (as is the case of carriers or ship-borne aircraft) is a far more 
effective method of defence than attempts to intercept and destroy enemy aircraft in the 
air (Australian Defence Committee 17 April 1940). 
... it is questionable policy to arm even a small portion of our Air Force with [fighters] 
which are incapable of carrying out the vital function of sea reconnaissance or bombing 
(Australian Defence Committee 17 April 1940). 
 
 
(Source: Imperial War Museum) 
Figure 86: German Heinkel 111 unmolested flies over London’s East End, 7 September 1940. 
 
World War II began with an aircraft attack, but not of the type predicted between the 
wars with heavy intercontinental bombers massacring city dwellers. Nor was it part 
of a well-orchestrated and minutely planned operation with calculated risk as might 
be imagined but a series of political-military miscalculations and mistakes. The pre-
war theory that air force bombers of the belligerents would immediately strike at 
each other's hearts—their capital cities—with such ferocity and kill enough civilians 
to quickly decide the issue, rendering a repeat of World War I between opposing 
armies unnecessary did not eventuate. Besides, neither the British nor German air 
forces possessed heavy four-engined bombers to initiate such a program even if they 
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had wanted to follow Douhet’s theories. Instead, the start of the conflict was little 
more than a continuation of World War I with more advanced technology and greater 
air support for the army.  
At 0434 hours on 1September 1939, the Luftwaffe's Oberleutnant Bruno Dilly's 
section of three, two-seated Junkers Ju-87 B Stuka dive-bombers, with their fixed-
undercarriage design from the 1920s, jumped the gun and destroyed the Dirschan 
bridge over the river Vistula, eleven minutes before Germany declared war on 
Poland.699 Weighed down by performance-resisting 500-pound bombs on external 
centre-line racks, the Stukas were capable of just 215 miles an hour.700 They would 
have been easy prey if the Polish air force had had modern monoplane fighters 
directed by radar. 
 
 
(Source: Public domain) 
Figure 87: One lesson from the first two years of war was that the bomber was no match for a 
contemporary fighter. This fact was reiterated in the Battle of Britain. 
 
After this uncontested attack and follow-up air bombardments, including heavy raids 
on Warsaw by twin-engined Luftwaffe bombers, came the invading Wehrmacht with 
its tanks and largely horse-drawn artillery in a conventional, if tactically improved, 
invasion. The Germans, through their miscalculation of British and French response 
arguably started World War II by accident —two days later, to Hitler’s surprise, their 
                                                 
699 Gunston, B. 2000, op. cit., p. 59. 
700 Green, W. 1959, op. cit., p. 46.  
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governments honoured their commitment to Poland, and declared war on 
Germany.701 The declaration came after sanctioning a host of similar if less 
spectacular Nazi transgressions.702 But by its non-aggression pact with Poland, 
Britain's fate fell into the hands of others—the leaders of Poland and Germany. The 
unlinking fact was that the Germans knew the value of air power to lead the charge 
and it worked. The ‘Blitzkrieg’ against Poland probably worked too well and led 
Luftwaffe leaders to jump to conclusions. 
 
 
(Source: RAF Museum) 
Figure 88: A German Dornier Do.17Z-2, one of the types used in the indiscriminate bombing of 
Warsaw in 1939 and half a hundred other cities including London and Coventry. Germany, Britain 
and France went to war without the four-engined bombers needed to instigate Douhet’s theory of 
carpet bombing to subdue a nation by air attacks alone. 
 
Unknown to the Germans, the British appeasement policy bought time for the 
coalition to modernise its fighter command towards international parity. Kershaw 
maintains that airpower was the key to appeasement although this stalling did not 
allow Britain to complete its air force re-equipment program—the weakness 
underlying the entire appeasement policy,703 so the declaration of war on Germany 
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which failed to assist the Poles may have been a mistake. Even when the Germans 
did begin their offensive against Western Europe eighteen months later, there were 
not enough fighters in the RAF; the Air Staff estimating sixty fighter squadrons were 
needed for the defence of Britain when only thirty-nine were ready.704 ‘Any way and 
whatever the outcome’, Chamberlain wrote to one of his sisters, ‘it is clear as 
daylight that if we had to fight in 1938 the results would have been far worse ... I 
realised from the beginning our military weakness and did my best to postpone if I 
could not avert war’.705 By the time the Battle of Britain began on 8 August 1940, the 
RAF strength had increased to fifty-one squadrons; thirty-two of Hurricanes and 
nineteen of Spitfires.706 
The Germans’ misreading of the Western powers’ response to Poland immediately 
put them at risk of being caught between a ground war in the east and a heavy 
bombing offensive in the west. Both Britain and France had bombers with range to 
attack German cities and industrial centres, in particular the Ruhr industrial area. But 
no such Armée d´Air or RAF missions eventuated. The Germans were left to occupy 
and carve up Poland with their Russian allies without being interrupted. Thus an 
ideal opportunity was lost through British politics with appeasement extended into 
the shooting war era: 
Germany’s weakest spot is the Ruhr, the heart of which was about the size of Greater 
London, and in which was concentrated … 60 per cent of Germany’s vital industry. It 
contains … a population which might be expected to crack under extensive air attack … 
We should not be the first to “take the gloves’ off. From this it followed that unless and 
until Germany either by killing large numbers of civilians or by a violation of Belgium 
… there could be no question of attacking the Ruhr.707 
The Anglo-French war against Germany was thus one in principle—neither nation 
was in a strategic or psychological position to take any direct military action. Instead, 
the British War Cabinet simply condemned Polish confidence during its weekly 
meeting stating that the Poles had, ‘… over-estimated their own and under-estimated 
the German strength—as one observer put it, “The Polish Army of 1939 had 
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admirably prepared for the war of 1918”.’708 The matter of sending aircraft to the 
Poles was discussed at British War Cabinet meeting 39 of 16 September, 1939. Item 
7 of the Recommendations offered the only military assistance to the Poles after 
ostensibly going to war in their defence:  
The Chiefs of the Air Staff said that the question of employing Polish pilots, referred to 
a telegram recently received from … Poland was being examined. A small number of 
Polish pilots were already in this country, and were being taught to fly [Fairey] Battle 
aircraft. They, in turn, would be able to instruct further Polish when they reached this 
country [UK]. This plan has been adopted with a view to enabling twenty Battle aircraft 
to be flown from France to Poland by Polish airmen. Needless to say Poland 
surrendered before this plan was … put into practise.  
Hitler himself, speaking publicly at Danzig on 19 September, threatened the British 
with unspecified air attacks in what they called, his ‘… customary misstatements of 
fact’.709 In a wild and rambling speech broadcast by the British Broadcasting 
Commission (BBC), he blamed both Poland and Britain for the war. The dictator 
claimed he wanted to avoid any direct military confrontation with the Western 
powers, but playing on air power as a terror weapon was high on his agenda—the 
spectre of Douhet. While giving unconvincing assurances that: ‘I have no war aims 
against England and France … I have told France that I have no further aspirations in 
the West …’710 Hitler threatened them both with a massive air attack, not by ordinary 
bombers as predicted between the wars, but by some more frightening, secret kind: 
‘The moment may come when we use a weapon which is not yet known and with 
which we could not ourselves be attacked. Let us hope that no one will then 
complain in the name of humanity’, a statement that seemed to be hinting at atomic 
weapons.711 
Some of the blame for the easy German victory in the east must go to the French and 
their Maginot Line mentality coupled with their obvious lack of understanding of 
modern, mobile warfare in which air power had a role of its own. The French 
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preparation for World War I and the British decision not to bomb the Ruhr allowed 
the Germans to avoid war on two fronts.712 It also showed the British were not ready 
to put Douhet’s theories into practice and bomb German cities to perhaps force the 
Germans to the negotiating table.  
A critical look at the opening shots of war also shows that although both the Anglo-
French Allies had medium bombers to attack soft German targets, they had not 
equipped their air forces with the types of planes for a protracted war—heavy 
bombers and long-ranged fighters to escort them on daylight missions to attack 
strategic targets rather than indiscriminate night bombing of cities to avoid aircraft 
losses. This lack of hardware together with an element of reluctance to terminate 
appeasement and bomb Germany prevailed for almost a year. Such a reactionary 
policy fuelled the 'phoney war' that followed Poland's collapse. Thus the chance to 
take the offensive slipped slowly away. It also gave the Germans time to relocate 
their military forces to Western Europe for their blitzkrieg against France, Belgium 
and Holland. The Luftwaffe had also been able to test itself in battle in which the 
enemy had an active if ineffective air force.  
The RAF’s paper offensive 
The civilian population of Britain had being waiting since September 1939 for a 
massive aerial bombardment to begin with an anticipated death toll in London alone 
of 600 000713 which may not have occurred without Churchill’s aggressive’ we can 
take it’ policies. But it was a fear of fear itself. As well as its lack of heavy bombers, 
the Luftwaffe did not have fighters with the range to reach Britain from Germany, 
and had to wait until France fell to attain airfields for its Messerschmitts to reach 
London.714  
From September 1939, the British had also expected the RAF to immediately make 
large scale bombing sorties against Germany to force a quick back-down.715 The 
Labour government under Chamberlain had tried to avert a heavy bombing campaign 
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between Britain and Germany (as had Hitler) with neither government applying 
‘Douhetism’.716 The RAF's Bomber Command, operating in line with Chamberlain’s 
‘wait and see’ policies, had begun its offensive against Germany with extensive 
unescorted reconnaissance missions and the dropping of more than twenty million 
propaganda leaflets written in German, over enemy territory including the capital, 
Berlin.717 These leaflets, which were reproduced in some British chronicles and 
magazines at the time, were aimed at demoralising the Germans people with stories 
about government corruption.718  
This so-called La dróle de guerre—the ‘phoney war’ period between the coalition 
and Germany with their leaflet raids seemed like Chamberlain’s last tilt at 
appeasement. Goering’s retaliatory comments about ‘bomphlet’ raids as they became 
known, claimed they were received by the German people with ‘incredulity, and then 
by fear and fury’, adding that ‘if the leaflets were changed to bombs there would be 
immediate reprisals’.719 This war of words showed there was still reluctance on both 
sides to launch into total air war from which there could be no return.720 At the same 
time there must also have been a dawning that bombing from the air would not be 
possible on the scale of pre-war predictions with the equipment available—twin 
engined bombers and short-ranged fighters. 
With the British government not prepared to bomb the Ruhr despite its promises to 
Poland, Britain’s Minister for Information tried to justify the leaflet campaign. At a 
War Cabinet Meeting of 16 September 1939, he stressed the ‘annoyance of the 
German Government at our dropping propaganda leaflets’ stating that from this ‘it 
might be assumed that the propaganda was effective and emphasised the ‘desire of 
the German public for genuine news (British news was 'real news' in Germany)’.721 
But there was much criticism about the absurdity of the raids and their waste of 
resources—Air Vice-Marshal Arthur Harris commented the program was ‘doing 
little more that providing Europe with toilet paper’.722 At least while the war of words 
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was continuing, there was still a chance of peace, however unlikely. The darker side 
meant that even as debate continued, RAF airmen and aircraft were being lost over 
Europe through interception, flak and mechanical failure during the controversial 
campaign for no military purpose.723 
The Germans responded in kind but it was not until after France capitulated and the 
Dunkirk evacuation that all-out bombing began. The German pamphlet messages 
encouraged the British to negotiate at a time when, unlike the Germans who were 
winning the war while the bomphlet raids were being conducted, seemed to have lost 
their way. The Luftwaffe scattered thousands of broadsheets over the parts of South 
East Britain it could reach, all containing the text of Hitler’s 'Last Appeal to Reason' 
extracted from his Reichstag speech of 19 July 1940.724 The British government, now 
under Churchill's uncompromising will, refused to entertain any compromise. The 
leaflet raids ended and any raids that took place were with explosives. This political 
shadow-boxing had provided some brief respite for the British population while it 
waited for the real bombing to begin, but that was all. After so much sparring, finally 
it was Churchill’s government which, almost a year after the war began, sent the 
RAF on a bombing raid against Berlin on 25 August 1940 when seventeen 
Wellingtons attacked the German capital. At that time Hitler still had an embargo on 
bombing London.725 Despite Hitler’s reputation as a warmonger, it was Churchill 
who deliberately unleashed the bombing campaign that was to reach a level of 
barbarism never before witnessed in history.726 
The bombing raids were supposed to start the night of 14–15 May 1940, just four 
days after the phoney war ended and the invasion of Western Europe began. In a War 
Cabinet meeting of the night before, 13 May, after weighing its options—whether or 
not to use the RAF's Bomber Command to attack the enemy's industries or put it to 
some other purpose, the War Cabinet decided to do nothing.  Instead its final 
proposal was deferred to a later date even though it was realised that 'an immediate 
[air] attack on the Ruhr might upset German plans and would probably have a 
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considerable psychological effect ...'.727 The British had no heavy four-engined 
bombers but did have a fleet of twin-engined mediums; mostly Vickers Armstrong 
Wellingtons, with a range of 3 200 miles and a speed of 180 mph.728 
 
 
(Source: Imperial War Museum) 
Figure 89: The Vickers Wellington was a mix of old and new technology: motorised turrets and 
retractable wheels, but constructed of wood and fabric. Derisively called ‘Widow Maker’ due to its 
vulnerability in daylight, it was replaced by Lancaster and Halifax four-engined bombers which 
carried more bombs. The Wellington participated in the leaflet raids of the Chamberlain era. 
 
 
(Source: Imperial War Museum) 
Figure 90: The nemesis of RAF Bomber Command forcing it into inaccurate nocturnal missions was 
the Messerschmitt Me-109. Advanced in concept for the 1930s, the best points of ‘Emil’ were speed, 
size, acceleration, climb and price.729 
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Indecision by the British government over the proactive use of Bomber Command 
illustrated that no definitive air doctrine had been developed for the RAF between the 
wars in the event of total war erupting. One of the main reasons put forward in the 
argument not to bomb behind the lines was completely passive: 'If we now bombed 
the Ruhr, the Germans would be forced to retaliate and might go for our aircraft 
factories and aerodromes, the defences of which are not as strong as they might 
be'.730 The British must also have realised their twin-engined bombers were 
inadequate for the task with debate continuing over how best to get past this problem 
ignored during the final years of peace. Heavy four-engined bombers eventually won 
out but time had been wasted, and with invasion a possibility,731 the job of designing 
and manufacturing multi-motored bombers to catch up with the Americans, still lay 
ahead. At a cabinet meeting of 15 January 1940, the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, 
Air Marshal Sir Richard E. C. Peirse, stated: 
Under modern conditions, the speed, bomb load, range and defensive armament 
required of a bomber necessitated a larger machine. The heavy bomber stood the best 
chance of fulfilling the true function of the bomber, namely to reach its objective, 
discharge its bomb load in the face of opposition, and fight its way back under its own 
protection. The Wellington for example as originally designed was intended to have a 
speed of 250 mph, but the addition of wireless equipment, improved navigational aids 
and power operated gun turrets … had resulted in a material reduction of its speed732  
Despite the fact that heavy bombers would have more defences, the British were yet 
to learn that no bomber ‘could fight its way back under its own protection’. British 
bombers carried only rifle-calibre machine guns making them virtually indefensible 
against cannon-equipped Me-110 and the Me-109 fighters.  
Although the industries of the Ruhr remained unscathed during the German invasion 
of France through fear of German retaliation, the Luftwaffe had no compunctions 
about bombing British military targets once they occupied air bases in Western 
Europe. A British Cabinet Minute of 27 October 1940 listed startling details of 
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destruction wrought by the Luftwaffe on British aircraft production over the previous 
three months.733 This minute revealed the British were unprepared for the loss of 
aircraft production bombing caused to their air effort. Most pre-war predictions had 
envisaged civilians as the war-winning target in a major war, not aircraft plants. The 
War Cabinet referred to 'the high priority' the Germans had placed on bombing 
British aircraft factories and that 'these disasters' as they were termed, resulted in the 
loss of some 300 warplanes in September alone; an alarming number.734 Importantly, 
Cabinet found the bombing of factories was not the sole explanation for the decline 
in output: ‘A more serious factor was the loss of working time due to the raid 
warning system. Some factories lost half their working hours owing to time [by 
employees] spent in the shelters’.735 During the bombing in the three months under 
review, research by the War Cabinet established that with only one exception, there 
had not been any warnings of air attacks on the manufacturers who suffered the most 
damage.736 It was decided that the companies involved would deploy their own 
observer corps to give alert of approaching German planes.737 To reduce the impact 
the Luftwaffe was making on output, the Ministry of Aircraft Production was forced 
to spend ‘a very large sum of money’ dispersing aircraft factories into shadow ones, 
which must have helped slow output even if this was not admitted. In Southampton 
for example, where Spitfire construction was centred, two bombed factories were 
dispersed to thirty-eight separate plants, which according to the Ministry found that:  
The benefits are many. The danger of damage from bombs is reduced and the working 
hours increased. In the conditions that now prevail, the small factory offers better 
prospects of production than the big establishment.738  
But at the other end, the Ministry had to admit, ‘The Cabinet should be aware of the 
immense expenditure involved and the enormous sums of money that will have to be 
provided as the system of dispersal is developed in its entirety’.739  
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And even more negative issues came to light. According to the War Cabinet, 'There 
has been a tendency for our people to rely more and more on American output of 
aircraft. This would be a mistake. On the contrary, the American situation shows the 
need to increase our productive effort here. This is the true lesson which it has for 
us.740 Not only that, the attrition rate in combat was enormous; some 2 731 British 
aircraft being lost on active service from all causes since the war began.’741  
Non-belligerent assessment 
The third of September 1939 is generally accepted as the day World War II began 
even if America, Russia, Italy and Japan were not directly involved. The 
governments of these countries could therefore study the application of airpower 
from a distance. In the case of the Americans and Russians, they were supplying 
fighters and light-medium bombers to countries opposing the Axis powers. They 
could therefore assess their combat application. But the same could not be said about 
Australians. They had the same observations opportunity, but predictably, the 
Menzies’ government's response to Britain’s declaration of war was not one of 
introspection but one of also declaring war on Germany, according to Menzies, 
because of Britain’s decision.742 But despite such haste, the government needed 
months of preparation before it could send forces into combat.743 The RAAF in 
particular had no operational squadrons ready—some aircrews were trained but were 
without experience in first-line operational interceptors simply because there were 
none in Australia.  
Meantime, the British faced more setbacks—the supply of aircrews over aircraft. To 
get aviators from Commonwealth counties, they established EATS in October 
1939.744 Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Rhodesia and South Africa were the 
principal contributors, although airmen from many nations including occupied 
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Europe and North America participated. The RAAF, being already depleted, could 
hardly afford the loss of aircrews any more than the RAF but many were sent to 
England and the Middle East after completing their training in Australia or to 
Rhodesia and Canada for operational training.745  
Like the Australian government, after a slight hesitation, other dominions queued to 
fight Germany while the nations that could have ensured Britain's survival—Russia 
and America—remained neutral. Even so, between 11 March and 31 December 
1941, 2 400 American warplanes were supplied to British forces in North Africa746 
which helped but did not alleviate the aforesaid problem: the training of aircrews 
getting enough planes. A UK War Cabinet meeting of August 1940 admitted that 
pre-war planning had been inadequate: 
‘... an advantage can only be taken of an acceleration of the production of operational 
type aircraft if that increase is preceded approximately six months beforehand by a 
similar increase in the production of trainer types ...’747  
Meantime the Luftwaffe was gaining air supremacy over Britain, not by bombing 
London or destroying Spitfires, but by targeting aircraft factories. Unfortunately for 
them, the damage was not assessable. Instead of continuing with strategic bombing, 
the Germans mistakenly switched to bombing cities, Douhet-style, probably in 
response to the RAF bombing Berlin. London raids were more spectacular, but less 
effective and after Warsaw and Rotterdam where a ground invasion was still 
necessary, Goering must have questioned such strategy. The Luftwaffe’s twin-
engined bombers were incapable of delivering enough ordnance on a specific target 
for a ‘knock-out’ blow.748 One of the reasons given for the failure of the Luftwaffe to 
win the Battle of Britain was that Germany’s aircraft industry had not developed a 
B˗17 or a Lancaster.749 
Thus the strangest and most unpredictable feature of the opening months of the 
European war was that they were expected to throw sudden and vivid light on the 
weight and value of the air arm in the implementation of pre-war predictions, but 
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failed to do so. The inter-war years had generated much debate about the possibilities 
inherent in the use of air power and its ability to win wars alone to the point that the 
beginning of the war was an anticlimax. The delivery system, the inter-continental 
bomber which was to rein supreme, carry out massive attacks against the enemies' 
infrastructure while defending itself, did not appear in the skies over Berlin or 
London. The consensus of opinion that air power would be the decisive factor in 
future wars and decimate civilian populations to destroy morale and force 
capitulation, was still a theory for the future. 
The pre-war fear of British cities being devastated were fuelled by newspaper 
accounts such as appeared in The Canberra Times of 15 June 1939 describing a 
‘Campaign of Frightfulness’ and a ‘Lightning Stroke by Enemy’ through aerial 
attacks.750 The British Air Raid Defence League in its review of the probable strategy 
of bombs over Britain before the conflict, reported convincingly that the anticipated 
strength of the Luftwaffe would mean up to 1500 bombers over London although 
bigger raids could be expected ‘for the sake of frightfulness’.751 The Luftwaffe, once 
degraded as a conglomeration of glider clubs and training outfits, was now bestowed 
with power it could never possess. The RAF also, with its collection of mediocre 
twin-engined bombers from the 1930s did not have the means of delivering a 
decisive blow against German cities and industrial targets to change the course of the 
war. The myth of Douhet’s writings had been broken.  
In Eastern Europe, no phoney war took place. Thousands of innocent Polish civilians 
died in German air raids between 3 September 1939 and 10 May 1940 when they 
capitulated to the Germans in the west and the Russians in the east. After that, the 
panzers and Stukas turned westward and the coalition’s last chance of assisting 
Poland by an aerial offensive against Germany evaporated. With it, the opportunity 
of studying air engagements and Germany’s blitzkrieg also vanished. R. Barker and 
the editors of Time-Life Books in their account The RAF at War under the chapter , 
'The first taste of combat: a bitter surprise', record just how inexperienced were RAF 
Hurricane pilots stationed in France with the British Expeditionary Forces (BEF) 
when, in their first action of November 1939, they intercepted a Dornier 17.752 After 
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crippling the bomber, one of the Hurricane pilots formated on it to assess the damage 
and was promptly shot down by the cannier German crew.753 
Without British and French participation, the role and performance of individual 
aeroplanes in the east was difficult to evaluate given the respective weight of the 
opposing German and Polish air forces. Stuka dive-bombers, for example, were able 
to operate with relative impunity because of the poor performance of the Polish air 
force, most of which was destroyed on the ground. But by not participating in the 
defence of Poland, the RAF and Armée d´Air remained ignorant of Allied ability to 
challenge the Luftwaffe in combat. 
Once the phoney war ended, the violent blitzkrieg against France and the Low 
Countries was still not a great testing time for the inter-war theories of air warfare—
the Allied air resistance was small, disorganised and ill-prepared. The Germans used 
aircraft largely as flying artillery in support of their army—their tactics were so 
overwhelming that the Allied troops manning the static defences were soon retreating 
towards the coast to prevent being surrounded. But there was no massed, heavy 
Luftwaffe bombing of Paris to take France out or against British cities.  
The British, conscious of their home defence, decided the RAF contingent committed 
to the BEF comprised second-line equipment so the air defence of France was never 
an equal trial of pre-war theories. Spitfires,754 the coalition’s finest fighters, were 
withheld. The French air force was apparently too demoralised to seriously hinder 
the German advance. As German ace, Adolf Galland, General of Fighters, wrote, 
‘Had France been in earnest at the time, the Armee de l’Air would have annihilated 
us.’755 Thus the Luftwaffe was not hindered enough during action over the western 
front for an authentic evaluation of airpower to be done. 
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(Source: Imperial War Museum) 
Figure 91: The best French fighter was the Dewoitine D 520. With the panic of 1940, French industry 
‘went mad’ and produced 100 a month, a figure seldom exceeded at the time, all to no avail.756 
 
The air forces involved all tried what they believed in as far as support of ground and 
naval forces were concerned and their theories succeeded or failed as they came 
under the microscope of combat. But such applications were nothing like pre-war 
predictions where ground forces would be made obsolete by air power. As the 
western front collapsed it appeared that too much emphasis had been placed on the 
air arm and that highly mobile ground forces with their fast moving tanks were just 
as important. 
The success of the German blitzkrieg, dependant on a combination of troops, tanks 
and aircraft striking suddenly where enemy defences were weakest, caused the 
application of air power to be debated by the British press. In the English periodical, 
The Aeroplane of August 1940. the writer argued that ‘Perhaps too much is expected 
of it’, and 'Perhaps too little has been asked of it'. While The Aeroplane still 
predicted air power ‘would win the war’ it had to admit it had ‘become a universal 
bogey and at the same time, the strong arm on which nations depend’757 and that its 
definitive application had yet to be decided. ‘Is its proper use’ the writer asked, ‘part 
an independent one such as General Trenchard towards the end of the last war 
demanded of it? Or should it be the spearhead of the army or a shield for the navy? 
Or should it share all of those duties as the RAF is doing to-day?’758  
These questions could not be answered while the war was still undecided and the 
lines of battle were undrawn, but they indicated the application of air power war was 
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still to be found. While the British press exalted the RAF’s techniques during the 
long retreat to Dunkirk, largely defensive, it naturally disparaged those of the 
Luftwaffe, the lead component of blitzkrieg, as something of a flash in the pan. The 
Aeroplane summed up what many people still believed: 'As the war progresses and 
lightning war ceases to give results, the idea of using Air Power to secure control 
without occupation may be given its full trial’.759 ‘The bomber force’, it noted, ‘best 
fitted for night work should turn the scale when the time comes’.760 This suggested 
the British press realised that expensive daylight British bomber raids had not 
worked and that the only alternative for Bomber Command, as Britain’s remaining 
military presence in Europe, was night bombing. But the limitations of night 
bombing were enormous; particularly its inability to accurately hit specific targets—
plus the need for nocturnal bombing never appears to have been examined by pre-
war theorists. At this juncture, the Commander-in-Chief of the British Expeditionary 
Force lamented '... we were unlikely to ever to have such a good chance opportunity 
[sic] for attacking the Ruhr [from the air] ...' yet no bombs fell on this massive 
German industrial complex.761 
Other vital lessons learnt by the coalition after September 1939 were mainly ones of 
‘too little; too late’ including the importance of the fighter arm. Without fighters, air 
superiority could not be achieved over the battle front thus allowing the enemy to 
succeed on the ground. In particular, the production of high performance fighters 
would have to take precedence until command of the air was guaranteed. Only then 
could strategic daylight bombing be effective as the Americans later perfected.  
Although the British rearmament program accelerated after Hitler took power, the 
number of British fighters was grossly undersized. In a ‘Most Secret’ War Cabinet 
meeting of 25 May 1940 the British faced their grim situation of fighting on ‘alone’ 
when the phoney war inevitably ended. There was the possibility of French 
resistance collapsing; a large part of the BEF being lost with it, and of Italy 
intervening. In its assessment report titled, ‘British Strategy in a Certain Eventuality’, 
the Chiefs of Staff Committee recorded pessimistically that unless the ‘United States 
of America is willing to give us full economic and financial assistance’, then ‘… we 
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do not think we could continue the war with any chance of success’.762 In concluding, 
the report predicted coming adverse events accurately, even the Japanese probability 
of seizing the ‘Golden Opportunity’ and launching an offensive in the Far East.763 
This secret report labelled ‘To Be Kept Under Lock and Key’ would not have 
reached the Australian government, but in its summary of ‘Britain’s Ability to Defeat 
Germany’, the committee noted that, ‘We must concentrate our energies primarily on 
the production of fighter aircraft and crews and the defence of these factories 
essential to fighter production should have priority’.764 In its assessment of 
requirements, the committee wrote five paragraphs on air forces stressing that, ‘The 
crux of the whole problem [of war with Germany] is the air defence of this country’, 
and that, ‘Should they [the Germans] succeed in obtaining a high degree of air 
superiority, they could deal comparatively unhindered except by A.A. gunfire, with 
any objectives they might select’.765 This statement alone reiterated clearly the 
emphasis the British put on air superiority. Through the Anglo-Australian 
relationship the Menzies government, even if not directly informed, could have noted 
by observation during the Prime Minister’s protracted visit to London in 1941.  
The Spitfire saves the world 
The British, in total war, thus fully appreciated the importance of the fighter above 
all else after less than a year. To press the point, Lord Beaverbrook, a successful 
British entrepreneur, was appointed Minister for Aircraft Production by Churchill to 
accelerate Spitfire manufacture including factory workers being ‘asked’ to give up 
their Sundays to help.766 Even aluminium pots and pans ‘to be turned into Spitfires’, 
were collected by housewives and school children.767 Pictures of the Spitfire wonder 
plane appeared regularly in the Australian press, one showing a full side view was 
printed in several papers including The Argus on 24 October 1939.768 The caption 
told the world that the fighter’s top speed was 362 mph; that it 'was the world's 
                                                 
762 CAB/66/7/48, War Cabinet Most Secret W.P. (40) 168, May 25 1940, British Strategy in a Certain 
Eventuality, UK Archives, London.  
763 On 25 June 1940, after the French surrender of 17 June, the Japanese Minister for the Army told a staff 
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fastest standard fighter' and ... 'could outstrip the famous German Messerschmitt 
109'.769 Worship grew to outlandish proportions. It was extended to Australian school 
boys who were catered for in the Argus of 9 May 1940 by an article headed 'Things 
to do',770 that gave accurate top, side and front elevation drawings and instructions 
about how to make an authentic Spitfire replica from wood. The details were credited 
to a model construction kit from the Central Aircraft Co. Pty. Ltd. of Princess 
Walk.771 RAAF pilots longed for such wonder planes of their own and must had 
drawn comparisons with the Wirraway. 
As individual fighters came to the attention of the public as the main tool of resisting 
Nazi oppression so did their pilots. RAF aces; ‘Sailor’ Malan, ‘Ginger’ Lacey, 
Stanford Tuck, Douglas Bader and Johnnie Johnson were worshipped like matinee 
idols by the English speaking world while the photogenic Spitfire retained its 
position as the material symbol of British resistance to Nazi tyranny. The idea of the 
Spitfire saving the British Isles and perhaps the world from enslavement swept the 
western world perpetuating an image of invincibility. 
But the Spitfire’s reputation, like the Zero, eventually outshone itself and led to its 
demise. In early 1942, when American P-39s and P-40s were unable to outperform 
the Zero, Dr Evatt, Minister for External Affairs, appealed to Churchill for Spitfires 
such was the aircraft's reputation. Churchill acquiesced, but when they arrived almost 
a year later, disillusionment soon set in. They were a veteran variant (Mark Vc 
‘tropicalised’) but by then (1943), the Zero was also in decline. The RAAF- and 
RAF-manned Spitfires failed to overcome the Zero, one report reading:  
A sense of disillusionment over the famous fighter spread through the Australian Air Force as shown by 
this revealing letter sent by major General R. H. Dewing, the head of the RAF liaison in Australia, to 
Churchill’s Chief of Staff Sir Hastings, ‘Pug’ Ismay after a visit to one of the [RAAF Spitfire] squadrons: 
When I talked to them, [RAAF] officers were almost bitter about the aircraft they had to use. They are far from the 
latest type of Spitfire and the machines themselves have done an amount of flying which at home would put them on 
the scrapheap. As you probably know, the squadron lost rather heavily through the pilots, in their enthusiasm, 
pursuing the Japanese too far out to sea … The moral of the story seems to be that if and when the United Kingdom 
                                                 
769 Anon. ibid., op. cit., p. 6. Jane's Fighting Aircraft of World War II gave the Spitfire 1’s speed at 367 mph. 
Therefore details in the Australian press: Anon. 1939, ‘Spitfire’s Top Speed’, Queensland Times, 24 June, p. 13 
(362 mph) and a child’s model kit (365 mph); Anon.1940, ‘Things of Make: Supermarine Spitfire’, The Argus, 9 
May, p. 15 were accurate and published in the press for the Minister to read.     
770 Ibid., p. 15. 
771 Ibid., p. 15. 
261 
is sending material contributions to this theatre, someone ought to ensure that the thing is handled to enhance 
prestige.772 
 
 
 
 
(Source: Imperial War Museum) 
Figure 92: South African Battle of Britain ace ‘Sailor’ Malan in his Spitfire. 
 
But there were alternatives to the Spitfire. Even before Poland was invaded, in March 
1939 as Nazi boots pounded through the streets of Vienna, a British air mission 
travelled to America to buy front-line aircraft. From the definitive account of Lend 
Lease by Edward Stettinius Jr, administrator of the program, it is obvious that the US 
aviation industry was hungry for orders for contemporary operational aircraft and 
would have welcomed some from Australia: 
The [British] mission found the American aircraft industry in April of 1938 operating 
only in skeleton fashion. Many companies were barely able to keep going at all on the 
thin stream of orders then coming in. The [US] Army was still limited by statute to an 
air force of 2,300 planes, and the Navy to one of 1,000 planes ... After visiting almost 
all the large companies, the British mission placed only two orders, but both had 
important consequences ... about the same time as the British Air Mission came to this 
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country, the French placed their first plane order ... It was for 100 Curtiss-Wright P-36 
fighters, the predecessor of the … world-famous P-40s.773 
 
 
(Source: Public domain) 
Figure 93: The Curtiss-Wright P-36 bought by the French from America and used against the 
Luftwaffe. It was available to all America’s allies on hire-purchase. 
 
Bombing cannot win the war 
Another discovery from the air war of 1939 to 1941 was that air attacks on civilians 
could be less effective than imagined. The Luftwaffe was the loser in what Churchill 
termed the 'exchange ratio'—the loss of an acceptable number of bombers for the 
destruction of a target. During the first stage of the bombing of England in May 
1940, the Luftwaffe flew only daylight raids against strategic military targets. This 
part of the battle was successful although losses were high. Because of losses and 
political reasons, the German switched to area bombing of British cities—firstly in 
the hours of daylight and then by night; a poor strategic decision that probably saved 
the RAF from some damage if not destruction: 
... on September 3rd [1940] Goring called a meeting at the Hague with two of his 
commanders, Kesselring and Sperle. Kesselring agreed that the attacks should be 
switched from Fighter Fields to the city of London, but Sperle did not agree stating … 
the RAF had more reserves than they were led to believe. From Berlin, Adolph Hitler 
gave the order … attacks on London should begin immediately. He was now firm in his 
beliefs that by concentrating on an all-out bombing campaign on the British capital [it] 
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would bring Britain to its knees, and that the bombing should continue until Britain 
submits under the strain.774 
The policy of bombing incorporated into the doctrine of air warfare to break the will 
of civilians apparently was still high on the agenda of Luftwaffe leaders at a time 
when British military targets were lucrative and had been so effectively attacked in 
1940. But for the Germans, the problem of bombing factories over cities may have 
been one of impatience—the results did not translate into any noticeable reduction in 
RAF interceptions of Luftwaffe formations or visible signs of British fighter 
production slowing.775 
The change from military and para-military targets by the RAF and Luftwaffe meant 
that public morale became a concern and was thought to be more fragile than in 
reality. Most air force commanders still seemed to believe an opponent could be 
defeated from the air if bombing against cities was carried on with enough conviction 
and gusto. While the switch in German tactics to London as the principal target was a 
reprieve for British leaders, they became concerned with morale, if in some cases, it 
was only for show. With no indication of how the assessment was made, the War 
Cabinet in its Weekly Resume (No. 58) of the Naval, Military and Air Situation of 
October 1940, recorded that: 
Morale 
101. The spirit of the public remains good ... Deep shelters are more popular. and 
surface shelters less so. The numbers of people resorting to the Tubes [underground 
railway stations] is increasing and the measures being taken to improve shelter 
amenities are generally improved.'776 
Pre-war predictions had emphasised the bomber reaching its target, but even in 
daylight raids against Britain the Germans found out that escorting Me-109s and 
110s were unable to guarantee safety for their bombers. In fact, the Me-110, the 
twin-engined Jaguar escort fighter could not protect itself. When attacked by RAF 
fighters, Me-110 pilots were often forced into a caracole; a manoeuvre in which they 
flew in a circle protecting each other’s tail.777 Some bombers arrived over England 
                                                 
774 Document 44, Fighter Command Order of Battle, 7 September 1940, UK Archives.  
775 Killen, J., op. cit., p. 149. 
776 CAB/66/12/43, War Cabinet Weekly Resume (No. 58) of the Naval, Military and Air Situation from noon 
October 3rd to 12 noon October 10th, 1940, UK Archives, London.  
777 Gunston, B. 1980, op. cit., p. 68.  
264 
without escort when fighters missed rendezvousing with them. As Luftwaffe 
aircrews found out, unescorted Dornier and Heinkel formations were often decimated 
by RAF fighters. Thus pre-war conceptions that ‘the bomber would always get 
through’ and that twin-engined fighters could succeed against single-seated 
interceptors was dispelled over England as it had been elsewhere before 1 September 
1939. 
While fighter production took precedence over other types, it did not take the British 
(or the Germans) long to also learn first-hand by trial and error that the bomber, in 
daylight, was never going to survive without single-engined fighter escort. Yet the 
British, with their defensive thinking, had not produced an escort fighter, nor did 
they have one under development.778 To find this out, RAF medium and light twin-
engined bombers made a number of courageous but futile unescorted raids on the 
anchored German fleet, including the pocket battleship Admiral Scheer, at 
Wilhelmshaven almost as soon as the war started. These operations, the first notable 
air action of planes against capital ships began on 4 September 1939 during the 
phoney war period. Blenheim and Wellington bombers made low level attacks at 
Wilhelmshaven and then Kiel when ‘the effects of bombing on battleships’ were, 
according to a British report, ‘still to be tested’.779 Of the twenty-nine RAF bombers 
taking part, seven were shot down.780 The only major damage to the enemy ships, 
was from a stricken Blenheim crashing into the cruiser Emden.781 Such missions 
proved that unprotected bombers could only reach their target by suffering terrible 
losses, and that low level daylight bombing against established targets was too costly 
in the face of modern anti-aircraft fire. The British periodical, The Second World 
War which gave graphic details of these RAF raids, was on sale to the public in 
Australia.782 The heroism of the aircrews was exemplary but it was difficult for RAF 
commanders to interpret any success from these missions. During a meeting of 
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cabinet at the Air Ministry on 14 October 1940, a month after the attacks, the 
Secretary for Air noted that it was … 
Difficult to get the measure of success against the [German capital] ships’, although 
reconnaissance flights in the interim would have revealed the RAF’s lack of results.783 
The need for fighters ignored 
Australia did not, in 1939, have an operational air force that included fighters and 
therefore, unlike the RAF, the RAAF could not defend the nation. But its 
government was not alone in its lack of foresight about the coming war in the air that 
would dominate World War II. The vital twenty-six months between September 
1939 and December 1941, covered many watershed events: Great Britain’s decision 
to fight on ‘alone’; Mussolini joining the Axis, Roosevelt deciding on massive 
assistance to Britain; Stalin trusting Hitler, the Germans invading Russia; Japan’s 
war on China, moving troops into Thailand and bombing Hawaii, and in one of his 
strangest announcements, Hitler declaring war on America.  
These two first fateful years were witness to the so-named phoney war with the 
British and French bunkered down in France awaiting the German onslaught, which 
when it came, was through Belgium and Holland. And just when the war appeared to 
be descending into protracted trench fighting similar to 1914, the Germans unleashed 
their ‘blitzkrieg’; the ‘lightning war’ ending quickly at Dunkirk. But then the war in 
the air changed everything. The watershed RAF-Luftwaffe duel over southern 
England—the Battle of Britain—that ‘saved’ England from invasion (if not the 
Western world it seemed) was won by the British illustrating the power of the fighter 
to reverse the strategy of an aggressor. The massive German assault on Russia of 
June 1941 removed any danger of Britain being invaded but ongoing conflicts in 
China and Finland were still providing lessons in air defence if anyone had been 
interested.  
Among the many fighter types supplied to the Finns by the Western powers was the 
American Brewster B-239 Buffalo. Named the ‘Sky Pearl’ by the Finns, it was used 
with success and was purchased by the British for the defence of Singapore. Eino 
Luukkanen, Finland’s third ranking air ace with fifty-four credited victories against 
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the Russian air force, claimed most of his victims while flying Buffaloes. Among his 
victories, Luukkanen who wrote that the Buffaloes ‘… had given new zest to 
squadron life …’ claimed to have shot down a Russian-flown Spitfire V fighter in a 
Brewster.784 Such claims enhanced the reputation of this obsolete naval fighter 
equipping British, Australian and New Zealand fighter squadrons in Malaya and 
Singapore where it was considered good enough to deal with Japanese fighters.785  
By the end of the 1930s, the previously locked doors of military funding had opened. 
American combat aircraft were being ordered in thousands by Western European 
governments. Realising that local production would never suffice, they ‘ticked up’ 
warplanes from the Americans who would soon be the prime innovators of aircraft 
design. By 1945, the USAAF would dominate the battlefronts of the world largely 
because of design and mass- production methods.786 France ordered fighters from 
Curtiss Wright and Grumman and twin-engined medium bombers from Martin and 
Douglas.787 Britain placed orders for Hudson bombers (as did Australia) and Harvard 
trainers.788 The British also began trialling a host of American operational types 
including the B-24 and B-17 heavy bombers many of which were later issued under 
Lend-Lease. The Dutch bought Curtiss Hawk 75A fighters and A-20 Boston 
bombers to defend the East Indies.789 
The Australian government watched and waited but did not follow suit apart from 
Hudsons, although the matter did not go unnoticed. In federal parliament Adair 
Blain, a government backbencher, asked the Minister for Air, James Fairbain himself 
a World War I fighter pilot, if consideration had been given to the manufacture of 
American warplanes under licence and ‘the importation of a nucleus of American 
craftsmen to train operatives in this country?’. Fairbain replied: ‘the Government is 
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exploring every possibility of drawing on American resources’ but that the matter 
was a secret and ‘he did not want to enlarge on what those resources may be, but, 
such as they are, we shall use them to the fullest possible degree’.790 
For Australia’s procrastinating politicians, very little improved during this vital 
period which came with a unique opportunity to study European air fighting and 
apply the results to the RAAF with the benefit of Lend-Lease. The new conflict 
instead only drove them closer to Britain with the placing of Australia's best naval, 
army and air units at the disposal of the British government.791 The bonds of Empire 
were energetically pursued by the British—their own military forces were obviously 
not sufficient to win the war.792 Despite the words of Fairbain, it became obvious the 
government did not intend to buy or arrange for the manufacture of American 
fighters arguably due to its own modification of the Salmond Plan. 
In the ‘Minutes of Defence Committee at Meeting Held on Wednesday, 17 April, 
1940’ at which Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Burnett, head of the RAAF, was 
present along with the army and navy commanders, it was decided that the CAC 
Wirraway ‘general purpose’ aircraft would equip fighter squadrons, and if necessary, 
be used in combat—it was official; no high performance, single-seat fighters of the 
type the RAF was at that moment using to change the course of history, would equip 
the RAAF:793 
Item 2: It follows from the reasons contained in the Committee's comments on War 
Cabinet's Agenda No. 84/1940 relative to the urgency of equipping [the air force] with 
aircraft, the General Reconnaissance Squadrons and their vital importance to the 
defence of Australia, that any procedures that can be taken to increase the strength of 
General Reconnaissance Squadrons are an important additional contribution to the local 
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defence of the Commonwealth. For these reasons … the Defence Committee fully 
endorses the proposal both from an Air and a general Service aspect— 
The destruction of the bases from which hostile aircraft operate and on which they are 
entirely dependent, (as is the case of carriers or ship-borne aircraft) is a far more 
effective method of defence than attempts to intercept and destroy enemy aircraft in the 
air. For this reason … where our home defence air forces are necessarily small, and 
where … enemy air attack must be launched from carriers or ships, it is questionable 
policy to arm even a small portion of our Air Force with aircraft (fighters) which are 
incapable of carrying out the vital function of sea reconnaissance or bombing.794 
The Defence Committee thus came to this extraordinary conclusion; that the best 
form of defence was for the RAAF to sink the ships and bomb the bases from which 
any aircraft attacking Australia were coming795—a doctrine used by no other nation 
and completely contradictory to the lessons being learned by the belligerents in the 
European war then raging. There it was clearly being demonstrated that only control 
of the air would win the day. And air supremacy could only be achieved with high 
performance fighters. Despite this, the Australian Defence Committee stated 
uncategorically that: 
The committee points out that this organisation of the Air Force at present, provides for 
nine squadrons equipped with a two-seater type aircraft [Wirraway] capable of giving a 
good account of itself as a two-seater fighter if required for that duty in an 
emergency.796 
There was even worse to come from the Defence Committee. With Japan moving 
south and operating its huge naval air force, the Australians, in a mood of self-denial 
concluded that: 
(a) Long range fighters may be desirable, but not essential, to counter aircraft 
operating from an aircraft carrier. With the improbability of Japan entering the war, the 
likelihood of aircraft carriers being used against Australia is proportionately reduced.797 
If anything, this conclusion appeared to be based on Giulio Douhet’s air doctrine 
which denied fighter aircraft a place in air forces and argued that close air support 
and interdiction would be a waste of air resources, claiming that the only role of an 
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air force was bombing.798 Douhet argued that the heavily armed bomber would 
always be equal to the fighter.799 
The Battle of Britain of 1940, ostensibly a prelude to invasion, but more realistically, 
a last attempt to force the British into peace negotiating before Germany invaded 
Russia, illustrated without reservation, that a relatively small, but well-organised 
interceptor air force could protect a nation from air attack as long as heavy damage to 
infrastructure and civilian casualties were accepted. Indeed, in its May 1940 
assessment of the critical situation facing the British Isles, the War Cabinet 
determined that one of the three vital ways in which the Germans might successfully 
break down the resistance of the UK were: ‘ … unrestricted air attack, starvation of 
the country by attack on shipping and ports, and occupation by invasion’.800 The 
report also stated that critical to the ‘air factor’ was ‘Whether the morale of our 
people will withstand the strain of air bombardment’.801 
Strangely, civilian deaths became desirable in war-winning terms compared to 
military degradation. This fact was illustrated when the Germans miscalculated by 
switching to civilians targets in mid-1940 giving the Churchill government the 
respite it desperately needed. In fact, in the War Cabinet’s report of 25 May 1940, 
the Chiefs of Staff wrote that, ‘The capacity of the [Luftwaffe] to reduce the 
effectiveness of our air defence depends to a considerable extent upon his ability to 
destroy our aerodromes, aircraft on the ground and our aircraft industry’.802 There 
were a lot of ingredients needed to achieved the RAF’s success—radar, observation 
posts, anti-aircraft artillery, high performance fighters flown by aggressive, patriotic 
pilots, a body of water between the defenders and the aggressors and lots of luck—
but the basic pattern could be applied to the air defence of any nation by imitating the 
British model. 
One of the unexpected problems concerning air battles that emerged and one that 
would go unsolved throughout the war was a reliable evaluation of enemy losses. 
Inevitably, claims by both sides were so exaggerated that they often became 
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ridiculous. Fudging, although it did happen, was not usually done by aircrews, but 
mistakes did occur from over-enthusiasm, exaggeration and duplication. If for 
example, several pilots attacked a bomber and it crashed, each pilot claimed a ‘kill’. 
Intelligence officers tried to unravel combat claims and in this instance would 
establish that only one bomber was destroyed with each pilot credited with a third of 
a victory. But such assessing was not very accurate despite the introduction of gun-
cameras and other means of confirmation such as witnesses and wreckage counts. On 
'Eagle Day', August 15, 1940, the day recognised as the climax of the Battle of 
Britain, 185 German aircraft were claimed destroyed by British pilots, the figure 
being released to the press worldwide.803 But post-war research revealed that sixty 
German aircraft (thirty-four bombers and twenty-six fighters) were actually lost by 
the Luftwaffe that day; a third of RAF claims.804 Thus it was impossible for Allied 
authorities to estimate the actual German air strength from the turmoil of battle, 
particularly when everyone from the prime minister to the man in the street wanted 
to hear good news—that the Germans were losing and there would be no invasion.  
These events were widely covered in the Australian press and were well received at a 
time when it appeared all was lost. But RAF claims of enemy losses did not go 
completely unchallenged. William McCall, in the House of Representatives after 
seeing the 185 Eagle Day results, asked Menzies if these ‘glowing and satisfactory’ 
figures could be confirmed by the British government.805 Menzies replied that the 
figures were authentic and spoke of ‘their losses and ours’. As British authorities 
could not really substantiate German losses, the inflated figures from RAF 
intelligence officers were apparently accepted as authentic. For an air force or a 
government trying to assess warplane numbers needed, a true evaluation could, in the 
end, be based only on its own strength. But with the Allies in need of any kind of 
victory, RAF aviators were idolised and inevitably bestowed with victories they 
never achieved.806 
Despite the positive publicity given to the air fighting over England in 1940, 
arguably, the lessons of the Battle of Britain were not learned by anyone. Certainly 
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21 August 1940.  
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they were not heeded in Australia. The RAAF never got interceptor squadrons to 
replicate those of the RAF. The Luftwaffe attacked Russia in mid-1941 with the 
same size air force it had used against Britain with the same light-weight, twin-
engined bombers supported by the mediocre Me-110 long-ranged, twin-engined 
fighter. The Germans, despite the failure of their air offensive against Britain which 
did not subdue the RAF or force the government to negotiate, never developed a 
heavy bomber. According to Galland, the requirement for heavy bombers went back 
to the 1930s but did not materialise for the wrong reasons.807 General Weaver, then-
Luftwaffe Chief Staff, had championed the idea of a four-engined bomber. German 
industry subsequently delivered him a raft of good designs.808 But when Weaver was 
killed in an air crash in 1936, the project stalled and was never revived.809 
 
 
(Source: Imperial War Museum) 
Figure 94: The Henkel He-177 of 1944, the nearest the Germans came to producing a heavy bomber. 
It did not live up to expectation and was converted to a troop carrier. 
 
Nor did they learn to exploit the full potential of the fighter-bomber like the Allies or 
produce a single-engined long-ranged escort fighter to replace the Me-110. Part of 
the problem for the Luftwaffe was that it over-succeeded in Poland and France to the 
point that Goering probably thought his air force was invincible despite the Battle of 
Britain, a purely British victory claim.810  
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808 Ibid., pp. 69 and 95. 
809 Ibid., pp. 69 and 95. 
810 Ibid., p. 111–2. 
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The British did install 20mm cannon in their fighters after the Battle due to 
explosives shells having better range and destructive power. And they did develop 
three long-ranged heavy bombers to strike back at Germany but these innovations 
took time. The outstanding lesson the British did not learn was to concentrate on 
bombing factories—they knew that German air attacks on their aircraft factories and 
airfields were much more effective than the bombing of cities. When the Germans 
changed from one to the other, then the RAF survived. Yet once the RAF built up its 
heavy bomber arm, its missions were primarily conducted against German cities in 
the hope of breaking the will of the people; a policy the government knew had failed 
when employed by the Germans.  
Another casualty of two years of war was the demise of the dive-bomber. Once it 
met Spitfires, the slow and vulnerable JU-87 Stuka was useless. But it was deployed 
in Barbarossa despite its failure over England. Unlike the Allied fighter-bombers, the 
P-40 and Hurricane, the Stuka was defenceless against interception. Thus the day of 
the dive-bomber in land warfare came and went quickly replaced by the much faster 
and less vulnerable fighter-bomber carrying a similar bomb-load. It was heavily 
armed, had only one pilot to lose, and could defend itself. Eventually it would be the 
fighter-bomber, principally the P-47 Thunderbolt and Hawker Typhoon (‘von Jabos’ 
in German) that proved the scourge of the Wehrmacht during its long retreat from the 
beaches of Normandy to Berlin.811 
The two years of neutrality before December 1941 did not see the Americans waver 
in their belief that their B-24 and B-17 would prevail unescorted over Europe in 
daylight.812 This was a direct application of Douhet's theories that received so much 
admiration between the wars. From the outset of World War II, it was established 
that the bomber could only get through in acceptable numbers escorted by long-
ranged fighters, or if, as in the case of Poland, air defences were inadequate. During 
the 1939–1940 testing time, bomber attacks by the RAF against Germany and the 
occupied countries disproved Douhet’s predictions. Yet the Germans, Americans and 
British did not develop a long-ranged, single-seated, escort fighter to protect their 
bombers to their targets and back. This is turn meant the RAF could only employ 
                                                 
811 Piekalkiewicz, J. 1984, Der VW Kubelwagen Type 82 im Zweiten Weltkrieg, Motorbuch Verlag Stuttgart,  
p. 149. 
812 Arnold, H. H., op. cit. p. 264. 
273 
inaccurate 'area bombing' techniques by night while the Americans and Germans 
suffered heavy losses on daylight missions. According to Lindqvist, on 20 June 1940, 
the definition of 'military targets' was expanded to include industrial targets.813 Thus 
the homes of factory workers were ‘legally’ attacked. In September 1940, Hitler gave 
orders for the Luftwaffe to bomb British cities at night.814 This offensive went on for 
six months and resulted in thousands of civilian deaths. On 11 October 1940, after 
the Battle of Britain, the British government responded by creating what would later 
be termed ‘free fire zones’ the bombing of the centre of cities apparently to interrupt 
transport and communications. 
Britain was developing four-motored bombers but in the first years of war, like all 
the belligerents, operated only mediums; inadequate in defending themselves and in 
bomb-carrying capacity. Thus the British attempt to influence the war from the air 
after Dunkirk was flawed. The bombers’ fire-power from their .303 inch machine 
gun equipped turrets was inferior to the cannon-equipped Luftwaffe fighters and to 
survive missions over Europe, they were dependent on stealth, moonless nights, 
dispersal and luck. This way, most British bombers, by flying out of formation, got 
home but with dubious bombing results. 
British crews also discovered that the bomb-loads twin-engined bombers delivered 
were ineffective in achieving significant impact against German infrastructure or 
reducing the enemy’s ability to wage war.815 And there was no defence against anti-
aircraft artillery or mechanical failure. The pre-war theory that once civilians came 
under sustained air attack, their government would surrender, was the opposite of 
what happened in practice. In fact air attack against cities stiffened morale and made 
civilians more determined to resist.816 Thus there were plenty of examples of 
Australia's allies pursuing bomber development in line with the theorist of the inter-
war years, but more importantly, the years of war before the Japanese entry, 
illustrated that air supremacy and fast single-seated fighters like the Me-109 were 
                                                 
813 Lindqvist S. 2001, op. cit., paragraph 181 (no page numbers); Spaight 1947 ch. 11; Sallagar, F. M. 1969, The 
Road to Total War, Van Nostrand Reinhold, New York, New York, ch. 11; Longmate, N. 1983, The bombers: the 
RAF offensive against Germany 1939–45, Hutchinson, London, Ch. 26. 
814 Kershaw, I., op. cit., p. 156. 
815 The results of bombing were often over-stated by all aircrews who risked their lives for hours over enemy 
territory. Psychologically, it was difficult for them to report a negative result. 
816 This point is still controversial—especially the massive bombing of German cities towards the end of the war 
and the dropping of atomic bombs on Japan—whether they were necessary or not measured against strategic 
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mandatory. Yet the government made no effort to either start producing or buying 
fighters as seemed so obviously needed after the German ‘blitz’. Only a bomber was 
being built in Australia, yet the first two years of the European war clearly showed 
that the theory of the bomber being able to reach its target unescorted was 
completely false, the basis for the government’s decision not to ‘waste’ money on 
interceptors.  
The two factors that therefore stood out during the years between 1 September 1939 
and 7 December 1941 were that first-line fighters and not bombers ruled the air 
during daylight hours and that much heavier bombers than those being employed by 
the belligerents so far in the war would be needed if the enemy’s war-waging ability 
was to be seriously degraded. Unescorted bombers could get through the enemy's 
defence by day, but losses were unstainable and therefore the attacking force would, 
in the long term, have to quit before the nation under attack surrendered. Also, the 
cost of losing highly trained bomber crews could easily run out of proportion to the 
damage they inflicted.  
The surprise factor, which could only be contemplated in peacetime, was the amount 
of bombing modern cities could sustain and still go on functioning. Aerial bombing 
in the early years of the war, not only failed to fill the attacked population en masse 
with fear, but actually helped sustain morale as in London during the 'blitz'.817 The 
other factor that did get examined was the limited range and fire power of 
interceptors designed in peacetime for defence. This was especially true of British 
fighters which were not only found to be under-armed but had very little sustained 
combat time.818 The matter of range also applied to Me-109s which had only a few 
minutes of combat over Britain. This no doubt impacted on both their effectiveness 
and on German aircrews’ morale as claimed by the British War Cabinet.819 
As already related, the gap between the performance of bombers and fighters 
widened dramatically with the introduction of the all-metal, low-winged monoplane 
of the 1930s—generally bombers got heavier and fighters got faster. Yet at the same 
time, the range of bombers continued to expand thus introducing the problem of 
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escort. British military aviation expert, William Green in his account, Famous 
Bombers of World War II, examined the relative development of the most widely 
used wartime Allied and Axis bombers all of which were designed in peacetime. 
Green claimed that the RAF's best bomber in 1939, the Wellington, had the dubious 
distinction of disproving  pre-war beliefs—that formations of modern monoplane 
bombers, with their speed, power turrets and ability to absorb punishment, could 
protect themselves against interceptors and penetrate enemy defences unescorted.820 
But in fact, this had already been established in China. Even the Flying Fortress, the 
best self-defended bomber of World War II until the B-29 arrived, to the chagrin the 
USAAF, proved unable to survive Luftwaffe fighter attacks over Europe. In August 
1941, Arnold pre-empted the coming war between Germany and America.821 In a 
paper to the Secretary of War Stimson that month, he wrote that ‘our heavy bombers 
are suitable for a decisive air offensive against Germany’ but did not mention them 
needing escort.822 Arnold also did not believe that American heavy bombers should 
be supplied to the British because, ‘She is having great difficulty at this moment 
operating the small Air Force she now has ... ’ and that ‘the US is not capable of 
creating the Air Force necessary to take decisive action if large … long-ranged 
aircraft are exported and expended in a nondecisive [sic] way’.823 The best types to 
send to England, Arnold opined, were medium bombers and pursuit planes.824 This 
implied the funding struggle for battleships over bombers was still alive during this 
twilight time before Pearl Harbour with Arnold noting that, ‘Every time we had an 
Aircraft Board meeting, Admiral Towers would put up a fight for material for 
battleships, destroyers, cruisers and aircraft carriers, as against bombers. However, 
the Presidential memorandum of June 23, 1941, for the large bomber program had 
stopped any further objection on that score’.825 
Fighters might have ruled the skies, but their performance depended on compromises 
such as range, armament, ammunition, and armour plating. This gave bomber crews 
some respite from prolonged fighter attack. The Spitfire is arguably accepted as the 
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definitive defensive interceptor of the war.826 But with full protection for its pilot, 
ammunition and fuel, it had a range of just 500 miles.827 The Zero with no pilot 
protection except a reinforced windscreen and which equalled the Spitfire in 
performance had a range three times greater.828 Until nations that were attacking each 
other's infrastructure developed a long-range escort fighter intercontinental fleets of 
bombers had to be flown without escort in the first three years of the war, often 
leading to uneconomic losses.  
Bombing was measured, not so much in the loss of aircraft and crews, which was 
accepted in wartime, but in down-time taken to replace them. In other words, if the 
bombing campaign was maintained at the same level of intensity and similar losses 
were incurred, the attacking force would, in a calculable time, be grounded. And at 
night, bombers could not fly in formation or hit specific targets. For a time, this 
removed much of the pre-war fear of massive civilian casualties and nations being 
overwhelmed and forced into surrender by bombing alone. 
Two years of war in Europe revealed that the Spitfire was the only Allied interceptor 
equal to the best of the Axis powers. But it had limited range and firepower and was 
only made in England. The Hurricane, the mainstay of the RAF, was only adequate, 
yet it was produced in greater numbers than the Spitfire—in October 1940, 180 
Hurricanes were made against 125 Spitfires.829 During the Battle of Britain, it was 
accepted as inferior to the Me-109 and was relegated to attacking bombers while 
Spitfires opposed the German fighters leading to the Secretary of State for Air 
declaring at a Ministers Meeting of 14 October 1940: ‘At over 30,000 feet and 
indeed less, the Hurricane is found no match for the Messerschmitt. The Spitfire 
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retains its superiority’.830 Strangely, the Americans did not have an interceptor equal 
to the Spitfire, Me-109 or Zero. Even with the war in Europe to study, they continued 
to equip their first-line fighter squadrons with P-40s and P-39s although the mass 
production of better aircraft was under way.831 
 
 
(Source: Imperial War Museum 
Figure 95: The Bell P-39 Airacobra in RAF service early in 1940. It was assessed unsuitable for 
European operations and rejected by the British soon after taking delivery and thus available for the 
dominions to buy. 
 
This US policy assisted the Axis powers to gain great victories and occupy vast 
amounts of territory both before and after the Americans entered the war until 1943 
when second generation American fighters arrived. The British were unable (and 
unwilling) to equip the air forces of the Commonwealth with Spitfires and retained 
them for home defence until the invasion crisis had passed. Apart from the 
Hurricane, they relied on Lend Lease to supply fighters to Allied countries including 
China and Russia which had to oppose the Axis air forces in second-line machines. 
This resulted in Australian fighter squadrons being equipped with P-40s in March 
1942 for home defence following the failure of imperial defence and the Wirraway 
‘general-purpose’ program. Once the USAAF and USN received improved fighters 
the tide of war began to turn.   
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The two years’ grace that America and Australia had could have been used by the 
Australians to minutely study air battles and aircraft and put this into practice. It was 
not until the Japanese offensive commenced that the inadequacies of Allied aircraft 
in front-line service were fully revealed. Despite the long-ranged bombing missions 
involved in the European and North Africa campaigns, only the Japanese deployed a 
singled-engined escort fighter. The other belligerents tried to adopt their standard 
interceptors to that role with drop-tanks and finely tuned motors. 
Another important point revealed during this two-year period, was that the conflict 
would probably be won or lost in the aircraft factories of the world. In the critical 
month of May 1940 when the Battle of Britain was being decided, British factories 
produced 747 military aircraft of all types and obtained 304 from America making a 
total of 1 051.832 At the same time, German factories made only 525 warplanes 
illustrating the Germans had little hope of winning the war.833 The Germans also had 
no avenue for the supply of comparable first-line combat planes from their allies 
whereas the British were receiving Hurricanes from Canada, but more importantly 
were tapping the vast manufacturing might of the USA.834 
As emphasised, daylight bombing by the Luftwaffe proved too expensive and did not 
make the British surrender. The next best option was to change to less accurate but 
more frightening nocturnal area bombing of British cities. Night bombers required no 
escort and the worst skilled aircrews could hit a sprawling city, even a blacked out 
one, and do some damage. But unlike the Luftwaffe daylight attacks on British 
military targets which were prematurely curtailed by Hitler, area bombing was less 
effective as a hindrance to the war effort. As long as the morale of the civilian 
population held, most of whom were more dispensable than military personnel, then 
the raids would eventually peter out as uneconomical. Their one purpose, apart from 
the bonus of killing defence workers in their beds, was to bring the enemy nation to 
its knees by public protest and force the government to sue for peace. But in fact to 
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the disappointment of Goering and later Arnold and Harris who apparently followed 
the theories of Douhet, bombing failed to induce a civilian uprising. Without Douhet, 
both the British and Germans may have maintained their offensive against strategic 
targets—airfield, factories, ship-yards, rail centres and power stations and progressed 
their cause more successfully. 
‘Strategic bombing’, precision raids; the policy of destroying specific military-
related targets in the enemy's heartland, for example air bases and munitions 
factories was directly counter to the theories of Douhet et al. Strategic bombing was 
more successful than area bombing but failed for several counter-productive reasons; 
mainly impatience and inaccuracy. As Churchill noted in his biography The Second 
World War, the RAF's Bomber Command soon discovered that even when they 
found their target, two-thirds of British aircrews failed to land their bombs within five 
miles of it.835 When strategic bombing by both the RAF and the Luftwaffe did not 
work quickly by night or day, both sides swapped to area bombing of each other's 
cities by night. This switch was justified by the British, who soon became its leading 
exponents, on grounds that if aircrews could not hit factories by day with strategic 
bombing, then they could kill factory workers at night, a process called ‘terror 
bombing’ but which became the comparatively respectable ‘attack on industrial and 
civilian morale.836 In fact the real purpose of this latter principle lay elsewhere—
terrorising the civilian population into submission and thus degrading the enemy's 
will to resist and removing the need for a ground invasion as Douhet theorised. But 
the RAF, despite the best efforts of ‘Bomber’ Harris throughout the war, 
intermittently supported by Churchill, did not achieve such an outcome. Victory was 
still stubbornly dependant on the land battle.  
Air war at sea 
The opening salvos of the new ship-versus-aeroplane warfare were fired in April 
1940, when relatively cheap and dispensable British single-engined aircraft, already 
obsolete, sunk an expensive, complex German cruiser that took years to design and 
build. The success of this encounter was widely publicised, yet the RAAF did not 
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acquire any dive-bombers until May, 1942 when the first of 342 American-made 
Vultee Vengeances was delivered.837  
The RN achieved even greater success for limited outlay in 1940. This time its 
bombers attacked the Italian fleet at Taranto. After a careful study of aerial 
photographs, on 11 November 1940 the raid was launched from the carrier HMS 
Illustrious by twelve Swordfish torpedo bomber biplanes.838 Despite their 
anachronistic World War I format, the Swordfish achieved victory. Three Italian 
battleships and a cruiser were immobilised and several destroyers damaged.839 This 
attack revealed the results achievable by the aggressive use of carrier-based aircraft 
against a strong surface fleet. Even if this British demonstration did not incite the 
Australians to equip the RAAF with effective torpedo and dive-bombing aircraft 
while there was still time, the Japanese studied it well.840 
During 1941, the theory that single-engined torpedo-carrying carrier-based planes 
could sink capital ships at sea was put into practice by the RN. A Swordfish from a 
Fleet Air Arm flight of the carrier Ark Royal dropped an aerial torpedo that hit the 
stern of the German pocket battleship Bismarck being hunted by RN warships in the 
North Atlantic.841 The Bismarck, under full steam, had its steering gear severely 
damaged in this night-time strike.842 The lucky, but decisive hit enabled British 
battleships to close the Bismarck and sink it by conventional naval gunfire.843 
Battleships ended the issue, but without the intervention of carrier-borne aircraft, the 
outcome of this battle might have been very different. These three successes by RN 
single-engined bombers foresaw the future of naval seat battles, particularly in the 
Pacific. In fact, the battles of the period between the end of the phoney war and Pearl 
Harbor graphically proved that even a tiny force of obsolete and vulnerable aircraft, 
could dispose of, or at least incapacitate, capital ships both at sea and at anchor.  
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Such developments not only put the capital ship into the past, but directed that a 
minor to medium military power such as Australia could defend itself against a great 
sea power such as Japan provided its air force was suitably trained and equipped. All 
that was needed was a government decision to purchase enough modern and 
available American single-engined dive or torpedo bombers and train crews 
competently in their use. Whether or not Australian-manned and operated aircraft of 
such types could sink an aggressor’s battleships and aircraft carriers was no longer in 
question. The only additional ingredient needed was to replicate the British model 
using American monoplanes, which were available under Lend Lease. The additional 
necessity was contemporary fighters.  
In summary, the first two years of World War II doubtlessly confirmed that the side 
controlling the air would win the war. And to gain air supremacy, a nation must have 
air superiority fighters with a medium to long range. Germany's one-sided battle 
against Poland was so successful that it apparently led to over-confidence in the air 
arm and helped sustain the belief that a nation may be overwhelmed through air 
power alone. It also placed the dive-bomber in the forefront of military operations, a 
position it could only keep while mastery of the air was not seriously challenged. 
When the Luftwaffe's legions ran up against the waiting and well-organised RAF 
defending Britain, it proved ill-equipped for a sustained offensive in which the odds 
were equal. The Germans were never able to gain air superiority over England except 
at night due to the RAF’s poor nocturnal ability both in training and equipment. And 
in Luftwaffe night operations, only much broader targets could be hit through 
indiscriminate bombing. This in turn led to a growing disillusionment in the air arm 
by the Germans in that the bombing of London, arguably Hitler’s trump card, did not 
bring down the British. Instead, it not only took pressure off the RAF, but helped 
raise morale and dissolved some of the pre-war fears about bombing. British civilians 
found they could live with bombing and with the help of Vera Lynn and Winston 
Churchill, learn to tolerate it in an ironical, unanticipated way. 
A big part of the German problem was that the Luftwaffe lacked both a heavy 
bomber and a long-ranged, escort fighter to negate the Spitfire. This meant that the 
Luftwaffe could not apply a coup de grace and overwhelm the RAF during the 
daytime or force the British to negotiate through area bombing by night. Only heavy 
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bombers may have achieved this latter result at a time when British night defences 
were weak. In other words what the Germans needed was a Mustang, Lancaster and 
Flying Fortress if they were to win rather than just applying a ‘carrot and stick’ 
approach to negotiate peace with the British Empire and get a free hand against 
Russia. The bomb-load the Luftwaffe’s mediocre twin-engined bombers could carry 
was too light, their range too short and their defences too meagre to achieve 
victory.844 And a cross-channel invasion was impossible while the British possessed a 
more powerful navy. 
The Battle of Britain in 1940 was as much a display of the superiority of the modern 
interceptor—directed by radar—over the bomber as anything else. Unescorted (or 
inadequately escorted) day bombers could not operate in a hostile sky controlled by 
defending fighters for any protracted period. The losses in aircrews made such 
warfare unsustainable if the raids were run over enemy territory even if home 
industries could replace the planes. This period also illustrated that in the air the 
conflict was more and more a machine war over an individual soldier's war that 
separated it from World War I. There were still individual air aces on both sides but 
the side that would win the war as against individual battles would be the one with 
the best and largest number of air superiority fighters rather than the one with the 
most aces.845 Claims by individual fighter pilots were always exaggerated giving the 
impression that a few high scoring aviators were winning the war by destroying 
hordes of enemy aircraft when in reality most of their scores could be reduced by 
half.846 
Conclusion 
The European conflict taught many new lessons in aerial combat which were there 
for the learning. The biggest and most convincing example of how a weaker nation 
could be successfully defended in the air against a superior power was spelt out in 
the skies over England. The Battle of Britain was fought purely between RAF 
                                                 
844 Calvocoressi, P. et. al., p. 149–50.  
845 An ‘ace’ in war parlance is a pilot who destroys five or more enemy planes in air-to-air combat. Different 
methods of scoring led to controversy particularly between RAF and USAAF pilots in World War II. The 
Luftwaffe’s method meant more points gained for a four-engined bomber, a twin-engined intruder and so on. The 
German and Russian victories ran into hundreds and were thus questionable; for example German pilot, Eric 
Hartman claimed 352 victories in three and a half years. RAAF ace, Caldwell, achieved twenty-seven and a half 
victories in five years (Bishop, C. op. cit., p. 283).  
846 AIR 2/7771, ‘Why did Britain win the Battle of Britain of 1940?’, viewed 20 April, 2010 at, 
<http:/www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/education/worldwar2/theatres-of-war/western-eur>.  
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interceptors and German bombers and fighters. In the beginning, the RAF consisted 
of 620 interceptors; considerably less than the Luftwaffe’s total of 1137 fighters and 
bombers.847 But the RAF was backed by the world’s best radar system which was 
supported by an efficient observer corps. By the end of October when it was 
generally recognised the battle was over, the RAF had lost 1379 aircraft and the 
Luftwaffe 1733, more than the numbers each side had when the contest began.848 
The Battle of Britain was also testament that only planes of world parity could 
endure and in large numbers due to combat and attrition. Accidents sometimes 
outpaced operational losses. Second-rate machines—the Hurricane, Defiant, Battle, 
Messerschmitt 110 and the Stuka were all found wanting in the high stakes of war 
over France and England. Each had to be protected in one form or another by hastily 
conceived tactics or by fighters of higher performance. In the case of the Me-110 and 
the Defiant; they retired to night duties in which little or no fighter versus fighter 
contests occurred.849 The concept of an aircraft with the performance of the 
Wirraway, which was re-equipping RAAF fighter squadrons during the period under 
review, trying to compete in such an environment, was inconceivable. There is no 
locatable evidence of any RAF or Luftwaffe commander ordering training aircraft 
into battle during the European air war no matter how desperate was the situation as 
later be done by the RAAF command in the Pacific. 
The highly publicised British air defence of 1940: radar stations at strategic 
locations; spotters; heavy anti-aircraft artillery and Spitfires could have been copied 
by anyone—it received so much media exposure. Only exceptional aircraft like the 
Me-109 and Spitfire came through the air battles of 1939 and 1940 with their 
reputations intact or enhanced. Both of these aircraft continued in production for the 
entire war, albeit in modified form and with their operational lives over-extended. 
But manufacture of the less effective Hurricane and Me-110 was terminated as soon 
as replacements could be found.850  
                                                 
847Cawthorne, N. 2003, Battles of World War II, Arcturus Publishing Limited, London, p. 35. The difference in 
numbers between the start and end of the Battle of Britain was due to the RAF’s and Luftwaffe’s relative 
expansions and British factories manufacturing fighters faster than the Germans.  
848 Ibid., p. 38.  
849 Chant, C. op. cit., p. 48.  
850 Scutts, J. 1998, Republic P-47 Thunderbolt: The Operational Record, Airlife Publishing Ltd, England, 
p. 99.  
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This information was available to the Australian government and for it to continue 
with its gamble not to equip the RAAF with fighters was a recipe for disaster. Curtiss 
P-40s and Bell P-39s, better aircraft than the Hurricane, were still purchasable from 
America up until Pearl Harbor. Light bombers and seaplanes were already arriving 
from the USA parent companies during this two year period.851 Thus the lessons of 
the RAF performance in the European war were not learned in time by the Australian 
government despite Britain being its major ally and Menzies’ visit to England. The 
danger of Japan and its fleet of aircraft carriers equipped with first-line fighters and 
bombers and its positioning of troops in Thailand and other intrusions south, were 
not faced. The air attacks on Rabaul, Darwin and Broome of early 1942 and the lack 
of a RAAF response, were the results. 
Finally for Australian government leaders, opportunity existed for a long and hard 
look at their one-sided alliance with Britain. In light of the Polish experience in 
which Britain and France declared war over Poland but failed to give military 
assistance, may have awakened the Menzies and Faden governments to entrusting an 
international power with their security. Australian troops, aircrews and naval units 
had all been sent to Britain, Canada and the Middle East to assist in the war against 
Germany, but no reciprocal military aid from Britain ever arrived. From their vast 
experience in France and the Battle of Britain, the British could have alerted the 
government to the need for strong air forces and helped it to get them. This had 
already been done in the 1930s when the British helped the Japanese to establish a 
first class naval air force.  
Despite the failure of the British with previous warplane deliveries, Menzies’ order 
for fifty-Beaufighter for ‘Australia’s first line of defence’ turned into another 
example of the same thing. Also Bristol must have known these aircraft were 
unsuited for the task of daylight interception.852 The financial gain by Britain would 
have been minute compared to the funds being outlaid by Menzies in keeping 
military forces overseas serving British interests. A more ‘motherly’ approach might 
have been to steer the Menzies government towards building up its own air defences 
while time still permitted. 
                                                 
851 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, The Senate, Hansard, Ministerial Statement Australia’s War Policy et 
al, Speech 21 November 1939. 
852 This purchase was addressed in a previous chapter.  
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(Source: Imperial War Museum) 
Figure 96: Careworn and older than their years, young RAF fighter pilots confer after a sortie during 
the Battle of Britain.  Of those serving in 1940, very few lived out the war. 
 
 
(Source: Imperial War Museum) 
Figure 97: Vapour trails over Big Ben as Luftwaffe and RAF pilots fight for air supremacy. 
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(Source: Imperial War Museum) 
Figure 98: Mark I Spitfires being built at Castle-Bromwich, one of the German targets during the 
Battle of Britain. Despite propaganda about RAF victories, shadow factories dispersed production and 
posted their own observer corps to survive. 
 
 
(Source: Public domain 
Figure 99: The Messerschmitt 110 twin-engined fighter-bomber from which much was expected after 
success in Spain, Poland and France, proved vulnerable to RAF fighters in 1940 and had to be 
defended by Me˗109s. Learning little from the Battle of Britain, the Germans deployed it in Russia 
when it was already obsolete. 
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CHAPTER 8: THE WIRRAWAY LEGACY 
The Wirraway Plane that is being produced in Australia is capable of giving a good 
account of itself against any seaborne aircraft that might attack us.853 
The [Defence] Committee point out that the organisation of the Air Forces at present 
provides for nine Squadrons equipped with a light two-seater [Wirraway] capable of a 
good account of itself as a two-seater fighter if required for that duty in an emergency. 
854 
When we came to government, at the end of 1941, there was not a single combat fighter 
plane in Australia.855 
Wither is fled the visionary gleam? 
Where is it now, the glory and the dream?856 
 
The Wirraway legacy 
On 18 January each year, a group holds a ceremony at the Shrine of Remembrance, 
Melbourne. The modest meeting commemorated the first air attack against 
Australian territory and the tragedy that befell eleven young RAAF pilots and 
gunners who took to the air in their Wirraways that morning to defend Rabaul 
against one hundred Japanese naval bombers, fighters and seaplanes.857 Of the sixteen 
gunners and pilots who took part, six were killed and five wounded.858 And of the 
eight Wirraways, three were shot down, two were wrecked in landing with battle 
damage and one had been destroyed on take-off.859 Watching from the ground, David 
Bloomfield later wrote: 
There was something sickening in that sudden, merciless extermination [of the 
Wirraways by Zekes at Rabaul]. It was like watching hawks attack sparrows. I was 
shocked at the sight and realised the RAAF crews had no chance against such numbers 
and such better aircraft. 
                                                 
853 Anon. 1939, ‘Australia’s Efforts. Prime Minister’s Review. Answer to Critics’, “No Failure of Duty”,  
The West Australian, 4 November, pp. 14 and 18.  
854 Fairbairn, J. V., Minister for Air, Submission to the War Cabinet Agenda No. 84/1940, 7 May 1940, p. 3.  
855 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Hansard, Question Australian Defence 
Speech, 8 May 1957, Dr Evatt, Leader of the Opposition. 
856 Wordsworth, W. 1807, ‘Ode: Intimations of Immortality’, from ‘Recollections of Early Childhood’.  
857 Odgers, G. 1943, op. cit., The Argus, 27 March, p. 33.  
858 Gillison, D., op. cit., pp. 355.  
859 Ibid, pp. 355–6. 
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The Zero tactics were noted …They would peel off and dive on a Wirraway … with one 
directly to the rear and the others to the side. Machineguns would be fired … to 
determine the fall of the shot, and as they closed the Wirraway, the cannon would be 
fired. If the gunfire missed, the Zeros used their superior power and speed to climb 
above and ahead, then stall turned back on the Wirraway.860 
This predicable ten minute air battle in which no enemy aircraft were destroyed 
despite George Odgers' newspaper claim that 'a number of Zeros’ were shot down 
before they themselves [Wirraways] went crashing downwards',861 put paid to pre-
war claims and counter-claims that the 200 mph Wirraway would be a match for 
Japanese warplanes. Instead, the encounter ended in an unnecessary tragedy that has 
gone into Australian history as an outstanding example of raw courage pitted against 
impossible odds rather than what it was—political negligence on an unprecedented 
scale highlighting in the worst way, the failure of the conservative governments’ pre-
war defence policy to provide the RAAF with warplanes and the ignorance of 
successive governments to change it.  
The CAC’s idea of a ‘fighter’ 
In his May 1940 submission to the Menzies' War Cabinet, Minister for Air Fairbairn 
proudly wrote that nine squadrons of Wirraways were proceeding to locations 
requiring air defence   ‘... and the [Wirraway] was capable of giving a good account 
of itself as a two-seater fighter if required for that duty in an emergency’.862 This 
statement by the third successive member of the Menzies Cabinet to extol the virtues 
of the Wirraway as a fighter was ‘tongue in cheek’ for at least two reasons: the 
defence of Rabaul in New Britain was never more than token; and second, six 
Wirraways, four Hudsons, one battalion of AIF troops and no navy863 could never be 
seriously described as a real response to ‘an emergency'. The token defence of 
Rabaul by the RAAF and AIF could not be justified and withdrawal was the only 
sensible option. The performance of Japanese carrier-based fighters was well known 
after Pearl Harbor so Australian aircrews (and soldiers) might have been saved for 
other less sacrificial battles when Kittyhawks were finally allocated to the RAAF.  
                                                 
860 McAulay, L. 2007, We who are about to die, Banner Books, Australia, pp. 112–13—the biography of 
Squadron Leader John Lerew who ordered Wirraways to ‘intercept’ Japanese aircraft over Rabaul.   
861 Odgers 1957, G., op cit. p. 33. 
862 Fairbairn, J. V., Minister for Air, Submission to the War Cabinet Agenda No. 84/1940, 7 May 1940.  
863 Keogh, E. G. (n.d.), South West Pacific 1941–5, Grayflower Production, Melbourne, pp. 108–9. 
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Once the Wirraways were swept from the sky, the Commanding Officer, Squadron 
Leader Lerew signalled south, ‘... Two Wirraways [remaining] useless defence. Will 
you now please send some fighters?’864 Back came the response from North East 
Area Command at Townsville, ‘Regret inability to supply fighters. If we had them 
you would get them’.865  
At last there was admission of any pretence Wirraways were fighters, at least 
between operational RAAF officers hammering home the point that it had only ever 
been politicians who had claimed otherwise.866 And secondly, that there were no 
designated RAAF fighters in all Australia. 
The decision by the Australian Defence Committee of April 1940 not to equip the 
RAAF with fighter aircraft was but a culmination of years of government vacillation 
and indecision. Between the wars there were many opportunities for upgrading 
Australia's air defence. Having settled on the Wirraway, the switch to a real warplane 
seemed part of the procrastination process that beset Australia’s politicians. Without 
this plane being manufactured by the CAC, some effort may have been made by the 
three consecutive conservative governments to buy fighters.  
An intruder by any other name … 
Members of cabinet did not have to reinvent the wheel or pursue an air defence 
policy that was controversial or unconventional. In the inter-war years there was a 
number of examples in which warplanes were deployed and the types needed to 
protect Australia from assault by a powerful adversary. The ‘no fighter’ policy 
camouflaged a realistic one, but once hostilities started in September 1939, the need 
for fighters dawned on some government politicians. This perceived alteration in 
outlook was likely a result of the battles of France and Britain and continual criticism 
of the Wirraway by the press and opposition and by Ellington. As emphasised, 
during the heads of Empire ‘Aircraft Production: Dominion Requirements’ Ottawa 
meeting of July 1940, the Australian representative was offered US Republic P-43 
                                                 
864 Gillison, op. cit., p. 356.  
865 Ibid, p. 356; Odgers, G. 1957, The Royal Australian Air Force, Ure Smith, Sydney, p. 113–14; MacDougall, 
A. K. 2005, Australia's Air Force: The Story of the RAAF, Waverton Press, Waverton, NSW, p. 19. 
866 This statement was correct; no fighters existed in all Australia. By chance, USAAC fighters aboard US 
convoys were unloading in Brisbane. The first forty-eight P-40Es reached Brisbane unassembled on the 
Pensacola convoy 23 December 1941 bound for Manila. It diverted when the Philippines was abandoned by the 
US. P-40s were not allocated to the RAAF until 10 March 1942 when ten were issued by the USAAC from a 
second convoy at Melbourne carrying the 49th Pursuit Group, (Rorrison, J., op. cit.). 
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Lancer or Grumman Wildcats fighters by the British from their Purchasing 
Commission orders. Such meeting was, as titled, to distribute US-made warplanes 
earmarked for the RAF then released to the dominions, ‘ … so far as United 
Kingdom needs will permit.’867  
 
 
(Source: USN) 
Figure 100: The American Grumman F4F Wildcat fighter ordered by the British Purchasing 
Commission and offered to dominion governments at an Ottawa conference of July 1940. The 
Australians declined the offer. 
 
As noted, the Australians dismissed this last chance and decided on the untried 
British Beaufighter at a time when deliveries of warplanes from the UK had either 
been commandeered by the RAF or dishonoured.868 Fifty-two Beaufighters869 
belatedly ordered for the RAAF from over-committed British aircraft manufacturers 
was, at best, policy on the run. The Beaufighter, a twin-engined, two-seated 
‘intruder’ had only made its maiden flight on 17 July 1939870 and began entering 
                                                 
867 CAB/65/10/10, op. cit.  
868 For example The Adviser reported 29 May 1939 that ‘Several highly armed four-engined Short Sunderland 
flying boats will arrive in Australia from England within a few months for use in reconnaissance’. Instead, the 
planes were commandeered by the RAF as noted (Anon.1939, ‘Flying Fortresses [sic] for RAAF’, The Adviser 29 
May, p. 19.).  
869 Gunston, B. 1990, op. cit., p. 85. The Beaufighter’s armament was four 20mm cannon and six 0.303-inch 
machine guns ideal for strafing Japanese sea-trucks and barges. Its short-coming for the RAAF was that it was 
not a P-38—a long-ranged air superiority fighter needed to intercept Japanese bombers. 
870 Jackson, R. 2009, The Encyclopedia of Military Aircraft, Parragon Press, Bath, p. 67.  
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RAF squadrons on 27 July 1940871 after the dominion heads meeting at Ottawa the 
same month.  
The Beaufighter decision is important because it meant the value of fast, high 
altitude single-seated interceptors was not appreciated by anyone in power in 
Australia. Menzies, who was also his own Defence Minister, obviously did not know 
that a successful twin-seat fighter was yet to be invented and was confused by the 
name 'Beaufighter'.872 The relative press release stated: ‘It is understood that the 
number of Beaufighters to be brought to Australia will be sufficient to counter any 
attempt by an enemy to land airborne troops’,873 a statement seeming to suggest the 
government was mixed up about the role of the Beaufighter. Under the caption of the 
Beaufighter’s photograph was written ‘… aircraft of this type are being imported to 
Australia from Britain as the first line of defence against air attack’.874 
 
                                                 
871 Gunston, B. 1990, op. cit., p. 85.  
872 The name seems a portmanteau of ‘Beaufort’ and ‘fighter’; many Beaufort parts were used. There 
were no successful twin-seat, twin-engined fighters in World War II. All failed in battle and were 
withdrawn to softer roles or scrapped. The only successful twin-engined fighter was the P-38 
Lightning. Anon. Janes Fighting Aircraft of World War II op. cit.; Gunston, B., op. cit.; Mondey, D., 
op. cit.; Chant, C., op. cit.; Green, W., 1961, op. cit.; Graham, B. 2009, The Pictorial History of Air 
Battles, Paul Hamlyn, Dee Why West, NSW; Collier, B., op. cit.; Okumiya, et al., op cit. 
873 Anon. 1941, ‘Beaufighters for Australia’ The Argus, 7 November 1941, p. 3. Obviously this article which 
included accurate Beaufighter performance figures was meant to boost public morale. 
874 Anon. 1941, op. cit., p. 3.  
292 
 
(Source: AWM) 
Figure 101: A Beaufighter in action with the RAAF in New Guinea, a year after it was ordered from 
the British. 
 
In a strange subsequent article just seventeen days later, The Argus announced that 
‘Beaufighters and Hurricanes may be made here’.875 Senator Donald Cameron, the 
new Labor Minister for Aircraft Production, ‘Hinted that Beaufighters and 
Hurricanes may be manufactured in Australia … There was no reason why Australia 
should not produce Hurricane fighters or any other type of plane’.876 The Senator’s 
‘hint’ came four days after Pearl Harbor, demonstrating how unconscious even the 
new Curtin government was of the urgency of air defence. At the twelfth hour the 
minister was, according to The Argus, searching for sites for a factory to make 
warplanes and that ‘experts’ had found some at Wagga and Wangal (NSW) while 
Cameron was ‘still waiting for [news of] their suitability’. According to the senator, 
‘Lack of information [of the Hurricane and Beaufighter] had thrown those 
responsible for production of the planes here on [Australia’s] own resources and 
                                                 
875 Anon. 1941, op. cit., p. 4.  
876 Ibid., p. 4. 
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experiments had to be made’;877 a fabrication—no British fighters were ever built in 
Australia. 
 
 
(Source: National Library of Australia) 
Figure 102: Labor Senator Donald Cameron, Minister for Aircraft Production was sent looking for 
factory sites to build (British) Hurricanes and Beaufighters in Australia by Curtin after the Japanese 
attack on Pearl Harbor of December 1941, a process that would have taken years. 
 
Obviously the lessons of building warplanes in Australia were lost on Cameron even 
when war against Japan was a reality. As Senator Cameron spoke about finding 
factory sites ‘after a tiring train trip from Canberra to Melbourne’,878 Japanese forces 
were rampaging through the Pacific, Malaya and South Asia. At the same time, the 
Australian-made Beaufort bomber which was supposed to sink capital ships and of 
which ninety were promised to the British for the defence of Singapore but never 
delivered, numbered just ten in service.879 880 However dedicated Australian industry 
was to the war effort, it was not equal to the task of either recommending aircraft for 
the RAAF or producing them on time. The government and its defence department 
obviously never appreciated the importance of interceptors or placing orders early 
                                                 
877 Ibid., p. 4. 
878 Ibid., p. 4.  
879 Parliamentary Debates House of Representatives, Hansard, Answers to Questions Australia’s War Effort: 
Strength, Equipment and Services of Armed Forces, 9 August 1946. 
880 Beaufighters were not produced in Australia until 4 June 1944 after the Beaufort run was complete (Anon. 
(n.d.), ‘ADF Aircraft Serial Numbers RAAF A8 DAP Beaufighter’ viewed 14 October 2012 at, 
<http://www.adf=serials. com.au/2a8.shtml>. 
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enough with the aircraft manufactures of North America to ensure the country was 
protected.  
The imperial defence myth 
The assumption that Australia was hostage to imperial defence is a myth of 
mammoth proportions perpetuated down the years. Such coalition vanished when the 
Lyons government decided to construct the AT-6 for the RAAF instead of a British 
plane. The major consecutive cabinet ministers’ mistake was not one of remaining 
within the bounds of imperial defence but stepping outside it and making aircraft 
acquisition decisions when they had neither the 'savvy', experience or active listening 
sense to take advice. In 1931, J. M. Salmond, Chief of the RAF Air Staff in his 
‘Memorandum by the Chief of the Air Staff’ titled ‘The General Situation in Respect 
of Air Armament’ (of the UK) wrote that ‘… my view is that the vulnerability of [the 
British Isles] to air attack constitutes, on purely strategical considerations, our 
weakest point in the whole field of Imperial Defence’.881 Salmond’s interpretation of 
imperial defence appeared limited but he highlighted that air defence needed 
overhaul. Apparently the British government took notice, when the Luftwaffe attack 
came in 1940, the RAF was ready.  
Had the government stayed within the parameters of imperial defence it may have 
been prepared for air attack in 1942—there would have been no Wirraway fiasco and 
the nation may have been defended by Hurricanes, Wildcats, P-43 Lancers or P-36s. 
The British calculated the number of fighter squadrons needed for defence while the 
Battle of France raged—a large and vital ingredient to the successful outcome of the 
coming air battles between the Luftwaffe and the RAF over England in 1940. The 
RAAF could have followed suit for the defence of mainland Australia if it had been 
equipped as the RAF’s Air Marshal Salmond suggested. Staying within the imperial 
defence family in terms of getting advice on air defence would have been more 
practical than any option taken. Whatever their shortcoming in terms of providing 
hardware for the RAAF, the British knew how to counter air attacks.  
                                                 
881 Salmond, J. M., Chief of Air Staff 1931, ‘The General Situation in Respect of Air Armaments’, British Air 
Ministry, 27 April, UK Archives, London.  
295 
Politicians as aviation experts 
When called upon to make air defence policy decisions between the wars, successive 
Australian politicians were never equal to the task although they assumed the role of 
aviation experts. In a parliamentary debate in 1957 on the defence situation in 
December 1941 and the absence of fighters during the Liberal term between the 
invasion of Poland and 7 December 1941, Dr Evatt (ALP) put this fact into words:  
They [fighters from the UK and USA] were not here when we came to government and 
only a few weeks later war with Japan broke out. That is the sad story of what happened 
the last time …a Liberal party-Country party government was given the responsibility 
of providing for … defence …. I am not in a position to dispute …the decisions 
…made. We cannot, as laymen who lack the technical advice … be dogmatic about 
these things.882  
The two times RAF British experts visited Australia to evaluate the RAAF, unless 
their findings met the government's liking, did not cause any action to be taken. Air 
Marshal Salmond evaluated the RAAF in a report dated 20 September 1928 with 
Prime Minister Stanley Bruce announcing that Salmond’s expansion plan would 
commence in the fiscal year 1928–29.883 Predictably he soon reneged, deciding that 
the RAAF would have to be content with what it had and in his view, ‘The sea was 
Australia’s first line of defence’.884 Perhaps Salmond was invited to evaluate the 
RAAF too early in the 1919–1939 period with the Great Depression ascended 
between the time of his report and the government having money again. But getting 
important RAF officers to evaluate the RAAF was arguably little more than 
camouflage for procrastination rather than a real attempt to protect the nation from 
the air.  
The second was the Ellington Report warning the Lyons’ government the Wirraway 
was not fast enough for a warplane.885 Regrettably the point had to be demonstrated 
in the skies over Rabaul and RAAF aviators’ lives lost before it was taken seriously 
by either side of the house. This dire situation, as documented in preceding chapters 
was that the conservative governments of the mid to late 1930s insisted on equipping 
the RAAF with 'general purpose' planes instead of purpose-built fighters. Once 
                                                 
882 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates House of Representatives, op. cit.  
883 Anon. 1928, ‘Mr Bruce Policy Speech’, Narandera Argus and Riverina Advertiser, 12 October, p. 8.  
884 Gillison, D., op. cit., p. 34. 
885 Odgers, G. 1965, op. cit., p. 67. 
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Wirraway production was in full swing, Lyons, Menzies and Fadden were, for 
whatever reason, unwilling to alter course, terminate the Wirraway’s manufacture 
and direct the CAC to make fighters. Or better still, purchased ready-made 
interceptors from the US where well-established aircraft companies had invested 
years researching and developing their planes. The fact that excellent fighters could 
have been acquired until 7 December 1941 from the Americans makes the episode 
border on criminal neglect.  
Those men partially responsible for Australia's air defence fiasco, mainly Thorby, 
Parkville and Street, Defence Ministers in the Menzies and Faden Governments, 
were strangely silent over adverse events at Rabaul and Darwin and the desperate 
attempts to equip RAAF fighter squadrons with Curtiss P-40s from the US convoys 
that unexpectedly reached Australian ports in late 1941 and early 1942. In their way 
these latter events let politicians ‘off the hook’. The Curtin Government's Minister 
for Air, Arthur Drakeford, later reiterated the legacy the Labor Government inherited 
in November 1941: 
In the final analysis, the whole purpose of any air force is to put fighter, bomber and 
reconnaissance aircraft in the air. But what did this present government find when it 
took over the reins of office? … that Australia had not learned the lessons of air power, 
with the result that gallant lads had been forced to meet overwhelming hordes of fast 
modern Zero fighters in pathetically outmoded Wirraways. One sublime page in 
Australia's history will relate to those five [sic] Wirraway pilots who, in the early days 
after Japan struck, went up over Rabaul to engage over 100 fighters and bombers. Those 
facts show that what this government inherited from its predecessors was an air force … 
inadequate to meet this terrible threat from Japan.886 
This condemnation was easy enough to make two years after the event with Australia 
safely under the US military umbrella after the Battles of Coral Sea and Midway 
removed any risk of invasion. The war was virtually won and there was time to 
attribute blame. Drakeford quoted Curtin in opposition in 1937: 'If we cannot afford, 
as we cannot, a floating navy equal to that of a world power, it is yet within our 
means to sustain an aerial fleet equal to any that can be brought against us'.887 But in 
making this statement, so fanciful in opposition, Drakeford was probably inspired by 
                                                 
886 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Hansard, No. 25, 1943, Tuesday, 22 June 
1943. 
887 Ibid., p. 2. 
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the spectre of Douhet with airplanes replacing armies and navies. But there is no 
evidence to suggest the Curtin opposition of the 1930s induced any debate on the 
merits of fighters versus bombers or that the alternative Labor budget would support 
any sudden purchase of fighters. Indeed, even after Pearl Harbor, it was not until 
March 1942 that Dr Evatt went to England to ask Churchill for Spitfires:888  
I had to fight both in Britain and the United States for equipment, especially air 
equipment without which our gallant airmen could have done nothing. As the result of 
that mission we received just under 100 Spitfires suitable for tropical conditions, and an 
enormous number of planes from the United States.889 
Churchill tardily gave Evatt his Spitfires which were slow to arrive, were of a veteran 
mark, and did not live up to their European reputation. This outcome does not 
necessarily detract from the Curtin government’s faith in British aircraft but it does 
show that neither Curtin nor Drakeford had learnt from the recent past; that orders 
for British warplanes were slow to be filled or were not filled at all, and the aircraft 
themselves (if they were delivered) always disappointed. Clearly the British were 
second-rate suppliers of warplanes and should have been foregone after the 
experience with the Sunderland and Beauforts orders. Instead the government kept 
trying to prod them along. 
 
                                                 
888 CAB/66/36.20, WP (43) War Cabinet, Report for the Month of March 1943 for the Dominions, India, Burma 
and the Colonies and Mandated Territories, UK Archives, London.  
889 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, No. 19, 1957, 8 May 1957, p. 1177. 
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(Source: AWM) 
Figure 103: Mark Vc Spitfires, probably the slowest of all versions, were sent to Australia in late 1942 
after Evatt’s plea to Churchill but proved disappointing. 
 
Finally an order for American warplanes but sans fighters 
The fact that the Australian government was not hostage to imperial defence was 
reiterated when the conservative government finally ordered US light bombers and 
seaplanes after orders for British counterparts were not honoured. Following the 
Polish invasion, Australia was competing with the RAF for aircraft, yet the British 
did not stop accepting off-shore orders. In May 1940 the Menzies’ government was 
informed by the British Air Ministry that '... delivery [of Beauforts from Britain] 
cannot be expected until 1941’.890 Consequently, the Minister for Air, James 
Fairbairn in his War Cabinet submission of 7 May 1940 wrote that, 'This makes the 
position regarding the supply of Beaufort aircraft so remote as to remove this type 
from practical consideration'.891 Fairbairn’s assessment was that if an order was 
placed with Lockheed for Hudsons, delivery could be expected at the rate of ten a 
month from September 1940.892 This was a watershed moment in history; an order 
could have also been sealed with Lockheed simultaneously for P-38 interceptors, a 
war-winning design.  
 
                                                 
890 Commonwealth War Cabinet Agendum No. 84/1940, 'Supply of Lockheed Hudson aircraft and 16 spare 
engines', 16 April 1940. 
891 Ibid., p. 1. 
892 Ibid., p. 1. 
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(Source: Public domain) 
Figure 104: What might have been—the Lockheed P-38, a long-ranged interceptor that may have fought the 
Japanese over Darwin had Australian politicians known the difference between an intruder and an interceptor. All 
USAAF aces, including Richard Bong, won their victories in the SW Pacific flying this unorthodox machine. 
 
The same situation existed with the supply of Beauforts from the DAP assembly line 
at Mascot. The project, begun late, was further delayed by the British failure to 
supply motors. Fairbairn's inquiries through the local Aircraft Production 
Commission revealed that deliveries of the first ninety Beauforts on order for 
Singapore’s defence would not start until August 1941 and therefore ‘ ... the Air Staff 
cannot recommend relying on this source of supply’.893 This Cabinet submission by 
the Minister of Air meant that not one of the Beauforts ordered from Britain or from 
DAP had been delivered as promised.   
The sudden switch to US warplanes was tantamount to an admission that American 
firms were more reliable than their British or Australian counterparts. Fairbairn's 
recommendation was accepted by the Defence Committee and the Hudsons reached 
Australia in time to activate two squadrons for Malaya before the war erupted.894 The 
order for British Beauforts was cancelled,895 but the Australian program to build the 
                                                 
893 Ibid, p. 1. 
894 Graham, B. 1950, ‘We Were There Too, General’, The Argus, 14 January, pp. 8 and 80. The ‘General’ is 
George Kenny, USAAF, Commander of Allied Air Forces, SWPA. His book, General Kenny Reports (Kenny, G. 
1949, General Kenny Reports, Duel, Sloan and Pearce, New York) published in 1950 paid scant attention to the 
RAAF in the Pacific War to which Graham took umbrage.  
895 Ibid., p. 2. 
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problematic bomber proceeded after protracted modification to allow American 
motors to be fitted. Except for the purchase of the Hudsons, basically a long-ranged 
maritime patrol plane with a bomb load of only 1600 lbs, (less than half that of the 
B-25 Mitchell),896 the RAAF would have been without bombers when Malaya was 
invaded. The Hudson was fast and reliable and above all, supplied as promised but 
no match for a Zero. 
 
 
(Source: AWM) 
Figure 105: Beauforts being assembled at Mascot years behind schedule. Lockheed Hudsons were 
bought ready-made from the US when the Beauforts were not delivered on time. 
 
At this critical pre-war time, the conservative government was being pushed in three 
directions: the unprecedented step of cancelling an order for British warplanes; 
breaking through the bonds of imperial defence by buying American aircraft and 
realising it could not count on DAP. But having established a precedent in dealing 
successfully with US aircraft makers the government passed up the chance of getting 
US fighters at the same time. Instead, the Minister for Air continued to claim the 
Wirraway would give a good account of itself as an emergency fighter—a term 
available evidence would suggest was original to Fairbairn. Curtin tried to keep the 
issue alive by asking the Minister for Defence about the Wirraway’s speed but Street 
skirted the issue: 
                                                 
896 Winchester, J. 2012, The Aviation Factfile Aircraft of World War II, Amber Books, London, pp. 169 and 203.  
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As the Wirraway type of machine has not yet been handed over for official tests, exact 
performance figures are not available, but there is no reason to believe … the maximum 
speed set down in the departmental specifications will not be attained. The specified 
figure is higher than that of …similar type aircraft manufactured in the United States of 
America and delivered to the United Kingdom Government.897 
Street omitted to add that this aircraft ‘type’ was supplied to the UK as a training 
plane, something Curtin failed to remind him therefore losing the initiative through 
his lack of knowledge of military aircraft and their combat application. Street was yet 
to grasp the critical need for fighters; an ignorance that can hardly be forgiven in 
light of the apparent battle for survival being waged between RAF and Luftwaffe 
fighters over Britain.  
 
 
(Source: Public domain) 
Figure 106: Defence Minister Street refused to supply details of the Wirraway’s performance in 
parliament undoubtedly because he knew it was inadequate. 
 
Prime Minister Menzies’ predictable answer to the nation’s plight was to keep 
knocking on Churchill’s door. In early 1941 his third mission to London, perhaps 
realising how vulnerable his country was to air attack, was a disappointment. The 
mother country was ostensibly embroiled in total war against the Axis powers, one  
in which it was still losing so Menzies could hardly have been a welcome sight. He 
                                                 
897 Ibid., p. 83. The speaker failed to mention the AT-6 equipped the RAF as a trainer. The speed of the 
Wirraway was 220 mph when fighters were generally reaching 350 mph (Gillison 1962, p. 716). Why 
consecutive conservative governments pretended the Wirraway was a warplane remains controversial but apathy 
and self-satisfaction seemed involved plus failure to admit a wrong decision was made and reverse it. Plus they 
probably wanted to show the British they were serious about EATS. 
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had become Prime Minister by proxy when Earle Page resigned with a new ministry 
sworn in on 26 April 1939;898 the same year war broke out. Menzies had been 
Attorney-General and Minister for Industry (1934–39),899 yet there is no indication he 
displayed any aptitude for understanding air power. Nevertheless, the wars in Spain, 
Finland, China, Poland and France in which the roles of dive-bombers, fighters and 
bombers were clearly established could hardly have escaped his notice.  
Somewhere deep behind the rhetoric and admiration for everything British, Menzies, 
unlike Fadden (who succeeded Fairbairn as Minister for Air), may have realised 
better aircraft than the Wirraway would be needed to meet the looming Pacific crisis. 
Both the RAF’s Air Chief Marshals Brooke-Popham and Ellington supported by 
British aeronautical periodicals had disparaged the Wirraway. If Menzies did have 
such a revelation it was apparently only partly satisfied by buying Beaufighters while 
in London—his government’s idea of a fighter.900  
After the German occupation of Europe, the British government took over a number 
of orders for American-made warplanes from French and other European allies 
before the aircraft could be delivered. After Pearl Harbor, the Americans also 
retained many off-shore aircraft orders for themselves. Once war engulfed the Pacific 
with heavy air strikes against the Philippines, Malaya and Hawaii simultaneously, the 
need for fighters could no longer be denied. But with so much evidence available 
before December 1941, it is difficult to understand why Australian prime ministers 
and their lieutenants needed a war in the Pacific to convince them fighters were 
mandatory for defence, especially after the example of the Battle of Britain to which 
Menzies was a sometime eye-witness. The fighter’s role must have been known to 
anyone who bothered to read the Aeroplane magazine distributed in Australia by 
Gordon and Gotch and available through newsagents. In each edition from 
September 1939 the Aeroplane carried an article titled 'The War in the Air'.901 In its 
August 1940 issue printed during German attacks on England, the role of interceptors 
both in quality and quantity was emphasised: 
                                                 
898 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Hansard, No. 18, 3 May 1939. 
899 Ibid. 
900 Menzies, R. 1941, op. cit., p. 110.  
901 Anon. 1940, 'The 48th Week of The War in the Air', The Aeroplane, August 9, p. 147. 
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... the Nazis tied the Luftwaffe to the tanks and other war vehicles. The policy seems to 
pay them so well [in the Blitzkrieg] only because Great Britain and France had not 
enough fighters to meet and smash these attacks … That kind of  … warfare demands 
an air force of high quality. Neither cheap aeroplanes nor partially trained crews can be 
turned to such work with any hope of success. Numbers, up to a point, are important, 
but numbers alone cannot serve the strategy of an independent air force.902 
The Japanese also knew the value of their Zero to the extent ace Matake Okumiya 
wrote in his biography: 
We stressed, perhaps repetitiously the role of the one aircraft [Zero] in the initial phases 
of the Pacific War. We feel, however that at Pearl Harbor as well as in the Philippines 
and Dutch East Indies, we could not possibly have achieved our sea, land, and air 
victories with a fighter of lesser performance than the Zeke. Our entire strategy 
depended upon the support of this aircraft.903 
Insanity sanctioned 
Of all the rhetoric, debate, conferencing and work put into the acquisition of aircraft 
for the RAAF, only one member of parliament showed the sense to break from the 
status quo and articulate the actual air defence situation. In a parliamentary debate of 
27 June 1941, just after the invasion of Russia which removed concerns the Japanese 
held for the Russians, Labor Senator John Armstrong announced in the lower house: 
‘… we have no … first-line fighter aeroplanes. We are manufacturing Wirraway 
aeroplanes, but we should have progressed … in the first eight months of the war to the 
manufacture of Hurricanes, Spitfires, and … Curtiss fighters. Without them we cannot 
defend Australia adequately. The Government has not attempted to take even the initial 
steps …for the manufacture of front-line fighter aeroplanes. Until we can manufacture 
all of these things the Government is wasting its time by training 250, 000 boys to 
defend our country’… we are exporting Wirraway … aeroplanes. If we are making too 
many Wirraways, we should switch part of … production …to the manufacture of front 
line fighter aeroplanes and a well-equipped army with adequate automatic fire-power 
actually in the field we shall be suspicious of the bona fide of the Government and the 
monopolists who pull strings behind the scenes. 904 
 
                                                 
902 Ibid., p. 135–136. 
903 Okumiya, M., et al., op. cit., pp. 82–83.  
904 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate No. 26, 1941, 27 June 1941.  
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(Source: National Library of Australia) 
Figure 107: Senator John Armstrong, Labour Senator for NSW contributed strongly to Labor’s 
vigorous attack on the adequacy of Australia’s war preparations telling the house in mid-1941 the 
RAAF had enough Wirraways and Australia should be manufacturing first-line fighters. 
 
To this accurate criticism, members of the Menzies government made no reply—a 
response Senator Joseph Collings for Labor called … ‘a conspiracy of silence’.905 
And so the ‘fighterless’ air force and the Wirraway program rolled on until time 
inevitably ran out and all the government’s rhetoric over the sanity of its policy of 
equipping the RAAF with trainers was answered in combat. By trying to accelerate 
the acquisition of warplanes by becoming self-sufficient, the government had slowed 
it down. Not only that, all the effort, time and money expended in producing aircraft 
had resulted in next to no British or Australian warplanes at the front-line 
A mistake compounded 
Government members, particularly the last three conservative prime ministers and 
their ministers failed to arm the RAAF with a contemporary fighter or interceptor 
because of their own inertia, ignorance and refusal to admit the Wirraway program 
was a defence disaster. They were not prepared to take the advice of British and 
American experts or seek that of RAAF pilots already flying fighters in North Africa 
and Britain. Instead they stuck to the ‘defence against light raids’ policy that 
increasingly went against logic and common sense. In other words, they took the line 
                                                 
905 Ibid., p. 551. 
305 
of least resistance and lived on hope. The British had their Singapore fortress and the 
Americans had strong bases in the Philippines and Hawaii. The likelihood of the 
Japanese breaking through these strongholds was apparently too unthinkable to 
consider. Alternatively, air defence was a gamble they were prepared to take 
although ministers must have been aware of the terrible chance they were taking. In 
his press release of February 1941, Acting Prime Minister Arthur Faden spoke of 
victory although the Japanese were yet to attack: 
 …that it was evident from the discussions at the [Advisory War] Council that all 
members realised that Australia, equally with the Empire as a whole, was now entering 
upon a period in which its very existence was at stake …a great responsibility rested 
upon all sections of the community to ensure that the maximum effort was exerted to 
carry us through the vital months ahead and to ultimate victory.906  
 
 
(Source: Public domain) 
Figure 108: Thirteenth Prime Minister, Arthur Faden warned Australians in February 1941 of dire 
days ahead.907 During his short stay, Faden made no effort to upgrade the RAAF despite being 
Minister for Air in 1940 and his passionate victory speeches before war against Japan had even begun. 
 
The British, far from containing Australian efforts (as long as they were not 
American-driven) had, as documented, offered to build a Hurricane factory in 
Australia. Instead, Defence Minister Robert Parkhill in accepting the CAC’s NA-33 
                                                 
906 Fadden, A. 1941, ‘Vital Period for Australia: All must share in Defence Speed-up: Mr. Fadden’s Warning’, 
The Argus, 6 February, p. 1.  
907 Ibid., p. 1.  
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proposal to manufacture an American trainer went ahead even after the connection 
between GMC (and thus GMH) and North American Aviation was revealed. In other 
words, GMC had a vested interest in the deal. Hurricanes, which could have been 
built more quickly than the Wirraway considering the Hawker’s ‘throw-away’ design 
and lack of modification ingredient. The British and probably the Canadians would 
undoubtedly have helped with Hurricane production conditional upon American 
companies not being involved. It is hardly surprising that once British firms 
discovered GMC was a part owner of CAC, they terminated further contact with 
CAC.  
The opportunities were there—imperial defence was not the ogre or the stumbling 
block—the Lyons and Menzies governments were their own enemy. They placidly 
went along with the production of the Wirraway as frontline warplane despite all the 
evidence to the contrary. Australian politicians, it seems, were just not equal to the 
task of either studying air war lessons or displaying enough self-confidence to 
delegate. Once Wirraway production started then any criticisms of its performance 
were strenuously defended. As one example, when in 1938 then-Opposition Leader 
Curtin commented that … ‘Australian aircraft were lamentably obsolete’,908 Defence 
Minister Thorby retorted that ‘No Government could improve on what was being 
done for the air force at the present time’.909 In his indignation he was obviously 
camouflaging the government’s refusal to accept the fact that the performance of 
single-seater fighters was far superior to the Wirraway—in other words using quality 
control as a subterfuge for doing nothing. 
 
                                                 
908 Anon. 1938, ‘Most Modern Aircraft Factory Claim: All 1938 Models at Fisherman’s Bend’, The Canberra 
Times, 22 June, p. 3.  
909 Ibid., p. 3. 
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(Source: State Library of New South Wales) 
Figure 109: Conservative Defence Minister Harold Thorby refused to accept criticism of the CAC 
Wirraway. Instead he heaped praise on the way it was being made rather than taking action to replace 
it. 
 
The sad picture that emerges is one of dishonesty and cover-ups. All other nations 
seriously involved in rearming before 7 December 1941 were doing so by making or 
buying aircraft that could compete against an enemy who had secured a huge head 
start. Australia had the human capital for a big and belated expanded air defence 
program that would eventually see it grow to thirty times its pre-war size; larger than 
the RAF of 1939.910 But although its maximum effort in the war against Japan was 
commendable and its aircrews without peers, it was never equipped with the aircraft 
necessary to sink capital ships so vital in the Pacific War. Thus its wartime 
conglomeration of imported and locally made planes was more one of similar 
capabilities to the RAF on a smaller scale than the USAAF or the USN. By 1945, it 
was still seen attacking a Japanese battle-cruiser near Darwin with heavy B-24 
Liberator bombers, a method long abandoned by the Americans. This ending which 
might be described as the edge of effectiveness traced back to defence decisions 
made in the 1930s. 
 
                                                 
910 Anon. 1944, ‘No Reduction in RAAF Size’, Northern Star, 11 April, p. 5.  
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(Source: AWM) 
Figure 110: B-24 Liberator heavy bomber of No. 24 Squadron, one of two shot down while 82 Wing 
was attacking the cruiser Isuzu near Timor in April 1945. The Isuzu was not sunk or even slowed by 
the RAAF attack. 
 
When the Pacific War erupted, the Curtin government, after a stumbling start, built 
an operational air force from ‘scratch’. The poor performance of conservative 
ministers in the years leading to war was made all the more shabby by the fact they 
showed by their last-minute actions before losing office, they were aware of the 
RAAF’s shortcomings by buying Beaufighters yet at the same time, leaving the 
Wirraway squadrons in the frontline to await their fate. The incoming Curtin 
government did little better. Its ministers did not appreciate the urgency of local air 
defence or they would have tried desperately to obtain fighters in the time they had 
left. Instead, the new Minister for Aircraft Production sought factory sites for 
building Hurricanes after the Japanese struck Pearl Harbor . Even a cursory look at 
the history of manufacturing warplanes locally would have told him that the time for 
such action was gone.  
Thus the belated acts of both the outgoing government and the incoming one of 
November 1941 did not result in a single fighter plane reaching the RAAF. The only 
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defensive weapons air force personnel had at Darwin were World War I Vickers 
machine-guns strategically positioned around the airstrip.911 Ten years of rhetoric, 
denial, vacillation, procrastination, spending, travel and misplaced effort came down 
to Australia’s air defences being in this lamentable state.  
Conclusion 
From the research for this thesis, the uncontested Japanese air attacks on Australian 
territory of 1942 need never have occurred. Prime Ministers Lyons, Menzies, Fadden 
and Curtin allowed the air force to degenerate into a training organisation for the 
RAF. Hundreds of men and women, many of them foreign refugees and American 
and Dutch military personnel, paid a terrible price for the mistakes made by these 
four men and their lieutenants, but accounting did not occur. A Royal Commission 
held into the debacle at Darwin of 19 February 1942 blamed RAAF personnel 
commanding the base that day when it should have been directed towards a frank 
appraisal of the leadership of the nation. The air defence strategy the politicians had 
crafted descended the RAAF’s minute operational capacity into a training, 
reconnaissance and transport organisation that could make only nuisance responses 
to aggression. Left unsaid, but certainly part of the deeper public’s opinion, was a 
perception that war demanded sacrifice, even callous sacrifice. Therefore the RAAF 
Wirraway pilots fought with what they had and died in defence of their country. The 
fact that their missions were sacrificial and did nothing to slow or interrupt the 
enemy’s advance has not appropriated blame on those who put them there. This logic 
places the pilots and their gunners in one of Australia’s favourite wartime images: 
the gallant stand of the lost cause. It successfully removed from the politicians the 
stigma of shame. The families of the aircrews who might otherwise have been 
outraged and heartsick at loved ones being ordered aloft flying trainers in tiny 
numbers, to combat an ultra-modern naval air force were mollified.  
John Curtin is remembered kindly as primarily and basically responsible for the 
leadership that united and inspired Australians to contribute to the winning of the 
war; a cause for which he gave his own life willingly just before the conflict ended. 
Menzies, a more charismatic character is probably recalled as being the longest 
serving prime minister, steering Australia through the tricky post-war years during 
                                                 
911 Rorrison, J., op. cit., p. 91.  
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international balance of power changes, and to have successfully administered 
political and military relationships with the Americans as Australia’s new guardian 
yet maintaining the British alliance despite the disasters of World War II. Thus 
neither of these well-thought-of politicians is blamed publically for the Wirraway 
fiasco in any direct way. If the matter was raised in parliament as it was from time to 
time during the war with Labor firmly in power or after August 1945, it was reduced 
to a quip by a Labor member that in 1941 the party inherited an air force without 
fighters, a problem that Curtin and his subordinates remedied just in time.  
But the ‘rank and file’ seemed to remember the way it was differently. At the twenty-
third Labor-in-Politics Convention held in Brisbane from 1 February through 5 
February 1960, one anonymous delegate-veteran who had served in the RAAF 
commented colloquially but honestly that: ‘We were not forced into these Armed 
Services. We went there and gave our services because we believed it was necessary 
for the safety and welfare of this country … we were shocked and disgusted with the 
Wirraways that were given to our flyers in which to fly to their death and destruction 
up in the northern waters of Australia. If we are to participate in another war, let us 
have the best weapons … rather than fly to our destruction and commit suicide.’912  
 
 
(Source: RAAF Power Development Centre) 
Figure 111: Flying Officer John Archer (with observer Sergeant N. French), flying the Wirraway 
behind them, downed a Japanese fighter on 26 December 1942 off New Guinea. Archer’s victory was 
so heroic and unlikely that the Americans awarded him a Silver Star.913 Archer’s and French’s 
Wirraway is displayed in the Australian War Museum. 
                                                 
912 Anon. 1960, ‘Official Record of the Twenty-Third Queensland Labor-in-Politics Convention’, Australian 
Labor Party, 1–5 February.  
913 Anon. 1943, RAAF Log, The Royal Australian Air Force, Canberra, ACT, p. 55. 
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(Source: RAAF Power Development Centre) 
Figure 112: Drawing by ‘B3/77’of Archer’s interception. 
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Chapter 9: Conclusion 
This thesis has been argumentative, chronological, descriptive and counter-factual. It 
has shown that incorrect political and government decisions made over military 
aircraft selection contributed to Australia’s chronic state of unpreparedness for 
Japanese attack. Only two military aircraft were in production in Australia when the 
Pacific War broke out and both proved inadequate for the roles they were supposed 
to perform. The first, the Wirraway, the North American Aviation’s AT-6 Harvard 
with light armament and anti-reflective paint added locally, was a designated 
advanced trainer. The conservative government’s decision to equip RAAF fighter 
squadrons with Wirraways and send them to operational areas outraged all military 
sensibilities. The rationale behind such action cannot be made clear in any logical 
measure—the only possible explanation being that the decision-makers never 
expected the Japanese to reach Australian territory. Later claims that this was a 
temporary deployment cannot be defended as no replacement planes were on order. 
The air defence challenge facing the new Labor government that inherited 
management of the RAAF in October 1941 the upgrading of the Wirraway air force, 
was not tacked with any gusto. It simply left things as they lay despite numerous and 
strenuous pre-war calls for a defence system based on air fleets as a substitute for 
everything else.  
Disappointingly, the drastic action that the Australian public may have been 
expecting from the Curtin government that the best fighters money could buy would 
be borrowed, hired or bought from anywhere in the world did not occur. It took a 
World War to inspire a final vivid immediacy and even then, it was done with a 
belated post-Rabaul panicky public appeal to Australia’s allies with a wash of 
emotions that Australia was doomed unless large numbers of Kittyhawk and 
Hurricane fighters were sent by someone; an appeal ambiguous in itself as the Curtin 
government still kept a foot in both UK and US camps. Internationally, these 
dramatic appeals were met with scepticism and ridicule as might have been 
anticipated. Even American newspaper editors knew that Australian governments 
had turned down opportunities to import the fighters now desperately demanded.   
Not withdrawing the Wirraways from front-line service once the Japanese military 
juggernaut reached New Britain, a month after Pearl Harbor, proved that the new 
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Curtin government’s political masters and their military advisers either failed to 
grasp the inadequacy of the AT-6s as warplanes or they were prepared to sacrifice 
them and their crews in a gruesome public demonstration of Australia’s defence 
desperation. Similarly, battalions of AIF troops were left stranded on Timor, New 
Britain, Java and other outlying islands to resist Japanese landings without any 
chance of success and no possible means of escape. 
The Bristol Beaufort, the light, second-rate British-designed bomber being assembled 
in government factories on a cottage industry basis, despite the optimism of the 
project’s introduction, was soon fraught with foreseeable problems given Britain’s 
military plight of ‘standing alone’. Major modifications needed to the Australian 
model caused by the British withholding the motors for which it was designed meant 
long delays in delivery. When it did go into action in June 1942, the Beaufort failed 
its design philosophy as a ship-sinking torpedo bomber and had to be converted to a 
basic gravity bomber flying night missions to survive Japanese defences due to the 
RAAF’s lack an escort fighter. This thesis has shown that better and less expensive 
American light and medium bombers could have been purchased at a much lower 
price directly from eager US manufacturers seeking sales under the generous terms 
of the Lend-Lease scheme as was being done by many other nations.  
The sinking of the RN Repulse and Prince of Wales, a battle-cruiser and a battleship, 
symbols of imperial defence, off the coast of Malaya three days after Pearl Harbor914 
by conventional, land-based Japanese bombers and torpedo planes, ended any chance 
of the battle for Singapore being won. Western powers found out too late that 
ordinary bombers, with acceptable losses, could sink capital ships at sea as 
demonstrated by American Lieutenant William Mitchell fifteen years before. The 
quality of the bombing force was important, but if the warships had no fighter cover 
to combine with enough shipboard anti-aircraft artillery, then the outcome was 
inevitable.  
This conclusion suggests that the ruthless but canny Churchill, a shrinking player in a 
global war in which the survival of the English-speaking world was at stake, 
arguably decided any temporary sacrifice for victory was justified. Japanese 
occupation of Australia was probably included if it came down to a choice between 
                                                 
914 Gill, F. 1957, Royal Australian Navy, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, p. 491 
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priorities. His policy was conveyed in action rather than words; the non-Spitfire 
reinforcement of Singapore to protect RN capital ships; his plea to Roosevelt to enter 
the war, his implausible promises to Menzies to rush forces from the Middle East to 
Australia in the event of a ‘serious’ threat and a comparison in the numbers of 
interceptors shipped to Russia and to South East Asia in 1941.  
The fact was that the Australians needed British assistance much less than they 
thought. The thesis has described how Chinese strategists employed ‘asymmetric’ 
warfare; tactics and tools that allowed a weaker and smaller country (in terms of 
military might) to inflict huge damage on a bigger rival.915 The Australian 
government did not need to match the Japanese defence budget pound for yen in 
order to achieve such a goal; it needed only to spend enough money on modern 
American warplanes to change the strategic balance over Australian territory. 
 
 
(Source: Mikasa Memorial Museum, Yokosuka, Japan) 
Figure 113: The 5 700-ton Japanese cruiser Isuzu attacked unsuccessfully by nine B-24 and seventeen 
B-25 RAAF bombers in the Timor Sea, April 1945 in what Odgers termed, ‘… a direct challenge by 
the Japanese Navy to Allied aircraft in the Northern Territory’,916 four years after the Japanese air 
forces sunk the British battleship Prince of Wales and the battle cruiser Repulse off Malaya in a matter 
of hours. 
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916 Odgers, G. 1957, op. cit., p. 405.  
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(Source: Imperial War Museum) 
Figure 114: In direct contrast, HMS Repulse, the 26 500 ton battlecruiser sent to the bottom of the sea 
near Singapore with the battleship Prince of Wales by land-based Japanese Navy bombers and single-
engined torpedo planes on 10 December 1941, four years before the RAAF attempted unsuccessfully 
to sink the Isuzu illustrated the superiority of the Japanese bombing over that of the Australians. 
 
 The USN equipped its task forces with the Dauntless and the Wildcat—planes 
capable of destroying warships up to the size of carriers and fighters. These were 
both inexpensive single-engined monoplanes arguably cheaper to buy or make than 
the Wirraway-Beaufort combination. American Catalina seaplanes and Hudson 
maritime patrol bombers were already in service with the RAAF by December 1941; 
bought from the Americans when Beaufort delivery times were constantly extended 
and the British decided not to fill the Australian order for reconnaissance flying 
boats. Combined for a concerted reconnoitre and ambush of the Japanese fleet of 
four carriers and ancillary support vessels which arrived off Darwin on the morning 
of 19 February 1942, the RAAF could conceivably have sunk some of the carriers 
and damaged others had it been similarly equipped to the USN and its aircrews given 
American training in destroying ships and fighting Zeros. Such a scenario was within 
the reach of the Australian defence budget, prevented only by ignorance of air power 
and a failure to believe the nation’s air force could equal the Japanese when they met 
over Rabaul and Darwin. Added to this scenario was an Australian failure to assess 
the aircraft needed to defend Australia and a ‘buy British’ mentality.  
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There is little doubt behind the argument that if different, logical and rational 
decisions had been made up until the time the Menzies government placed its 
purchase order for British Beaufighters in March 1941 under the illusion it was 
buying interceptors, then Darwin and Broome could have been defended from 
Japanese aerial devastation in 1942. The opportunities to attain first class American 
fighters were numerous but ignored.  
The repercussions that flowed on from the lack on aerial defence were more than the 
obvious immediate and tragic ones. The RAAF lost any autonomy it might have 
otherwise had when forced into the role of a USAAC satellite, but only up to the time 
that Americans had a use for it.  With the RAAF under direct American control for 
the duration of the Pacific War which, with British approval, dictated the supply of 
aircraft the RAAF received via Lend-Lease, restricted its area of operation and even 
its target selection.  
On the government’s confusion of purpose, a particularly glaring light was shone by 
the case of the various attempts to protect the nation from the air. Sadly, Australia 
did not have the manufacturing capacity to venture into the highly competitive 
international field of contemporary military aviation in time for a long predicted war 
against Japan. The CAC and the DAP could recline comfortably on a domestic 
monopoly so long as the nation did not have to use the aircraft in combat that they 
were making. Their employees’ knack of innovation was misplaced on the military 
aircraft they produced—all high quality products but lacking in performance and 
fulfilment of purpose—the opposite of the USAAF warplanes that won the Pacific 
air war. Thus included in this thesis was a comparison of the relative costs of making 
aircraft locally or buying war-winning designs ready-to-fly from the US. Not only 
were the Americans making better planes, they were being bought by the British 
themselves to replace or supplement many of their own designs including the 
Beaufort.  
The political consequences of the Australians not being able to defend themselves 
from air attack were two-fold. In December 1941 when the government was content 
to hand over defence to the Americans who quickly and systematically completed the 
job in a matter of weeks worked well enough. In a heavy raid of 25 April 1942, 
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USAAC P-40 fighters defending Darwin scored a major victory over the JNAS;917 a 
demonstration of how successful the RAAF might have been with just three 
interceptor squadrons stationed in the bush behind Darwin. But by Curtin 
unflinchingly relinquishing the defence of the nation to the Americans, any direction 
the government might have held over its own military and political affairs such as 
that displayed by Finland and China was lost. The resurgence of the RAAF in 1943–
44 came too late to make any contribution to the shortening of the war and its 
position as the world’s fourth largest air force was stymied by the American political 
decisions to keep Australian forces south of the equator. Predictably, the RAAF’s 
size and strength was allowed to evaporate quickly after August 1945 with 
demobilisation and the cold war yet to pose a new threat to world peace. From then 
on, the government used what international sway it had to squeeze a defence pact 
from the Americans, the Australian New Zealand United States (ANZUS) 
agreement, to try to ensure America would always provide 1942-style protection in 
real terms. Thus Australia’s defence could again be token and the budget directed 
into other areas.   
No one can say what might have happened had the Lyons and Menzies 
administrations copied the British form of aerial defence of the 1930s—a small string 
of ‘chain home’ radar stations across the northern approach to the continent linked 
directly to air bases staffed by modern fighters, and not wasted their defence budgets 
on Wirraways, Beauforts, EATS and not attempted to play a world role in military 
deployment. The Germans were never able to overcome Britain’s sophisticated air 
defence and were constantly surprised by the accuracy of RAF interceptions and 
ambushes. But even nations with smaller, lesser systems such as Finland, Spain, 
China and Poland put up stiff fighter aerial opposition to those who aggressed against 
them in the air, in some cases for years. As argued, Australia seemed to be the one 
developed country that offered no interruption to Axis bombing during the open 
months of air war over its own territory. What is certain is that although the Japanese 
air forces might have still succeeded in reaching their Australian mainland targets, 
many of their aircraft would have been destroyed and experienced aircrews lost. The 
two Japanese planes that did most of the damage at Darwin, ‘Vals’ and ‘Kates’918 —
                                                 
917 Rorrison, J., pp. 1–4.  
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carrier-based single-engined bombers—were effective but verging on obsolescence 
and practically defenceless against modern Allied fighters. 
 
 
(Source: Public domain) 
Figure 115: Japanese Naval Aichi D3A Val dive-bomber, twenty-seven of which took part in the raid 
on Darwin 19 February 1942; a raid unopposed by the RAAF. The Val’s top speed was only 240 mph 
and was vulnerable to interception. 
 
 
(Source: US Navy) 
Figure 116: Japanese B5N Nakajima B5N1 Kate navy torpedo bomber that also took part in the 
Darwin raid. It too had a poor top speed (235 mph) and was practically defenceless against 400 mph 
fighters like the Lightning as was illustrated when the P-38 entered the Pacific War with the AAF. 
 
Thus it has been shown conclusively that the nation was defensible from the air by 
the timely purchase of a few hundred American-made fighters deployed intelligently 
and strategically around the top end. The Australians underestimated the strength of 
their own military potential and took it for granted they could never stop the 
Japanese doing what they liked without massive British or American help. In such a 
climate of lack of self-confidence, it was logical for a war cabinet under Menzies to 
appeal directly to Churchill for help and when that failed, for Curtin to cry out to the 
Americans.  
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As a postscript to the events described in this thesis, generally no lessons were 
learned by post-war governments from the air defence crisis of 1941–42 when all 
seemed lost. The panacea for change came not from World War II but with the 
Korean War. After victory in the Pacific, successive Australian post-war 
governments of both persuasions quickly went back to arming the nation’s air forces, 
both the RAAF and the RAN, with British aircraft until the Korean War experience 
of 1950–53 clearly demonstrated that English jet fighters supplied by the British to 
the RAAF in Korea had not kept parity with those of the Americans and Russians. It 
seemed the expression, ‘‘Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to 
repeat it’919 has an element of truth to it.  
 
 
(Source: AWM) 
Figure 117: RAAF Meteor jets break formation before landing after a mission over Korea. Sold to the 
Menzies government by the British as fighters, they were inferior to the Russian swept-winged MIG-
15 operated against them and like the British Beaufighters in New Guinea could only be used for 
ground attack.  
 
The British sold the Australian government straight-winged Gloster Meteor jets to 
replace No. 77 Squadron’s piston-engined Mustangs in Korea. But as RAAF pilots 
found out, the Meteor was obsolete. The sale of the Meteor to the Australian 
government seemed to be the last straw. Since then, no British warplanes have been 
bought or built for the RAAF. 
                                                 
919 Santayana, G. 1980, The Life of Reason, Volume I, ‘Reason in Common Sense’, Dover Publications, New 
York.  
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